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Abstract 
In this thesis I develop a pragmatic account of how similes are understood within the 
framework of relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1995). Similes, or ‘poetic comparisons’, 
(Achilles is like a lion) and non-poetic comparisons (Wasabi is like mustard) are understood 
in similar ways. While non-poetic comparisons communicate that A is like B in terms of a 
(relatively) determinate range of respects in which the comparison is taken to hold, poetic 
comparisons achieve relevance by virtue of weak implicatures which are evoked, in part, in 
pursuit of certain respects in which the comparison holds. However, the outcome of simile 
understanding does not necessarily involve deriving a determinate range of points of 
comparison as part of the content of the comparison. In these cases, the speaker/author 
simply communicates that the relevance of the comparison lies in the fact that two entities 
or activities are being compared and the hearer/reader has the responsibility for deciding 
where relevance lies. 
This account explains: (i) why certain comparisons achieve relevance in this way (why certain 
comparisons are poetic); (ii) why metaphors and similes, nonetheless, can achieve similar 
effects; (iii) why competing accounts (which tend to conflate metaphor and simile) are 
vulnerable to counterexamples; (iv) why qualifying similes (Achilles is a lot like a lion) and 
supplying additional linguistically-specified content which relates to potential points of 
comparison (Achilles is like a brave lion; Achilles is like a lion in the parched savannah) does 
not make a comparison less ‘poetic’; (v) why certain relationships between tenor and vehicle 
tend to obtain in similes but not in non-poetic comparisons; and (vi) how certain types of 
metaphor/simile interaction work. 
Key words: simile, metaphor, relevance, poetic effects, literary meaning.  
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Terminology and conventions for presentation 
I introduce the technical term poetic comparison for those comparisons which achieve 
relevance primarily through the communication of poetic effects (Achilles is like a lion). 
Poetic comparisons are largely coextensive with the pre-theoretic category of ‘simile’. Non-
poetic comparisons are those comparisons which clearly do not achieve poetic effects. 
Others have called these ‘literal comparisons’ or simply ‘comparisons’. 
I follow Richards (1936: 96) in using the term tenor for the A term in an A is (like) B 
metaphor/simile, and vehicle for the B term, although I use these terms strictly for parts of 
utterances (words or strings of words). I use the terms point of comparison and (later) 
comparison-relevant content for the respects in which a comparison is taken to hold. For 
Achilles is like a lion, a typical interpretation will include the property BRAVE as a point of 
comparison. Extended and explained poetic comparisons are described and explained in 
Chapter 5, §5.4. 
Examples are typically numbered consecutively in each chapter, unless otherwise stated. 
Occasionally additional constructed examples of utterances and contextual/communicated 
assumptions are given in-text, where they appear in italics. In other cases italics are used for 
emphasis. 
Discussion of constructed examples involves feminine pronouns and women’s names for 
speaker/author/communicator and masculine pronouns and men’s names for 
hearer/reader/audience (following Sperber and Wilson, 1995) unless otherwise stated. 
I have modelled my citation method after that recommended to authors submitting to the 
Journal of Pragmatics (Elsevier)1. Later editions and republished articles are typically given 
with only the date of the version used except where it is likely that the reader will have 
access to the earlier version (e.g. the articles in Sperber and Wilson, 2012a, and Martinich 
(Ed.), 2010), with the exception of Davidson, 1978/1984, which is always cited as Davidson, 
1984 (due to being reproduced multiple times). The only other exceptions to this rule are 
                                                          
1 The guidelines can be found at: http://www.elsevier.com/journals/journal-of-
pragmatics/0378-2166/guide-for-authors#73001. Last accessed 7th January 2014. 
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articles by Grice in Studies in the Way of Words, all of which I cite as Grice, 1989 
(occasionally distinguishing articles by section marks, e.g. §1). 
Some constructed examples which are common in the secondary literature are repeated ad 
lib., but I have attempted to credit the originator of the example where possible. 
All page references in the index refer to the main text. 
Many of the literary examples are cited from the fifth edition of The Norton Anthology of 
Poetry (Ferguson, et al., 2005). I use the abbreviation NA followed by the page number for 
this edition. 
Recorded works are cited as follows: Writer, Artist (if different), Title, Year, Title of Album (if 
relevant), Publisher (in the UK if multiple). 
Examples taken from published works which are not clearly out of copyright will be redacted 
for the electronic version of this thesis. Those copyrighted works which are not mentioned 
separately in the list of references under the original author are identified in a section which 
appears after the conclusion. 
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Chapter 1: Why simile? 
Simile is widely recognised as a rhetorical figure whereby an author uses a comparison which 
is literally, often uninformatively true to achieve effects which are usually classed as 
‘figurative’ (see §1.2 for a discussion of ‘figurativeness’). In terms of their effects, similes 
have much in common with metaphors (Whalley, 1988; Brogan, 1994; Corbett and Connors, 
1999: 396f). As of April 2014, to the best of my knowledge, there has yet to be a monograph 
published in English on the topic of how similes are understood2. By contrast, the secondary 
literature on metaphor is vast. It has been said that: 
“The only reasonable response to the philosophical literature on metaphor is one of 
despair.” 
(Guttenplan, 2005: 1) 
Metaphor is widely studied in pragmatics, literary studies and philosophy of language. Many 
theories of metaphor understanding assume that similes are understood in a particular way 
(see especially Chapter 3), and even those approaches which dispute the claim that 
metaphors and similes are understood in the same way often rely upon intuitions about the 
similarities and differences between metaphors and similes. Therefore, simile is central to 
current accounts of metaphor understanding. Given this situation, the absence of a full-
length treatment of simile is perplexing. How could such a situation, where simile is both 
central to and ‘eclipsed by’ metaphor, have come about? 
There are a number of ‘paradoxes’ which have emerged from this situation in the field (see 
Sperber and Wilson, 1990/2012, for similar observations about the study of style and 
rhetorical theory more generally). Similes are typically taken as being one of the more 
central ‘tropes’ in rhetorical theory (e.g. Aristotle Rhetoric III.4; McCall, 1969 passim). 
Students are often taught to identify similes at school. But despite simile’s importance in the 
history of rhetorical studies, and the apparent ease with which one is expected to be able to 
                                                          
2 Within relevance theory, there is, as of yet, no published monograph on metaphor either. 
Vega Moreno (2007) comes close, but is somewhat outdated (Cf. Carston, 2010a). 
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identify it, some researchers have made no distinction whatsoever between metaphors and 
similes in their theoretical work, while others have asserted that metaphors are somehow 
‘better than’ similes (for more on this narrow question see Chapter 4, §4.7 of this thesis), 
often without justification. 
1.1 Where to start investigating simile understanding? 
There is some confusion in the field of figurative language studies over the definition of 
simile. Moreover, metaphor is often conflated with simile. I claim that these two factors 
have led to a situation which is not conducive to research on how similes are understood. 
The aim of this thesis is to return to the key question of the nature of the relationship 
between metaphor and simile, but with two aims: to clarify (i) what similes are; and (ii) how 
they achieve their effects. Instead of using simile to explain metaphor, or metaphor to 
explain simile, I aim to establish where metaphor research has gone wrong in its 
assumptions on the relationship between metaphor and simile. In doing so, a very different 
view of simile emerges, one which is consistent with the principle of Occam’s modified razor 
(Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity) (Chapman, 2005: 104f; Grice, 1989: 47. Cf. 
Davis, 1998 §1.4), but which does not assume that they are manifestations of the same 
phenomenon. Rather, similes are a subset of constructions which share the same basic 
syntactic form: comparisons. This reorientation of the problem of defining simile can be said 
to be largely implicitly assumed in discussions of simile from a relevance theory perspective 
(e.g. Carston and Wearing, 2011; O’Donoghue, 2009), and raises the following important 
question which this thesis also addresses: how and to what extent does simile differ from 
what might pre-theoretically be called ‘literal comparison’? 
Philological approaches to figurative language use are concerned with the meaning of 
individual expressions: what did a particular author mean by, or what effect did they mean 
to achieve by, deploying a particular figurative expression? Such questions can be 
determined by reference to other instances of the same expression being deployed, or by 
appeal to an authoritative source, such as an encyclopaedia from the appropriate era, or the 
notes of a commentator, and so on. Let us call this the ‘lexicographical’ approach to 
figurative language use, as a putative ideal lexicon could offer a definitive solution to an 
interpretive problem. For instance, with a perfect lexicon, one could answer definitively 
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whether a communicated meaning we wish to attribute to an author of a particular period is 
attested at or before the date of composition. The task of an interpreter of the text is then 
to identify which senses are attested appropriately, and to disambiguate between them. 
The lexicographical approach elicits claims about individual instances of language use which 
are fundamentally comparative, and, as such, question-begging: metaphor A means such 
and such because it means that elsewhere. They also constitute appeals to authority, 
another source of invalid argument. A lexicographical approach may be apposite for 
examination questions on literature, for instance, or as the basis for historical arguments 
about the content of a given work, as well as for the kind of critical conversations that lovers 
of literature may share. But one cannot make such incautious appeals to authority and value 
judgements in establishing the principles which lie behind the characteristic effects of 
figurative language use.  
Furthermore, the lexicographical approach fails to explain how ‘figurative’ meanings arise in 
the first place. Compare the following two metaphors given in (1a) and (1b): 
(1a) Achilles is a lion. 
(1b) Achilles is a gazelle. 
One could say with some justification that an utterance of (1a) is taken as communicating 
that Achilles is fearless, ruthless in battle, and so on. Some of those senses of lion may be 
stable over time, even across cultures. But (1b) will typically be understood in a slightly 
different way by native speakers of English. Perhaps Achilles is understood as being capable 
of leaping gracefully, running fast, and so on. As it happens, gazelles are seen as exemplars 
of extreme beauty and elegance in medieval Arabic literature. For a medieval Arabic-
speaking audience, the Arabic equivalent of (1b) would have most likely been interpreted as 
(1a) is by most contemporary speakers of English: providing direct access to a (relatively) 
standardised set of properties (related to beauty) which can then be predicated of Achilles. 
For a modern English-speaking audience, the interpretation of (1b) will more likely 
incorporate properties such as speed, proficiency at jumping, and so on, which are more 
closely related to the general knowledge about gazelles that the audience might have. But 
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because ‘gazelle’ is far less conventionalised than ‘lion’ is as a metaphor, the likely 
interpretation is much more subjective. 
A lexicographical approach, fascinating as it may be in elucidating cultural differences 
between speaker communities and perhaps even providing insights into language change, is 
entirely misleading in studying what makes a figurative use of an expression different from a 
non-figurative one. Let us call (1a) a (relatively) ‘standardised’ case and (1b) a ‘creative’ or 
‘novel’ case of metaphor use. To say that the word lion is ambiguous between members of 
the species panthera leo and ‘the class of lion-like things’ does not explain how such 
meanings arose in the first place. Moreover, it is uncontroversial to claim that there is 
obviously some connection between the ‘literal’ lions, a set of entities which includes only 
certain big cats, and ‘figurative’ lions, which includes any entity one might want to ascribe 
certain properties to. It seems likely that such standardised interpretations of examples such 
as (1a) started life as novel cases like (1b), and even fairly ‘standardised’ metaphorical cases 
such as (1a) often do communicate more than an analysis of metaphorical meaning based on 
lexical ambiguity might suggest. One can profitably compare cases of genuine lexical 
ambiguity such as (1c): 
 (1c) The cat jumped on the sleeper. 
The underlined expression can be used to denote either an animate agent who is sleeping or 
a particular type of train. A hearer of (1c) must identify which of two senses is intended in 
order to understand the utterance. But, if the analogy between metaphor and ambiguity is 
to hold, then disambiguating between people sleeping and sleeper-trains should evoke the 
same sort of effects as metaphor. An utterance such as (1c) is not interpreted as figurative. 
The lexicographical approach to ‘figurative’ meaning fares even worse in cases of simile. 
Take the simile examples given in (2a) and (2b): 
 (2a) Achilles is like a lion. 
 (2b) Achilles is like a gazelle. 
Firstly, it is not clear that (2a) and (2b) differ in how ‘standardised’ their interpretations are. 
Nor is it clear whether, and to what extent, interpretations of (1a) and (2a) and (1b) and (2b) 
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respectively are likely to differ. Chapter 5 addresses exactly this issue: what is the process by 
which similes such as (2a) and (2b) are understood, and how does this differ from the 
understanding of metaphors such as (1a) and (1b)? In order to do so, I must challenge the 
widespread assumption that a metaphor such as (1a) can be ‘paraphrased’ as a simile such 
as (2a) without causing a significant change in meaning. This will be tackled in Chapter 4, 
§4.2. However, the most important observation about simile at this juncture is that it is not a 
‘figurative sense’ of lion or gazelle which Achilles is compared to in (2a) and (2b). The 
‘figurative’ meaning arises somehow despite lion and gazelle being used in their primary, 
standardised, ‘literal’ sense. 
Philological, lexicographical approaches to all figurative utterances will face similar 
explanatory problems. An additional problem is that the pre-theoretic notions of ‘literal’ and 
‘figurative’ are not well-defined (for critiques and qualifications of ‘literal’ meaning from a 
variety of points of view within pragmatics see e.g. Gibbs, 1994; Searle, 1978; Sperber and 
Wilson, 1990/2012: 89; Recanati, 2004: 460f). The recognition that individual rhetorical 
figures, tropes and schemes are often poorly defined goes back as far as the Roman 
rhetorician Quintilian in the 1st century CE (Bahti, 1993: 409a). The use of a particular 
construction (comparisons) can elicit certain (figurative) effects. This is what requires 
explanation. These effects are similar to those of metaphors. Does this mean we should start 
investigating simile by comparing simile to metaphor? 
1.2 Should metaphor and simile be investigated side by side? 
Comparing metaphor and simile is not the only way to approach the question of how similes 
are understood. But if we do choose to compare them, it is not immediately obvious what 
the relevant similarities and differences are. One important difference which has been 
played down in the metaphor studies literature is that similes come in many different forms. 
But some who do look at simile as a phenomenon in itself posit that there is a default type of 
simile, epic simile for instance (e.g. suggested by Ben-Porat, 1992), which certain other 
similes are derivative of3. But why should there be such ‘default’ types? If there is a 
                                                          
3 For Ben-Porat there is a dominant norm of epic simile which Homer’s similes largely depart 
from to varying degrees (1992: 148). If Ben-Porat’s scheme does not apply to all simile, but 
only to ‘epic’ simile, then it will not help us in explaining how epic similes are 
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‘standard’ form of simile, what is it, and does this explain why certain comparisons are 
interpreted in a figurative way? I discuss the potential role of other ‘default’ assumptions in 
understanding similes in Chapter 5, §5.2. 
The majority view appears to be that a typical simile is of the following form (example (2a) 
repeated here): 
(2a) Achilles is like a lion. 
The reason that examples such as (2a) are appealing to researchers in the field is that they 
appear to be the simplest possible type of example. Examples such as (2a) look very similar 
to metaphors, as in (1a) (repeated here): 
 (1a) Achilles is a lion. 
An utterance of (2a) and an utterance of (1a) are likely to communicate a whole range of 
implications (technically, implicatures. See Chapter 2) which overlap. In fact, it is hard to 
discriminate between the effects of (1a) and (2a). For instance, both (1a) and (2a) could 
communicate, amongst other assumptions, the following, given in (3a-c): 
 (3a) Achilles is brave. 
 (3b) Achilles is resilient in battle. 
 (3c) Achilles’ compatriots should be proud of his martial prowess. 
 etc. 
Since metaphors and similes look ostensibly similar and can both convey the same sort of 
things, including assumptions like those suggested in (3a-c), it might be argued that they 
must both be the same thing. Indeed, we even have an authority such as Aristotle to endorse 
this view. In his Rhetoric he claims that similes are the same as metaphors. He explains that 
both metaphors and similes appear smart (asteion) if they are well expressed, but (i) similes 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
comprehensible in the first place. I do not devote more detailed attention to Ben-Porat’s 
views as (i) they assume that simile can be identified a priori, and (ii) they do not address the 
central question of why some comparisons are understood as similes in the first place. 
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are a type of metaphor differing only in how they are presented (their prothesis), (ii) similes 
are less sweet (hêtton hêdu) than metaphors because they are longer, and (iii) because 
simile does not say like this that (hôs touto ekeino) the mind does not seek this at all 
(Aristotle Rhetoric 3.10.3. For more on Aristotle’s views on metaphor and simile see e.g. 
Kirby, 1997; McCall, 1969 §2). If the first claim means that metaphors and similes are the 
same (e.g. Cope and Sandys, 2010: 109), Aristotle was wrong. The second claim is open to 
challenge, and in Chapter 4 I explore this in more depth (§4.7). The last claim is particularly 
difficult to interpret, especially since he denies that similes say like this that using a word 
which is often used in similes: hôs. 
Most take Aristotle to mean here that whereas metaphors say that one thing is another, 
similes do not. But then it is not clear why he would think that the mind would seek this 
(apparently the vehicle of the simile or metaphor) in metaphors but not in similes. I suspect 
that he may have had a different contrast in mind, and this explains why the text is so 
difficult to interpret. Nevertheless, not everybody agrees with the conflation of metaphor 
and simile, and even those who see the phenomena as manifestations of essentially the 
same process of meaning construal make subtle distinctions between the two (e.g. 
Glucksberg’s view of similes as ‘metaphors expressed as comparisons’ changes subtly from 
id. 2001 to id. 2008: 75. This change in views has also been noted by Waɫaszewska, 2013: 
332 n1). Nevertheless, I challenge the assumptions that metaphors and similes must be (i) 
close in terms of their typical effects, (ii) close in terms of how they are understood, and that 
claims (i) and (ii) are relevant to investigating simile as a phenomenon in its own right. 
A lot of theoretical argument has rested on the intersubstitutability of these two ‘tropes’, to 
use the ancient terminology, at least in cases such as (1a) and (2a) (I refute this is Chapter 4, 
§4.2). Arguments based on this assumption have run in several directions. One argument 
proceeds as follows: we have a full account of metaphor; similes are like metaphors; we 
need only to explain how the process of metaphorical understanding is modified in the 
understanding of similes. Both conceptual metaphor theorists like Lakoff and his colleagues 
(Lakoff and Johnson, 2003; Lakoff and Turner, 1989; Turner, 1996; Lakoff, 2008; Fauconnier 
and Turner, 2002) and Glucksberg and his colleagues (Glucksberg, 2001; 2008; Glucksberg 
and Haught, 2006; Glucksberg and McGlone, 1999; Glucksberg and Keysar, 1990) have at 
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different times endorsed such a view. The opposite argument has also been made, but in 
three slightly different ways. Either (i) we have a full account of simile; metaphors are like 
similes; we need only to explain how the process of simile understanding is modified in the 
understanding of metaphors. This appears to be the view of Gentner and colleagues, as 
evidenced in her earlier work, which takes metaphor to be a species of analogy (Gentner 
1983. Cf. Gentner and Bowdle, 2008); or (ii) we have a full account of simile; metaphors do 
not achieve their characteristic effects directly; they do so (in at least some cases) by first 
implicitly communicating a simile, which generates those effects in the usual way. This is a 
view associated with a number of pragmaticists and philosophers of language, including 
Grice and Searle (Grice, 1989: 34; Searle, 1993; Martinich, 1984/1991); or (iii) we do not 
have, and have never needed, an account of how similes are understood as anything other 
than communicating what they say ‘on the surface’ (that A is like B). This is a view 
particularly associated with the philosopher of language Davidson (1978/1984). 
There are still other views which might have implications for one’s approach to simile 
research. One diverse group of thinkers in particular, whose work I do not engage with 
critically in this thesis, including Nietzsche (1873/2004), and, perhaps, the later Wittgenstein 
(1958), see all language use as being as flexible and elusive as metaphorical language use. 
However, one need not subscribe to scepticism about any notion of context-invariant 
linguistic meaning in order to see the same processes which underlie figurative language use 
at work in cases which we might assume to be unequivocally ‘literal’ (Lakoff and Turner 
similarly distance themselves from the ‘everything is metaphor’ camp. See id. 1989: 218). 
Relevance theory allows one to maintain a view of language which prioritises the study of 
linguistic (that is, grammatical) structure, and which holds that one’s internal Grammar 
represents a narrow suite of innate, species-specific cognitive capacities (a view associated 
primarily with Chomsky), whilst recognising the ‘Romantic’ insight that the processes 
underlying figurative language use are ubiquitous (see Sperber and Wilson, 1990/2012). The 
benefits of such a compatibilist approach should be clear to theoretical linguists. 
As we are primarily interested in what makes certain comparisons amenable to a figurative 
interpretation (see below), it is not necessarily the case that those which can be easily 
converted into metaphors, such as (2a), will provide most insight. For now, it need only be 
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pointed out that a lot of classicists who are familiar with the work of Homer will find it hard 
to see (2a) as a representative simile at all. Most of Homer’s similes compare actions. 
Example (4a) is an utterance of a verbal simile: 
(4a) Achilles leapt like a lion leaps. 
But even (4a) is not representative of Homer’s use of simile. Example (4b) is far closer to a 
typical Homeric simile: 
(4b) Achilles leapt like a lion pouncing upon a careless hunter as he foolishly pursues 
the retreating lioness. 
What kind of metaphor could stand in for (4a)? And what kind of metaphor needs to be 
explained in terms of (4b)? Why would anyone persist in the conflation of metaphor and 
simile in the face of such glaring counterexamples? Why are such examples either ignored, 
or dismissed as marginal or derivative phenomena4?  
Part of the cause of the lack of clarity in this area must be that metaphor is a clear test case 
for one’s views about the nature of language (see also below). If one must deal with 
metaphor as a ‘canonical’ topic in a theory of language or communication, one is less likely 
to treat simile in its own right. This has often proved to be the case even if it turns out that 
one’s theory of metaphor understanding rests on an assumed, but unexplained, theory of 
how similes are understood (on metaphor’s status within pragmatics see e.g. Ariel, 2010 
§6.3; Levinson, 1983 §3.2.5). One is also likely to model one’s account of the (subjectively) 
less central phenomenon (simile) on the basis of the more central phenomenon (metaphor) 
to which one may have dedicated years of taxing research and theorising. But another major 
problem which may have contributed to the relative paucity of simile research is that while 
                                                          
4 One also finds mistaken assumptions outside the Western academic tradition. Leezenberg’s 
summary of al-Jurjānī’s views (2001 §1.3) suggests that the medieval Arabic rhetorician held 
distinctions between metaphor and simile which neither overlap with the common 
assumptions in the Western tradition nor agree with my own. 
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metaphor wears its strangeness rather overtly, the problem with simile is that there often 
does not appear to be a problem at all5. 
Moreover, we need to be clear about what we mean by a figurative interpretation. It will not 
suffice to say that those comparisons whose interpretations are similar to those of (poetic, 
creative, novel) metaphors are figurative. Definitions of ‘figurativeness’ tend to be either 
theory-dependent, typically positing that figurative interpretations are those which make 
use of particular processes of conceptualisation in a particular way (e.g. Turner, 1998: 60f; 
Bredin, 1992: 70; see Chapter 3 passim), or beg the question, identifying figurative language 
in terms of the ‘tropes’ which are figuratively interpreted (e.g. Bethlehem, 1996: 205; 
Roberts and Kreuz, 1994: 159. See also Borberly, 2008: 416 for different ways of defining 
‘figurativity’). One such circular definition is given by Cuddon: 
figurative language: Language which uses figures of speech; for example, metaphor, 
simile, alliteration (qq.v.). Figurative language must be distinguished from literal (q.v.) 
language. 'He hared down the street' or ‘He ran like a hare down the street' are 
figurative (metaphor and simile respectively). 'He ran very quickly down the street' is 
literal. See HYPERBOLE; METONYMY; SYNECDOCHE. 
(Cuddon, 1998: 320. Emboldening/italics in source) 
Other theorists simply identify figurative language as some kind of ‘creative’ use of language 
which is easily identifiable as divergent from a literal norm (Nowottny, 1965: 52f; Cf. Katz, 
1998: 19-21)6.  
                                                          
5 As Diane Blakemore has put it (p. c.): the problem is there is no problem. 
6 Guttenplan seeks to draw a distinction between ‘figurative claims’ and predicative 
metaphors (2005: 231-247). I suggest that his distinction is not entirely successful, as I am 
not quite sure what he thinks distinguishes the two, although he relates the former to 
synaesthesia but not the latter. For Guttenplan, ‘figurative’ and ‘metaphorical’ are almost 
the same notion (id., ib.:  231f), and figurativeness involves some kind of ‘emblematic’ 
relationship (id., ib.: 238). 
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I follow the, admittedly impressionistic, conventional use of ‘figurative’ and ‘figurativeness’ 
with a number of qualifications. I propose that we stick to an intuitive notion of figurative 
uses of language as contrasting with literal uses of the same lexical items in the same order. 
For example, Aslan is a lion is a literal use, where Aslan is understood as being a big cat of 
the appropriate species (panthera leo), whereas Achilles is a lion is understood as figurative. 
Although the main interest in researching figurative uses of language is that such uses ‘feel’ 
intuitively different to literal uses, and an account of understanding in linguistic 
communication must concern itself with such issues (e.g. Sperber and Wilson, 1990/2012), 
we need to be more precise about which intuitions of language users in identifying 
figuratively-used expressions are relevant. I assume here that there are some uses of 
expressions which can be reliably identified by language users as: (i) involving a type of non-
literal interpretation, communicating something different or in addition to the meaning 
which is given by the grammar (by virtue of the lexically-encoded meaning of the words used 
and syntactic rules of composition); and (ii) communicating a particular type of content, 
including: (a) precise meanings which the lexically-encoded meanings do not provide 
another language user with direct access to, and/or (b) certain content which cannot be 
lexically- and/or syntactically-encoded in principle (such as impressions, feelings, and so on). 
The penultimate clause of this provisional definition of figurative language will be more 
relevant to certain figurative uses (especially, metaphors) than others. The final clause 
distinguishes those uses which are novel, creative, or ‘poetic’ from those which are 
conventional, standardised, or ‘mundane’. It also provides a window onto the negative 
definition of poetry attributed to Robert Frost as ‘what gets lost in translation’ when 
converted into prose (MacKenzie, 2002: 166). 
Consider (1a) and (2a) again: 
 (1a) Achilles is a lion. 
 (2a) Achilles is like a lion. 
An utterance of (1a) is, where Achilles is a man, strictly-speaking false. This is shown clearly 
in Mary’s ‘smart-guy’ response to Peter in the constructed exchange given here in (5): 
(5) Peter: Becci is a lion. 
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Mary: She’s coming over for dinner. We’d better get some zebra meat in. 
The paradox of metaphor is how one can communicate any cognitive content at all (a 
thought, a proposition) by saying something false. And, if the apparent ‘falseness’ of 
metaphors has something to do with how they achieve their characteristic effects, why are 
all blatant falsehoods not characteristically ‘figurative’ (Cf. Chapter 3, §3.4)? 
An utterance of (2a) on the other hand will be taken as expressing a true proposition in 
almost any circumstance. It is true that Achilles is like a lion if Achilles is a bear, or a 
partridge, or a figment of one’s imagination, or a part of one’s anatomy, or a 
supercomputer. In fact, an utterance such as (6), when Aslan is an animal of the species 
panthera leo, is quite possible, even if one may feel that it fails to be pragmatically felicitous: 
(6) ?Aslan is like a lion. [In fact, he is a lion.] 
While metaphors are ostensibly false, it is generally agreed that similes are ostensibly, 
obviously, uncontroversially true, in almost every case7 (Carston, 2002a: 357. Cf. Fogelin, 
1988). 
The phenomenon of metaphorically-used language is crucial for some semanticists (e.g. 
Davidson, 1978/1984; Stern, 2000) because it threatens models of linguistic communication 
in terms of the fully-truth-conditional propositional content of (at least some) sentences. 
Explaining metaphor is a priority for pragmaticists because it poses a problem for the kinds 
of views of semantics which pragmaticists are often sceptical of (see e.g. Ariel, 2010: 4ff on 
how pragmatics as a field has developed since 1970), whether one prefers to explain 
metaphor understanding in terms of implicit communication (Grice, 1989; Sperber and 
Wilson, 1995 §4.10) or in terms of the inferential modification of the explicit content of 
utterances (e.g. Carston, 2002a §5). Metaphor is also central for cognitive linguists because 
it provides a model for the kind of cognitive flexibility and creativity which underlies a lot of 
human linguistic (and non-linguistic) capabilities, so researchers from that school of thought 
                                                          
7 But not trivially true. If they were trivially true then their negations would be trivially false, 
but the utterance in (fn1) is just as obviously true as (2a) Achilles is like a lion: (fn1) Achilles is 
not like a lion. I owe this clarification to Iván García-Álvarez (p. c.). 
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claim (see e.g. Turner, 1996; Gibbs, 2008: 5). For all these approaches, metaphor is going to 
loom large in any account of figurative language use. Irony, another ‘trope’ on the 
Classical/Medieval rhetorical view of figurative language, has also attracted a great deal of 
attention from theorists (e.g. Sperber and Wilson, 1995 §4.9; see Gibbs and Colston (Eds.), 
2007; Wilson and Sperber, 2012b). However, irony is not usually seen as being in 
competition with metaphor, although Grice gives rather similar accounts of metaphor and 
irony (1989: 34). None of his followers, whether ‘neo-‘ or ‘post-Gricean’, appear to have 
done so8. 
It may well be that, because metaphor is seen as so much more important than simile and so 
fundamental to the fields of pragmatics, cognitive linguistics and philosophy of language, the 
study of simile is more relevant to theorists as potentially illuminating metaphor than a 
subject worthy of study in its own right. Simile as an object of independent study has failed 
to become established, in anthropological terms, it has failed to become a ‘meme’ (Dawkins, 
1989: 189ff) or ‘cultural attractor’ (Sperber, 1996 §3), amongst researchers on figurative 
language. As a competitor with metaphor studies, simile studies struggles because, whereas 
metaphor is clearly of relevance to the full range of theorists, the problem with simile, as I 
said earlier, is that there is no (semantic) problem: hence, for them, simile appears to be 
undeserving of further investigation. 
In order to dismiss this canard once and for all, I engage in an ostensibly counterintuitive 
manoeuvre. I attempt to answer as definitively as is currently possible what can, and cannot, 
be inferred about simile understanding from metaphor understanding and vice versa. In 
other words, I engage in exactly what I have just argued has contributed to a dearth of 
progress in the field. The difference between my approach and the other approaches 
criticised here is that I do not privilege one form of simile over another, but subject a range 
of assumptions in the field to as full a range of data as possible. Moreover, I treat simile as a 
phenomenon within ostensive-inferential communication, and allow the theory I adopt to 
                                                          
8 Empson sees metaphor and irony as involving ‘ambiguity’, but his definition of ambiguity is 
extremely broad (1953). 
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explain this phenomenon to ‘filter out’ which aspects of simile use are relevant to theorising 
about how similes are understood, and which are not.  
In order to achieve this objective I will also have to establish the utility of this theoretical 
framework. Establishing that relevance theory best explains this phenomenon provides 
circumstantial evidence for the explanatory utility of those aspects of relevance theory 
which are central to my explanation. This will provide further supporting evidence for the 
theory as an overarching theory of human cognition and communication by augmenting its 
empirical coverage. Moreover, in identifying often tacit assumptions in the field of figurative 
language research, and treating them as falsifiable hypotheses by challenging them with 
attested real-world data, I hope to refocus the study of figurative language away from 
metaphor (which, for reasons investigated in Chapter 3, appears to have reached an 
insurmountable theoretical obstacle in the form of ‘emergent properties’) onto investigation 
of simile in particular and a wider range of figurative ‘tropes’ in general in the hope of 
identifying avenues for further progress in our understanding of how one can use words 
which apparently mean one thing to mean something else9. 
1.3 Relevance theory and figurative language research: why so little attention to simile? 
If the foregoing discussion suggests why there has been so little attention devoted to simile 
in and of itself, and so little development in the theoretical literature on how similes are 
understood, it does not explain why relevance theory in particular has not looked at simile in 
more depth. The Postface to the second edition of Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance 
suggested that metaphor and related phenomena would be central to their subsequent 
work (1995: 279), but this is not what transpired (see Wilson and Sperber, 2012a for a 
collection of articles which cover important developments in relevance theory, especially 
since 1995). 
                                                          
9 Even before the problem of emergent properties had been extensively articulated and 
explored (see Chapter 3, §3.1), Blackburn wrote: “I think nobody would claim that the study 
of metaphor has been one of analytical philosophy’s brighter achievements” (1984: 180 
n5.6). 
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In Relevance, Sperber and Wilson proposed that metaphorical utterances can be viewed as a 
type of ‘loose talk’ or ‘loose use’ (1995: 231ff). Carston developed this account further, 
arguing that metaphorically used lexical items communicate concepts which are derived 
from, but different to, the concept lexically-encoded by the word used, that is to say, they 
communicate ad hoc concepts (2002a: §5). Both the ‘loose use’ and ‘ad hoc concept’ 
developments within the relevance theory account of metaphor understanding have 
significant theoretical consequences for linguistic pragmatics as a whole. The loose use 
account of metaphor understanding is incompatible with certain competing pragmatic 
theories (drawing from Grice, 1989) which assume that speakers and hearers are 
constrained by a presumption of truthfulness, so it marks a distinctive break from such 
theories. The ad hoc concept development to the account marks a radical divergence from 
other theories of linguistic meaning, in that it allows for the possibility that all words which 
lexically-encode concepts can be used to communicate a concept they do not lexically-
encode (Sperber and Wilson, 1998/2012: 32). Therefore, current relevance theory 
recognises that there is linguistic underdeterminacy even at the level of individual lexical 
items (Carston, 2002a: 360). This makes relevance theory a radically contextualist approach 
to pragmatics (id. 2009; 2010b). 
The above two developments helped to position relevance theory in relation to two 
important issues in linguistics and philosophy of language: the nature of linguistic meaning, 
and the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. A more recent development, again 
driven by the work of Carston and colleagues (e.g. 2010a; Carston and Wearing, 2011), 
proposes that certain difficulties within the relevance theory account of metaphor 
understanding, namely the problem of ‘interaction’ between metaphors (and between 
metaphors and similes) and the problem of ‘emergent property metaphors’, necessitates a 
rethinking of what is involved in utterance understanding. Carston proposes a ‘second mode 
of metaphor processing’, whereby the non-figurative (lexically-encoded) meaning of the 
metaphorically used words remains highly salient during processing of the utterance, and 
where certain mentally stored representations of the denotation of concepts (including 
analogue visual representations) may play a role (e.g. 2010a: 319). 
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If the second mode of metaphor processing can be shown to play a role in how metaphors 
are understood, then this would be an important development in pragmatic theory. Firstly, it 
would appear that somehow both the lexically-encoded and the ad hoc senses 
communicated by a word can remain active at the same time, and contribute simultaneously 
to the overall interpretation of the utterance. Secondly, it might provide a window onto the 
interface between the inferential processing of utterances and analogue representations 
(see also Pilkington, 2010: 164-170). I do not deal with Carston’s second mode of metaphor 
processing directly, as my concern is with the understanding of simile. But I have found that 
no appeal is necessary to a ‘second mode’ of simile processing to explain even the complex 
examples I look at in Chapters 5 and 6. Moreover, it appears that there are no ‘emergent 
property’ similes (see Chapter 6, §6.2). If a fully inferential approach to simile understanding 
can be maintained, this may threaten the utility of appeals to the second mode of metaphor 
processing. 
Because metaphor has been a productive topic for research in relevance theory on central 
issues such as the distinctions between semantics and pragmatics and between explicit and 
implicit content, it has attracted a great deal of attention. Apart from one working paper 
(O’Donoghue, 2009), and some work touching on the metaphor-simile relationship (e.g. 
Carston and Wearing, 2011), there is very little published work on simile from a relevance 
theoretic perspective10. Since the publication of Relevance, there has been only one 
                                                          
10 Since the examination of this thesis in March 2014, the work of Waɫaszewska has been 
brought to my attention (e.g. id., 2013). I do not in this thesis address her hypothesis which 
states that like in similes encodes a procedure which instructs the hearer to construct an ad 
hoc concept. However, I would make a number of observations. Firstly, she draws upon the 
view of Hernández Iglesias (2010), whose approach I critique in Chapter 4, §4.2. Secondly, it 
appears that she is using the notion of a procedure in a way which is incompatible with 
Blakemore’s original formulation of the notion of a procedure as a semantic constraint on 
relevance (1987. Although see 2002 for cases of procedures affecting contributions to 
explicit content). Fourthly, Waɫaszewska seems to take it for granted that “similes are more 
related to metaphors than to literal comparisons” (2013: 332), a view that I argue against in 
Chapter 4. Finally, if similes communicate a single ad hoc concept as part of the explicitly 
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monograph on poetic effects (Pilkington, 2000), which dedicates one chapter to metaphor. 
Poetic effects are central to my explanation of how similes are understood.  
Apart from other stylistic-pragmatic work (including a special issue of Language and 
Literature, volume 5 issue 3) and one monograph-length work on relevance and post-
structuralist literary theory (MacKenzie, 2002), other work which is less directly relevant to 
simile study from a relevance theoretic perspective has typically been concerned with the 
relationship between metaphors and lexical pragmatics (some ramifications of 
developments in relevance theoretic metaphor studies are explored in Chapter 3). It is not 
surprising, given the tendency in the wider field to neglect simile, that simile has not been a 
major focus for relevance theorists11. Professional researchers have to engage with the 
theoretical controversies of the day, and arguments in favour of pragmatic intrusion into 
explicit content are of greater theoretical impact than another phenomenon which 
metaphor can exemplify: poetic effects (Chapter 2, §2.10). But these are also a central 
prediction of relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1995 §4.6). By clarifying the differences 
between how metaphors and similes achieve poetic effects, I hope to contribute to the 
literature on this central theoretical issue within relevance theory, as well as to the growing 
body of literature on metaphor from a relevance theory perspective (important summaries 
of recent developments in relevance theory pertinent to metaphor include: Vega Moreno, 
2007; Soria and Romero (eds.), 2010; Sperber and Wilson, 2008/2012. See especially 
Carston’s recent work, including 2010a; 2010b: 256ff; 2012). 
The key distinction which sets relevance theory apart from the other approaches to 
metaphor research is how relevance theory distinguishes between the explicit and implicit 
content of utterances (e.g. Carston, 2004). While the literal/figurative distinction is of 
contested utility, the ‘problem that is not a problem’ of simile can be addressed more 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
communicated content of the utterance, how would Waɫaszewska’s account proceed for 
cases of ‘extended’ and ‘explained’ simile (see especially Chapter 5, §5.4)? 
11 I have come across a tantalising footnote by Bredin: “I do not consider the cognitive and 
linguistic principles that govern the formulation and processing of comparisons. These are 
dealt with most effectively by relevance theory” (Bredin 1998: 68 n1). 
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productively once the explicit/implicit distinction is established. The claim that metaphors 
are ‘literally false’ and similes ‘literally true’ is misleading, and, in an important sense, 
incorrect. While metaphors involve the communication of an ad hoc concept, and the 
indeterminacy of the explicit content of the utterance can be traced to the responsibility 
that the hearer has in recovering the intended ad hoc concept, I propose in Chapter 5 that 
comparisons are inherently underdetermined at the level of explicit content, and that in the 
case of similes (or, better, ‘poetic comparisons’) the enrichment of the explicit content 
results in an explicitly communicated content of the utterance which is indeterminate. While 
the implicit indeterminacy of metaphors and similes can overlap, perhaps explaining why 
intuitions about their intersubstitutability have arisen (see §4.2), and both (novel, creative) 
metaphors and poetic comparisons weakly communicate explicit content, the way they 
achieve their effects is different. 
1.4 The choice and presentation of data 
As there was no formal procedure in place for identifying similes before I began this 
research, to impose a procedure without first establishing that we have ‘picked out’ a 
natural kind would be inappropriate. I claim that there is no such procedure which would 
pick out all and only those phenomena pre-theoretic intuitions would class as similes, 
because there is no agreement on the constitution of such a category. In Chapter 5 I 
introduce the term poetic comparisons, which is the title of this thesis. In Chapter 6 (§6.1) I 
use my definition of poetic comparisons to classify certain phenomena into those which are 
understood in this fashion and those which are not. This suggests my account of poetic 
comparisons can serve as a criterion for future empirical work on the use of similes. The lack 
of a sound basis for identifying similes threatens the validity of much of the empirical work 
on simile use (for corpus research on similes in English see e.g. Wikberg, 2008; Moon, 2008). 
Moreover, the centrality of metaphor studies in the field of figurative language research may 
have caused researchers to prioritize those issues which are pertinent to metaphor in their 
approach to simile. My thesis will help to clarify what the pertinent research questions for 
future work on simile ought to be. Furthermore, few have addressed the problem of 
distinguishing similes from non-figurative uses of the same comparison constructions. 
For reasons of simplicity, I have limited myself to three sorts of construction: 
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 (i) A is like B. 
 (ii) A VERBs like B. 
 (iii) A is as ADJECTIVE as B. 
Those utterances which have one of the forms given in (i)-(iii), and which achieve affects that 
a typical reader/hearer would identify as ‘figurative’ or ‘poetic’, I have called ‘simile’. When I 
introduce the notion of ‘poetic comparison’ in Chapter 5, I intend it to be a theoretically 
justified definition. This will be an improvement on the rough simile-identification heuristic I 
have described. 
Even restricting our attention to constructions involving like, the class of comparisons12 of 
this type is diverse. As a conjunction, like can introduce a manner adjunct (Quirk, et al., 1985 
§8.79) or serve as a type of conjunction joining two syntactically complete clauses, and as a 
conjunction its “functions [...] are difficult to classify in terms of traditional word classes” (id., 
ib. §9.4). As Quirk et al. argue (id., ib. §9.48), prepositional uses of like vary in their 
interpretation, as is evidenced by (7a) and (7b): 
 (7a) The missile darted across the sky like lightning. 
 (7b) Electricity is like lightning. 
In (7a), with an intransitive verb, like is interpreted as something like ‘in a manner 
resembling’, whereas in (7b), with a copula construction, the meaning of like is “purely that 
of resemblance” (id., ib. §9.48). Note that Quirk et al. make no mention of the figurative 
interpretations of examples such as (7a) and the possible figurative interpretation of many 
examples which have the same structure as (7b) (such as (2a)). 
I do not claim to establish a typology of simile in this thesis, but I have adduced sufficient 
evidence to suggest that the focus in the experimental literature upon ‘A is B’-type 
metaphors and ‘A is like B’-type similes is likely to give a fundamentally flawed 
characterisation of how figurative predications and figurative comparisons (roughly, similes 
of the forms given in (i)-(iii) above) differ in their processing and their effects. However, 
                                                          
12 Not to be confused with comparative adjectives, such as better. 
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unlike those who have simply flagged up the issue of metaphor-simile interaction before 
moving on (e.g. Croft and Cruse, 2004. See Chapter 6, §6.3), I have begun to identify how a 
research programme might proceed based on the hypotheses that the theoretically sound 
category is not similes but poetic comparisons, and that such phenomena are worthy of 
further investigation in their own right. In particular, I aim to clarify the metaphor-simile 
relationship, as well as the less well researched issue of the relationship between similes and 
other comparisons of the same syntactic form (see Chapters 4 and 5 passim). Moreover, I do 
so within a framework of an inferential account of utterance understanding which is 
independently motivated (Chapter 2). 
I make liberal use of constructed examples because (i) this is common practice in pragmatics, 
and (ii) it can be argued that constructed examples in pragmatic stylistics are legitimate by 
analogy with similar procedures in theoretical linguistics (Fabb, 1997: 17). Despite objections 
to the use of decontextualized examples, for instance by those in the conceptual metaphor 
theory tradition (including Semino and Steen, 2008: 237; Ritchie, 2013: 65; Gibbs and 
Colston, 2012: 343), using such examples is standard practice in the field of pragmatic 
stylistics, and is essential to foundational work in the pragmatics of communication (and was 
frequently used by pioneers within conceptual metaphor theory, including Lakoff and 
Johnson, 2003). My aim is to establish a sound methodology for the investigation of a 
particular type of linguistic expression in literature and communication. For this reason it is 
appropriate to adopt a current methodology in relevance theoretic pragmatics in treating 
such phenomena, and any justifications for constructed and isolated examples in the 
relevance theory literature apply to this thesis. Although I do not address the experimental 
literature systematically, several of my findings will have implications for experimental work 
on metaphor and simile. These implications include: (i) metaphor is not ‘better than’ simile 
(Chapter 4, §4.7); (ii) there are no formal differences between simile and ‘literal’ comparison 
(§4.9, Chapter §5.1); and (iii) there are no obligatory conceptual relationships between tenor 
and vehicle in similes (§§5.2.1-4). Any experimental work which relies upon assumptions 
contrary to these findings will require reinterpretation in the light of this thesis. 
However, as speaker intuitions about weak effects are more difficult to determine than, for 
instance, grammaticality judgements in theoretical syntax, I rely heavily upon examples from 
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published poems and literary fiction where relevant. However, my choice of investigating 
extant similes should not be taken as a critique of the use of constructed examples. One 
might challenge my identification of a particular expression as being figurative and intuitively 
‘poetic’ if I relied primarily upon constructed examples. It stands to reason that an 
expression deployed in a poem is quite likely to be deployed with a view to the generation of 
poetic effects in an audience (Chapter 2, §2.10). If the reader is uncomfortable with a theory 
which treats literary texts as part of the same natural kind as spoken utterances, I refer them 
to Chapter 2, §2.13 
1.5 The structure of the thesis 
In this section I summarise (i) the argument of the thesis, identifying those sections which 
address most directly questions of the secondary literature relevant to the topic, (ii) the 
methodology adopted in the thesis, and (iii) where the reader might find real-world data 
(actual utterances taken from published poetry, prose, literary fiction and song writing, 
primarily in English, but also occasionally in Arabic, Classical Greek and Latin) relevant to the 
particular theoretical issues. 
In Chapter 2 I present the main elements of relevance theoretic pragmatics as a theory of 
ostensive-inferential communication. This theory will underpin the argument in the 
following chapters. I also explore the implications of relevance theory for the study of style, 
and defend my treatment of literary texts as utterances. Such an account is not only 
defensible, but superior to those accounts which might treat literary understanding as sui 
generis. In Chapter 3 I explore a number of accounts of metaphor understanding (or 
metaphorical meaning) whose assumptions may have consequences for an account of simile 
understanding. Some accounts argue that metaphor and simile are irrelevant to 
understanding linguistic meaning, and their typical interpretations require no explanation 
(Davidson, 1978/1984). If this were true, this would invalidate my account in Chapter 5. 
Other accounts try to capture the typical effects of metaphors and (by extension) similes in 
terms of their semantics (e.g. Stern, 2000; 2008). Still other accounts attempt to capture the 
typical content of metaphorical utterances in terms of psychological processes of conceptual 
manipulation: these can involve (i) mapping correspondences between concepts (e.g. 
Gentner and Bowdle, 2008); (ii) extending a conceptual category associated with the vehicle 
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to match that associated with the tenor (e.g. Glucksberg, 2001; 2008)13; and (iii) accessing 
existing conceptual associations which are organised in terms of conceptual metaphors (e.g. 
Lakoff and Johnson, 2003). All of these accounts are either incompatible with the evidence 
of how similes are understood, are inadequate to characterise the typical effects of 
metaphor, or both, and so must be dismissed as competing approaches to simile 
understanding. The major differences between these different approaches and relevance 
theoretic approaches to figurative language understanding are spelled out. 
In light of the rather conflicted state of the field outlined in Chapter 3, I argue in Chapter 4 
that we need to reconsider certain more or less widely-held assumptions about the 
relationship between metaphor and simile (§§4.1-3, 7-8), what might be the typical or 
‘default’ form of similes (§§4.4-6), and whether similes can be distinguished from other 
comparisons of the same syntactic form (§4.9). I give my own theory of how similes are 
understood in Chapter 5 and defend it in light of the observations raised in Chapters 3 and 4, 
as well as certain other assumptions about tenor-vehicle conceptual relationships in 
(‘successful’) similes (§5.2). 
My account of how similes are understood (see especially Chapter 5) is based on the claim 
that there is a use of particular types of comparison construction which overlaps with the 
intuitive definition of simile given at the start of this chapter. I call such uses poetic 
comparisons. I do not propose that utterances of metaphor and simile represent linguistic 
realisations of underlying conceptual mappings (Cf. Chapter 3, §3.5). I also adopt my own 
view of the role of ‘points of comparison’ in comparison and simile understanding (see 
Chapter 5, §5.3). In Chapter 6 I explore some of the implications of my account for the 
identification of similes in further empirical work, the status of the metaphor-simile 
relationship in figurative language studies in general and relevance theoretic stylistic 
approaches to figurative language in particular, and I look at how my account explains how 
                                                          
13 As Glucksberg’s account of metaphor understanding shares limitations with that of 
relevance theory I devote little attention to the former (see also Chapter 3, page 109 
footnote 32). 
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some more complex examples of metaphor-simile interaction and elaboration of the simile 
vehicle are understood. Chapters 4-6 draw upon a wide range of literary data. 
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Chapter 2: Relevance, communication and style 
This chapter addresses the issue of why one ought to adopt a cognitive approach to style in 
general, and to the understanding of figurative utterances in particular. Such an approach 
allows for continuity in explaining utterance understanding: literary utterances (those which 
are clearly intended as texts to be read as literary works) and poetic utterances (those 
utterances, whether ‘literary’ or ‘mundane’, which achieve effects we would consider to be 
poetic) are just as conducive to investigation from a cognitive-inferential perspective as non-
literary, non-figurative, non-poetic utterances. Continuity can be seen as one way of 
preserving theoretical parsimony. If our account of utterance understanding is insufficient 
for the understanding of literary utterances, then it is incomplete, and so would require 
domain-specific principles to explain literary understanding. This might invite all sorts of 
theoretical complications, including raising the question of how an audience acquires the 
ability to understand literary utterances. 
One approach to communication, which is of broad scope and subsumes a variety of 
‘semiotic’ approaches, is has been called ‘the code model of communication’. Although it 
draws from a ‘folk’ understanding of communication (see e.g. Reddy, 1993), such an 
approach fails to account for how the correct context of utterance is arrived at by the 
hearer/reader (§2.3), or what counts as successful communication (§2.7), and does not 
acknowledge the role of inference in determining the explicit and implicit content of 
utterances (§2.8). The picture of ostensive-inferential communication which is defended 
here, namely that proposed by relevance theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1995), solves the 
above problems in a theory of communication. It also provides a framework for a cognitive 
investigation of style (§2.11), which includes an account of metaphor understanding (§2.9, 
§2.12) and can account for the effects achieved by a range of phenomena which have 
previously been argued to be fatal for a view of communication and/or literary 
understanding which sees communicative intentions as crucial to utterance understanding 
(§2.13). 
2.1 Communication and context 
The transfer of information between organisms takes place in such different ways, that there 
is no hope of an overarching theory of communication so defined (Wharton, 2009: 8f). We 
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cannot hope to produce a unified account for such variegated phenomena as a plant 
changing its growth pattern to emerge from the shade of another plant, an individual fish 
coordinating with others in a shoal, in addition to what might be called ‘canonical’ 
communication, namely a human speaker communicating via a verbal message with a 
human audience. To attempt such a thing would be like trying to come up with a general 
theory of locomotion (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 2). However, the impossibility of a ‘theory 
of everything’ (Chomsky, 2000: 70) of this type does not mean that a certain domain of 
communication is not conducive to empirical investigation or productive theoretical 
speculation. The trick is to find what the appropriate domain for investigation consists in. 
We need a fuller understanding of the way in which intentional communication by means of 
language takes place. We need to address both (i) what is communicated, and (ii) how 
communication is achieved (see e.g. Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 1, 54). It has usually been 
believed, and plausibly so, that speakers communicate meanings (Blakemore, 1992: 5), but 
the notion of ‘meaning’ then requires explanation. The problem can be reframed as an 
investigation of what it means to say that a speaker means something by uttering a given 
expression. Utterances, on this view, are public evidence for the private thoughts a 
speaker/author intends to communicate (Sperber and Wilson, 1995). So how does a 
hearer/reader determine what was intended to be communicated by a speaker/author? 
One possible solution to the problem of defining communication is to take the meaning of 
an utterance to be a linguistically-encoded thought. De Saussure spoke of language as “a 
system of signs that express ideas” (2011: 16). According to this view communication 
involves the pairing of mental facts (conceptual representations; the signifié or signified) 
with representations made up of linguistic sounds (sound-images; the signifiant or signifier) 
that are used for their expression (id., ib.: 67). If utterances are public representations of 
private thoughts, this model of communication would suppose that a speaker encodes the 
thought into a publicly-available symbol system (Cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 5-8), and that 
the hearers’ task in understanding the utterance as intended is merely to decode that 
representation. When a speaker encodes a thought which she transmits to the hearer in a 
public language, the hearer decodes this utterance to produce a thought identical to that of 
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a speaker. On this view, utterance understanding is a process of decoding, and what is 
communicated is a thought with a fixed, determinate content.  
The only sources of information which can contribute to the duplicated thought the 
hearer/reader decodes are: (i) the encoded information of the utterance itself and (ii) the 
rules for decoding that encoded information. On this view, the grammar can be seen as a set 
of rules for decoding the information contained in the utterance into the communicated 
thought. The notion that the output of a mental grammar is a semantic representation is a 
plausible one, as “a generative grammar is a code which pairs phonetic and semantic 
representations of sentences” (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 9). However, this approach cannot 
account for the way in which utterances are understood because of the role that the context 
plays in utterance interpretation.  
The complete interpretation of an utterance can also involve the identification of 
assumptions/thoughts which are communicated by the utterance but which are not part of 
its explicit content (i.e. implicit content). For instance, we often communicate certain 
implications of utterances along with the grammatically-encoded information. Indirect 
answers to questions such as Carly’s utterance in (1a) highlight how this takes place: 
 (1a) Tom: Do you like kashk bademjan? 
 Carly: I don’t like Iranian food. 
Clearly Tom understands Carly as communicating that she does not like kashk bademjan. But 
how is he justified in making this assumption? He has the expectation that her response is in 
answer to his question. But in order to validly infer that Carly does not like kashk bademjan, 
he must entertain certain contextual assumptions (such as (1b)) in addition to the 
assumption she communicates in (1a) which together license that inference (given in (1c)): 
 (1b) Contextual premise: Kashk bademjan is Iranian food. 
 (1c) Inferred conclusion: Carly does not like kashk bademjan. 
Context also plays a role in determining the speaker’s attitude towards the propositional 
content. Carly may also communicate in addition to the proposition expressed by her 
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utterance in (1a), the contextual assumption in (1b) and the assumption which actually 
responds to Tom’s question, an assumption such as (1d): 
 (1d) Carly knows that kashk bademjan is Iranian food. 
In fact, communicating an assumption such as (1d) might be the point of Carly giving an 
indirect answer to Tom’s question in the first place. So clearly the content communicated by 
an utterance is not necessarily exhausted by the grammatically-encoded content of an 
utterance. Utterances can also communicate certain implications (technically, implicatures. 
See below) such as (1b) and (1c), as well as higher-level representations such as (1d) which 
convey attitudes to propositional content. One clear case of such a higher-level 
representation constituting the main point of an utterance is (2): 
 (2) You’re the manager. 
 (see Carston, 2010b: 223) 
An utterance of (2) is unlikely to be informative to the addressee if all it communicated were 
the proposition that the addressee is the manager: they are likely to be aware of that fact. 
Clearly the utterance means something more precise, such as (2a): 
 (2a) The speaker knows that the addressee is the manager. 
Moreover, context also plays a role in determining the propositional content of an 
utterance. For example, an utterance of (3a) is lexically ambiguous: 
 (3a) He’s riding a bike. 
Clearly the propositional content of (3a) will have different truth-conditions whether it is 
taken to mean a pedal bicycle or a motorbike. What will be the correct interpretation of 
(3a)? That intended by the speaker. What will allow a hearer of (3a) to disambiguate 
between the (at least) two senses of bike? Contextual assumptions, and their relationship 
with the communicative intentions of the speaker. 
The same sort of process is required in order to understand an utterance containing 
referring expressions, such as (3b) (referring expressions underlined): 
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 (3b) She’s speaking tomorrow. 
 (see Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 12) 
What is communicated by (3b) will vary from one occasion of utterance to another. There 
could be various candidate referents for the pronoun she in a particular physical context. 
The truth conditions of the proposition expressed by (3b) will also vary depending upon the 
time of utterance. 
The role of disambiguation and assigning a referent to deictic expressions in determining the 
proposition expressed by an utterance is widely accepted. What is more controversial is the 
notion that context and inference can play a part in determining the contribution to the 
proposition expressed by the natural language equivalents of the logical operators and the 
contribution to the proposition expressed by certain ‘loose uses’ of lexical items. One 
example of the former phenomenon is (3c): 
(3c) [Getting married and having children] is better than [having children and getting 
married]. 
(from Levinson, 1983: 35) 
Clearly (3c) is understood as meaning that getting married before having children is the 
better outcome. But this is not the meaning of the logical operator, which merely guarantees 
that a conjunction of two propositions is true if and only if the individual propositions it 
conjoins are true. If that were what was communicated by the sequences in square brackets 
in (3c), then both of the bracketed sequences would mean the same thing, and (3c) as a 
whole would be infelicitous. 
Many lexical items appear to have a clear definition, but when they are used in 
communication, they communicate a concept which does not fall under that definition, such 
as the word ‘empty’ in (3d): 
 (3d) The glass is empty. 
 (see Carston, 2002a: 41) 
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There is an easily available definition for the lexical item empty, namely, ‘having no 
contents’. Unless (3d) is referring to glass in a perfect vacuum, then the apparent meaning of 
(3d), that the glass contains nothing at all, is false. But, importantly, the contextually-
determined meaning of empty (something like, ‘containing so little liquid it is not worth 
drinking’) communicated by (3d) is different to the lexically-encoded meaning. This means 
that context and inference can override certain grammatically-determined meanings (for the 
philosophical implications of this see Carston, 2002a: 159). 
So there are at least three factors at work in the understanding of utterances: 
(i) The (grammatical) decoding of a semantic representation. 
(ii) The integration of contextual information. 
(iii) The determination of communicative intentions. 
And there are at least three types of content of utterances: 
(i) That which is based upon the semantic representation provided by the 
grammar (the explicit content). 
(ii) Information about the attitude of the speaker to that content. 
(iii) Implicit content. 
The code model focusses on the first factor in utterance understanding, and the first type of 
utterance content, but ignores the role of context and intentions in understanding 
utterances. The question then becomes, how do hearers determine the intended content of 
an utterance? How do they select the appropriate context?  
In light of examples such as (1)-(3d) we must reframe the question of how to account for 
human communication as follows: (i) how does the hearer determine the intended content 
of the utterance; (ii) how does the hearer determine the intended context of the utterance; 
(iii) what role do communicative intentions play in understanding utterances; and (iv) what is 
the nature of the content of utterances? 
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2.2 Towards an inferential model of communication: communicative intentions 
Grice noted the importance of communicative intentions in determining speaker meaning 
(see e.g. id. 1989 §§5, 6, 14). We can see the role of the hearer/reader in understanding 
utterances such as (1)-(3d) as recovering the intended interpretation. Strawson (1964) 
reformulated Grice’s notion of speaker meaning (Grice, 1989: 220) as follows: 
 To mean something by x, an individual S must intend: 
(a) S’s utterance of x to produce a certain response r in a certain audience A; 
(b) A to recognise S’s intention (a); 
(c) A’s recognition of S’s intention (a) to function as at least part of A’s reason for A’s 
response r 
(cited in Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 21) 
Imagine a speaker S has uttered (4) to an audience A: 
 (4) There’s a cup of tea in the kitchen. 
In uttering (4), S wants A to believe the content of (4a): 
 (4a) There’s a cup of a tea in a kitchen contextually salient to S and A. 
If A does come to believe (4a), then condition (a) is fulfilled. A is also likely to realise that S 
wanted A to believe (4a). Therefore condition (b) is likely to be fulfilled, as in (4b): 
(4b) S wants A to believe (4a). 
The fulfilment of (4b) plays a role in fulfilling (4a), therefore condition (c) above is also 
fulfilled. 
But are conditions (a-c) in Strawson’s reformulation of Grice’s account of meaning equally 
crucial to successful communication? As Sperber and Wilson point out, (i) communication 
can proceed without (a) being fulfilled at all; and (ii) (c) cannot be fulfilled if (a) is not (id., ib.: 
28f). Therefore, only (b) can be considered to play a necessary role in human 
communication: namely, the communicator’s intention to have her intention to 
communicate something recognised by the audience. Sperber and Wilson reformulate the 
essential component of communicative intentions (informally) as follows: 
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Informative intention: to inform the audience of something; 
Communicative intention: to inform the audience of one’s informative intention. 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 29).  
Only the communicative intention (b) “the intention to have one’s informative intention 
recognised” (id., ib.) is required to cause (a) the informative intention to be fulfilled. As the 
structure of (4b) suggests, intention (b) suggests a second order intention (an intention 
about another intention). 
2.3 The problem of context selection 
One of the important roles which communicative intentions play in utterance understanding 
is in guiding how the hearer/reader selects the appropriate context of utterance. If context 
determines the content of an utterance to some degree, and communicative intentions play 
a role in determining the right context in which a hearer/reader interprets the utterance, 
then how does the hearer/reader select the right context? For any given utterance, the 
potential context in which it could be interpreted will be vast.  
On the model of communication proposed by Sperber and Wilson, the context consists in 
the “set of premises used in interpreting an utterance (apart from the premise that the 
utterance in question has been produced)” (1995: 15f). This context is not conceived of as 
‘external’ to the speaker and hearer, but forms a subset of the hearer’s assumptions about 
the world (id., ib.). The hearer’s task of determining the intended context can now be 
approached in terms of how a hearer arrives at the intended set of contextual assumptions. 
One way to explain successful communication is to limit the potential context to only those 
assumptions which are mutually known (Clark and Marshall, 1981). A proposition P is 
mutually known if the speaker knows that P, and the hearer knows that P, and the speaker 
knows that the hearer knows that P, and the hearer knows that the speaker knows that P, 
and so on. But, as Sperber and Wilson point out, this introduces an infinite regress (1995: 
17). If the speaker and the hearer must have the same context, how do they distinguish 
those assumptions they share from those they do not? To confirm that any proposition is 
mutually known would require an infinite series of higher-order assumptions of the above 
type (‘the speaker knows that the hearer knows that the speaker knows that the hearer 
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knows that P’ and so on) because the proposition that ‘both speaker and hearer know that P’ 
needs to be known by both speaker and hearer, as does the fact that the other interlocutor 
knows that fact, for any proposition P. 
One proposed solution to this regress in models of mutual knowledge, introduced by Clark 
and Marshall (1981), is that speakers and hearers have access to ‘finite induction 
procedures’ to establish that a proposition is mutually known. If these procedures are 
sufficiently simple, then they could solve the problem of the complexity and psychological 
plausibility of the context of utterance being limited to mutually known assumptions (in 
relation to definite reference, at least).  
The heuristics proposed by Clark and Marshall depend upon the ability of speakers and 
hearers to infer the ‘infinity of conditions’ required for mutual knowledge relying upon 
assumptions about each other’s rationality (id., ib.: 32). They argue for the existence of 
certain ‘co-presence heuristics’ built upon the ‘simultaneity assumption’ and the ‘attention 
assumption’, that speaker and hearer know that in that moment that they share attention 
on an action, and the ‘rationality assumption’, that the inferences of the interlocutors are 
predictable on a rational basis (id., ib.: 33). The ‘co-presence heuristics’ are justified by one 
or more ‘bases’ for mutual knowledge (incorporating the three assumptions mentioned in 
the previous sentence. See their Table 1 (id., ib.: 43)): (i) community membership; (ii) 
physical co-presence; (iii) linguistic co-presence; and (iv) indirect co-presence (id., ib.: 35-42). 
Physical co-presence provides the most direct evidence for mutual knowledge, as speakers 
need only assume rationality and shared attention on the part of hearers and vice versa; 
linguistic co-presence provides more indirect mutual knowledge on the basis that the code 
being used is itself mutually known; and community membership provides weaker evidence 
still of mutual knowledge, on the basis that members of the same community can (with a 
certain degree of confidence) be assumed to know a body of mutually known assumptions 
shared by that community (summed up by Blakemore, 1992: 19f). Indirect co-presence 
refers to cases where the information which must be mutually known can be inferred from 
the other bases of mutual knowledge. 
These assumptions allow Clark and Marshall to argue that interlocutors establish the basis 
for the mutual knowledge that a proposition p obtains as follows: 
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Mutual knowledge induction schema: A and B mutually know that p if and only if 
some state of affairs G holds such that: 
1. A and B have reason to believe that G holds. 
2. G indicates to A and B that each has reason to believe that G holds. 
3. G indicates to A and B that p. 
(Clark and Marshall, 1981: 33. Some alterations are made here for consistency of 
presentation) 
The point of this schema is that interlocutors do not need to confirm any of the conditions of 
mutual knowledge at all. Rather, the co-presence heuristics, given speakers’ and hearers’ 
confidence in their belief in G (for ‘grounds’) which satisfies the three conditions in the 
mutual knowledge induction schema, enable them to confirm “the infinity of conditions as 
far down the list as they wanted to go” (id., ib.: 34). 
Clark and Marshall’s heuristics suggest that assumptions are drawn primarily from general 
knowledge related to a particular discourse (environmental factors, discourse objectives and 
so on), rather than from memory. Moreover, even if mutual knowledge could be established 
in this fashion, for mutually known propositions to play a part in utterance understanding, 
they need to be mutually known under a particular description, rather than any of a myriad 
other possible descriptions, and this would require many further ‘auxiliary descriptions’ 
(Blakemore, 1992: 20). We could weaken the requirements of a mutual knowledge model of 
context selection by arguing that interlocutors try to establish it only to a certain degree (as 
suggested by the quote from Clark and Marshall in the previous paragraph): but to what 
degree? And, given the picture of auxiliary assumptions as bases for mutual knowledge given 
in Clark and Marshall (1981: 43, Table 1), must each of these assumptions be mutually 
known, and, if so, to what degree? Furthermore, misunderstandings do occur, and when 
they do occur, speakers and hearers do not typically account for their misunderstanding in 
terms of mutual knowledge or regret not devoting more attention to establishing mutual 
knowledge (Blakemore, 1992: 20).  
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Even if mutual knowledge could establish the potential context of an utterance, what 
evidence is there that it plays a role in the determination of the actual context (those 
assumptions such as (1b) above which play a role in determining the explicit or implicit 
content of an utterance)? Take the following simple example of assigning a referent to a 
referring expression in (5): 
(5) The pen is on the desk. 
A hearer of (5) will aim to select a context which gives a specific referent for the expression 
(definite description) the pen. But there will typically be a great number of possible, mutually 
known candidates: mutual knowledge is insufficient to establish even the relatively simple 
case of definite reference in (5) (id., ib.: 21). When we come to examples of communication 
between two people who clearly do not know each other, such as when most readers read a 
literary utterance, “mutual knowledge as a pre-requisite for communication makes no sense 
at all” (Pilkington, 2000: 62), especially if Clark and Marshall are right that co-presence plays 
a part in determining mutual knowledge. 
Most worryingly, mutual knowledge is not a necessary condition for successful 
communication to take place. If we combine a code model of communication with the 
mutual knowledge ‘solution’ to the problem of context selection, we are presented with a 
model of communication in which the context of the utterance is selected in advance of 
utterance understanding, rather than one in which at least part of the context is generated 
in the process of utterance understanding (Blakemore, 1992: 22). The actual context of a 
given utterance is to a large degree dependent upon assumptions to which processing the 
utterance provides access. For instance, if we look at the following constructed exchange (6)-
(6b), the context which Tom would have to search through in each instance in order to 
understand Carly’s intended meaning (an implicature, given in (6c)) is different for (6a) and 
(6b): 
 (6) Tom: I’m bored. 
 (6a) Carly: If you’re bored, we’ll go and see the Happy Mondays. 
(6b) Carly: The cinema has closed down. We’ll go and see the Happy Mondays. 
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To understand (6a), Tom has to generate the implicature (implicated conclusion) in (6c): 
(6c) Tom and Carly will go and see the Happy Mondays. 
But to make sense of (6b), Tom would need a number of different implicated premises, 
including (6d-f): 
(6d) Activities which are not boring include at least going to the cinema and seeing 
bands play. 
(6e) The Happy Mondays are a band. 
(6f) The Happy Mondays are playing tonight. 
etc. 
Importantly, Tom can entertain an assumption such as (6f) even if he has never had such a 
thought before on the basis of what Carly says. Contextual assumptions such as (6d-f) are 
not a prerequisite for Tom to understand Carly’s utterance, but can be ‘triggered by’ her 
utterance (see below). 
The definition of linguistic context as part of a ‘common ground’ of mutually known 
assumptions (e.g. Clark and Marshall, 1981; Clark, 1996; Schiffer, 1972: 30ff. Cf. Stalnaker, 
2002) throws up particular obstacles to developing a robust theory of communication. 
Firstly, it is impossible for an infinite regress of mutually known assumptions (see previous 
paragraph) to fall under the communicative intentions of speakers, simply because human 
beings do not have infinite processing capabilities (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 17ff). 
Secondly, it seems that knowledge (in the sense of ‘justified, true belief’) is too strong a 
criterion for the kind of mental representations that play a part in utterance understanding. 
Sperber and Wilson approach the question of context selection in utterance understanding 
from a completely different perspective (1995). The question which they seek to address is: 
in what sense do communicators share information with addressees (Sperber and Wilson, 
1995: 38)? They first establish that each individual has a cognitive environment made up of 
their assumptions about the world, then that these cognitive environments can be shared 
between individuals, and finally that communication can be seen as the enlargement of a 
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mutual cognitive environment, namely a shared cognitive environment which includes the 
assumption that a subset of the assumptions in an individual’s cognitive environment is 
shared.  
An individual’s cognitive environment is made up of assumptions which are held to varying 
degrees of manifestness. Assumptions are, loosely speaking, ‘thoughts’, or ‘sentences in the 
language of thought’ (e.g. Pilkington, 2000: 91). More precisely, they are “structured sets of 
concepts” (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 85) and can be represented in terms of propositions 
which are truth-conditional in nature. 
‘Manifestness’ is a technical notion which captures the availability of a given assumption 
within a cognitive environment: 
A fact is manifest to an individual at a given time if and only if he is capable at that 
time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation as true or probably 
true. 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 39. Their emphasis)14 
Not all assumptions in a cognitive environment are manifest to the same degree. Because 
human cognitive organisation involves the selective direction of attention to certain stimuli, 
when a phenomenon is noticed: 
“[…] some assumptions about it are standardly more accessible than others. In an 
environment where a doorbell has just rung, it will normally be strongly manifest that 
there is someone at the door, less strongly so that whoever is at the door is tall 
enough to reach the bell, and less strongly still that the bell has not been stolen.” 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 40) 
The total cognitive environment of an individual would consist of not just all the facts that 
are mentally represented by an individual, but all those which she is capable of being aware 
of (such as by inferring on the basis of other manifest assumptions). This makes the notion of 
                                                          
14 Sperber and Wilson explain that to be manifest means to be perceptible or inferable 
without being immediately invalidated (1995: 39; 283f n28). 
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manifestness akin to ‘visibility’: just as something is visible if it could be accessed by visual 
cognition, so manifest facts are manifest inasmuch as they can be perceived or inferred by a 
conceptual cognitive system (id., ib.: 39). For instance, there has been a box of tissues sat on 
my desk beside my computer for weeks. It has the property of being visible. But the 
assumption that There is a box of tissues on the desk typically only comes to my attention 
when, for instance, I need to blow my nose. That assumption or related assumptions which 
would allow me to reason along similar lines must be manifest to me, as I am capable of 
representing them should the occasion demand that I reason about them. However, I am 
not necessarily actively entertaining any of those assumptions in a conscious fashion, if at all. 
Nor do I need to recall that assumption from a body of previously assumed facts: the box is 
visible to me. But whether I can recall that fact, or perceive it anew, or infer it when I notice 
that a tissue is protruding from behind a pile of books, the assumption There is a box of 
tissues on the desk is manifest to me. 
Moreover, just as optical illusions are, in a sense, ‘visible’ (that is, they are responded to by 
the visual system to yield some information within the mind), an assumption need not be 
true for the environment to provide sufficient evidence for an individual to entertain that 
assumption (id., ib.). For instance, when I overhear a conversation between you and your 
friend, it may be manifest to me that you are from the south of England, based on your 
accent. Whether this assumption turns out to be true or not does not affect my ability to 
reason on the basis of this assumption. Whether I am right or not that the protruding tissue 
belies the presence of a box of tissues is also not to the point: it is evidence enough for me 
to entertain that assumption. Moreover, just as there are degrees of visibility, so there are 
degrees of manifestness. Whether and to what degree an object is visible is a function of 
whether it can be perceived, but this depends on two factors: (i) the physical properties of 
an object, and (ii) the visual abilities of the individual. Similarly, to what degree an 
assumption about the world is manifest is a function of: (i) properties of the physical 
environment (including visibility of particular objects, audibility of certain sounds); and (ii) 
the cognitive abilities of the individual (whether information in support of that assumption 
can be accessed through perception, memory, or inference on the basis of other manifest 
assumptions). 
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One consequence of this picture of one aspect of human mental life is that an assumption 
can be manifest without being known, or even being assumed (in the sense of being 
currently entertained) (id., ib.: 40). For example, it is likely to be manifest to you that 
Alexander the Great was not born in the year 2000 CE. I doubt you have ever entertained 
such an assumption, but you can easily infer it from other assumptions you have, such as 
that Alexander was a historical figure who lived over 2000 years ago. This fact was manifest 
to you all along, because you could have inferred it from your background knowledge at will. 
As well as ‘currently inferable assumptions’, there are also ‘perceptible but unrepresented’ 
assumptions (id., ib.: 40f), namely those perceptible phenomena which you could attend to 
but do not because, for instance, they do not demand your attention (compare the 
background chatter of birds to the sudden squawking of a crow). 
Because Sperber and Wilson define cognitive environments in terms of manifestness of 
assumptions (that is, the view from ‘inside’ an individual), individuals’ cognitive 
environments will differ even in the same physical environment (id., ib.: 38). So two 
individuals can be said to share a visual environment inasmuch as they are able to see the 
same facts. These individual environments can never be totally shared, and the shared visual 
environment is defined in terms of what two or more individuals can see, not what they are 
seeing at any given moment (id., ib.: 40f). Similarly, cognitive environments can overlap, or 
intersect. This intersection of assumptions we call a shared cognitive environment  (id., ib.: 
41). But, again, no two individuals’ cognitive environments completely overlap (they are 
never totally shared), and they are defined not in terms of which assumptions the individuals 
are currently mentally representing or have previously done so, but whether they are 
capable (through perception or inference) of forming such an assumption (id., ib.). 
Sperber and Wilson give the following example of a particular type of shared cognitive 
environment E (7a-d) (from ib.: 41f). Peter and Mary hear a phone ringing, and the following 
assumptions are made manifest or more manifest to both Peter and Mary: 
 (7a) The phone is ringing. 
 (7b) It is manifest to Peter and Mary that the phone is ringing. 
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(7c) It is manifest to Peter and Mary that it is manifest to Peter and Mary that the 
phone is ringing. 
(7d) It is manifest to Peter and Mary that it is manifest to Peter and Mary that it is 
manifest to Peter and Mary that the phone is ringing. 
This kind of shared cognitive environment, a mutual cognitive environment, is crucial for the 
relevance theoretic notion of communicative success (id., ib.: 64). The shared cognitive 
environment in E includes assumptions (6b-d) which are assumptions about the lower level 
assumption (7a). So when Peter and Mary hear the phone ringing, this fact becomes 
manifest to them, as does the fact that it has become manifest to both of them. This allows 
them to infer (7c) and (7d) and still further higher-order metarepresentations (see §2.6 
below) about that first level of information. We can see a similar phenomenon when any 
group of people requires certain assumptions to be known or believed in order to ‘count’ as 
a member of that group. For instance, members of the Freemasons both share certain secret 
knowledge and share the assumption that all other members share the same secret 
information, in other words, that they have a particular shared cognitive environment 
containing this information (id., ib.: 41). 
The notion of manifestness also allows us to account for cases where contextual 
assumptions are not available to the hearer/reader in advance of understanding the 
utterance, but are triggered by the utterance. When Tom understands Carly’s utterance in 
(6a) above, his expectation that Carly is giving a relevant response (such as one which 
supports the conclusion that they should go and see the Happy Mondays) guides his search 
for contextual assumptions which will play a role in his interpretation. The possible 
contextual assumptions are those which are made accessible by her utterance. When Carly 
produces her utterance in (1a) (repeated here), her utterance will make manifest or more 
manifest a range of contextual assumptions: 
 (1a) Tom: Do you like kashk bademjan? 
 Carly: I don’t like Iranian food. 
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It is possible that Tom does not know that kashk bademjan is an Iranian dish. But as long as 
he knows that it is a type of dish, then assumptions about the different types of food will be 
more or less highly manifest in his cognitive environment when he hears Carly’s utterance. 
By uttering the phrase Iranian food, Carly makes a range of assumptions about types of food 
manifest or more manifest to Tom. Crucially, it may include the implicated premise (1b) 
(repeated here) that ‘kashk bademjan is Iranian food’: 
 (1b) Contextual premise: Kashk bademjan is Iranian food. 
Of course, Carly’s utterance will make manifest or more manifest to Tom a range of 
assumptions which do not play a part in Tom’s interpretation of her utterance. How the 
proper context is selected from this vast potential context will be explained in §2.6 below. 
But accounting for the context of utterance in terms of mutual manifestness rather than 
mutual knowledge has a number of immediate advantages. 
The first advantage of accounting for context in terms of mutually manifest assumptions is 
that it avoids the false premise that Tom must know in advance of understanding Carly’s 
utterance in (1a) that kashk bademjan is Iranian food. This cannot be the case. Moreover, it 
does not require that the assumptions which play a part in utterance understanding be true. 
If we are to take mutual knowledge seriously as a theoretical construct, then it must be a 
type of knowledge, and the truth of a proposition is generally regarded as a necessary 
condition of its being known. Clearly, whether the contextual premise in (1b) is true or not is 
beside the point. People can communicate false information, whether mistakenly or covertly 
(masquerading as communicating true information). It merely matters whether Tom takes it 
to be (likely to be) true, or that Carly believes it to be (likely to be) true. Moreover, to say 
that Carly and Tom mutually assume (1b) would also be too strong a condition for 
communicative success (id., ib.: 42). For (1b) to be mutually assumed would require an 
infinite series of mutually assumed assumptions, just as for (1b) to be mutually known 
requires an infinity of higher-order mutually known assumptions (id., ib.). What relevance 
theory claims is that an infinity of higher-order assumptions (higher-order 
metarepresentations of (1b)) are made more manifest by Carly’s utterance in (1a). In other 
words, Tom is capable of inferring these assumptions should he need to. But there is no 
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problem of psychological plausibility here, as Tom is not required to assume those auxiliary 
assumptions for (1b) to be manifest to him. 
Another significant advantage of the relevance theory account of context consisting of 
mutually manifest assumptions is that it avoids another false presumption which is implicit 
in the mutual knowledge account of context selection. On the mutual knowledge account, 
for S to successfully communicate with H two types of information must be mutually known 
by S and H: (i) the code itself (for example, that the word Iranian means ‘Iranian’ and food 
means ‘food’ in the code being used, and so on for every coded meaning); and (ii) the 
contextual assumptions which play a part in understanding the utterance. But once this 
condition is met, as it must be for an act of communication to be considered successful, the 
act of communication is essentially symmetrical: S and H must choose the same code and the 
same context in order to communicate (id., ib.: 43f). But the assumption that 
communication is typically symmetrical is false. 
By limiting context to mutual knowledge, the symmetrical choice of code and context can be 
guaranteed. But, as Sperber and Wilson make clear (ib.: 43f), we can communicate without 
making symmetrical choices of code and context as long as one interlocutor takes the bulk of 
the responsibility for successful communication. Sperber and Wilson give the following 
example. Peter and Mary are walking together when Mary notices a church and utters (8) 
(id., ib.: 43f): 
 (8) Mary: I’ve been inside that church. 
In order to be understood, Mary does not need Peter to know that the building she is 
referring to is a church, or that she knows that he knows it and so on. Her utterance itself 
could be justification enough for him to believe it to be a church (for instance, if he was 
short-sighted, or unfamiliar with church architecture, and so on). All that is required for 
Peter to understand Mary is that an assumption such as (8a) or (8b) is manifest to Peter 
which would allow him to understand her utterance in (8): 
 (8a) The building Mary identified is a church. 
 (8b) Mary believes that building she has identified is a church. 
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There could be still further contextual assumptions which could be manifest to Peter which 
would also allow him to understand (8) the way Mary intended it to be understood. The key 
to the relevance theoretic account of context selection is that the contextual assumptions 
which are taken to be communicated by Mary will be those which Peter understands her to 
be intending. How these intended meanings are recovered will be addressed from a number 
of angles in the following sections. 
Although mutual manifestness is a dispositional notion15 like ‘knowledge’ or ‘belief’, it is 
weaker than mutual knowledge as a requirement for successful communication in just the 
right way (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 43; Wilson, 2000/2012: 241). We need some 
dispositional notion in an account of utterance understanding because the kind of 
information which plays a part in utterance understanding is: (i) mentally represented; and 
(ii) stands in a certain relation to other information. To be exact, the type of assumptions we 
are talking about are intentional in the technical sense. This means that, like beliefs, the 
assumptions which play a part in communication, whether they form part of the context of 
the utterance or part of the content, are about states of affairs, individuals, other 
assumptions, and so on. But, as we have seen, being mutually ‘known’ or ‘assumed’ is too 
strong a condition for contextual information, and it gives a misleading picture of what 
communicative success consists in. Relevance theory instead accounts for communicative 
success in terms of the mutual manifestness of assumptions, which has a number of 
advantages: 
(i) Mutual manifestness is more psychologically plausible than mutual 
knowledge. It does not assume infinitely recursive computations. It does not 
even require that assumptions are actively entertained (that is, known or 
believed), as they can be (non-demonstratively) inferred (Wilson, 2000/2012: 
241). 
                                                          
15 I am using the word ‘dispositional’ rather loosely here to denote any kind of relationship 
of ‘aboutness’ between a mental representation and some real or hypothetical state of 
affairs (including other representations) (Cf. e.g. Fodor, 2003: 140). 
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(ii) Mutual manifestness allows for the kind of asymmetry we actually see in 
communication (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 43). This asymmetry helps avoid 
co-ordination problems. As in ballroom dancing the bulk of the responsibility 
for any lack of coordination by the dancers with the music or with each other 
falls on the ‘leader’, so in communication the speaker must take the lion’s 
share of the responsibility for the selection of the appropriate contextual 
assumptions and any misunderstandings. 
(iii) According to Sperber and Wilson, a special kind of mutually manifest 
assumption plays the defining role in the establishment of successful 
communication, that is, communicative intentions (1995). 
According to this way of looking at the mental life of communicators, phenomena can be 
said to impinge upon one’s cognitive environment inasmuch as they make certain 
assumptions manifest (whereas before they were not manifest) or more manifest (in that 
they are more easily accessible) (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 151f). Communicative 
phenomena (utterances) make certain assumptions manifest or more manifest to an 
audience in a particular way. I will explore the third advantage of the notion of manifestness 
in the following sections. 
Because inference plays a role in working out a speaker/author’s communicative intentions, 
the hearer/reader has no guarantee that the interpretation they recover is identical to the 
one intended by the speaker. Communication can now be re-framed as the enlargement of 
mutual cognitive environments: that is, the extent to which assumptions are shared 
between interlocutors (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 193; 2005/2012). When a speaker makes 
an utterance, they make manifest or more manifest to the hearer certain assumptions which 
may a play a role in understanding the utterance. An utterance is simply (public) evidence 
for a (private) thought of the speaker/author, and in understanding an utterance a 
hearer/reader makes an interpretation of that thought (id., ib.: 230f). The definition of 
communicative success on this model is very different from that suggested by the code 
model of communication outlined in §2.1 which supposes that successful communication 
consists in the duplication of thoughts. The kind of co-ordination which interlocutors achieve 
is, as Sperber and Wilson put it, “best compared to the co-ordination between people taking 
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a stroll together rather than marching in step” (Sperber and Wilson, 1998/2012: 46). But 
contextual assumptions are conceptual representations. The concepts which make up these 
representations will provide access to encyclopaedic information about the denotation of 
the concept (e.g. Carston, 2002a: 321). This encyclopaedic information will (typically) also be 
in the form of conceptual representations, accessing whose conceptual constituents will 
make more assumptions manifest and more manifest, and so on. So the potential context of 
any utterance is likely to be vast. How do interlocutors achieve any degree of reliability in 
communication? The answer to this question is due to the way in which utterances direct a 
hearer/reader in their search for an appropriate interpretation of the utterance: towards a 
relevant interpretation. 
2.4 Relevance and ostension 
I began this chapter with the observation that a theory of all possible types of information 
sharing would be too broad. Relevance theory limits its purview to a specific type of 
communication: ostensive-inferential communication. Because communicators have 
independent cognitive environments, they can convey assumptions to each other in 
different ways, including the following (based on Wilson and Sperber, 1993/2012: 151f): 
(i) Accidentally: trying to conceal evidence for an assumption but betraying 
oneself 
(ii) Covertly, masquerading as accidentally: trying to get the other agent to think 
you are engaged in (i), when in fact you have some other intention 
(iii) Covertly, masquerading as covertly masquerading as accidentally: trying to 
get the other agent to think you are engaged in (ii), when in fact you have 
some other intention. 
These correspond to examples (9a-c) respectively: 
(9a) Carly tries to conceal the fact that she finds Tom’s new haircut amusing. She 
smiles inadvertently. Her expression gives away her true feeling accidentally. 
(9b) Carly wants to let Tom know that she finds his new haircut amusing, without 
letting him know that she is doing so deliberately, so she mimics an inadvertent smile 
covertly. 
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(9c) Carly wants Tom to think that she wants him to think that she finds his new 
haircut amusing, even though she does not really. She lets him know she is mimicking 
an inadvertent smile deliberately. 
All of (9a-c) are possible ways for Carly to elicit Tom’s belief in (9d): 
 (9d) Carly finds Tom’s haircut amusing. 
Communication cannot just involve the conveying of assumptions, because Carly’s 
behaviours in (9a-c) can all convey the assumption in (9d), but we are unlikely to call any of 
them communication proper. There is a fourth way of conveying an assumption, which 
happens to be typical. This is by producing an ostensive stimulus. Take the stimulus 
described in (10): 
 (10) Carly smiles overtly at Tom. 
What is overt about Carly’s smile? We can be more precise about this. The following 
assumptions in (10a-c) are all justified by (10): 
(10a) Carly has produced a stimulus. 
(10b) Carly is making a demand on Tom’s attention. 
(10c) Because of the fact of (10b), the stimulus must be worth Tom’s effort in 
understanding what Carly meant in producing it. 
If Carly intended to intentionally communicate (9d) by engaging in the kind of behaviour 
which is exemplified by (10), we can call that behaviour ostensive. 
Ostensive stimuli are stimuli which: (i) attract an audience’s attention; and (ii) focus it on a 
communicator’s intentions (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 53), by making manifest the intention 
to make something manifest (id., ib.: 49). In other words, they exhibit two layers of 
information: the first, basic layer of information can be about anything at all; the second 
layer states that the first layer has been intentionally made manifest (id., ib.: 50, 53). 
Ostensive behaviours can be very weak (such as sniffing the air ‘ostensively’, in order to 
communicate something thereby) or much more specific, such as linguistic assertions. But all 
ostensive stimuli must attract the audience’s attention and focus it on the communicator’s 
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intentions (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 153), and even ‘literal’ utterances only provide 
evidence towards the recognition of the communicator’s intentions (id. 1998/2012: 46). 
There are a number of important consequences of looking at communication in terms of the 
assumptions which an act of ostension makes manifest or more manifest to a hearer/reader. 
Firstly, it allows us to account for both verbal and non-verbal communicative behaviours (see 
e.g. Wharton 2009). Secondly, it captures the idea that communicators aim for a ‘loose’ kind 
of co-ordination rather than the duplication of thoughts, while recognising that this process 
of co-ordination is somehow motivated by the fact that communication is taking place. 
Thirdly, it allows for the possibility that an utterance can be interpreted as ostensive, and, 
hence, can communicate something, even in the absence of a physically co-present, or even 
previously known, originator. This will be crucial to my discussion of intentional 
communication and literary utterances in §2.13. But it also allows for the communication of 
not just determinate content, but also weaker ‘impressions’. The communication of weak 
effects will be elaborated more fully below (§2.10), and are central to relevance theoretic 
accounts of figurative language. 
Sometimes the same communicative behaviour can communicate a range of impressions. 
Some can be more like the relatively determinate assumption in (1c) communicated by 
Carly’s utterance in (1a) (namely, that Carly doesn’t like kashk bademjan), but others can be 
much more indeterminate. In the descriptions of similar scenarios in (11a-c), we can see that 
the same (in this case, non-linguistic) behaviour can communicate different things (adapted 
from Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 55): 
(11a) Carly and Tom arrive home. She opens the door. She smells gas. She sniffs 
ostensively. Tom concludes that there has been a gas leak. 
(11b) Carly and Tom arrive in their hotel room on a seaside holiday. She opens the 
window and sniffs ostensively. Tom shares in Carly’s impression of the atmosphere. 
(11c) Carly and Tom are dining with friends. They are presented with the main 
course. Carly sniffs ostensively at the food. Tom may conclude that Carly is 
appreciative of the food, or he may merely share part of the experience with Carly in 
focussing his attention on the food. 
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In the case of (11a), there is plausibly a single assumption which Carly intends to 
communicate, such as that given here as (11d): 
 (11d) There is a gas leak in the house.  
In the case of (11b), it could be that there is a specific assumption Carly intends to 
communicate (such as Carly is enjoying being at the seaside), but it would typically not be 
the only assumption she wanted to share with Tom. There could be a whole range of others 
(Carly enjoys the smell of the sea, Carly is satisfied with Tom’s choice of destination, etc.). In 
(11c), that openness of interpretation is greater still (Sperber and Wilson talk of ‘implicit 
vagueness’, 1995: 56), so much so that it is difficult for Tom to find a single assumption or 
set of assumptions she intended to communicate. But we would still want to say that she 
has communicated something. 
But how does linguistic communication (including the production of literary utterances) ever 
succeed, that is, how do hearers/readers ever arrive at an interpretation of the 
speaker/author’s communicative intentions in a predictable way if: (i) the potential context 
of any given utterance is so vast; and (ii) the range of assumptions and impressions which 
can be communicated by an utterance can be so diverse? Something must constrain the 
hearer/reader in their search for an interpretation. Sperber and Wilson argue that ostension 
provides the key to communicative success, because it implies a guarantee of relevance, and 
that this guarantee is implied because human cognition is itself relevance-hungry (Sperber 
and Wilson, 1995: 50). 
2.5 The cognitive principle of relevance 
It would not do for a cognitive agent to attend to all stimuli in the world equally. It would be 
far more adaptive for such an agent to attend primarily to those stimuli whose processing 
would lead to some improvement in their understanding of the world, that is, a cognitive 
gain (see e.g. Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 265). Cognitive efficiency is with respect to some 
goal or other (id., ib.: 46). Some cognitive tasks have an absolute goal. In the case of facial 
recognition, this task can be described as identifying the owner of the perceived face, and, if 
failing to do so, concluding that the individual is unknown to the perceiver. Other cognitive 
tasks have relative goals, such as “improving on an existing state of affairs” (id., ib.: 47). A 
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task such as this could be assessing the reliability of an interlocutor as a source of 
information. 
The observation that cognition is aimed at improving an individual’s knowledge of the world 
has non-trivial consequences. Cognitive agents want: (i) more information; (ii) more accurate 
information; (iii) more easily retrievable information; and (iv) information which is “more 
developed in areas of greater concern to the individual” (id., ib.). But cognitive agents are 
also constrained by certain limitations: finite processing power, finite memory, finite energy, 
and finite time in which to engage in computations or search for further information in the 
environment to facilitate processing. Therefore, they have to allocate, or ration, their 
cognitive resources in pursuit of the above types of information (id., ib.: 47f). 
Relevance theory captures the relevance of an assumption in a given cognitive environment 
in terms of the impact that such an assumption has against the body of assumptions which 
are already held as part of that cognitive environment. Relevance theorists use the term 
cognitive effects for contextual modifications to the cognitive environment of an individual 
(e.g. Carston, 2002a: 376). Cognitive effects are a special case of contextual effects (id., ib.: 
377), which are divided into three main types: (i) supporting or strengthening existing 
assumptions; (ii) contradicting and eliminating existing assumptions; (iii) combining with 
existing assumptions to generate new conclusions. Positive cognitive effects are those that 
contribute positively to the fulfilment of cognitive functions or goals (id., ib.: 378). 
If you came home to find, to your surprise, the contents of your bedroom drawers scattered 
across the floor, this is likely to be relevant within your cognitive environment. In part, this is 
because it provides a new assumption which may not have been manifest to you before, 
such as the assumption that someone has searched your room. Moreover, it may make 
more manifest to you certain assumptions which will themselves be relevant, such as the 
assumption that it is desirable that you check to see if anything of value has been taken. 
The cognitive principle of relevance is the hypothesis that human cognition is organised so as 
to maximise relevance (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 262). Relevance is a property of inputs to 
cognitive processes which is crucial to cognitive economy, expressed in terms of costs 
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(processing effort) and benefits (positive cognitive effects) (Wilson and Sperber, 2002/2012: 
63):  
Relevance to an individual (classificatory): 
An assumption is relevant to an individual at a given time if and only if it has some 
positive cognitive effect in one or more of the contexts accessible to him at that time. 
 
Relevance to an individual (comparative): 
Extent condition 1: An assumption is relevant to an individual to the extent that the 
positive cognitive effects achieved when it is optimally processed are large. 
Extent condition 2: An assumption is relevant to an individual to the extent that the 
effort required to achieve these positive cognitive effects is small. 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 265f) 
In the case of finding the contents of your bedroom drawers disturbed, the assumption that 
someone has searched your room will be relevant to the extent that it has positive cognitive 
effects in your cognitive environment. One assumption which is likely to be highly relevant 
to you is that there has been a thief in your room. This assumption will likely have many 
positive cognitive effects, as your material comfort (to which end people typically devote a 
great deal of cognitive effort) may be compromised by losing valuable property. An 
assumption such as somebody knows how messy my sock drawer was is less likely to be 
relevant. 
But if relevance is evaluated in terms of how worthwhile a given assumption is in terms of 
processing, how does a cognitive system know in advance which stimuli are worth its while 
processing? The short answer is: it does not. We maintain cognitive efficiency by only testing 
hypotheses in order of accessibility (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 66f). Because the cognitive 
system is relevance hungry, any other priority than accessibility would be inefficient, and 
therefore would privilege stimuli which were not relevant. As soon as an assumption is 
found to generate more positive cognitive effects than an alternative, the latter will no 
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longer be attended to, and is no longer considered relevant. One may be embarrassed by 
the disorganisation of ones sock drawer, and this fact may be relevant in a different context, 
but because one’s cognition is geared towards maximal relevance, assumptions related to a 
thief being in your room are likely to be much more relevant and quickly replace 
assumptions which have fewer positive cognitive effects. 
Whenever a new stimulus is processed, relevance dictates which assumptions are more 
highly manifest than others. The net result is that a snapshot of a cognitive environment 
yields a body of assumptions, held to differing degrees of strength (and so more likely to 
endure over time), some being more manifest than others. As new stimuli impinge upon that 
environment through perception or reactivation from memory, they are subject to the same 
processing constraint. But note that a cognitive environment is structured by virtue of the 
process which generated that environment in the first place. Some assumptions are there on 
the surface, as it were, to be tested in the initial stages of a search for relevant assumptions, 
because they have been accessed recently or are accessed regularly. The more often an 
assumption is found to be relevant, the more likely it is to bob up to the surface. Every 
impinging stimulus is subject to the same constraint, so, at any point, some assumptions will 
be more accessible than others, and cognitive agents can be assumed to access those 
assumptions, when needed, in order of accessibility. 
But not all positive cognitive effects are communicated. If I assume that there has been a 
thief in my bedroom, even if I am correct in assuming this, is it true to say that the thief who 
ransacked my room communicated the assumption that he had been in my bedroom? His 
doing so did cause me to make this assumption. But he did not intend to inform me that this 
was the case, and he did not intend to inform me of his intention to inform me that this was 
the case (see §2.2, above). One important consequence of the cognitive principle of 
relevance is that, because the cognition of all speakers and hearers is geared towards 
relevance, it allows speakers/hearers to use certain assumptions as evidence of their 
interlocutor’s cognitive environment, including: 
(i) Mutual assumptions about their respective cognitive abilities; 
(ii) Mutual assumptions about their mutual physical environment and 
coexistence; 
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(iii) Mutual assumptions which have become part of their mutual cognitive 
environment during the course of communication 
The previous section provided one important example of the third type of assumption: that 
an act of ostension has been made. Ostensive stimuli (i) carry a tacit guarantee that they are 
relevant in a particular way; (ii) this tacit guarantee makes manifest the intention behind the 
guarantee; and (iii) this intention is the primary evidence for the intended interpretation 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 50). If there is additional coded information within the stimulus 
this can provide strong evidence for particular features of the communicative intention (as is 
typically the case with the semantic content of linguistic utterances), but the intention, as it 
were, ‘comes first’. 
2.6 The communicative principle of relevance 
The central claim of the relevance theoretic view of communication is that the fact that 
humans are constrained by the cognitive principle of relevance makes the “cognitive 
behaviour of another human predictable enough to guide communication” (Sperber and 
Wilson, 1995: 263), at two important levels: (i) guiding the selection of the correct 
contextual assumptions; and (ii) justifying assumptions a hearer can make given the way the 
stimulus has been constructed. All utterances have a style. Moreover, all utterances 
communicate something simply by virtue of the fact that they are utterances (a type of 
ostensive stimulus): that they are optimally relevant (id, ib.: 156ff). 
Because engaging in inferential processing comes at some psychological ‘cost’ (in terms of 
processing effort expended. Wilson and Sperber, 2002/2012: 63), it is not enough to justify a 
hearer’s effort that they merely hope that an utterance will be relevant. They have to expect 
that an utterance will be relevant. From the perspective of the speaker, it is not rational to 
overtly demand someone’s attention without providing a cognitive ‘gain’ (in terms of 
positive cognitive effects. id., ib.).  
It follows that if a stimulus is ostensively communicated, then the communicator intends to 
make it manifest to that audience that the stimulus will be relevant enough to be worth 
their effort in attending to it. This is because it is mutually manifest to communicator and 
audience (and all other cognitively normal humans) that the audience (like any other 
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individual) will attend to a stimulus only if it is relevant enough to be worth their attention. 
So for every act of ostensive communication, if it is mutually manifest that the stimulus is 
being ostensively communicated, the communicator intends to make manifest to the 
audience that this stimulus is relevant enough to be worth their attention. But this 
corresponds with our definition of ostensive communication: 
“[Ostensive communication is] communication which involves a stimulus which 
makes it mutually manifest to communicator and audience that the communicator 
intends, by means of this stimulus, to make manifest or more manifest to the 
audience a set of assumptions.” 
(Carston, 2002a: 378) 
To put it another way, because the communicator provides a manifestly intentional stimulus 
which (a) attracts attention and (b) would be irrelevant unless treated as evidence of the 
communicator’s intentions, it follows by necessity that the fact that the stimulus is ostensive 
is mutually manifest (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 163). In short, every act of ostensive 
communication carries with it the presumption of optimal relevance. Sperber and Wilson do 
not claim that communicators should follow a particular principle, or that relevance is a goal 
that they ought to achieve. Rather, they claim that part of the content of a given act of 
ostensive communication is the following presumption (id., ib.: 270f; Wilson and Sperber, 
2002/2012: 65): 
 Presumption of optimal relevance: 
(a) The ostensive stimulus is relevant enough for it to be worth the addressee’s 
effort in processing it. 
(b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one compatible with the 
communicator’s abilities and preferences. 
The communicative principle of relevance states simply that for every act of ostensive 
communication, the presumption of optimal relevance is ostensively communicated 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 271f). Grice also recognised that “the very act of communicating 
creates expectations which it then exploits” (id., ib.: 37). As Sperber and Wilson put it: 
53 
 
“The fact that ostensive inferential communication may be achieved simply by 
providing evidence about the communicator’s intentions makes it possible to use 
symbolic behaviour as stimuli.” 
(Sperber and Wilson, 2002/2012: 275) 
In other words, without ostension, there could not be any communication.  
The presumption of optimal relevance communicated by an act of ostension need not 
always be true. For instance, you may already be aware that there is an open manhole cover 
in front of you when I wave at you to warn you that there is an open manhole cover in front 
of you. This information will not lead to positive cognitive effects for you. But you are 
justified in assuming that I would not have attracted your attention at all unless I believed 
that that information would have positive cognitive effects in you (see also Wilson and 
Sperber, 2002/2012: 341 n4). The assumption there is a manhole cover in front of you is (in 
fact) irrelevant to you. But, crucially, I thought it would be relevant to you, and so my 
utterance is consistent with the presumption of optimal relevance communicated (Sperber 
and Wilson, 1987: 744). 
To clarify, this is not a definition of communication, but rather a characterisation of factors 
involved in communication which make communication possible (id., ib.: 32). In the case of 
verbal communication, even those who evidently fail to produce relevant utterances, such as 
bores, “manifestly intend their audience [sc. on that particular occasion etc.] to believe that 
they are worth listening to”. Relevance is always aimed for even if it is not achieved (id., ib.: 
158-60). One interesting consequence of this view is that “pragmatic interpretation is 
ultimately an exercise in metapsychology” (id., 2002/2012: 261)16. This means that a 
psychologically plausible account of communication must take as a primary object of 
explanation a speaker’s/hearer’s thoughts about their interlocutor’s thoughts, including, 
crucially, the intention of a speaker that the hearer of utterance should metarepresent her 
communicative intention in a particular way. In other words, when I communicate by means 
                                                          
16 A feature of communication which Grice appears to have prefigured (Sperber and Wilson 
op. cit. cite Grice, 1989, Chapters §§14, 5, and 18). 
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of a linguistic utterance, part of what is communicated by that utterance (its content) is the 
assumption that I am communicating a message by means of producing that utterance. 
Understanding my utterance involves recovering my communicative intentions from the fact 
that I have produced an utterance. All accounts of communication in terms of 
communicative intentions must see metapsychological reasoning as crucial to understanding 
utterances (see §2.2). 
Although not everything we might pre-theoretically call communication would fall under the 
relevance-theoretic definition of ostensive-inferential communication, we can use the 
presumption of optimal relevance to explain certain cases of covert communication. Let us 
assume that I am a spy, and I come home to find the contents of my bedroom drawers 
scattered on the floor. I also notice that my expensive laptop has not been taken. I infer that 
somebody, perhaps my handler in the secret service, wanted me to know that my secret 
identity had been compromised. When could we say that the assumption that my cover has 
been blown has been communicated? This would depend on my expectations about the kind 
of behaviour my handler was able to engage in. He could not send me a message directly 
because I am likely to be under surveillance by the people who now know my identity. But 
he could stage a break-in to my flat and disturb my effects. Whether the assumption has 
been communicated or not depends upon my uptake of an important auxiliary assumption: 
that somebody is communicating that a certain stimulus (the break in) will be optimally 
relevant to me. If my handler misjudged my inferential abilities or which assumptions would 
be highly manifest to me upon seeing my ransacked bedroom, then he would have failed to 
communicate the intended assumptions. 
2.7 The relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure 
Sperber and Wilson argue that the communicative principle of relevance and the definition 
of optimal relevance together suggest a practical procedure for an audience to construct a 
hypothesis about a communicator’s meaning (Sperber and Wilson, 1998/2012: 39-42): 
“The hearer takes the conceptual structure constructed by linguistic decoding; 
following a path of least effort, he enriches this at the explicit level and complements 
it at the implicit level, until the resulting interpretation meets his expectations of 
relevance; at which point, he stops.” 
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 (id., ib.: 39) 
We can see how this comprehension procedure is used by hearers by looking at the 
following constructed exchange in (12), which we can imagine taking place at a cinema: 
 (12) Yousef: [outside the ticket office] What time does the film start? 
 Claire: I haven’t got my glasses. 
In order to understand Claire’s utterance, Yousef must determine that Claire meant that she 
needed her spectacles in order to read the film times. But the word glasses is lexically 
ambiguous. It could also denote a type of drinking vessel. However, it is already mutually 
manifest that Yousef wants to know the film times because they have gone to the cinema in 
order to watch a film. It is also mutually manifest that one can determine film times by 
checking a schedule (either because they can see such a schedule, or they have seen one 
before). It is also mutually manifest that Claire needs reading glasses on certain occasions. 
Only if the content of Claire’s utterance concerns the spectacles will Yousef be able to infer 
that Claire does not know what time the film starts. The effort involved in entertaining 
interpretive hypotheses concerning drinking vessels would not be offset by sufficient 
cognitive effects. 
The process of utterance understanding does not take place in a linear fashion. There is 
mutual parallel adjustment of interpretive hypotheses, which may involve “backwards and 
forwards adjustments of content before an equilibrium is reached which meets the system’s 
current ‘expectation’ of relevance” (Carston, 2002a: 143). Yousef’s expectation of relevance 
will be satisfied only when he has disambiguated glasses. But any further consideration of 
alternative hypotheses would be gratuitous. Importantly, expectations of relevance 
determine both the context and the content of Claire’s utterance. As we shall see in the 
following section, this differs radically from the Gricean model of utterance understanding. 
Particular contextual assumptions can be made more or less strongly manifest by an 
utterance. One consequence of the relevance theoretic account of communication, involving 
the enlargement of mutual cognitive environments, is that weak impressions can also be 
communicated. This is crucial to how literary utterances often achieve their effects. 
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Implicatures can vary in ‘strength’ (id., 1995: 297ff. Cf. Grice, 1989: 39f). Often it is the case 
that what is implicated by an utterance is a fully determinate assumption. But this is not true 
of every case of implicature. Some utterances achieve relevance by virtue of the weak 
implicatures they communicate (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 197). In (13), Carly can be taken 
as communicating the implicature in (13a) as a contextual premise: 
 (13) Tom: Do you like the Happy Mondays? 
 Carly: I don’t like dance music. 
 (13a) The Happy Mondays play dance music. 
Tom might infer from (13a) the assumption in (13b): 
 (13b) Carly would not like to go to a Happy Mondays gig. 
But Tom might also infer on the basis of an additional contextual premise in (13c) the 
assumption in (13d): 
 (13c) The Prodigy play dance music. 
 (13d) Carly would not like to go to a Prodigy gig. 
Carly does not force Tom to infer the assumptions in (13c) and (13d). They are not fully 
determinate and specifically intended parts of the content of her utterance. But it is hard to 
claim that they are entirely unintended either (id., ib.: 198). Tom could make further 
inferences too, such as by accessing the contextual premise in (13e) in order to derive (13f): 
 (13e) People who don’t like dance music don’t like going to raves. 
 (13f) Carly would not like to go to a rave. 
There is no “clear-cut distinction between wholly determinate, specifically-intended 
inferences and indeterminate, wholly unintended inferences” (id., ib.: 199). Rather, (13b) is a 
stronger implicature of (13) than (13d) or (13f). The optimally relevant interpretation of 
Carly’s utterance which Tom derives may include a range of weak implicatures. When we get 
to cases of figurative language use, we find that some utterances achieve relevance primarily 
through the weak implicatures which they communicate. But if understanding verbal 
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communication is primarily a metapsychological, inferential process (id. 2002/2012: 265; see 
above), what is the relationship between the coded information carried by utterances and 
what is derived inferentially? 
2.8 The role of inference in communication: explicit and implicit content 
The distinction between explicit and implicit content is a subject of controversy (see e.g. 
Bach, 1994; Carston, 2002a; Recanati, 1989/1991). On Grice’s model of communicative 
cooperation, the explicit content of an utterance – ‘what is said’ – consists of the 
conventional meaning of the words used, but inference is allowed to play a minimal role in 
determining the referents of indexical expressions and in disambiguation. But ‘what is said’ 
is still closely related to the (grammatically encoded) meaning of the sentence uttered (see 
for instance Grice, 1989: 87f; Sperber and Wilson, 2005/2012: 2f; Saul, 2002: 351; Neale, 
1992: 520f). For Grice, because speakers and hearers assume that their interlocutor is being 
cooperative (the cooperative principle), this allows a hearer to infer certain assumptions 
which go beyond ‘what is said’: 
The Cooperative Principle: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at 
the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in 
which you are engaged. 
(Grice, 1989: 26) 
Generally speaking, adhering to a number of maxims and sub-maxims (more or less general 
principles) will allow a speaker to provide a cooperative contribution to a talk exchange, that 
is, one consistent with the cooperative principle (Sampson, 1982: 210 n1). Grice gives the 
maxims (of quality, quantity, manner and relation) in his ‘Logic and conversation’ (1989: 
22ff) although he did at times propose amendments to his list of maxims (e.g. ib.: 273). 
However, central to his theory of conversational cooperation are examples such as the first 
submaxim of quality, which states Do not say that which is false, and the maxim of relation, 
Be relevant. 
It is not entirely clear whether Grice meant the maxims to be understood as prescriptive 
norms (e.g. Greenall, 2006: 546), or as principles of conduct which arise from the 
benevolence of speakers and hearers (e.g. Pratt, 1986; Sampson, 1982), or as part of a 
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“normative theory concerned with proper implicature” (Davis, 2007: 1671. Cf. Davis, 1998; 
Saul, 2001: 633). But Grice did imply that there was both a normative and an ethical 
dimension to adhering to the maxims in pursuit of conversational cooperation: 
“I would like to be able to think of the standard type of conversational practice not 
merely as something that all or most do in fact follow but as something that it is 
reasonable for us to follow, that we should not abandon.” 
(Grice, 1989: 29. His emphasis) 
Whatever the status of the maxims, Grice gave them a particular role in communication. 
Grice proposed the term implicatum for an implicitly communicated assumption and 
implicature (first used in Grice, 1989 §15) for the process of computing implicated meanings 
on the basis of ‘what is said’ and certain principles of cooperation in communication which 
he called ‘maxims’. Following the practice in contemporary pragmatics, I use the term 
‘implicature’ for what Grice would call an ‘implicatum’ (e.g. Sperber and Wilson, 1995; Clark, 
1996: 141; Gazdar, 1979: 37). 
For example, in (14), the cooperative principle allows Carly to infer, on the basis of what Tom 
says and the assumption that he is being cooperative, that Tom wants to know where he 
might purchase some petrol: 
 (14) Tom: I am out of petrol. 
 Carly: There is a garage round the corner. 
 (adapted from Grice, 1989: 32) 
According to Grice’s view, ‘what is said’ in Tom’s utterance is the proposition Tom is out of 
petrol. ‘What is implicated’ is the proposition Tom wants to know where he might purchase 
some petrol. This inference is rationally justified because Tom is assumed to be cooperative 
by (at least) adhering to a certain maxim, the maxim of relation (Be relevant). Because Carly 
assumes that Tom’s utterance will be cooperative, and, hence, relevant, he must have 
meant to communicate more than the proposition Tom is out of petrol. Inference also plays 
a limited role in determining what Tom says: a referent (Tom) must be assigned to the 
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pronoun I, and (perhaps) the phrase out of petrol must be disambiguated to mean 
something like possessing a car which does not have sufficient petrol (Cf. id., ib.: 25). 
Sperber and Wilson drew heavily upon Grice’s approach to meaning and conversational 
cooperation (1995 passim; 1987b: 745) but they and other researchers have pointed out a 
number of limitations of his account of the role the maxims were meant to play in utterance 
understanding, perhaps building upon Grice’s own admission that his account was 
incomplete (e.g. there may be more maxims. id. 1989: 27; the account of the maxim of 
relation is not fully developed. id., ib.: 86f)17. However, the problem with Grice’s account of 
conversational cooperation which is most relevant to this thesis concerns his distinction 
between ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’. As Sperber and Wilson have shown, Grice’s 
claim that the maxims only play a role in the determination of what is implicated is open to 
challenge18. 
                                                          
17 Many challenges have also been made to Grice’s theory over the role and nature of the 
different maxims, particularly regarding the role of the maxim of relation (Sperber and 
Wilson, 1995: 36; Harnish, 1976/1991: 361 n50; Levinson, 2000; Grandy, 1989: 524; 
Greenall, 2006: 545f), and whether the maxims constitute inter-cultural universals (Keenan, 
1976; Pratt, 1986: 66f. Cf. Leech, 1983: 80; Green, 1990). 
18 There are also problems with Grice’s view of implicature. For Grice, there are three types 
of implicatures which can arise: those which are licensed by a particular linguistic expression 
and apply through convention (conventional implicatures), those which arise on the basis of 
the cooperative principle and the maxims unless explicitly cancelled (generalised 
conversational implicatures) (see Levinson, 1983: 104; Levinson, 2000 passim), and those 
which arise from observation or exploitation of the cooperative principle and the maxims 
(particularised conversational implicatures). Conventional implicatures are not widely 
accepted in the field (see e.g. Horn on the vanishing utility of conventional implicature. 
2004: 6. Cf. e.g. Potts for an example of continued use of the concept, 2005), and 
generalised conversational implicatures (e.g. Levinson, 2000) are associated with a particular 
(‘neo-Gricean’) way of approaching pragmatics. For reasons which lie beyond the scope of 
this thesis, relevance theorists reject the notions of conventional implicature (e.g. 
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Apart from the limited role of inference in reference assignment and disambiguation, Grice 
does not allow inference to intrude upon ‘what is said’. However, as examples (3a-d) 
(repeated here) show, contextual information does play a role in determining the explicit 
content of utterances, and this contextual information must be integrated on the part of the 
hearer by inference: 
 (3a) He’s riding a bike. 
 (3b) She’s speaking tomorrow. 
(3c) [Getting married and having children] is better than [having children and getting 
married]. 
 (3d) The glass is empty. 
Although Grice does allow inference to play a role in disambiguation as in (3a) and 
determining reference as in (3b) (see his treatment of He is in the grip of a vice. 1989: 25), 
his treatment of the natural language equivalents of the logical operators would account for 
the interpretation of (15a) as taking place in a temporal sequence as being a kind of 
implicature19. An utterance of (15a) is not just taken as communicating the conjoined 
propositions that the speaker wants to get married and the speaker wants to have children, 
but also the implicature in (15d). This implicature is reasonable on the basis of the 
assumptions in (15b-c): 
(15a) I want to get married and have children. 
(15b) The speaker of (15a) is being cooperative. 
(15c) Saying A and B usually implicates A then B. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Blakemore, 2002, especially §2.4) and generalised conversational implicature (e.g. Noveck 
and Sperber, 2007/2012). 
19 The details of Grice’s account do not concern us here. He would have the temporally-
sequential reading of and as a kind of default implicature, known as a generalised 
conversational implicature. See Carston (2002a §3) for arguments against this view. 
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(15d) Implicature: I want to get married and then have children. 
But if ‘what is said’ is logically prior to ‘what is implicated’, how is it possible for an 
implicature to fall under the scope of a comparative adjective as in (3c) (repeated here)? 
(3c) [Getting married and having children] is better than [having children and getting 
married]. 
According to first order propositional logic, conjoining two propositions with the operator 
‘&’ (equivalent to English and) ought to yield a proposition whose truth conditions are fully 
exhausted by the truth-conditions of the propositions it conjoins: the conjoined proposition 
is true if and only if both conjoined atomic propositions are true. On that account, getting 
married and having children and having children and getting married ought to mean the 
same thing. But (3c) is not infelicitous. So inference and the determination of ‘what is said’ 
cannot be autonomous (Levinson 1983: 35). Also, if what is said has to be fully-propositional, 
then phrasal utterances (Here; Under the table; That man) do not ‘say’ anything at all (see 
Clark, 1996: 145; Stainton, 2006: 222-230; Carston, 2002a: 152ff). Moreover, there is good 
reason to believe that inferential intrusion into ‘what is said’ is ubiquitous. One way in which 
this takes place will be explored more fully in the following section. 
It is now widely agreed that inference plays a far greater role in the determination of what 
speakers ‘say’ than Grice envisaged (e.g. Blakemore, 1987; Carston, 2002a; 2004; Recanati, 
1989/1991; 1993; 2001; Sperber and Wilson, 1995; Sperber and Wilson, 2005/2012; Travis, 
1991; Levinson, 2000: 195; Ariel, 2010: 104-7 and passim; Neale, 1992: 530 n27), leaving 
‘what is said’ something of “a grammar/pragmatics hybrid” (Ariel, 2010: 289 n10), as 
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listeners “have to calculate parts of what is said” (Clark, 1996: 144)20. The right distinction is 
not between a grammatically encoded ‘what is said’ and an inferential ‘what is implicated’, 
but between those assumptions which are communicated on the basis of what is 
grammatically encoded (a ‘hybrid’ of coding and inference) on the one hand and those 
assumptions which are communicated and fully inferentially-determined (implicatures) on 
the other (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 182). Sperber and Wilson introduced the notion 
‘explicature’ to refer to the former: 
“An explicature is a combination of linguistically encoded and contextually inferred 
conceptual features.” 
(id., ib.: 182) 
Carston has developed this definition further: 
Explicature: An assumption (proposition) communicated by an utterance is an 
‘explicature’ of the utterance if and only if it is a development of (a) a linguistically-
encoded logical form of the utterance, or of (b) a sentential subpart of the logical form. 
(Carston, 2002a: 124) 
The role of the semantic representations of sentences is much more skeletal on the 
relevance theory model of communication than on the code model, or for Grice. Semantic 
representations are delivered automatically by an individual’s Grammar and serve as 
assumption schemas which require inferential supplementation into explicatures. While 
semantic representations delivered by the Grammar are ‘skeletal’, explicatures are 
                                                          
20 There is also a metatheoretical problem with the notion of ‘what is said’, which minimalist 
conceptions of ‘what is said’ are subject to. According to Ariel, defining linguistic meaning as 
“some truth-conditional representation of the proposition (of whatever degree of 
faithfulness to the speaker’s intention)” commits such theorists to treat all conceptually-
required interpretations as linguistic (purely semantic), and implies that speakers typically do 
not endorse what they explicitly communicate (2010: 109). This undermines the project of 
providing a definition of linguistic meaning as context-independent compositional meaning. 
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assumptions actually communicated by an utterance and so can be brought to 
consciousness (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 193). 
But explicatures cannot be limited to the equivalent of ‘what is said’ or even ‘the proposition 
expressed’. Higher-level information about the explicature (see (1d)) also plays a significant 
role in utterance understanding. In the exchange in (16), taking place after a long argument, 
Katie’s utterance communicates the explicature in (16a) (based on Blakemore, 1992: 95): 
(16) Imran: Who hid my plectrum? 
Katie: OK, it was me. 
 
(16a) Explicature: Katie hid Imran’s plectrum. 
Is the explicature in (16a) relevant to Imran? No. He already assumes that Katie hid his 
plectrum, so this information is unlikely to have positive effects in his cognitive environment. 
It is rather the higher-level explicature in (16b) which is relevant: 
 (16b) Higher-level Explicature: Katie admits that she took Imran’s plectrum. 
Non-declarative utterances achieve relevance primarily through the construction of higher-
level explicatures, as when Maureen says to Paul in (17): 
(17) Maureen: Make a pot of tea. 
The utterance in (17) gives rise to the explicatures in (17a-c) 
(17a) Maureen is telling Paul to make a pot of tea. 
(17b) It is moderately desirable to Maureen (and achievable by Paul) that Paul make 
a pot of tea. 
(17c) Maureen is requesting that Paul make a pot of tea. 
Note that higher-level explicatures fall under the relevance theory definition of ostensive 
communication (see above; also Carston, 2010b: 223f; Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 50-64). 
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Sometimes, a higher-level explicature is the main ‘point’ of an utterance, as is the case for 
Katie’s utterance in (16) and Maureen’s in (17). 
Higher-level explicatures must be explicatures, not implicatures, because (i) this allows for a 
parallel treatment of declarative and non-declarative utterances, and (ii) higher-level 
explicatures can then play a parallel role with explicatures in the derivation of implicatures, 
as in (18) (following example from Carston, 2010b: 224ff): 
(18) Ann: So have you changed your views about Jane?  
Beth: She is basically a nice person. 
Beth’s utterance in (18) gives rise to the following explicature (18a) and implicature (18b): 
(18a) Explicature: Jane is basically a nice person. 
(18b) Implicature: Beth has changed her mind about Jane. 
The implicature in (18b) cannot be derived from the (typical) explicature in (18a). It is rather 
a higher-level explicature in (18c) which serves as a premise in an inference which justifies 
the implicature (18b): 
 (18c) Higher-level explicature: Beth thinks that Jane is basically a nice person. 
Because (18c) is developed from the semantic representation of Beth’s utterance in (18), 
rather than constituting an inferentially-supplied assumption based on (18a) and other 
assumptions, it follows that higher-level explicatures are a type of explicature rather than 
implicatures. 
Given this notion of explicature we can define implicature as follows: 
“Any assumption communicated, but not explicitly so, is implicitly communicated: it 
is an implicature. By this definition, ostensive stimuli which do not encode logical 
forms will, of course, only have implicatures.” 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 182. Their emphasis) 
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Whereas implicatures are entirely implicit, derived by inference on the basis of other 
assumptions, explicatures involve a mix of decoded and inferentially-derived information. 
Therefore, explicatures can vary in explicitness. An explicature is more or less explicit to the 
extent that linguistically encoded information contributes to the explicature as opposed to 
contextually inferred information (id., ib.). 
On this view, (19a) would be the most explicit and (19c-d) far less explicit: 
(19a) Liam put the bundle of keys which contained his house key, his car key, and the 
key to his girlfriend’s flat on the table in the hall. 
 (19b) He put the keys on the table. 
 (19c) He put it there. 
 (19d) On the table. 
 (examples based on Carston, 2002a: 117) 
All of (19a-d) could on a particular occasion be used to communicate the same assumption. 
They differ in the degree to which they require inference in order to be understood to 
communicate that assumption (id., ib.). 
The assumptions which can be communicated by an utterance can be either explicatures 
(developed from coded information by inferentially supplied information) or implicatures, 
and explicatures can vary in explicitness. Implicatures, on the other hand, are entirely 
implicit (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 182). But they do differ in determinacy. 
Indirect requests exhibit some of this indeterminacy, as in (20) (due to Morgan, 1993: 127f): 
(20) [Spoken on a crowded train] You’re sitting on my hat.  
Any of the following implicatures given in (20a-c) would serve the purpose for the situation 
above: 
 (20a) The speaker would prefer it if I moved. 
(20b) The speaker is threatening me with certain repercussions if I don’t move. 
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 (20c) The speaker will be upset if I don’t move. 
 Etc. 
The ultimate effect of communicating any of (20a-c) would be the same: the hearer is aware 
that they ought to move. Moreover, there is a similarity between (20a-c): the speaker would 
be satisfied with the hearer taking any of those interpretations. As long as the hearer derives 
some set of implications of the utterance as being communicated (that is, as implicatures of 
the utterance) which would facilitate the desired outcome, this would count as a case of 
communicative success. Therefore (20a-c) are implicatures of the utterance. Whether they 
are actually entertained by the hearer is beside the point. The hearer is justified in taking the 
speaker as having communicated something like this set of implicatures. 
The notion of indeterminacy of implicatures appears to have been prefigured by Grice: 
“Since, to calculate a conversational implicature is to calculate what has to be 
supposed in order to preserve the supposition that the Cooperative Principle is being 
observed, and since there may be various possible specific explanations, a list of 
which may be open, the conversational implicatum in such cases will be disjunction 
of such specific explanations; and if the list of these is open, the implicatum will have 
just the kind of indeterminacy that many actual implicata do in fact seem to possess.” 
(Grice, 1989: 39f; see also Ariel, 2010: 125; Clark, 1996: 141 n9; Levinson, 1983: 118). 
One can compare in this regard indeterminacy in the interpretation of metaphors. An 
utterance of (21) is likely to give rise to implicatures such as (21a-e) (from Levinson 1983: 
118. The Gricean model of metaphor understanding will be addressed in §3.2): 
 (21) John is a machine. 
 (21a) John is cold. 
 (21b) John is efficient. 
 (21c) John never stops working. 
 (21d) John puffs and blows. 
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 (21e) John is not particularly intelligent. 
But the ‘indeterminacy of implicit import’ is incompatible with the idea that an implicature is 
necessarily a proposition specifically intended by a speaker (Blakemore, 1987: 70; Greenall, 
2006: 547; Saul, 2001: 634-637; Davis, 1998: 70-72). An utterance of (21) could implicate any 
or all of (21a-e). Grice correctly recognised that figurative meanings are not sentence 
meanings but contextually sensitive utterance meanings (Wilson and Sperber, 2002/2012: 
52). However, his account is clearly incomplete (for other limitations of Grice’s account of 
metaphor understanding, see §3.4). Moreover, it suggests that the indeterminacy of implicit 
import can be captured in terms of a set of disjunct implicatures (see quote above). But 
implicit communication cannot be accounted for entirely in these terms (see especially 
§2.10). In the following sections I describe how relevance theoretic pragmatics accounts for: 
(i) indeterminacy on the implicit side of communication (§§2.10-11); and (ii) still further 
underdetermination of the proposition expressed by an utterance than has been explored in 
this section (§2.9) . 
2.9 Pragmatic interpretation of lexical content: ad hoc concepts 
The previous section has demonstrated that inference plays a significant role in the recovery 
of the explicit content of an utterance. But this has thus far been at the level of the 
propositional content of the utterance. What if inference plays a role in determining lexical 
content, that is, the contribution of individual lexically-encoded concepts to the explicature? 
The work of Carston in particular (see especially Carston, 2002a) has argued for just such an 
analysis. This will have significant implications for relevance theoretic approaches to 
metaphor (see §2.12 and §3.6). But, as I will argue in §5.1, this contrasts with how similes 
are understood. 
Monomorphemic conceptual expressions (i.e. content words) are treated in relevance 
theory as encoding atomic concepts (Carston, 2002a: 321. Due to Fodor, 1998. Cf. Fodor, 
2008). These concepts consist of an address or node in memory which makes available three 
types of information: logical content, encyclopaedic or general knowledge, and lexical 
properties. For instance, the atomic concept LION has three ‘entries’ associated with it: 
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(i) Logical entry: including inference rules with outputs such as BIG CAT, ANIMAL OF A CERTAIN 
KIND, and so on. 
(ii) Encyclopaedic entry: containing general knowledge about the denotation of the 
concept (i.e. actual lions), such as the appearance and behaviour of lions, perhaps 
visual images of lions, as well as (for some speakers) details of their physiology, 
cultural assumptions about their significance, and so on. 
(iii) Lexical entry: For the English word ‘lion’, this means the phonemic structure 
/laɪən/, and grammatical properties of the word ‘lion’ (takes a plural in /-s/ etc.). 
(See Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 86; Vega Moreno, 2007: 46) 
It is clear that not all the encyclopaedic information which is made accessible by the concept 
LION is relevant in each case in (22a-c): 
(22a) Edinburgh Zoo once bought a lion called Jayendra. 
(22b) The hunter mounted a lion on his wall. 
(22c) Achilles is a lion. 
In (22a) most of the encyclopaedic information which is made highly manifest by the 
encoded concept LION will be relevant, but (22b) will not communicate that some of the 
stored logical properties of the concept LION (such as LIVING BEING) will be applicable to the 
(obviously) stuffed lion which the hunter mounts on his wall. An utterance of (22b) is 
therefore a ‘loose’ use of the word lion (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 233ff), and the concept 
communicated by the word lion will be radically different to that of the lexically encoded 
concept. Metaphorical uses are more radical still: very few properties proper to LIONS are 
predicated of Achilles in (22c). I will have much more to say about how metaphors are 
understood in §2.12 and Chapter 3. 
There are three main views of the relationship between words and concepts which one 
might hold: 
(i) One-to-one. That is, for every monomorphemic word we have a concept. This view 
is associated primarily with Fodor (1998; 2008). 
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(ii) One-to-many. What we think of as the concepts evoked by words are ‘composite’ 
rather than ‘atomic’. Concepts can typically be exhaustively defined in terms of 
semantic primitives expressed as features, for example ADULT, MALE, MARRIED; BACHELOR 
= [+ADULT][+MALE][-MARRIED] (Katz and Postal, 1964; Katz, 1972: 399-412. See also 
Pustejovksy, 1996; Wierzbicka, 1996). 
(iii) Many concepts, with fewer lexicalised concepts (i.e. a ‘partial’ mapping Sperber 
and Wilson, 1998/2012: 33ff).  
The one-one mapping account, also known as ‘meaning atomism’ (Murphy, 2010: 74f), has 
an interesting consequence. Because conceptual meanings are non-decompositional, they 
cannot be made up of other meaning components. One might propose, then, that all 
concepts are therefore innate (e.g. Fodor, 2008: 129ff)21. If all concepts are innate, then that 
would include concepts such as IPAD or CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP, concepts which have only 
recently entered my conceptual repertoire. Rather than claiming that all such concepts are 
‘in situ’ from birth, Fodor, for instance, appears to argue instead that we have certain innate 
tendencies towards constructing concepts22, and in this sense all concepts are innate: the 
human capacity for conceptualisation has an initial state from which all concepts which are 
acquired must be developed. If we accept an account along these lines for the acquisition of 
concepts, this still does not rule out the third way of understanding the relationship between 
words and concepts: that we have many concepts, far more than we have stable word-
                                                          
21 Fodor does appear to suggest that concepts constitute innate tendencies to construct 
certain knowledge structures, rather than innate knowledge structures (1998; 2008: 132 n2; 
Cf. Sperber and Wilson, 1998/2012: 33ff). My argument here should not be understood as 
an attempt at refuting Fodor’s views. Rather, a ‘naive’ reading of the conceptual atomist 
position leads to the kind of reductio I describe in the text. 
22 Fodor once advocated a view of concept acquisition based on ‘phenomenally-specified 
stereotypes’ (1998: 143), but he either abandoned it or thinks that it is seriously deficient. In 
more recent work he claimed: “I don’t know how concepts are acquired. Nor do you. Nor 
does anybody else.” (2008: 146). 
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concept relationships. Moreover, it does not explain what happens when we use a word to 
communicate a concept it does not lexically-encode. 
For instance, a naive atomist approach to lexically-encoded meaning, whereby the 
conceptual contribution of a lexical item is uniform across all cases, would struggle to explain 
cases of polysemy. Concepts (including natural kind concepts such as FISH) which appear to 
be stable make different contributions to the explicit content of utterances on different 
occasions, as in (23a-e): 
(23a) One by one, she prised the fish out of their shells. 
(23b) The fish leapt above the waves alongside the boat. 
(23c) He smashed the glass bowl and the fish wriggled on the floor. 
(23d) The fish savagely attacked the young swimmer. 
(23e) We had some delicious fish in a mornay sauce. 
(examples taken from Carston, 2002a: 325) 
We could account for the difference in the way the word fish is understood in these 
examples by supposing that fish is polysemous between, say, three senses of fish, 
exemplified in (23a), (23b-d) and (23e) respectively. However, that would require that senses 
even of natural kind terms like fish would have to be disambiguated to work out which sense 
is intended. It might be more plausible, in psychological terms, that there is a single concept 
encoded by fish which is indeterminate (vague) and is specified (the concept is enriched, or 
the extension is narrowed, depending on one’s perspective) on each occasion of use (id., ib.).  
The second view of the word-concept relationship cannot account for the fact that even 
those concepts which are prima facie well-defined make different contributions to the 
explicit content of utterances on different occasions, such as in (24) (adapted from Carston, 
2002a: 27): 
 (24) My friend wants to meet a bachelor. She hasn’t had a date in months. 
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Clearly my friend does not want to meet any adult, unmarried male human being. The 
second sentence of the utterance makes clear that she would not be satisfied with a gay 
man or the Pope as the result of her search, because they would not be appropriate 
candidates for a date with a woman. Bachelor here communicates something more specific 
than adult, unmarried man. 
The third view of word-concept relationships is defended at length by Sperber and Wilson 
(1998/2012) for two main reasons. Firstly, we typically do seem to reason about the world 
by means of lasting mental structures for which we have no word, but which cannot be 
explained as reactivation of the same occasion-specific concept in all its particulars. Take the 
following exchange in (25) (adapted from Sperber and Wilson, 1998/2012: 39ff): 
 (25) Peter: Do you want to go to the cinema? 
 Mary: I’m tired. 
Peter takes Mary to be providing evidence by her utterance which will be relevant to him, in 
this case, by providing an answer to his question. Mary does not want to go to the cinema. 
By communicating that she does not want to go to the cinema indirectly, Mary puts Peter 
through additional processing effort in understanding her utterance than she would have 
done by answering ‘no’. This additional effort is justified by an additional effect, namely 
providing a reason for her not wanting to go to the cinema. What Mary communicates is as 
in (25a-c): 
 (25a) Explicature: Mary is tired. 
(25b) Implicated premise: Mary’s being tired is a sufficient reason for her not to want 
to go to the cinema. 
(25c) Implicated conclusion: Mary doesn’t want to go to the cinema because she is 
tired. 
But notice that the transition from the explicitly communicated assumption (explicature) to 
the implicated premise cannot be direct. Only if Mary is ‘tired’ to a particular degree in a 
particular way, rather than ‘tired’ simpliciter, will the inference from (25a) to (25b) be 
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justified. In other words, Mary is communicating explicitly that that she is tired enough not 
to want to go to the cinema on that occasion (id., ib.: 41). 
Is there any evidence that such an occasion-specific sense of, for example, ‘tiredness’ might 
stabilise over time? If constructing a concept in an ad hoc fashion is more effortful than 
simply accessing a concept directly, it would certainly be cognitively efficient for humans to 
be capable of forming stable concepts in this way. And there is abundant evidence from 
introspection that we do reason about the world by means of stable, but unlexicalised, 
mental structures (Sperber and Wilson, 1998/2012: 44). One frequently finds that there is 
not quite the right word available in a public language (such as English) to express one’s 
private thought with a high degree of fidelity. This is not a conclusive proof of the existence 
of such unlexicalised concepts, as Sperber and Wilson recognise (id., ib.), but it is a far more 
reasonable hypothesis about human conceptual organisation than the alternative: that what 
Mary communicates by tired in (25) (an ad hoc concept, TIRED*. See below) is accessed every 
time that concept functions as a constituent of one of her thoughts, and that a process of 
disambiguation amongst a plethora of senses associated with the word tired is required to 
determine the content of her utterance. 
A second argument in favour of the hypothesis that we have more concepts than words is 
that new lexical words (excluding proper names) are relatively rare. Clear examples of 
neologisms for previously unlexicalised concepts or concepts which did not exist previously 
are infrequent. Consider new technologies, such as the concept TABLET-COMPUTER, which 
many English-speakers did not have only a few years ago, and new uses of homonyms, such 
as the word text, which is now often used for typed messages communicated by mobile 
phone. These new coinages are relatively infrequent. It does not seem plausible that a new 
‘mental file’ is opened only when a new word (or new homonym) is coined (for the 
epistemological significance of ‘mental files’ see Recanati, 2012). Rather, it would be far 
more efficient for an individual to restructure conceptual information so that it could be 
accessed at a new mental address. A related argument for such enduring mental structures 
is when a speaker from one speech community borrows an expression from the (public) 
lexicon of another speech community, such as the German word Schadenfreude borrowed 
into English. It is surely plausible that many English speakers already have a stable concept 
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for the malicious enjoyment of the suffering of others before they learn of the German 
word, or its antonym, from Sanskrit, mudita (taking vicarious pleasure in the good fortune of 
others). 
The relevance theory account suggests more mental concepts than those that are lexically-
encoded, and moreover that some words which do have conceptual content appear to 
encode not ‘full concepts’ but ‘pro-concepts’. Like pronouns, whose semantic contribution 
must be specified for the assumption they are being used to communicate explicitly to have 
a truth value, there are certain words which have some conceptual content, but clearly not 
enough to yield a truth-evaluable proposition. For instance, the word his in his present could 
refer to the present he bought, or the present gifted to him (Sperber and Wilson, 
1998/2012: 32). Whether such a category exists or not does not make much difference to 
the following argument, but a related claim by Sperber and Wilson does: that even if a word 
encodes a ‘full’ concept, in certain circumstances, it can behave as if it encoded a pro-
concept. In these cases, a hearer contextually adjusts the lexically-encoded concept to grasp 
the ad hoc concept that it has been used to convey. 
Some of the strongest evidence for the role that pragmatic interpretation plays in the 
determination of lexical content comes from certain rhetorical ‘tropes’ including metaphors 
(see §2.12) as well as ostensible tautologies which communicate something far more specific 
than their uninformative ostensible meaning might suggest. Utterances such as (26) are 
typically not interpreted as (uninformative) identity statements but rather as communicating 
something far more informative: 
 (26) Boys will be boys. 
(adapted from Glucksberg and Keysar, 1993: 413) 
An utterance of (26) is uninformative and unlikely to ever achieve relevance as an identity 
statement, but as a class-inclusion statement it can be understood as communicating the 
assumption in (26a): 
 (26a) BOYS will be BOYS*. 
74 
 
In the interpretation represented in (26a), the ad hoc concept BOYS* denotes a narrower set 
than the lexically-encoded concept BOYS does, with particular properties. For example, 
BOYS*are reckless, fun-loving, and so on, whereas BOYS may or may not be so. 
In understanding tired or boys will be boys in (25) and (26), what sets off the process of 
exploring contextual assumptions is the search for a relevant overall interpretation. The 
direction such interpretation follows is along the path of least effort. The search through the 
context stops when relevance is achieved in the expected way. The fact that the denotation 
of TIRED* in (25a) is narrower in some respects and broader in others than that of TIRED, or 
that BOYS* in (26a) has a narrower denotation than BOYS is an outcome of the process of 
utterance understanding. ‘Narrowing’ and ‘broadening’ are simply by-products of this search 
for relevance (e.g. Wilson and Carston, 2007).  
The ‘banal’ obvious truths given in Carston (2004: 830) and repeated here as (27a-d) can all 
be explained in terms of ad hoc concept construction, where the concept communicated has 
a ‘narrower’ extension/denotation than the lexically-encoded concept: 
 (27a) It’ll take [SOME TIME]* to heal. 
 (27b) Ralph [DRINKS]*. 
 (27c) Emily has a [TEMPERATURE]*. 
 (27d) [SOMETHING]* has happened. 
Example (27a) will be taken to mean not that it will take any amount of time to heal, as such 
would be completely uninformative (all processes take some amount of time), but that it will 
take a contextually significant amount of time. An utterance of (27b) is more likely to be 
interpreted as explicitly communicating the assumption that Ralph drinks alcohol, or 
(depending on context) that he drinks alcohol often, in a problematic way, rather than that 
he drinks liquids (informing someone of which would rarely be relevant). Similarly, an 
utterance of (27c) typically means a high temperature, rather than some unspecified 
temperature, and an utterance of (27d) would mean in almost every case that some relevant 
event of significance has happened. 
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The opposite kind of relation between encoded concept and ad hoc concept can also hold. In 
examples (28a-e), the outcome of the process of mutual parallel adjustment involves the 
construction of an ad hoc concept whose denotation is ‘broader’ than that of the encoded 
concept: 
 (28a) Holland is [FLAT]*. 
 (28b) The stones form a [CIRCLE]*. 
 (28c) (On a picnic, pointing to a flattish rock): That’s a [TABLE]*! 
 (28d) (Handing someone a tissue): Here’s a [KLEENEX]* 
 (28e) (Handing someone a paper napkin): Here’s a [KLEENEX]*. 
(examples from Sperber and Wilson, 2008/2012: 106) 
Utterances of (28a-b) do not communicate the clearly-defined topographical or geometric 
senses of flat and circle, but something a concept whose denotation includes entities which 
lie outside those definitions. Such cases involve ‘broadening’ of the encoded concept. We 
might say that Holland is not literally flat, for instance. But note that we would not typically 
say (29): 
 (29) ?Holland is metaphorically flat. 
This suggests that non-literal interpretations involve something more than just broadening 
of the denotation of a concept, and that the concept of a ‘literal’ use does not always 
contrast with a ‘metaphorical’ one. The utterance in (28c) contains an ad hoc concept TABLE* 
which denotes not just tables (which are typically manufactured) but also natural formations 
which serve the same purpose. Example (28d) involves the use of the name of a salient sub-
category (a brand name) of tissues to denote the category itself. Example (28e) is broader 
still, as paper napkins are not strictly speaking ‘tissues’, but are members of a superordinate 
set of items which include tissues as well as other items which can be used for the same 
purposes. 
There are other non-figurative uses which involve both narrowing and broadening of the 
lexically-encoded concept, as in (30): 
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(30) He’s a person with a [BRAIN]*. 
An utterance of (30) is taken as communicating that he has a relevant (non-negligible, 
perhaps above average) amount of intelligence. The communicated concept BRAIN* does not 
simply denote a narrower set of brains (those possessing a certain degree of intelligence) 
but rather communicates the specific degree of intelligence that is being attributed to him, 
not the brain itself. The fact that the outcome of the process of mutual parallel adjustment 
involves an ad hoc concept which involves both narrowing and broadening of the lexically 
encoded concept in (30) might explain why (30) ‘feels like’ a metaphor more than, for 
example, (28a) does. It is far less infelicitous to say (30a) than (29) above (I certainly find): 
 (30a) Metaphorically, he’s a person with a brain.  
This is despite the fact that traditional rhetorical theories would classify (30a) as a metonymy 
(one word standing in for, that is, replacing another) rather than a metaphor23.  
The class of non-literal uses is broader than what is usually called ‘figurative’ language. What 
distinguishes truly figurative cases (such as ‘creative’ metaphors) from the more mundane 
loose uses is whether the search for the appropriate ad hoc concept contributes to the 
communication of poetic effects. This will be explored §2.10 and §2.12. One real advantage 
of the relevance theoretic approach advocated here over other theories of metaphor 
understanding (particularly those that see metaphor as a deviation from literal language use) 
is that it allows for metaphor to be seen as lying on a continuum of ‘loose’ or ‘approximate’ 
uses, with ‘literal’ uses at one end of the continuum. An utterance of (31) could 
communicate the explicatures in (31a), (31b) or (31c) in the different linguistic contexts 
given in square brackets:  
(31) The soup is boiling. 
(31a) [Dinner will be ready soon.] The soup is BOILING. 
                                                          
23 I understand metonymies as a type of loose use, akin to metaphors, which happen to be 
used referentially. The distinction between metaphors and metonymies is not pertinent to 
the topic of this thesis. 
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(31b) [Don’t go near the pot now.] The soup is BOILING*. 
(31c) [You could eat dinner now but it would be best to let it cool down.] The soup is 
BOILING**. 
(see Carston, 2010a: 301f; Wilson and Carston, 2006) 
The explicature in (31a) includes the lexically encoded concept BOILING, which we can 
reasonably assume to denote, for instance, water at over 100°C. The soup is ‘literally’ 
boiling, and when it finishes boiling it will be ready to eat. That in (31b), which will likely be 
taken as a premise for the conclusion given in the brackets, includes the ad hoc concept 
BOILING*: just hot enough to justify the conclusion that you shouldn’t go near the pot. This is 
an approximate use (not ‘literally’ boiling, but close enough to justify a conclusion that one 
would come to if the soup were ‘literally’ boiling). The utterance in (31c) also involves a 
degree of approximation, as in (31b), but whereas the situation in (31b) is a warning that you 
might get burned, (31c) could be a recommendation to avoid an unpleasant, rather than a 
harmful, situation. In other words, (31c) is more of an exaggeration than (31b). Hence, the 
use of boiling in (31) to communicate the explicature in (31c) would be interpreted as a 
hyperbole, and BOILING** is broader still than BOILING*. 
Traditionally, hyperbole (defined as rhetorical overstatement) was seen as a trope or figure 
of speech. However, it is hard to identify any particular ‘rhetorical effect’ in the 
interpretation in (31c). The ‘dead metaphor’ problem notwithstanding (which on this model 
would simply involve the mapping of a stable concept to a lexical item, just as with any other 
lexically-encoded concept. See Chapter 3 passim), it seems that many metaphors, including 
mundane but still ‘live’ ones, do involve some kind of stylistic effect: 
(32) [Look out the window.] The sea is boiling. 
(32a) The sea is BOILING***. 
An utterance of (32) is unlikely to be interpreted as literal, approximate or hyperbolic. It is 
taken as explicitly communicating that the sea is BOILING***, a concept both broader (in 
some respects) and narrower (in others) than either BOILING, BOILING* or BOILING**. It might 
mean something like the following paraphrase in (33): 
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(33) The sea is seething, throwing up spray like steam, dangerous to approach, and so 
on. 
The process by which the ad hoc concept in (32a) is recovered is essentially the same as that 
in (31a-c): the identification of the intended (and communicated) concept by exploring the 
encyclopaedic assumptions attached to the lexically-encoded concept in order to determine 
the explicature. But there are two interesting differences between the approximate and 
hyperbolic cases and the metaphorical ones. Firstly, the way in which the context is explored 
is different. Secondly, paraphrases of metaphors are far less satisfying than those of 
approximate and hyperbolic uses ((34a) and (34b) respectively): 
 (34a) The soup is so hot that touching the pot will hurt you. [=(31b)] 
 (34b) The soup is so hot that eating it will burn your mouth. [=(31c)] 
What makes (31) either literal (31a), approximate (31b), or hyperbolic (31c), is the particular 
set of encyclopaedic assumptions actually used in making the utterance relevant in the 
expected way (Wilson and Carston, 2006). Encyclopaedic assumptions which play a part in 
constructing the ad hoc concept communicated might include those in (a)-(d) which are 
assumptions which are accessed via the concept BOILING: 
 BOILING (LIQUID): Encyclopaedic assumptions 
(a) Seethes and bubbles, emits vapour, etc. 
(b) Too hot to consume, too hot to be poured into a plastic cup, etc. 
(c) Dangerous to touch, etc. 
(d) Inhospitable to pathogens, hygienic, etc. 
(adapted from Wilson and Carston, 2007: 249) 
An assumption such as (d) contributes to the relevance of a literal understanding as in (31a). 
An approximate interpretation would require access to (b) and (c), but not (d). Hyperbolic 
understanding (31c) depends on an assumption such as (b). 
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An utterance of (32) is likely to communicate not just the explicature in (32a) but a whole 
range of weak implicatures (see §2.10), and a greater degree of responsibility for successful 
communication lies with the hearer in the case of (32) than in any of the interpretations of 
(31a-c). It is not just the implicatures which are weakly communicated: the explicature is also 
weaker in the case of metaphor than in the literal, approximate and hyperbolic cases 
(Sperber and Wilson, 2005/2012: 13). This is what makes metaphors typically resistant to 
paraphrase, not their having no explicit content at all (contra Davidson. See section §3.2). 
Some metaphors are extremely ‘weak’ indeed, and the responsibility for an interpretation 
lies with the hearer almost exclusively. 
This (potential or actual) ubiquity of inferentially-determined lexical content has led Carston 
to propose that lexically-encoded concepts need to be thought of as conceptual schemas 
which are interpreted in specific ways to meet the expectations of relevance raised on 
particular occasions of utterance. Perhaps words like kind or happy do not encode concepts 
at all, but rather ‘point’ to conceptual regions: 
“This pointing or mapping provides access to certain bundles of information from which 
the relevance-constrained processes of pragmatic inference extract or construct the 
conceptual unit which features in the speaker’s thought.”24 
                                                          
24 There are alternative views of conceptual adjustment (see Vega Moreno, 2007: 49). These 
include treating narrowing as involving the application of default rules (Blutner, 1998; 2004; 
Levinson, 2000: 185f), and treating broadening (or ‘approximation’) as a type of vagueness, 
governed by contextually-determined standards of precision (Lasersohn, 1999; Lewis, 1979: 
352). Carston’s account of narrowing-broadening is more persuasive as it suggests why there 
is an apparent continuum of cases, as in (31a-c). But my account of simile understanding 
requires inferential ‘enrichment’ in a different way to that involved in metaphor 
understanding: (i) similes always involve conceptual narrowing, as anything can be like 
anything else in some respect or other (Goodman, 1976: 77); (ii) it is not a single concept 
which is narrowed, but the interpretation of the string (such as) is like B as a whole. The 
process of free enrichment which supplements the explicit content often involves more than 
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(Carston, 2002a: 360f) 
To be absolutely clear: elements of the ‘code’ (delivered by the strictly ‘linguistic’ system of 
syntax and lexical semantics) can be overridden by the inferential pragmatic system (id., ib.: 
159). Both (i) decoded ‘semantic’ representations (the logical form) of utterances and (ii) 
individual lexical contributions to such representations are abstract and schematic: 
“While sentences encode thought/proposition templates, words encode concept 
templates; it’s linguistic underdeterminacy all the way down.” 
(id., ib.: 360) 
2.10 Poetic effects and non-propositional effects 
The previous section has demonstrated that concepts cannot be thought of as 
internalisations of the words used to communicate them (Sperber and Wilson, 1998/2012). 
The fact that there is no lexical item for the occasion-specific sense which is communicated 
proves no obstacle to successful communication. An unlexicalised concept can still be 
communicated. But, by using a word which lexically-encodes a concept different from the 
one communicated, a speaker shifts the responsibility for successful communication onto 
the hearer. They are put to additional effort in recovering the concept intended as part of 
the explicature, and the effort involved in the search for the communicated concept is offset 
by an expectation on the part of the hearer for a wide range of positive cognitive effects. 
This expectation is then ‘cashed in’ in terms of the weak implicatures of the utterance. To 
put it another way: poetic effects arise when a hearer takes a large number of contextual 
implications to fall under the communicative intentions of the speaker, but this means that 
there is no clear cut-off between weak implicatures and ‘mere implications’ (Pilkington, 
2000: 81). 
It has plausibly been argued that certain uses of language, including but not limited to 
figurative utterances, do not just communicate either (i) relatively determinate implicit 
content, or (ii) a wide range of weakly communicated implicatures (poetic effects), but can 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
one conceptual element, something which is impossible for metaphor according to the 
account given above. 
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also communicate (iii) non-propositional effects. For example, the metaphor Achilles is a lion 
can be taken communicate the feeling of fear one might feel in Achilles’ presence, and the 
simile Our relationship is receding like a train disappearing into a tunnel could be said to 
communicate an image, namely the image of the disappearing train which is mentioned in 
the vehicle. One important question I will address at the end of this section is whether what 
we need from a theory of simile understanding is an account of the poetic effects similes 
communicate, or whether we need to go beyond the account of the communicated content 
of figurative utterances which Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance (1995) provides and 
incorporate a theory of the evocation of non-propositional effects. 
In relevance theory, acts of ostensive communication are public events which provide 
evidence for private thoughts (e.g. Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 230). But as the hearer shares 
responsibility with the speaker for successful communication, and does so to varying 
degrees, how does a hearer know if the representation recovered in interpreting the 
utterance is a representation of the thought the speaker intended to communicate? If by 
this we mean an identical representation of the thought the speaker intended to 
communicate, then the speaker has no such guarantee that the communicated assumptions 
will match (that is, be identical to) those intended to be communicated by the speaker. 
Sperber and Wilson call representations which are used to represent some state of affairs by 
being true of that state of affairs descriptions. But utterances are not descriptively identical 
to the thoughts they are used to communicate. Rather, every utterance is an interpretation 
of a private thought of a speaker. Interpretations are representations which resemble 
another representation to the extent that they share analytic and contextual implications 
(id., ib.: 227; Carston, 2002a: 158). Successful communication can then be seen as involving a 
hearer making an interpretive assumption about the speaker’s informative intention, and 
the proposition expressed by an utterance is an interpretation of a thought of the speaker 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 230f). 
Literal uses can be seen as limiting cases of resemblance: when an interpretation shares all 
analytic and contextual implications with the representation it interprets, they are logically 
identical and the interpretation is a literal interpretation of the other representation 
(Carston, 2002a: 332). Relevance theorists originally saw metaphor as primarily about the 
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relationship between thoughts and the utterances which are used to communicate those 
thoughts simpliciter (see Sperber and Wilson, 1995 §4.7-8; also Carston, 2002a; 2002b; 
Wilson, 2000/2012; Wilson and Sperber, 2002/2012). On this account, metaphorical 
utterances are loose interpretations of thoughts (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 231-7). An 
interpretation is ‘loose’ when it is not logically identical to the thought communicated: 
“In some (perhaps many) instances, a speaker chooses to produce an utterance which is 
a less-than-literal (that is, a loose) interpretation of the thought she intends to 
communicate. This will arise when she judges that the communication of her thought is 
facilitated by such a non-literal utterance, in that it makes the thought more accessible 
to the hearer than a literal one would, or when there is not an utterance available to 
provide a literal means of expression of the thought [...] [In many cases] it is just not 
possible to find a literal utterance to express the thought one has and a 
loose/metaphorical use is not just the best, but the only, way to communicate it.” 
(Carston, 2002a: 331) 
Not only does the ‘loose use’ account of metaphor capture the difference in content 
between the thought communicated and the interpretation of that thought (which underlies 
the intuition that metaphors are ostensibly false), it also predicts that such loose uses will 
often be more relevant than any possible literal interpretation in the public language which 
is available to speaker and hearer. 
In a literal use such as (35a), the contextual implications of the thought communicated and 
the interpretation of that thought (the proposition expressed by the utterance) are the 
same: 
(35a) Aslan is a lion. 
An utterance of (35a) communicates that the fictional character Aslan is a member of the 
species panthera leo, which is exactly the thought intended to be communicated. The 
utterance achieves relevance as a literal interpretation of the thought communicated. 
However, in an utterance of (35b), the proposition expressed and the thought 
communicated come apart: 
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(35b) Achilles is a lion. 
Achilles is a (human) soldier, and so cannot be a member of the species panthera leo. The 
speaker communicates that her utterance is optimally relevant, but the proposition 
expressed does not provide the hearer with the right contextual implications (such as the 
implicature that Achilles is brave, and others). 
If an interpretation shares logical and contextual implications with the representation of 
which it is an interpretation, how do we know if what the hearer recovers shares logical and 
contextual implications with the thought the speaker intended to communicate? Utterances 
are external interpretations of internal thoughts. Thoughts have constituents, and so do 
utterances which contain linguistic constituents (including literary utterances). One solution 
to the above problem would be to assume that constituents of utterances should 
correspond to constituents of thoughts. But this is not always the case. 
A clear case of the deliberately creative trade-off between cognitive effort and effects is 
epizeuxis. Epizeuxis is traditionally identified as a figure of speech whereby a speaker/author 
uses repetition of a lexical item to elicit a stylistic effect. As Sperber and Wilson show (1995: 
219ff), the utterances in (36a-e) all use repetition of a single lexical item, but the effects are 
different: 
 (36a) We went for a long, long walk. 
 (36b) There were houses, houses everywhere. 
 (36c) I shall never, never smoke again. 
 (36d) There’s a fox, a fox in the garden. 
 (36e) My childhood days are gone, gone. 
 (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 219) 
The example in (36a) conveys that the speaker went for a very long walk; (36b) that there 
were a lot of houses; (36c) that the speaker is determined never to smoke again; (36d) that 
the speaker was excited about there being a fox in the garden; and (36e) that the speaker 
has been emotionally affected by the passing of her childhood days. The contributions that 
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the repetitions make can be at the level of the explicit content of the utterance (the 
explicature, as in (36a-b)), or the degree of commitment to the explicit content of the 
utterance (a higher level explicature, in (36c)) or in some other expression of the speaker’s 
attitude (id., ib.). 
In (36a-b), the speaker can communicate something other than the equivalent utterances 
without repetition would have communicated, and she does so by exploiting the fact that 
utterances communicate a presumption of their own optimal relevance. In other words, 
utterances communicate the fact that they are in the optimal form possible (given their 
current purposes in communication and expectations about each other’s abilities and 
preferences) which would provide the hearer with the most positive cognitive effects for the 
least possible effort. What happens if an utterance is in such a form that provides evidence 
to the hearer that he is being put through additional effort than would otherwise be the 
case? For utterances involving epizeuxis, this additional effort is due to processing a longer 
utterance with no increase in linguistically supplied content commensurate with the 
additional effort required to process the utterance. 
The result of understanding such utterances as (36d-e) is that a wide range of contextual 
implications fall under the communicative intentions of the speaker because of the 
presumption of optimal relevance communicated on this occasion. Therefore these effects, 
although they are less determinate than strongly communicated implicatures, are still 
communicated. Moreover, the implicit content of the utterance (understood in terms of a 
range of weak implicatures) provides a more or less faithful interpretation of the 
communicator’s feelings and so on (conveying a “sense of apparently affective rather than 
cognitive mutuality.” Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 224). In strong communication speakers 
“have fairly precise expectations about some of the thoughts the audience will actually 
entertain” (id., ib.: 60). With indirect answers such as in (1a), where only a small and largely 
determinate set of contextual implications can be said to be intended to be recovered by the 
hearer, these are strong implicatures.  
However, there are often also weak implicatures due to the degree of the hearer’s 
responsibility in finding the optimally relevant interpretation. Communicators can exploit the 
‘gulf’ between the proposition expressed and the thought communicated, and the cognitive 
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effort that this forces the hearer to go through, in order to include under the communicative 
intentions of the speaker a wider range of contextual implications of the explicature of the 
utterance and contextual assumptions which are made more manifest by elements of the 
explicature. In relevance theory, this phenomenon is known as the communication of poetic 
effects: 
“Let us give the name poetic effects to the peculiar effect of an utterance which 
achieves most of its relevance through a wide array of weak implicatures […] [Poetic 
effects] do not add entirely new assumptions which are strongly manifest in the 
environment. Instead, they marginally increase the manifestness of a great many 
weakly manifest assumptions. In other words, poetic effects create common 
impressions rather than common knowledge.” 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 222-224)  
Creative metaphors are taken to achieve just such effects (id., ib.: 237), as in (37): 
 (37) The night is a veil. 
An utterance of (37) will not be taken to have communicated that the night is made of cloth, 
but rather, that it is dark, it hides something one might otherwise see, it provides cover for 
otherwise embarrassing or nefarious activities, and so on. The speaker has chosen to 
communicate something by means of a word which does not directly encode that meaning. 
This incurs otherwise gratuitous processing effort in determining what the speaker has 
conveyed. In order to do so, the hearer has to expand the context in which the utterance is 
interpreted, accessing less and less manifest contextual assumptions, including 
encyclopaedic assumptions attached to concepts contained in other encyclopaedic 
assumptions, until the first interpretation which does satisfy the presumption of relevance is 
achieved. Developments within relevance theory maintained the explanation of metaphors 
as ‘loose uses’, but subsumed metaphorical understanding under the view of lexical-
pragmatic inferential adjustment of conceptual elements introduced in §2.4 (see Carston, 
2002a §5). Sperber and Wilson propose a similar explanation for example (36e) (1995: 219-
222). 
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The outcome of comprehension of loose uses looks quite different from the communication 
of a single message which can be captured in propositional terms, as with strong 
implicatures. A much wider space in the topography of the hearer’s cognitive environment 
has been subtly altered. Note that the kind of ‘exploitation’ involved here is not a deviation 
from a standard use, as with the proposed ‘floutings’ of Gricean maxims (see section §3.2). 
Speakers are ‘exploiting’, that is ‘making full use of’, the fact that their utterances will always 
be considered to be geared towards achieving relevance: a perfectly general, exceptionless 
occurrence.  
Similes can also achieve poetic effects, but, crucially, relevance theory would predict that 
they will do so in a slightly different way to metaphor: 
 (38) The night is like a veil. 
There is some debate about what an utterance of a simile such as (38) communicates 
explicitly (see Chapter 3 and §4.2). However, the assumption here will be the simplest one: 
that an utterance of a simile communicates what they appear to communicate, namely a 
comparison. An utterance of (38) communicates many of the same poetic effects as (37). But 
the explicit content of metaphors is also open to debate (see Chapter 3). The pressing 
question for an analysis of the pragmatics of similes is why does a certain type of linguistic 
string correlate with the communication of poetic effects? As I explored in §2.6, there is a 
clear theoretical reason why metaphors are amenable to evoking poetic effects: due to the 
lexical pragmatic processes which are required in understanding them. So why do (37) and 
(38) overlap in terms of their weaker effects (part of the implicit content of these 
utterances) at all? How certain comparisons achieve poetic effects is the central question of 
this thesis and this question will be addressed in Chapter 5. 
For Fodor, thoughts are ‘representations’ in two senses (1998). The first is that thoughts are 
‘represented’ in the mind (in the same way that Chomsky uses the notion of 
‘representation’. 2000: 158-160). The other is that “their content is at least partly 
determined by their relationship with the external world” (Blakemore, 2002: 29). In fact, 
natural language sentences cannot have truth conditions, but thoughts can (see e.g. Carston, 
2002a: 58). Does that mean that all thoughts are propositional? What are the kinds of 
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thoughts which poets communicate? Are these fully-propositional? There are many reasons 
to believe that communicated thoughts are not limited to fully-propositional 
representations. 
Importantly, for our purposes, poets seem to understand poetry as a deficient means of 
communication, in at least two senses. The first is that poets often see poetic ‘inspiration’ as 
coming from ‘outside’ themselves. For instance, the first line of Homer’s Iliad evokes the 
muse (aëide theā: ‘sing, goddess, [...]’), and notions of preternatural poetic inspiration are 
quite common in the world’s cultures. It is unclear how (metaphorically) ‘external’ sources of 
poetic inspiration might be integrated into an ostensive-inferential account of 
communication25. 
Figurative utterances, including the more poetic cases of epizeuxis such as (36d-e) and 
poetic metaphors and similes like (37) and (38), have certain affective effects. By this I mean 
the sense one feels in hearing or reading them that they communicate emotions whose 
content is unparaphraseable and (perhaps) ineffable. Relevance theorists have taken the 
view that at least certain affective effects of figurative utterances may be explicable in fully 
inferential (cognitive, conceptual) terms (Carston, 2002a: 356; Sperber and Wilson, 1995; id., 
1990/2012; Pilkington, 2000, Chapters 6-7). By communicating poetic effects utterances can 
produce a sense of mutuality between speaker and hearer which includes the (merely 
apparent) impression that part of their mutual cognitive environment involves affective 
mutuality: the sharing of an emotion (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 224. Cf. Pilkington, 2000: 
165ff). I do not address how far such an account of the communication of emotion through 
devices such as metaphor and simile can go in this thesis. However, it must be acknowledged 
that an important part of what (at the very least) poets claim to be communicating must 
involve non-propositional, affective content26. 
                                                          
25 It is possible that the introspective phenomenon which underlies such notions is that 
poets are aware that a certain form of utterance will produce weak effects in their audience, 
but are unaware of why this form will evoke those effects and not others. 
26 It must be noted that Pilkington takes the view that poetic effects cannot be entirely 
propositional (2000: xi; 2010). 
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Authors sometimes describe the act of writing poetry or literary composition in general as 
involving some kind of negotiation between comprehensibility on the one hand and fidelity 
to one’s message on the other. This second way in which poets are conscious of the 
‘deficiency’ of poetic utterances as a means of communication is that poems are seen as 
poor imitations of some ‘original’, as in the following quote from Shelley: 
“When composition begins, inspiration is already on the decline, and the most 
glorious poetry that has ever been communicated to the world is probably a feeble 
shadow of the original conceptions of the poet.” 
(Shelley, quoted in Redpath, 1976: 15) 
The poet Seamus Heaney spoke of poets mediating between ‘accuracy’ (that is, fidelity to 
the thought communicated) and ‘decency’ (comprehensibility) (Pilkington, 2000: 12). As 
relevance theory already claims that utterances are interpretations of thoughts, Shelley’s 
doubt about the possibility of identity between ‘composition’ and ‘inspiration’ is a specific 
case of the non-identity of thoughts and utterances. But relevance theory also predicts that 
the relationship between thoughts and public interpretations of those thoughts is crucial to 
a cognitive understanding of style. 
There is also another sense in which metaphors and similes have been understood as 
communicating non-propositional content. For instance, both (37) and (38) could evoke in 
the hearer some kind of mental representation of what the night and a veil look like. As I will 
briefly explore in Chapter 5, §5.4, Carston has proposed that images may also play a role in 
how metaphors are processed, not just in what they communicate (that is, as part of the 
utterance’s content). My priority in this thesis is to give as full an account of simile 
understanding as is currently feasible on the relevance-theoretic model of ostensive-
inferential communication. Consequently, I will have far more to say about the propositional 
content of utterances (both explicit and implicit) than any non-propositional effects they 
may have as the former are currently better understood than the latter and any inferential 
account of the non-propositional effects of an utterance must start with a model of the 
communication of conceptual content because it is very unclear what inference over a non-
propositional object might involve (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 164). However, the notion 
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that images play a role in how metaphors are understood will be a recurrent theme in 
Chapter 3, as several accounts of metaphor understanding assume that what needs 
explaining in an account of metaphor understanding is how metaphors encourage the reader 
or hearer to ‘see’ one thing ‘as’ another. My critique of these approaches will suggest that 
such an account would confuse the phenomenology of readers’ experiences with what in 
fact demands theoretical explanation in metaphor understanding (why saying something 
which is, on the face of it, false communicates something else instead) and simile 
understanding (why uttering a banal, obvious truth can communicate effects we also 
associate with metaphors).  
2.11 Relevance theory and style 
One aspect of communication which is pertinent to theorists is how to account for intuitions 
of ‘style’. The way in which an utterance has been constructed can communicate all manner 
of things. We can, on the other hand, make certain information more manifest to an 
interlocutor accidentally (Wilson and Sperber, 1993/2012: 151f. Cf. the nature of ‘belief 
transfer’ in the spreading of panic amongst a crowd, Sperber and Wilson, 1987: 736). For 
instance, if a telemarketer calls my house, and I engage in conversation with them, I could 
make it manifest to them that I am a native speaker of English, that I come from the 
northwest of England, that I am male, that I belong to a particular socio-economic group and 
so on. But which of these assumptions are communicated? Relevance theory would predict 
that only those assumptions which it is manifest that I am making (more) manifest to the 
hearer will be those which are communicated. This will, in part, depend on certain linguistic 
or non-linguistic features of the utterance. For instance, I could emphasise the pronunciation 
of certain words in my regional accent which would help the hearer to distinguish my accent 
from others in the expectation that this will make it more manifest to the hearer that I am 
from a particular region. The fact that some mere implications of an utterance can fall under 
my communicative intentions also allows for the communication of information which is 
made only marginally more manifest by my utterance. Relevance theory captures this 
phenomenon in terms of weak implicature. 
The relevance theoretic account of style does not claim to be all-encompassing. But one 
‘side-effect’ of the characterisation of communication as the promotion of the mutuality of 
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cognitive environments between speaker and hearer, in conjunction with the 
characterisation of utterances as carrying with them a presumption of optimal relevance, is 
that utterances can achieve optimal relevance not just by adding a new assumption to a 
hearer’s cognitive environment, but by incrementally affecting the degree of manifestness of 
a wide range of contextual assumptions called upon in reaching the optimally relevant 
interpretation of an utterance. This allows for an account of non-propositional effects of 
utterances (of the type we get in reading poetry, for instance) in terms of minute cognitive 
(pragmatic, inferential) effects (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 224; Pilkington, 2000). 
As outlined above, because the presumption of relevance communicated by an utterance 
guarantees to the hearer/reader that the utterance is optimally relevant, this justifies the 
hearer/reader in performing certain tasks, including determining the explicit and implicit 
content of the utterance. One advantage of the relevance theoretic approach to 
communication is that it can capture the notion of ‘style’ in these terms. All utterances have 
‘style’ if we understand style as being the way in which an utterance achieves relevance 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 219). 
If we had a model of communication in which the duplication of thoughts were possible 
(such as the naive code model refuted in §2.1) then we could not achieve an account of style 
in these terms. But the communicative principle of relevance allows us to make predictions 
about how style affects understanding: 
“From the style of a communication it is possible to infer such things as what the 
speaker takes to be the hearer’s cognitive capacities and level of attention, how 
much help or guidance she is prepared to give him in processing her utterance, the 
degree of complicity between them, their emotional closeness or distance. In other 
words, a speaker not only aims to enlarge the mutual cognitive environment she 
shares with the hearer; she also assumes a certain degree of mutuality, which is 
indicated, and sometimes communicated, by her style.” 
(id., ib.: 217f) 
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The relevance theoretic account predicts that no speaker can avoid style (id., ib.: 218). It also 
provides a solution to objections to ‘intentionalist’ accounts of literary understanding (see 
e.g. Molina (Ed.), 1976). One such objection is the following by Maynard: 
“[W]e know intention, a thing supposed to be in the mind, only from its outward 
evidence.” 
(Maynard, 2009: 30) 
It should be noted that this objection applies to ‘ordinary’ utterances as well as literary texts. 
But, as we have seen above, intentions do play a role in determining the content of 
utterances. Nevertheless, intentions might conceivably play a role in everyday conversation, 
but either play a different role in literary understanding, or play no role at all. One such view 
is that of Austin, who argues that language used on the stage or in poems is not used 
seriously, but in a way parasitic upon the normal use of language. Such uses are ‘etiolations’ 
of language (1962: 22. Cited in Hough, 1976: 225). But seeing literary language as somehow 
‘deviant’ would invite an acquisition problem: how can language users understand literary 
language at all if such understanding requires special mechanisms? On what basis could such 
a capacity have arisen in the species? Furthermore, how could they understand ‘ordinary’ 
language use in communication if there is always the possibility that a speaker is engaging in 
a ‘parasitic’ use? Appeals to secondary mechanisms of literary understanding would 
therefore be unparsimonious. Relevance theory does not require the view that literary 
utterances are ‘exceptional’. I explore a range of objections to the current account of the 
understanding of literary utterances in §2.13. But Maynard’s objection above can be 
countered immediately. We do not necessarily ‘know’ intentions in face-to-face 
communication either. But the hearer/reader’s assumption that the stimulus is ostensive is 
enough to warrant the process of understanding the stimulus. 
The relevance theoretic approach to style is not a view based on ‘rhetorical devices’ (as a 
classical approach might have it) but communication, where ‘tropes’ are not treated as 
unique. We are not accounting for them in terms of deviations from norms of 
communication, but as types of expression which contribute to relevant interpretations at 
least in part by the poetic effects they evoke (Sperber and Wilson, 1990/2012).  
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A relevance theoretic account of simile understanding must be in terms of how 
readers/hearers recover the interpretations of similes they typically recover on the evidence 
of the formal properties of utterances of similes. There will be factors external to the 
utterance, in particular, the presumption of optimal relevance communicated and 
contextual assumptions, which play a key role in how these interpretations are derived. But 
context and the presumption of relevance play a role in how all utterances are understood. 
A relevance-theoretic treatment of classical ‘tropes’, including metaphor and simile ought to 
explain why the interpretations of certain syntactic representations tend to correlate with 
poetic effects under certain circumstances. What are the typical effects of metaphors and 
similes? And why do they achieve these effects?  
What is it about (39a) (a metaphor) and (39b) (a simile) which makes them amenable to the 
evocation of poetic effects? Utterances of (39a-b) will typically communicate a wide range of 
weak implicatures: 
 (39a) His words are honey. 
 (39b) His words are like honey. 
Why does (39a) evoke poetic effects? The most recent relevance theoretic account of 
metaphor understanding (explained in the following section) argues that predications such 
as (39a) can achieve relevance in large part due to the poetic effects they evoke because the 
concept communicated by honey in (39a) is different to the concept lexically-encoded by 
honey. This is an effortful process on the part of the hearer/reader, and the presumption of 
optimal relevance justifies the hearer/reader in pursuing a wider range of weak implicatures 
than would otherwise be the case (such as, His words are seductive). I address how 
utterances such as (39a) achieve relevance in more depth in the following section. But what 
is it about the form of (39b) that justifies the pursuit of poetic effects on the part of the 
hearer/reader? I answer this question in Chapter 5. 
If all utterances can be reduced to how an utterance achieves relevance, do all utterances 
have ‘style’27? If, as Sperber and Wilson claim, “style is the relationship [sc. between speaker 
                                                          
27 I am indebted to the examiners for this question. 
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and hearer]” (1995: 217), then the outcome of all utterance understanding will involve 
certain assumptions about that relationship being made mutually manifest to speaker and 
hearer. On this view, the real question about style and utterances is what factors affect 
whether the choice of style is merely ‘indicated’ or is in fact communicated by the speaker or 
author (ib.: 218). This does not mean that all issues concerning pre-theoretic notions of 
‘style’ can be subsumed under the account outlined above. But the technical relevance 
theoretic notion of style captures two important generalisations about how the style of 
utterances can affect how they are understood: firstly, that for any utterance, how the 
utterance has been formed can play a large role in determining the (implicit) content of the 
utterance; and secondly, that one important factor in communication which can be 
communicated by the style of an utterance is that certain assumptions are part of the 
mutual cognitive environment of speaker and hearer. In other words, communicators can 
enlarge a mutual cognitive environment with an audience not just by providing additional 
communicative ‘content’ (explicatures, implicatures, and higher-level explicatures) but also 
by allowing the interlocutor to derive further cognitive effects from the fact that the 
communicator is indicating the degree of mutuality of their cognitive environments. 
Sperber and Wilson emphasise that style is not just a matter of literary utterances but arises 
even in everyday communication. In relevance theoretic terms, example (40a) is less explicit 
than (40b) or (40c) (based on id. 1995: 218): 
 (40a) Sperber and Wilson are the originators of relevance theory. 
(40b) The academics Sperber and Wilson are the originators of relevance theory. 
(40c) Sperber and Wilson, who conduct and publish original academic research, are 
the originators of the ostensive-inferential theory of communication and cognition 
known as relevance theory. 
While (40a-c) each have a different style, they share much the same general ‘import’ (what I 
called ‘content’ above). What differs between them is the degree to which each example 
relies upon the hearer’s ability to recover the implicit part of that content. The resulting 
effect will depend upon how the hearer responds to the speaker’s choice of style. If the 
speaker chooses (40a), then there may be a stylistic effect involving the hearer recognising 
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the degree of mutuality between the speaker’s and hearer’s cognitive environments. But 
even if the hearer does not recognise this, assumptions such as (40d) are mutually manifest 
to speaker and hearer: 
(40d) It is mutually manifest to speaker and hearer that relevance theory is an 
ostensive-inferential theory of communication and cognition. 
When a speaker produces, for example, (40c), then they make the assumption in (40e) 
mutually manifest: 
(40e) It is not mutually manifest to speaker and hearer that relevance theory is an 
ostensive-inferential theory of communication and cognition. 
The technical notion of style can be captured in these terms, as the way in which utterances 
can make manifest or more manifest the degree of manifestness that a communicator is 
assuming with their audience. Assumptions such as (40d) are not always communicated by 
utterances like (40a) and (40b). But when a speaker misjudges their audience’s degree of 
mutuality with them, and, for instance, produces an utterance such as (40c) in a context 
where it ought to be known who Sperber and Wilson are and what relevance theory is, this 
misjudgement can even cause offence. The reason it does so is that the speaker has ‘let slip’ 
that they assume that (40e) is true or probably true28. 
Because relevance theory defines communication as the enlargement of mutual cognitive 
environments, we are not limited in explaining effects such as those discussed above in 
terms of utterance content (or import), but also in terms of the further effects of utterances 
which hearers may choose to pursue. There is no clear cut-off point in many cases between 
what is communicated and what is merely suggested by the style of an utterance, and so 
communicators produce not just shared knowledge, but ‘common impressions’ (Sperber and 
Wilson, 1995: 222-224). In the following section I will look at certain cases where inferential 
intrusion into the explicature can also generate poetic effects. 
                                                          
28 Of course this might not be the case in, for example, examinations, where the hearer is 
expected to know many assumptions which the speaker is expected to explain. 
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2.12 Metaphor: lexical pragmatics and style 
The relevance theoretic account of metaphor outlined in §2.9 is the most developed account 
of a rhetorical ‘trope’ within relevance theory, with the possible exception of irony (e.g. 
Wilson and Sperber, 2012b). Exploring how metaphors are understood is relevant to this 
thesis, firstly, because so much of the secondary literature either treats metaphor and simile 
in parallel or sees simile as the ‘poor relation’ of metaphor (see Chapter 4 for clarification of 
the relationship between metaphor and simile). Secondly, my account of how similes are 
understood differs radically from how relevance theorists argue metaphors are understood. 
Outlining the differences between the understanding of metaphors and similes will help to 
explain (i) why metaphors and similes appear to ‘interact’ in the ways they do (§6.3) and (ii) 
why certain intuitions about the relationship between metaphors and similes (Chapter 4) 
may have arisen (see Chapter 5 §5.2, and Chapter 6). 
The difference between a ‘literal’ predication and a metaphorical use of a predication can be 
spelled out by comparing the exchanges in (41) and (42): 
(41) Gareth: Which new animals have Edinburgh zoo acquired? 
Wendy: Jayendra is a lion. 
Explicature: Jayendra is a LION. 
As part of the explicature of Wendy’s utterance there is a lexically-encoded conceptual 
constituent LION. Some encyclopaedic assumptions of the concept LION are likely to be as in 
(41a-e) below: 
LION: Encyclopaedic assumptions 
(41a) A LION lives in a zoo. 
(41b) A LION is an aggressive predator, etc. 
(41c) A LION eats meat, etc. 
(41d) A LION sleeps most of the day, etc. 
(41e) A LION is brave, etc. 
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In (41), Wendy communicates explicitly that Jayendra is a lion, and her utterance achieves 
relevance by virtue of the encyclopaedic assumption (41a), that lions live in zoos, because 
this allows Gareth to recognise the relevance of the proposition expressed by her utterance. 
In the exchange in (42), where ‘lion’ is used metaphorically, there is some conceptual 
adjustment of the lexically-encoded sense of ‘lion’: 
(42) Gareth: I need a stud for my bitch. 
Wendy: Don’t let her anywhere near my dog. Buster is a lion. 
Explicature: Buster is a LION*. 
In order to for the underlined sequence of Wendy’s utterance in (42) to achieve relevance, 
Gareth must construct an ad hoc concept he takes Wendy as having communicated as part 
of the explicature of her utterance. This concept, LION*, is ‘narrower’ than LION. Table 2.1 
below spells out how Wendy’s utterance achieves relevance: 
Assumptions Explanation 
(a) Assumption: Wendy has said to Gareth 
Buster is a lion. 
Decoding of Wendy’s utterance generates a 
higher-level representation which can play a 
part in inference. 
(b) Presumption of relevance: Wendy’s 
utterance is optimally relevant to Peter. 
Expectation raised by the recognition of 
Wendy’s utterance as a communicative act. 
(c) Presumption communicated on this 
occasion: Wendy’s utterance will achieve 
relevance by responding to Gareth’s 
expressed need for a male dog as a mate for 
her female dog. 
Expectation raised by (b), given that Wendy 
is responding to Gareth’s expressed need for 
a mate for his dog. 
(d) Contextual assumption: Lions are 
aggressive predators. 
Assumption (d) activated by the use of the 
word ‘lion’ (a contextual assumption 
associated with the concept LION). 
(e) Contextual assumption: Aggressive 
predators are prone to hurt those around 
Assumption (e) is a contextual assumption 
made more manifest by the recovery of (d). 
97 
 
them. As (e) might be relevant to (c), it is 
tentatively accepted as an implicit premise 
of Wendy’s utterance. 
(f) Implicatures (premises and conclusion): 
Buster, being a male dog but prone to hurt 
those around him, would be an unsuitable 
mate for Mary’s dog. 
Implicit conclusion derivable from (d) and 
(e), together with an appropriate 
interpretation of Wendy’s utterance, which 
would make her utterance relevant-as-
expected. Tentatively accepted as an implicit 
conclusion of the utterance. 
(g) Explicature: Buster is a LION* (where LION* 
is a meaning suggested by the use of the 
word ‘lion’ and enabling the derivation of (d) 
and (e)). 
Interpretation of the explicit content of 
Wendy’s utterance as decoded in (a), which, 
together with (d) and (e), would imply (f). 
Interpretation accepted as Wendy’s explicit 
meaning. 
(h) Explicature and implicated conclusion: 
Buster is a LION* and so would not be an 
appropriate mate for Wendy’s dog 
First overall interpretation of Mary’s 
utterance (explicit content plus implicatures) 
to occur to Gareth which would satisfy the 
expectation of relevance in (b). Accepted as 
Mary’s meaning. 
Table 2.1 Mutual parallel adjustment in interpreting Buster is a lion. (modelled after Sperber 
and Wilson, 2008/2012: 113, Table 5.2) 
The table involves one significant simplification. There is a degree of indeterminacy in the ad 
hoc concept communicated, LION*. For Wendy’s utterance to achieve relevance, it has to 
communicate that a LION* is aggressive, but she did not say Buster is aggressive. Because (i) 
her utterance guarantees its own optimal relevance, and because (ii) in order to reach the 
optimally relevant conclusion (given under (h) in Table 2.1) Gareth had to access certain 
assumptions in the process of constructing the ad hoc concept LION*, Wendy’s utterance has 
also guaranteed that accessing any suitable contextual assumptions in pursuit of that goal is 
also relevant. Therefore, as part of the promotion of the mutuality of their contextual 
environments, her utterance has promoted in manifestness certain assumptions (or 
prompted the creation of some or all of them) which were not part of the explicit content of 
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her utterance. These are the implicatures of her utterance which she has made only weakly 
manifest or more manifest, and so are poetic effects. Examples such as this demonstrate 
that ‘poetic effects’ are a term of art in relevance theory, and so do not always coincide with 
an utterance being ‘poetic’ in the usual sense of the word. Wendy’s metaphor in (42) is quite 
‘dull’ in contrast with (39a) His words are honey, for example, but is still likely to 
communicate poetic effects. 
Poetic effects are not directly ‘caused by’ creative metaphors or any other ‘tropes’ (see 
Sperber and Wilson, 1990/2012). However, song lyrics, poems and some literary prose 
fiction are all typically associated with these kinds of effects, and all make recourse to 
creative metaphors and similes (and likely more often than in everyday speech). The reason 
for the correlation between tropes and poetic effects is that they can communicate poetic 
effects on a small scale. For instance, a single word, used metaphorically, can weakly 
communicate a wide range of weakly implicated assumptions. Poetic effects could be 
achieved by other means than the canonical tropes (see e.g. Davidson, 1978/1984: 256f, on 
the symbolism of a ‘hippopotamus’ representing the Church in several stanzas of Eliot’s The 
Hippopotamus), but tropes are an effective means of communicating such effects. However, 
any attempt to account for the understanding of literary utterances in ostensive-inferential 
terms will fall down if it can be established that literary understanding cannot be thought of 
as a species of ostensive-inferential utterance understanding. 
2.13 Intentional communication and literary utterances 
Grice recognised that human communication involves the recognition of intentions, and also 
suggested that recognition of communicative intentions is sufficient for successful 
communication (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 25). But there have been objections to such a 
characterisation of speaker meaning, both from the perspective of pragmatics and from 
literary theory.  
There are two main types of counterexamples to the idea that meaning can be accounted for 
in terms of intentions from the viewpoint of pragmatic theory (Avramides, 1998: 76ff). The 
first are ‘audienceless’ examples, such as diary entries, rehearsing a speech, soliloquies, and 
writing notes to help organise one’s thoughts (id., ib.). One solution, due to Grice, is to have 
a broader notion of what constitutes an audience (Grice, 1989: 112-116). The relevance 
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theory account of literary understanding I give here makes a very different case: it follows 
from the definition of ostensive-inferential communication that a communicator need not 
be in direct contact with an audience, merely that the stimulus the communicator has 
produced makes certain assumptions more manifest to an audience. 
Signs can serve as examples of utterances whose audience is not determined in advance of 
the production of the utterance: 
 (43) Gentlemen. [a sign on a toilet door] 
The claim from relevance theory is that (44) does communicate a presumption of its own 
optimal relevance. It achieves relevance by providing access to assumptions such as (45a-b): 
 (43a) The gentlemen’s toilets are here. 
 (43b) Only men are allowed to enter this door. 
The assumptions in (43a-b) are likely to be strongly implicated by (43). That no ‘intentional 
source’ can be identified proves no obstacle to understanding (43). But the relevance 
theoretic comprehension procedure is justified by the communication of the presumption of 
relevance. If nobody is ‘making’ this intention at this point, what justification does the 
reader of (43) have in proceeding with the comprehension procedure? Because it is a 
linguistic utterance, this justifies the assumption that there is an intentional ‘source’ behind 
the erection of the sign, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the sign was 
put up deliberately. Why would it be put up deliberately? In order to communicate 
assumptions such as (43a-b). 
But what about examples which are genuinely audienceless? Sperber and Wilson give an 
account of how the name labels on plants in a botanical gardens can communicate that a 
plant is named whatever is on the label, even if the potential audience does not actually take 
up the presumption of optimal relevance which is being ‘shown’: 
“[A]ll the labels which modify the cognitive environment of visitors by making them 
capable of recognizing that the curators of the garden intended to inform them that 
this or that plant is called so-and-so are cases of communicative success.” 
100 
 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1987: 740. Their emphasis.) 
An explanation such as this would not be possible were it not for the definition of 
manifestness given above (§2.3). The labels on the plants make certain assumptions more 
manifest: that is, if someone were to notice the labels, this would make certain assumptions 
available to them. One of these assumptions is the presumption of optimal relevance. 
Clearly there is something in common here between this sort of example and cases of 
publication or performance of literary utterances. Moreover, even if an utterance were 
intended to have no audience (such as a poet writing for her own pleasure, and hiding her 
poems in a drawer), it would still count as an interpretive representation of a private 
thought. 
The second set of counterexamples involves some complication in terms of the 
communicative intention (Cf. Avramides, 1998: 77f, discussing objections raised by Schiffer, 
1972, and Grice, 1989 §5). For example, giving the correct answer in a viva may not involve 
the speaker ‘telling’ the hearer anything they do not already know. So the speaker cannot be 
intending to produce only effects which cause new beliefs in the hearer. Reminders, 
confessions (when the hearer knows full well what the speaker is confessing to) and lectures 
(where the speaker does not necessarily want the hearer to think that she believes the 
content of her utterances) elicit similar objections to this account. Examination answers, 
such as (44), will not achieve relevance by providing an examiner with a positive cognitive 
effect in the form of an assumption which they had previously never entertained: 
 (44) World War I lasted from 1914 to 1918. 
A (written) utterance of (44) will achieve relevance through the higher-level explicature 
(44a), which is a new belief on the part of the hearer: 
(44a) Higher-level explicature: The examinee knows that World War I lasted from 
1914 to 1918. 
More complex putative counterexamples to the centrality of intentions to utterance 
understanding (involving literary utterances) will be addressed below. For Searle (1969: 55) 
and Avramides (1998: 78), our analysis of meaning need only be ‘good enough’, akin to 
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Grice’s notion of an ‘optimal state’ (1989: 301f). But objections such as those above have 
prompted relevance theorists to propose an alternative notion of what the aim of 
communication is, and, hence, how speakers ‘mean’ by their utterances. 
There are also objections to characterising literary utterances in terms of the recognition of 
communicative intentions at all. There are two ways in which the study of communication 
and the analysis of style in literature can interact, both of which share the same assumption. 
The first, and most typical, is for researchers to apply insights in pragmatic theory to the 
analysis of literary style (e.g. Black, 2006; Fabb, 1997). The second is for researchers to test 
claims in communication theory against one particular subset of utterances: literary 
utterances29. The assumption shared by both approaches is that claims about how 
utterances are understood are applicable to literary language use. This thesis adopts the 
second approach. The use of similes in everyday utterances, in poetry, literary prose and in 
song lyrics challenges certain assumptions in the figurative language research literature 
(which are spelled out in depth in Chapter 4). By clarifying the relationship between 
metaphor and simile on the one hand and simile and what is usually called ‘literal’ 
comparison on the other, we can lend support to an account of figurative language 
understanding which is grounded in a cognitive theory of communication tout court. 
However, (i) if literary understanding turns out to be sui generis (that is, involving discrete 
capacities which are not required for communication), or (ii) if communication can be 
accounted for exhaustively in terms of the coding and decoding of messages, such attempts 
must fail. 
Some make the invalid inference that because intentions are impractical to ascertain with 
certainty they can play no role in understanding literary utterances at all (Maynard, 2009: 
154. Cf. Hirsch, 1976a: 98). Moreover, situating meaning ‘inside’ texts, no matter how 
plausible this may seem at the outset, leads to a reductio ad absurdum. For instance, 
Beardsley, in discussing a poem (Akenside, The Pleasures of Imagination, 1744) argues that 
even though the original author would have never heard the word plastic being used of 
polymers, when the poet says he raised his plastic arm, the ‘polymer’ interpretation of 
                                                          
29 I follow Fabb in considering ‘literature’ to be coextensive with ‘verbal art’ (1997: 14). 
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plastic, rather than the older sense of flexible, gracile and so on, constitutes part of the 
‘meaning’ of the poem (Beardsley, 1992: 26). Even though other literary theorists recognise 
that texts, strictly speaking, do not have meanings at all (e.g. Hirsch, 1976b: 195), Wimsatt 
and Beardsley, for instance, are led to claim that word meanings which ‘evolved’ after a 
poem was written can be part of what a poem ‘means’ (1976: 257 n7). Many would disagree 
with such a characterisation of literary ‘meaning’. 
The first group of putative counterexamples to characterising literary meaning in the way I 
have here involve ‘accidental’ utterances. If a linguistic string is not created deliberately, 
then what justification does a hearer have in proceeding with the comprehension 
procedure? Knapp and Michaels give a famous thought experiment of a verse from a poem 
being left behind on the shore by a retreating wave. Rather than demonstrating that 
accounting for meaning in terms of intentions is necessary but incoherent (id., 1982: 724), 
what this in fact demonstrates is that the linguistic nature of an utterance is enough to 
justify an audience in taking a particular external stimulus as guaranteeing its own optimal 
relevance. A more complex example is (45), due to Fish: 
(45)      Jacobs-Rosenbaum 
   Levin 
   Thorne 
   Hayes 
       Ohman (?) [sic] 
 (Fish, 1980: 323) 
Fish asked his students to interpret the poem given in (45), and they were able to give an 
interpretation of it. The problem for an intentionalist account of literary utterances is that 
(45) was not intended as a poem at all by its originator, but had been left behind on the 
board by a previous lecturer, and, moreover, it is not recognisably English. Does (45) provide 
enough of a justification for a reader to begin assigning an interpretation to it according to 
the comprehension procedure? Perhaps so. It appears to be close enough to a linguistic 
utterance for a reader to attempt to comprehend it. But Fish’s ‘experiment’ is misleading. He 
asked his students to interpret (45). In a sense, Fish was ‘vouching for’ the optimal relevance 
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of (45). Moreover, he had taught them previously how to interpret certain religious poems 
which may have made it far easier for them to come to a relevant interpretation of (45) (as 
Fish himself recognises. See id., ib.: 328). 
Another group of problematic literary utterances are those where there is evidence of more 
than one ‘intentional source’ (threatening a “palimpsest of intentions”, a phrase due to 
Maynard, 2009: 50). Some stochastic literature involves modification of existing poems by 
some (partly) randomised procedure to produce a different text (see e.g. Mathews, 1998: 
130). There are lots of different types of ‘reworked’ utterances, such as song-lyrics 
composed by a ‘cut-up’ technique (associated with, for instance, David Bowie), or ‘centos’, 
such as Etienne de Pleure’s reworking of lines from Virgil’s Classical Roman epic the Aeneid 
into a Christian religious poem about the Nativity (Chambers (Ed.), 1728: 180). Do such 
‘mosaic’ utterances refute accounting for the meaning of literary utterances in terms of 
intentions? 
If they did, then multiple authorship would pose the same problem. If meaning is a matter of 
intentions, when I read Relevance (Sperber and Wilson, 1995), whose intentions are at issue, 
Sperber’s or Wilson’s (for more on the issue of intentional communication and joint 
authorship see Maynard, 2009: 200 n56)? We can solve the above objections at a stroke: 
utterances are not directly meaningful. Peckham takes a similar view: 
“When we interpret poetry, we go through the same behavioral [sic] [sc. cognitive] 
process that we go through when we interpret any utterance. Whether or not we use 
the word ‘intention’ in going through that process is not of the slightest importance.” 
(Peckham, 1976: 157) 
The utterance is what provides evidence towards the intention to communicate something 
by that utterance. The only relevant intention is the specific communicative intention, that 
the intention to communicate something by the utterance be recognised. Authors may have 
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other intentions. They may even have rather ‘vague’ intentions (Maynard, 2009: 62)30. But 
those intentions cannot be communicated directly by the utterance, which can only provide 
direct evidence for the intention to communicate by means of that utterance. This intention 
does not really ‘belong to’ anybody. It ‘belongs to’ the utterance. 
For the thought experiment given by Knapp and Michaels above, the grammaticality of the 
words found on the shore is a sufficient condition for interpreting a phenomenon as an 
utterance, but, as non-linguistic communication demonstrates, linguistic grammaticality is 
not a necessary condition for communication. The necessary condition is that the 
phenomenon be interpreted as providing evidence for a communicative intention: that it 
constitutes an ostensive stimulus. The question, then, is how the automatic ascription of 
meaning to linguistic utterances takes place and on what basis. Relevance provides just such 
an explanation. 
Some literary theorists take the view that literary texts involve an ‘implied’ author, or that 
interpreters of texts must ‘construct’ an author or a narrator for all fictional narratives 
(Culler, 1997: 86; Booth, 1993). One way of putting this clearly is to say that the implied 
author is “the creator [of the utterance the author] chooses to project” (id., 2005: 82), as 
opposed to the real creator of the utterance, the author. For the notion of a 
‘constructed/implied author’ to be explanatory, it needs to perform a function in the 
understanding of a particular subset of utterances (literary texts) which cannot be accounted 
for in terms of the understanding of utterances in general. But it follows from the relevance 
theoretic view of communication that hearers/readers have expectations about their 
interlocutors which play a role in understanding utterances. How different is the 
‘constructed author’ of a fictional narrative, for instance, from the (only possibly true) 
assumptions any hearer entertains about the expectations, abilities and preferences of real 
speakers? If physical co-presence were a prerequisite of ostensive-inferential 
communication, then this would pose a particular problem for explaining literary 
                                                          
30 I am not arguing that authorial intentions are irrelevant to literary evaluation, rather that 
they are irrelevant to understanding an utterance. This account is neutral as to whether 
authorial intentions are relevant to criticism or not. 
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understanding. But relevance theory does not require this. In the case of finding my 
bedroom ransacked by a thief on the orders of my secret service handler, could my handler 
have communicated to me that my cover was blown even if I had no idea who my handler 
was? Of course. As long as it was manifest to me that someone (a ‘creator’, or, better, 
‘ostender’) was making it manifest that they had a particular communicative intention, then 
this would license the relevance-theoretic comprehension heuristic and the act of ostension 
could be understood. However, in the scenario outlined here the communicator runs the 
real risk of failing to communicate anything at all31. This contrasts with a scenario where, for 
instance, my handler arranges for my scattered underwear on the floor to be rearranged to 
spell out the message Cover blown. This would be recognised instantly as an act of ostension 
because it is sufficiently overt. What this brief discussion makes clear is that there is no clear 
cut-off point between acts of communication ‘proper’ (spelling out the message) and merely 
exhibiting a stimulus (my ransacked room) which may make certain assumptions more 
manifest to the audience (for more on the ‘showing-telling’ continuum see Wharton, 2009). 
The outcome of understanding ostensive acts will likely involve certain assumptions about 
the ‘source’ of this act of ostension being made manifest or more manifest. But these will be 
more or less determinate. In some cases, implicatures or higher-level explicatures about the 
‘ostender’ will contribute to overall relevance, in others they will not. More problematic for 
the notion of a ‘constructed author’ is how individuals acquire the putative, domain-specific 
ability to understand certain texts in a certain way. I see no evidence for a domain-specific 
ability for the understanding of fictional narratives. Some theorists have characterised 
literary understanding as a matter of finding a ‘best hypothesis about authorial intent’ 
(Jerrold Levinson, 2010: 149. His emphasis), but that does not necessarily mean that this is 
relevant to literary appreciation. Relevance theory explains why literary utterances are 
understood in terms of such a hypothesis: because all utterances communicate a 
presumption of their own optimal relevance. 
We are innately ‘attuned’ as a species to picking out a particular set of (auditory) stimuli 
from the “blooming, buzzing confusion” of our sensory environment (e.g. Chomsky, 2011: 
                                                          
31 I am indebted to the examiners for this observation. 
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269). We are justified in treating certain stimuli, namely those which have certain 
grammatical (phonological and syntactic) properties, as linguistic utterances. Although not 
all communicative stimuli are linguistic (gestures, paralinguistic auditory stimuli like clicks 
and whistles used by English speakers), only the minds of conspecifics (other humans) have 
the same linguistic capabilities as our own. Therefore, we cannot help but (initially) interpret 
linguistic stimuli as originating in the mind of a conspecific, another human being. This 
justifies the use of the metacognitive abilities (reasoning about other people’s reasoning 
abilities) which are required in communication to interpret stimuli whose origin is more 
obscure than is the case for utterances in face-to-face communication. 
A broader problem with existing literary critical approaches to the understanding of literary 
utterances is that they appear to deny that texts can communicate meanings without the 
assumptions that certain critical frameworks require. But this is patently false, as Pilkington 
makes clear: 
“The idea that meanings are locked up in literary works, until structuralism (or some 
other theory or method) finds the key to unlock them, implies that all those readers 
who have read or enjoyed literary works prior to the invention of structuralism (or 
whatever theory), and all those benighted present day readers who have not taken 
courses in structuralism, were, or are, at a distinct disadvantage when it comes to 
interpreting literary works.”  
(Pilkington, 2000: 49) 
As the above demonstrated, relevance theory hypothesises that all utterances communicate 
a presumption (that is, it is not a mere ‘conviction’ on the part of the hearer/reader, but a 
justified assumption) that the speaker/author has produced the optimally relevant 
representation of the thought she wishes to communicate. This relationship is not just true 
of speakers and utterances on the one hand and poets and poems on the other, it proves to 
be crucially important to how literary utterances can achieve their characteristic effects. 
Relevance offers an explanation for why certain effects may be associated with certain types 
of utterance, and hence an explanation for why certain utterances communicate the kinds of 
effects we associate with literary texts. 
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2.14 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that relevance theory is sufficient as an account of 
communication. But why approach figurative meaning from the perspective of 
communication at all? Surely what is most interesting about metaphors and similes is that 
understanding them involves seeing something as something else? In the following chapter I 
address a number of competing accounts of metaphor and (to a lesser extent) simile 
understanding. I evaluate them according to the insights into simile understanding they 
provide on their own terms. But I also want to highlight the very different approach that 
relevance theorists have to how metaphors and similes are understood from most of these 
accounts. They often see elucidating the psychological, or epistemological, nature of 
metaphor understanding as the primary aim of theories of figurative language 
understanding. I do not, for a number of reasons.  
Firstly, it is not entirely clear what ‘seeing as’ means, or what an account based on 
experiencing one thing as another might explain. I could say (46) (due to Lakoff and Johnson, 
2003) in order to communicate the assumption in (46a): 
 (46) We’ve come to the end of the road. 
 (46a) Our relationship is about to end. 
Does this mean that I am in some sense ‘seeing’ our relationship as a journey? And does my 
interlocutor have to ‘see’ the two phenomena in the same way in order to understand my 
utterance in (46)? This is a tempting analysis. It places the explanation for a phenomenon in 
communication in the domain of a psychological account of conceptualisation. There are 
many advantages that such a manoeuvre away from communication and into psychology 
might provide. In Chapter 3 I critically review several attempts to account for metaphor 
understanding along these lines, some identifying ‘seeing as’ as primarily an issue of 
comparison, others as primarily an issue of conceptual ‘mappings’ – that is, enduring mental 
structures which provide direct access from one domain of mental life to another. 
Secondly, it is not entirely clear in any of these accounts what the relationship is between 
the process of ‘seeing one thing as another’ and the characteristic effects of certain types of 
figurative language (one of which is the topic of this thesis). If we begin the process of 
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‘seeing as’ whenever we hear certain lexical items, then why do dead metaphors (Those are 
bitter words) seem to differ in quality from novel or creative metaphors (Those are honey-
coated words; It was a bitter birth)? Thirdly, might it not be better to account for the 
characteristic effects of figurative language in terms of aspects of experience which arise in 
the process of utterance understanding (much like the mutuality effects discussed in §2.11 
above) rather than as an ‘inheritance’ of the experience of one thing (journeys) in thinking 
about another (relationships)?  
Although there is significant disagreement in the secondary literature about what type of 
conceptualization (category membership, different types of conceptual alignment or 
mapping, and so on) is involved in metaphor understanding, theorists who adopt the ‘seeing 
as’ approach to figurative language understanding use very similar examples in their 
theoretical arguments and similar experimental stimuli. Moreover, the theoretical and 
experimental literature make extensive use of examples of similes. If we want ultimately to 
explain how metaphor understanding relates to human creativity, then I suggest that we 
first need to ‘weed out’ irrelevant desiderata. I will make the prima facie case in Chapter 4 
for a strong distinction between how metaphors and similes are understood, before 
outlining how I think relevance theory would predict that some comparisons would be 
interpreted (as similes). But what if the content and effects of simile can be fully accounted 
for in ostensive-inferential terms? Where would this leave those who use similes as 
experimental stimuli? Investigating linguistic utterances may not provide the direct insight 
into (non-inferential) cognition that many suppose.  
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Chapter 3: How relevant is metaphor in an account of simile understanding? 
I have two objectives in this chapter. The first is to evaluate certain accounts of metaphor 
understanding which make predictions about how similes are understood. If any of these 
accounts make the correct predictions about how similes are understood, then the validity 
of my account of simile understanding will be open to challenge. The second is to challenge 
the validity of the accounts discussed as complete accounts of metaphor understanding. If I 
can demonstrate that these accounts fail to explain their primary desideratum, then this will 
undermine one widespread assumption in the field: that metaphor theory is directly relevant 
to how similes are understood. In contrast, my account claims that: (i) similes are a 
particular use of comparisons; (ii) they evoke poetic effects for particular reasons; and (iii) 
these are not the same reasons as metaphors typically evoke poetic effects. I will claim that 
the field of metaphor studies is in a state of disarray. Researchers appear to have reached an 
impasse over: (a) the nature of the data relevant to investigation of figurative meaning; (b) 
metatheoretical commitments in terms of how to explain figurative meaning; and (c) how to 
account for certain phenomena in metaphor understanding (see below). Given this state of 
research in the field of metaphor studies, one might think that assuming that similes are 
understood as metaphors would be unparsimonious by default. Yet this is exactly what 
many of the accounts adduced here assume. 
There are several initially plausible explanations for how figurative meaning should be 
explained. We could argue that figurative utterances trigger inherently creative modes of 
figurative construal, such as finding correspondences between concepts (§3.6; e.g. Gentner 
and Bowdle, 2008) or through creating new conceptual categories (e.g. Glucksberg and 
Keysar, 1993)32. We could take a slightly different, but still psychological, approach and 
account for figurative meaning in terms of systematic correspondences between concepts 
                                                          
32 I do not address in this thesis the significant psycholinguistic research into metaphor 
understanding proposed by Sam Glucksberg and colleagues (e.g. Glucksberg and Keysar, 
1993; Glucksberg, McGlone and Manfredi, 1997; Glucksberg, 2001; Glucksberg, 2008). This 
approach shares a great deal with the relevance theoretic ad hoc concept approach to 
metaphor understanding (see Carston, 2002a: 373f n14; Ritchie, 2013 §3) and will face 
similar obstacles in attempting to account for emergent properties (see also §4.3). 
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which interlocutors already possess (§3.7; e.g. Lakoff and Johnson, 2003), and account for 
the typical effects of creative uses of figurative language in terms of the combination and 
elaboration of such existing associations. We could also attempt to capture the figurative 
meaning of metaphors and similes in terms of a semantic operator which licenses the 
contextually supplied meanings that are typically found in figurative utterances (§3.3; e.g. 
Stern, 2000). We could also account for the typical meaning of one figurative phenomenon 
by reducing it to another: so metaphors can communicate figurative meanings because they 
elliptically or implicitly communicate comparisons (§§3.4-5; Fogelin, 1988; Grice, 1989). Or 
we could simply deny that the figurative meaning of either metaphors or similes is relevant 
to the study of language at all (§3.2; e.g. Davidson, 1978/1984). If any of these accounts 
could also account for the effects of similes, this will threaten my hypothesis about how 
similes are understood. 
In this chapter I look at each of the above approaches to metaphor understanding and 
evaluate how well they hang together with the theory of communication defended in 
Chapter 2, as well as with respect to a number of phenomena which have proven 
problematic for a number of accounts of metaphor understanding to explain: 
(i) Dead metaphors: He’s a dog meaning (amongst other things) He’s a promiscuous 
male. 
(ii) The characteristic effects of novel metaphors: e.g. She’s a gazelle will communicate a 
whole range of impressions, some of which are relatively determinate, others far less 
so. 
(iii) The metaphor-simile relationship: how applicable are these accounts of metaphor 
understanding to how similes are understood, if at all? 
(iv) Emergent property metaphors: Sharon is a bulldozer communicates that Sharon is 
likely to override all opposition, will be difficult to dissuade, and so on. But these are 
not properties associated either with the lexically-encoded concept BULLDOZER or 
concepts associated with Sharon (PERSON, WOMAN, etc.). So where do they come 
from? 
Here I give a quick summary of how the relevance theoretic account of metaphor 
understanding would tackle issues (i)-(iii), leaving the discussion of emergent properties (iv) 
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for section §3.1 below. For relevance theorists, dead metaphors will occur when connections 
between words and the (initially) ad hoc concepts they are used to communicate stabilise 
(e.g. Wilson and Carston, 2007). Someone who has not acquired the sense of dog we are 
discussing will likely interpret an utterance of (1) as communicating an explicature such as 
that given in (1a): 
(1) He’s a dog. 
(1a) He’s a DOG*. [i.e. an ad hoc concept related to concept DOG] 
On certain occasions, the concept DOG* might be constructed in such a way as to denote 
men who are promiscuous. It seems plausible that with repeated use of the word dog to 
communicate similar ad hoc concepts, certain properties of DOG* could become ‘stabilised’, 
that is, they are likely to be evoke consistently over time. This may result in a new 
conceptual address (DOG2) being associated with dog, so dog becomes ambiguous between 
these non-overlapping senses. 
For many modern speakers of English, the word dog can communicate (roughly speaking) 
either CANINE or PROMISCUOUS HUMAN MALE. Therefore, (1) will communicate either (1b) or (1c): 
(1b) He’s a DOG. [i.e. canine] 
(1c) He’s a DOG2. [i.e. sexually promiscuous human male] 
What differs in (1a) and (1c) is the degree to which the hearer has responsibility for the 
construction of the appropriate explicature, and whether a range of weak implicatures will 
be communicated. ‘Dead metaphors’ are therefore far less likely to communicate poetic 
effects than novel, or creative, metaphors. Can the metaphor accounts explored below 
account for this crucial issue in the way the mental lexicon functions? What will be the 
theoretical consequences of adopting their solutions? 
The same sort of questions can be raised in relation to how to account for how novel, 
creative metaphors are typically understood. More creative metaphors such as (2) are more 
likely to evoke poetic effects than (1) (which can be seen as somewhat mundane): 
 (2) His words are honey. 
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According to the ad hoc concept account of metaphor understanding given in Chapter 2, 
§2.12, an utterance of (2) will communicate an explicature such as (2a): 
 (2a) His words are HONEY*. 
But (2) will also communicate a wide range of weak implicatures (see §2.10). Do the theories 
of metaphor understanding below say anything significant about: (i) the difference between 
‘dead’ (no poetic effects traceable to ad hoc concept construction), ‘mundane’ (few poetic 
effects) and ‘creative’ (many poetic effects) metaphors; (ii) what exactly is communicated in 
the case of novel metaphors that makes them especially ‘figurative’; and (iii) how such 
effects are generated? To address all these questions satisfactorily would require further 
study. But in this chapter I show that there ought to be sufficient doubt about how 
metaphors are understood to call into question the utility of equating metaphor and simile. 
There are only three possible approaches one might take to the metaphor-simile 
relationship: 
1. Metaphor and simile are manifestations of the same phenomenon. They are only 
formally distinguishable. One variant of this view is that at least metaphors and 
similes of the form A is (like) B are underlyingly ‘the same’. What this ‘sameness’ 
resides in will vary from theory to theory. 
2. Metaphor and simile are situated on a figurative ‘continuum’, with one (almost 
always metaphor) situated at the most figurative end. Where exactly simile sits in 
relation to metaphor will vary from theory to theory. But in order to claim this, one 
must have a clear view of what exactly makes one interpretation ‘more figurative’ 
(‘more powerful’, ‘more evocative’, ‘better’, and so on. See Chapter 4, §4.7) than 
another. 
3. Metaphor and simile are distinct phenomena. They may share certain effects, but 
these are not unique to metaphor and simile. Therefore they cannot be treated as 
manifestations of the same phenomenon in terms of how they are processed or the 
effects they achieve. 
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The predictions of theories discussed below about the metaphor-simile relationship will be 
addressed on a case-by-case basis, as they are so different. However, a certain pattern will 
emerge: few researchers make as strong a distinction as I will between how metaphors and 
similes are processed. Perhaps metaphor studies has failed to reach even a broad consensus 
over how metaphors are understood because intuitions about the metaphor-simile 
relationship have been used in radically divergent ways. I will call into question the intuitions 
which lie behind the conflation of metaphor and simile in Chapter 4. 
3.1 Emergent property metaphors 
One of the major research aims of the relevance theoretic metaphor studies in recent years 
has been to explain the phenomenon of ‘emergent properties’ in metaphor interpretations 
(Wilson and Carston, 2006; Carston and Wearing, 2011). The following utterances are all 
examples of metaphors involving emergent properties33 and are widely discussed in the 
literature (with the exception of (3d), due to Leezenberg, 2001: 48, apparently based on al-
Jurjānī): 
 (3a) Robert is a bulldozer. 
 (3b) Sally is a block of ice. 
 (3c) That surgeon is a butcher. 
 (3d) His words are honey. 
According to the lexical-pragmatic account of metaphor understanding outlined in Chapter 
2, §2.10, the understanding of (3a-d) will involve the construction of ad hoc concepts as part 
of the explicature: 
 (4a) Robert is a [BULLDOZER]*. 
 (4b) Sally is a [BLOCK-OF-ICE]*. 
                                                          
33 As far as I am aware, (3b) is due originally to Searle (1993). Examples involving bulldozer 
may be due to Fogelin (1988: 88). Examples (3a-c) are widely repeated in the secondary 
literature, and are apparently rarely attributed to the author of their first occurrence. I 
apologise for any inadvertent oversight on my part. 
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 (4c) That surgeon is a [BUTCHER]*. 
 (4d) His words are [HONEY]*. 
The ad hoc concepts communicated in (4a-d) differ from the encoded concepts in a number 
of ways, which are suggested by the encyclopaedic assumptions given in Table 3.1. 
BULLDOZER: [BULLDOZER]*: 
Encyclopaedic assumptions: 
(a) A BULLDOZER is a machine. 
(b) A BULLDOZER moves earth. 
(c) A BULLDOZER is made of metal. 
(d) A BULLDOZER is dangerous to be around. 
Etc. 
Encyclopaedic assumptions: 
(a) A [BULLDOZER]* refuses to listen. 
(b) A [BULLDOZER]* will ignore one’s decisions. 
(c) A [BULLDOZER]* will not respect your 
autonomy. 
(d) A [BULLDOZER]* may threaten one. 
Etc. 
[BLOCK-OF-ICE]: [BLOCK-OF-ICE]*: 
Encyclopaedic assumptions: 
(a) A [BLOCK-OF-ICE] is COLD. 
(b) A [BLOCK-OF-ICE] is made of water. 
(c) A [BLOCK-OF-ICE] can break easily. 
(d) A [BLOCK-OF-ICE] can be used to cool 
drinks. 
Etc. 
Encyclopaedic assumptions: 
(a) A [BLOCK-OF-ICE]* is [COLD]* [i.e. 
metaphorically]. 
(b) A [BLOCK-OF-ICE]* doesn’t care about one’s 
feelings. 
(c) A [BLOCK-OF-ICE]* is unsupportive. 
(d) A [BLOCK-OF-ICE]* is stubborn. 
Etc. 
BUTCHER: [BUTCHER]*: 
Encyclopaedic assumptions: 
(a) A BUTCHER cuts meat. 
(b) A BUTCHER uses a cleaver. 
(c) A BUTCHER is strong. 
(d) A BUTCHER wears an apron. 
Etc. 
Encyclopaedic assumptions: 
(a) A [BUTCHER]* is incompetent. 
(b) A [BUTCHER]* is unskilled. 
(c) A [BUTCHER]* is dangerous. 
(d) A [BUTCHER]* should not be allowed to 
practise surgery. 
Etc. 
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HONEY: [HONEY]*: 
Encyclopaedic assumptions: 
(a) HONEY is SWEET. 
(b) HONEY is made by bees. 
(c) HONEY might aggravate one’s allergies. 
(d) HONEY is not eaten by vegans. 
Etc. 
Encyclopaedic assumptions: 
(a) [HONEY]* is [SWEET]*. [i.e. metaphorically] 
(b) [HONEY]* is persuasive. 
(c) [HONEY]* is seductive. 
(d) [HONEY]* is not boring. 
Etc. 
Table 3.1 Encyclopaedic assumptions of lexically-encoded concepts versus ad hoc concepts 
in understanding emergent property metaphors (3a-d) 
Uttering (3a) typically communicates that Robert has properties which are not typically 
associated with bulldozers. Similarly, whereas Sally in (3b) is understood as being 
‘metaphorically’ cold, a block of ice is not cold in that sense; it is ‘literally’ cold. Also, one 
might not consider butchers to be stereotypically incompetent, but even if you have a high 
regard for the craft of butchery, the interpretation of (3c) would still be that the surgeon is 
incompetent. In the case of (3d), we can see a similar type of ‘emergence’ as in (3b) (HONEY is 
not persuasive, and so on), but we also see a high degree of indeterminacy of interpretation, 
as evidenced by (3e-f): 
 (3e) I don’t trust him. His words are honey. 
 (3f) He makes me feel good about myself. His words are honey. 
An utterance such as (3e) might suggest that his words are inappropriately persuasive, (3f) 
that they are soothing, comforting, kind, and so on. 
The kinds of emergent properties exemplified by the A is B type metaphors in (3a-d) are not 
peripheral to metaphor understanding. The interpretations experimental subjects provide 
for metaphors often involve emergent properties (see below). Some have taken ‘emergent 
properties’ to be a key difference in the interpretation of metaphors and similes, because 
similes refer to the basic-level (lexicalised) concept, while metaphors refer to an ad hoc 
(occasion-specific) concept and so tend to evoke emergent properties (e.g. Glucksberg and 
Haught, 2006: 364; Glucksberg, 2008: 74ff). It is not clear to me that the properties 
recovered in understanding similes and metaphors are comparable. I will explain this fully in 
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Chapter 5. But for our current purposes I should make clear that although there are no 
‘emergent property similes’ (see Chapter 6, §6.2), this is not because hearers do not recover 
similar interpretations for Robert is like a bulldozer, Sally is like a block of ice, and so on as 
for (3a-d), because introspection suggests that they can (Cf. Fogelin, 1988: 88). Rather the 
way in which similes and metaphors are understood differs. How similes are understood will 
be explain in Chapter 5, and the question of whether there are any emergent property 
similes will be addressed directly in Chapter 6, §6.2. 
Exploring ‘emergent properties’ highlights an important difference between metaphors and 
similes, and will serve as a barometer for the state of current metaphor research: despite 
claims to the contrary, some of which I will evaluate, there are no extant accounts which 
solve the problem of emergent properties. It is strange, therefore, given the failure of all 
these accounts to explain where emergent properties come from, that in discussing the 
potential sources of emergent properties, elements of two of these accounts (structure-
mapping and conceptual metaphors) have been proposed as just such a source (Carston, 
2002a: 355f). Relevance theoretic accounts of how we should explain emergent property 
metaphors are, at the time of writing, speculative. However, I argue that there are inherent 
problems in structure-mapping theory and conceptual metaphor theory. In the case of 
conceptual metaphor theory, there is little evidence that conceptual metaphors play any 
explanatory role in an account of metaphor understanding (if they can be said to exist at all) 
and the methodology of conceptual metaphor theorists suggests that they are more 
concerned with lexical typological variation than the capacity for humans to communicate by 
linguistic utterances a message which is not co-extensive with the grammatically-encoded 
meaning of the utterance (the view from pragmatic theory). 
Nevertheless, several attempts to combine relevance theory and conceptual metaphor 
theory have been made by researchers in the latter tradition (see especially Kövecses, 2011). 
But the theoretical underpinnings of conceptual metaphor theory are not just open to 
objections on their own terms; they are inherently incompatible with the aims of relevance 
theory. I evaluate one such ‘hybrid’ account, that of Tendahl (2009; Gibbs and Tendahl, 
2006; Tendahl and Gibbs, 2008), and argue that it too fails to account for emergent property 
metaphors. All that remains of conceptual metaphor theory as a plausible contributor to 
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utterance understanding is that strengthened associations between particular concepts 
might contribute ‘on the effort side’ to the understanding of metaphorical utterances 
(Wilson, 2011; Wilson and Carston, 2006). 
One way of attempting to solve the problem of emergent properties within relevance theory 
is to assume that encyclopaedic assumptions attached to the lexically-encoded concepts can 
allow for adjustments of the concepts which comprise their sub-parts. In understanding (5), 
assumption (5a), attached to the concept [BLOCK-OF-ICE], could be accessed in the form (5b), 
where COLD* is an ad hoc concept which denotes both cold temperatures and cold emotions: 
 (5) Sally is a block of ice. 
 (5a) A [BLOCK-OF-ICE] is COLD. 
 (5b) A [BLOCK-OF-ICE] is COLD*. 
Vega Moreno suggests something like this as a solution to the emergent property problem 
(2004: 315f). The assumption that “Sally is a [BLOCK OF ICE]*” might implicate, for instance, 
that she is not a good person to talk about your problems to, because being a [BLOCK OF ICE]* 
entails being HARD*, COLD*, RIGID* and therefore emotionally reserved and so on. 
There are two major problems with this solution. Firstly, where does COLD* in encyclopaedic 
assumption (5b) come from? For example (5), it is quite plausible that there are at least two 
concepts which are encoded by the lexical item cold, one for physical COLDNESS, the other for 
emotional COLDNESS. But there are cases of emergence where no such appeal to distinct, 
stable concepts can be made, as in (3c) and (3d) (repeated here): 
 (3c) That surgeon is a butcher. 
 (3d) His words are honey. 
Nor is it clear that COLD as a component of a conceptual representation (such as an 
encyclopaedic assumption) can properly be treated as analogous to the use of the word cold 
in an utterance, because it is the lexical properties which the two concepts attached to the 
polysemous term share (the fact that they are attached to the word cold), not (necessarily) 
their logical properties or encyclopaedic assumptions. In other words, ad hoc concepts are 
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not directly associated with lexically-encoded concepts in the same way as the word cold 
lexically-encodes cold. Moreover, if we allow appeal to unlimited homonymy (one-word-to-
multiple-concept mappings) in our account of metaphor understanding, whether at the level 
of the word-concept relationship or at the level of encyclopaedic assumptions containing 
stable, distinct but related concepts, this will have no explanatory value. We can always 
claim that such a word-to-concept mapping exists in advance of utterance understanding. 
On such an account, the ad hoc concepts communicated by metaphors will not, strictly 
speaking, be ‘ad hoc’ at all: they must all be there in some sense in advance of utterance 
understanding. 
One argument in favour of (limited) homonymy playing a role in explaining emergent 
properties is given by Wilson and Carston (2006). They discuss an example like the following: 
(6) Andrej: Should I talk to Sally about my problems? 
Britney: Sally is as cold as a block of ice. 
The response of Britney in (6) does not appear to trade on an equivocation on cold. 
Communicators appear to be able to access a superordinate concept COLD* whose 
denotation/extension includes both physical and psychological COLDNESS (Wilson and Carston, 
2006: 425-7; Tendahl, 2009: 145f). But there is a problem here. This could be argued to be a 
case of metaphor-simile interaction (see section §5.3). What if processing the comparison 
provides the relevant property? I explore this option, which is also predicted, perhaps 
counterintuitively, by the relevance theory account, in Chapter 5, §5.2. 
I agree with Vega Moreno that emergent properties pose a problem for all theories of 
metaphor understanding where metaphors are argued to attribute properties to the tenor 
concept on the basis of pre-existing properties associated with the vehicle concept (2007: 
99). The advantages of a relevance theory account are that it is fully inferential and located 
within a more general theory of utterance understanding (Wilson and Carston, 2006). There 
are a number of experimental predictions which are compatible with the account given in 
Chapter 2, §2.12. For example, because relevance is goal-directed, this might explain the 
experimental data about salience in emergent properties (e.g. Glucksberg and Estes, 2000). 
So abandoning mutual parallel adjustment and the ad hoc concept account of metaphor 
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understanding is not a viable option. But emergent properties still remain unexplained, and 
this has been used as a counterargument to the relevance theory approach to ad hoc 
concept construction in general. For example, Ruiz de Mendoza Ib  ez cites emergent 
properties in claiming that relevance theory does not have an account of how conceptual 
adjustment takes place “in terms of the way our minds handle concepts” (2009: 194f). But 
communicated concepts have emergent properties. This may be due to the way concept 
formation and integration functions. But why is it assumed that the explanation has to be in 
these terms? 
We could, instead, appeal to conceptual associations, which mandatorily provide access to 
the assumptions associated with, for example, coldness and emotional distance. This 
approach is associated with conceptual metaphor theory, and I dismiss this possibility in 
section §3.7 below as unexplanatory. The second major problem is that it would require an 
equivocation between premises and conclusions. This should invalidate an inference. But for 
mutual parallel adjustment to be operative at all, we require a fully-inferential account of 
utterance interpretation. So how are emergent properties to be reconciled with a fully-
inferential account (Wilson and Carston, 2006)34? 
There is much experimental evidence that emergent properties play a role in 
communicators’ understanding of metaphors. For instance, experiments have suggested 
that over 60% of properties generated during processing of poetic metaphors emerge during 
interpretation according to participant reports (Gineste, et al., 2000). Participants list more 
emergent features than those belonging to tenor or vehicle alone (Becker, 1997). Also, 
participants systematically preferred interpretations of a metaphor presented to them which 
are based on emergent properties than those which are based on common features of tenor 
and vehicle (Tourangeau and Rips, 1991). However, demonstrating that emergent properties 
                                                          
34 This contrasts with Recanati’s view (1995; 2002; 2004: 459f) which would put the ‘move’ 
from decoded meaning to explicature (containing e.g. COLD*) as a ‘primary’, non-inferential 
process, and that from explicature to implicatures (including the conclusion that Mary meant 
that Caroline was spoiled, indulged, etc.) as secondary. Relevance theorists reject such an 
account for a number of reasons (see Carston, 2002b: 142). 
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both exist and are typical of linguistic metaphors does not help us determine how they are 
derived (Vega Moreno, 2007: 77). Moreover, ‘emergence’ is sometimes understood as 
conceptual context-dependence in general (e.g. Barsalou, 1982; 1983). Tourangeau and Rips 
tested for only those properties which arise during metaphor understanding and are not 
attributable to the overlap between the tenor and the vehicle concept (1991). But the only 
genuinely ‘emergent’ properties in the sense I have discussed are those which cannot be 
attributed to encyclopaedic assumptions attached to either the vehicle concept or the tenor 
concept. There is a lot more work to be done on this issue, and lack of clarity on some basic 
issues may be impeding progress, not least whether similes and metaphors are the same and 
what the characteristic effects of metaphors and similes and similes are. In short, research 
currently does not know how to even formulate the appropriate questions regarding the 
metaphor-simile relationship. 
3.2 Is figurative language relevant to the study of meaning? 
Davidson is famously sceptical of the view that metaphors have any ‘meaning’ beyond what 
they ‘literally’ mean (1978/1984). Metaphors might otherwise be a problem for the project 
which Davidson was undertaking to give a compositional account of semantic meaning, 
where interpreting a sentence yields a fully truth-evaluable proposition for that sentence 
which can be captured in terms of ‘truth theories’ (e.g. Davidson, 1967/2006. For a two 
volume defence of Davidson’s programme see Lepore and Ludwig, 2005; 2007. Cf. Soames, 
2010: 33-42). Davidson prefers the term ‘first meaning’ to ‘literal meaning’ (1986/2006: 
252), but they amount to much the same notion: the meaning taken to be encoded by the 
words used. If the first meaning of a sentence involves not a shared meaning but a genuine 
‘content’ which differs from the shared meaning, this runs counter to the second of 
Davidson’s three “plausible principles concerning first meaning in language” that first 
meanings are shared (id., ib.: 254). Quite a lot was at stake for Davidson if metaphors turned 
out to have the kind of content that many argue they do have. 
Davidson advocates a model of semantics in which “[l]iteral meaning and literal truth 
conditions can be assigned to words and sentences apart from particular contexts of use” 
(1978/1984: 247). As Chapter 2 demonstrated, there are very strong reasons to doubt such a 
model, where utterances (even ‘literal’ ones) are taken to communicate fully truth-evaluable 
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propositional contents based solely on their compositional, semantic meaning. So Davidson’s 
account of language is not a theory of linguistic communication at all. But he does have 
something to say about metaphors and similes. 
Davidson’s ‘no content’ view of metaphor contrasts squarely with the view of, for instance, 
Sperber and Wilson, for whom metaphors do have genuine cognitive content (1990/2012: 
92). For Davidson, the reason that metaphors prove difficult to paraphrase is that there is 
nothing there to paraphrase (1978/1984: 246). What metaphors ‘do’, is to make us ‘attend 
to’ a ‘likeness’ (ib.: 247). As Leddy puts it, they “tease the reader into creative perception of 
the world” (1983: 65). A simile, on the other hand, “tells us, in part, what a metaphor merely 
nudges us into noting” (Davidson, 1978/1984: 253). By “in part” Davidson appears to mean 
that similes, like metaphors, do not tell us the respects in which a similarity holds any more 
than metaphor does. Although ‘noticing’ a particular similarity is an important feature of 
both metaphor and simile understanding, this is a difficult task, as “everything is like 
everything, and in endless ways” (ib.: 254. Cf. Goodman, 1976: 77; Israel, et al., 2004: 126). 
But this is not an issue for the semantics of simile, which is (for Davidson) provided by the 
literal meaning of the words used independent of context of use. Therefore, similes do not 
have a figurative meaning at all. If we do not posit a ‘special’ meaning for simile, why should 
we do so for metaphor? The widely-held view that similes are all true and metaphors are all 
either false (Juliet is the sun) or patently true (e.g. Cohen’s example No man is an island. 
1975: 671) is of no theoretical consequence. The fact that most metaphors are patently 
‘false’, ‘contradictory’ or ‘absurd’ merely helps to explain why we interpret some sentences 
metaphorically (Davidson, 1978/1984: 258). If metaphors did have a ‘special cognitive 
content’, why do we have difficulty in paraphrasing a metaphor’s putative content (a view 
which goes back at least as far as Brooks, who argues that poetry is resistant to paraphrase. 
Cf. id., 1947: 185 on ‘the heresy of paraphrase’ and metaphor)? Surely a paraphrase should 
be available for genuine content? 
There are a number of idiosyncrasies to Davidson’s approach. Firstly, he proposes no 
connection between the (unexceptional) semantics of figurative utterances and ‘what we 
are caused to notice’ by their use. From the perspective of a theory of communication, this is 
an unsatisfactory outcome. Secondly, there is strong evidence that occasion-specific 
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meanings do contribute to the content of utterances, and that metaphors appear to lie on a 
continuum with such uses (see e.g. Carston, 2002a; Sperber and Wilson, 2008/2012). 
Moreover, the content of utterances is not limited to their (truth-conditional) semantics, but 
can include implicatures (see Chapter 2). 
He also provides no way of accounting for the evolution of creative metaphors into ‘dead’ 
metaphors, where the content supplied is as clear and as independent of context of use as 
many instances we would consider literal: 
 (7a) I told my boss what happened and he blew his top. 
 (7b) I told my boss what happened and he was extremely angry. 
The idiomatic expression to blow one’s top is very likely to be conventionalised amongst 
many speakers of English. This ‘dead metaphor’ presumably started life as a ‘live’ metaphor 
before gradually becoming conventionally associated with a particular concept (see the start 
of this chapter). Hence, (7a) can be paraphrased as in (7b) without a significant loss of 
meaning. If utterances such as (7a) never had any content when they were still ‘live’, how 
did they suddenly acquire it later on (Cf. Crosthwaite, 1985: 325ff)? 
Furthermore, Davidson does not address emergent property metaphors. He makes no 
mention of them in his published work on metaphor (1978/1984), but since his view is that 
metaphors have no content at all, there is no problem in accounting for the content which 
appears not to come from the concepts encoded by the words used. Utterances of (8a-b) 
would then communicate propositions with similar truth-conditions: 
 (8a) Robert is a bulldozer. 
 (8b) The latest Caterpillar model is a bulldozer. 
Whatever properties we happen to attribute to Robert are not part of the content of the 
utterance. It is just a matter of ‘seeing’ the similarity. So for Davidson, metaphors are like a 
joke, a dream, a picture, or a bump on the head (1978/1984: 262). He is not obligated to find 
an explanation for the gulf between the content of utterances and the (skeletal) semantic 
representations which are used to communicate them. So the emergent property problem, 
and the dead metaphor problem are both moot for Davidson. But in order to go along with 
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this line of argument, one would have to find unproblematic the claim that the truth-
conditions of (8a) and (8b) are similar, and be comfortable with an account of metaphor 
understanding which does not explain why some metaphors are ‘alive’ and others are not. 
Furthermore, if what is communicated by a metaphor or a simile on a given occasion is not a 
particular ‘cognitive content’ (by which I take him to mean a component of an explicitly 
communicated assumption), that does not exclude the possibility that much else is implicitly 
communicated. Davidson himself seems to recognise that there is a pragmatic component to 
these issues in charging other theorists with confusing ‘content’ and ‘effects’ (1978/1984: 
261), although it is unlikely he would have advocated an inferential account of the latter. 
Davidson also states that “in fact there is no limit to what a metaphor calls to our attention, 
and much of what we are caused to notice is not propositional in character” (1978/1984: 
263). This is an important insight which some of the other accounts of metaphor 
understanding described in this chapter do not acknowledge. However, relevance theory 
offers the prospect of providing an integrated account of how weak implicatures and non-
propositional effects are communicated within a fully-inferential theory of utterance 
understanding (Chapter 2, §2.10). 
There are a couple of objections which could be made to Davidson’s treatment of simile in 
particular. Davidson argues that there is nothing to be explained when it comes to the 
characteristic effects of similes (1978/1984: 255). Crosthwaite claims, rightly, that just 
because metaphor and simile have similar communicative effects, and that we typically do 
not posit a special meaning for simile, this does not mean that there is no such meaning for 
metaphor (1985: 323ff). She says that “[t]his is not a particularly strong argument” (id., ib.: 
324): it may be clear that similes mean that something is like something else, because they 
are formally comparison statements, but there is no clear way in which metaphors ‘say’ that 
something is like something else. Although I agree with Crosthwaite that Davidson has 
missed some important insights into simile, I think she has overlooked a more significant 
problem. Davidson has no account whatsoever for how similes are taken to mean ‘more 
than’ the ostensibly otiose meaning they typically encode. In fact, his entire argument rests 
on the claim that because nobody would claim such content for similes, nobody should claim 
it for metaphors. 
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The only example Crosthwaite gives for a simile being understood in a figurative way is cold 
as ice (id. ib.: 324). I will come back to the difficulty of treating ‘A is as ADJECTIVE as B’-type 
examples in Chapter 5 (section §5.4). Moreover, although Davidson’s ‘radical interpretation’ 
project (see Davidson, 1973/2006; Lepore and Ludwig, 2005: 147ff) does take into account 
variation in the way in which sentences are interpreted (e.g. Davidson, 1986/2006), it does 
not emphasise the crucial role that inference plays in communication. As we shall see in 
sections §§3.6-7 below, Davidson was not the last theorist of metaphor to argue that 
figurative meaning is primarily an issue of non-inferential mental processing: of seeing A as 
B. Davidson’s only article dedicated to metaphor opens with “[m]etaphor is the dreamwork 
of language” (1978/1984: 245), which is not only a metaphor itself, but constitutes a 
(perhaps unwitting) allusion to Freud35. But he never characterises the psychological 
processes involved, nor why this process ‘kicks in’ in some cases but not in others. 
3.3 Metaphor and simile as indexical items: the operator mthat 
Stern has proposed a formal semantic account of figurative meaning which, if correct, would 
undermine the approach of this thesis (1985; 2000; 2006; 2008). Whereas Davidson denies 
that there can be an account of metaphor in terms of a “finite number of simple meanings 
and a finite number of rules of composition” (Stern, 2008: 266), placing the characteristic 
interpretations of metaphor and (by analogy) other tropes outside of theories of language 
use, Stern argues that one can maintain a semantic account of metaphor if one treats the 
context-sensitivity of metaphor as analogous to that of indexical items. This contrasts with 
contextualist approaches, such as those advocated by relevance theorists, because the 
contextual-contribution to the meaning of the metaphor is semantically constrained (id. 
2008: 269). He aims to achieve this by adopting a semantic approach to metaphorical 
meaning based on Kaplan’s solutions to certain puzzles in the philosophy of language 
relating to indexicals and uses of definite descriptions (Kaplan, 1978/2010; 1989. Cf. 
Wearing, 2006; Leezenberg, 2001). Stern proposes that the contextual dependence of 
metaphorical interpretation can be traced to the presence of a semantic operator ‘mthat’, 
analogous to Kaplan’s ‘dthat’ for demonstrative items and rigid definite descriptions (Kaplan, 
                                                          
35 Kittay makes this connection (1987: 117ff). My attention was drawn to this allusion by Ben 
Pritchett (p. c.). 
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1978/2010. Cf. id. 1989; Braun, 2010), which features in the logical form of a sentence 
containing a metaphorical expression. Stern also proposes (almost in passing) that similes 
will be conducive to a similar account (2000: 232). 
Indexical items (including pronouns) are a paradigm case of contextual information playing a 
part in determining the content of an utterance (see e.g. Levinson, 2004). If assigning a 
referent to an indexical were all that were involved here, then utterances of (9a-c) would all 
communicate the same thing: 
 (9a) I am Adam Gargani. 
(9b) ?Adam Gargani is Adam Gargani. 
(9c) The speaker of this utterance is Adam Gargani. 
The word I in (9a) cannot be paraphrased simply by inserting another description (such as a 
proper name) of the referent, so (9b) is infelicitous. The utterance in (9c) is closer to what an 
utterance of (9a) is taken to mean, but there is still something missing, as the word this is 
itself indexical (discussion based on Levinson, 2004: 104)36. For Kaplan (1978/2010), the 
meaning of the ‘pure indexical’ I is its character, namely a function or rule which variably 
assigns an individual concept (in this case, the speaker) in each context. Certain uses of 
definite descriptions appear to show a similar kind of context sensitivity, which Kaplan 
captures in terms of an operator, ‘dthat’. We can use definite descriptions either 
‘attributively’ as in (10a) or ‘referentially’ as in (10b) (a distinction due to Donnellan): 
 (10a) [at a crime scene] Smith’s murderer [sc. whoever he is] is insane. 
 (10b) [in court] Smith’s murderer [sc. e.g. ‘Jones’] is insane. 
 (from Donnellan, 1966/2010: 267) 
To distinguish cases such as these, Kaplan proposes that there must be an ‘operator’ (dthat) 
at the level of the semantic representation of the sentence which has certain properties: 
                                                          
36 Note that this is a separate issue (involving the assignment of a referent to a referring 
expression) from the uninformativeness of an utterance such as (9a). See §2.1 example (2). 
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(Dthat) For every context c and every definite description Φ, an occurrence of 
‘Dthat[Φ]’ in c directly refers to the unique individual (if there is one) denoted by Φ 
in the circumstance of c, and to no one otherwise. 
(from Stern, 2000: 100) 
This operator, which is a formal ‘surrogate’ for the English demonstrative that (Braun, 2010: 
171), effectively ‘converts’ a definite description into a rigid designator (a notion due to 
Kripke, 1980. See Sosa, 2001: 467f) that picks out a particular individual as the content of 
that description. This can be used to explain the difference between (10a) and (10b). The 
semantic representation of (10b) must then include an instance of the operator as in (10c): 
(10c) dthat[‘Smith’s murderer’] is insane. 
Now the description Smith’s murderer would pick out a particular individual in much the 
same way that the demonstrative that (or that man, or a gesture such as pointing) would. 
Metaphorical interpretations are similarly context-dependent. For instance, in examples (3e) 
and (3f) (repeated here), His words are honey communicates something different in each 
case: 
 (3e) I don’t trust him. His words are honey. 
 (3f) He makes me feel good about myself. His words are honey. 
One objection to Stern’s account is that some indexical items, such as temporal and 
locational adverbs, exhibit a much greater degree of indeterminacy than the simple case of 
the pronoun I above (e.g. Stern, 2000: 256). But while on this model indexicals and 
demonstratives change their content, and context plays a role in determining the content, 
there is a degree of uniformity about how that content is determined across uses (Wearing, 
2006: 314). Clearly, if one wants to preserve a view of semantics as providing fully-truth 
evaluable propositions from the lexically-encoded meanings plus syntactic rules of 
composition, then one might also want to explain the context-sensitivity of metaphorical 
interpretations in terms of a ‘covert’ indexicality of this type. 
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Stern proposes that a sentence such as that in (11) has a set of ‘possible characters’ (11a-e) 
(Stern, 2000: 134): 
 (11) Juliet is the sun. 
 
 (11a) <<{Juliet}, {is the sun}>> 
 (11b) <<{Juliet, {mthat}[‘is the sun’]}>> 
 (11c) <<{mthat[‘Juliet’]}, {is the sun}>> 
 (11d) <<{mthat[‘Juliet’]}, {mthat[‘is the sun’]}>> 
 (11e) <<{mthat[‘Juliet is the sun’]}>> 
 (case of mthat altered for consistency of presentation) 
The representations in (11a-e) form the ‘character set’ for (11). The character described in 
(11a) would be of a sentence in which both the subject Juliet and the predicate is the sun are 
interpreted literally. The character in (11e) would be the one selected when the whole 
sentence Juliet is the sun is taken to ‘stand for’ something else. The characters in (11b-d) 
would describe where the predicate is the sun, or the subject Juliet or both the subject and 
the predicate are interpreted metaphorically. Stern clearly states that these possible 
metaphorical interpretations are “generate[d]” by the grammar (Stern, 2000: 134). The right 
structural representation from this character set is then assigned by a process of 
disambiguation (Wearing, 2006: 315). 
The operator mthat in the member of the character set (typically, for (11), (11b)) would then 
supply semantic content to the predicate from a set of presuppositions which constitute the 
context for the interpretation of that expression. Mthat[‘is the sun’] is a non-constant 
function which delivers for each context a property or set of properties as the content of 
that expression: 
(Mthat) “For every context c and for every expression Φ, an occurrence of ‘Mthat[Φ]’ 
in a sentence S (=...Mthat[Φ]...) in c (directly) expresses a set of properties P 
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presupposed to be m-associated with Φ in c such that the presupposition ⟨...P...⟩ is 
either true or false in the circumstance of c.” 
(Stern, 2000: 115) 
These properties are the contextual parameter for metaphors, in the same way that the 
identification of a referent supplies the contextual parameter for an indexical (see id. 2006: 
177f). Such properties have to be presupposed, argues Stern, because they pass certain tests 
for presupposition, such as survival under negation (2000: 114). Some of the relevant 
presuppositions for Juliet mthat[‘is the sun’] would include facts about Juliet, Romeo, their 
relationship, the sun, and the kind of features of the sun which might have something to do 
with Juliet. 
For Stern, the variability in interpretation of the same metaphorical expression in different 
contexts can be traced to different presuppositions in those contexts (e.g. Stern, 2000: 221), 
not to different conceptual contributions of individual lexical items. Stern claims that 
pragmatics plays a role in understanding metaphorical utterances and that distinguishing the 
relative contributions of semantics and pragmatics to the meaning of metaphors may be 
difficult to disentangle (see e.g. id., 1985: 706-8), but he seeks to characterize what is a part 
of a hearer’s linguistic competence which allows them to understand metaphorical 
utterances (id. 2000 §1). That is, his account is strictly semantic, but allows a wide range of 
beliefs to play a part in determining the content of a metaphor, as well as allowing for a wide 
range of relations (not just similarity) to hold between A and B in A is B-type metaphors 
(Wearing, 2006: 316). 
Also, the diverse character set his analysis provides does seem to capture the way in which 
different parts of a sentence can be interpreted metaphorically, as in (12): 
 (12) The flowers are smiling in the light. 
Stern gives example (12) as a demonstration that there can be at least two possible, equally 
metaphorical, interpretations of certain sentences (2000: 134f). In this case, either (i) the 
flowers are (metaphorically) smiling (that is, the operator attaches to the predicate: 
mthat[‘are smiling’]), meaning they look beautiful, are bright, open, make one feel happy to 
129 
 
look at them, and so on, or (ii) the expression the flowers does not refer to literal flowers but 
to individuals who can metaphorically be referred to as flowers (that is, the operator 
attaches to the determiner phrase containing the subject: mthat[‘the flowers’]). These two 
possible characters would be structurally analogous to (11b) and (11c) above, respectively. 
But Stern’s mthat, unlike Kaplan’s dthat, is not really a fully semantic constraint. Whereas 
the dthat operator used the denotation of the description to provide the content, Stern 
wants ‘metaphor-associated’ (m-associated) properties of the denotation of the term 
controlled by mthat to supply the content of the metaphor. Whereas Kaplan’s dthat cannot 
be attached to just any expression, mthat can be attached to a range of expressions37. The 
notion of ‘m-associated properties’ is also extremely vague (Guttenplan, 2005: 255ff). This is 
far from Kaplan’s characterisation of dthat as an operator or ‘rigidifier’ (1989: 580), which 
assigns a simple, determinate content. Kaplan was also quite reticent about his account of 
dthat: it does not explain how ‘character’ is created, nor how meanings are ‘assigned’ (1989: 
613f). But it is precisely how certain ‘meanings’ are typically ‘assigned’ to metaphorically 
interpreted elements that a pragmatic account of metaphor of the type advocated by 
relevance theorists seeks to provide. Kaplan’s characterisation of dthat as an operator does 
not sound like the kind of theoretical project which could be modified to provide an account 
of how metaphorically used items contribute to what is explicitly communicated. 
Stern conceives of ‘dead’ metaphor in a slightly different sense than I am using it here (2000: 
309). But one type of ‘dead’ metaphor he addresses is the same as the cases discussed here 
(e.g. He’s a dog). For Stern, a metaphor is ‘dead’ inasmuch as its “interpretation ceases to be 
dependent on presuppositions specific to its actual context of utterance” (ib.: 316. His 
emphasis), because in certain cases the same presuppositions of a metaphor start to be 
routinely assigned to the linguistic string (e.g. dog) in every context. This might work well for 
metaphors which are more ‘dead’ than dog, where the original ‘literal’ sense is no longer 
available to language users. But there is no single ‘routinized’ content of dog: there are two 
                                                          
37 Stern is not entirely clear what that range of expressions is. Guttenplan (2005: 158) is a 
good place to start when looking at the range of word classes which can be interpreted 
metaphorically. 
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stable senses for many users of English. How should Stern account for this kind of acquired 
ambiguity? 
One piece of evidence Stern gives for his account is the apparent availability of linguistically 
realised correlates of his metaphor operator, such as in (13a-c): 
 (13a) In a sense, my hands are tied. 
 (13b) Figuratively speaking, my hands are tied. 
 (13c) Metaphorically speaking, my hands are tied. 
 (examples modified from Leezenberg, 2001: 193) 
If the adverbial expressions in (13a-c) were linguistic realisations of an underlying operator, 
then we ought to expect that they should be able to appear in the places where mthat 
appears in the character set, helping us to disambiguate between those different structural 
representations. To illustrate, the characters containing instances of mthat in (11b-e) should 
yield linguistically-realised equivalents of mthat in the examples (14a-d) respectively, and 
the explicit realisation of mthat should make it clear that these different structures are 
interpreted differently: 
(14a) Juliet, in a sense, is the sun.  [=(11b)] 
(14b) In a sense, Juliet is the sun.  [=(11c)] 
(14c) ?In a sense, Juliet, in a sense, is the sun.  [=(11d)] 
(14d) In a sense, Juliet is the sun.  [=(11e)] 
Examples (14b) and (14d) are formally identical, and (14a), (14b) and (14d) appear to mean 
the same thing. An utterance of (14c) is very infelicitous. Sentence adverbials such as those 
in (14a-c) can much more plausibly be taken as directing the way in which my hands are tied 
is to be understood, rather than disambiguating between structurally distinct interpretations 
provided by the grammar. Moreover, we do not find equivalent dthat-related ‘realisations’, 
such as ?In a reference, ?Indexically-speaking and so on. Even if we were to grant that 
expressions such as those in (14a-c) are realisations of a (typically unexpressed) operator, 
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how does interpretation proceed in the absence of such explicit realisations of the operator 
(id., ib.: 193f n3)? 
Stern proposes that the operator mthat is available for every case in which we could find 
metaphorically interpreted elements (Stern, 2000: 239). But, if the operator mthat is 
traceable to logical form, then each member of the character set in, for instance, (11a-e), is 
also traceable to logical form. This would entail massive structural ambiguity for a great 
many sentences of a given language, and would, according to Wearing, be incompatible 
with, at least, current theories in generative syntax (Wearing, 2006: 315 n7, 317f). Even so, 
the interpretations of each member of the character set are very difficult to distinguish. For 
instance, Romeo would not be concerned if someone took him to mean that Juliet is a sun-
like thing, or has sun-like properties, or that in saying she is like the sun he has made a 
related claim, if they understood him to communicate in saying Juliet is the sun the same 
broad set of implications, such as that she was central to his existence, a source of 
(metaphorical) warmth, bright, and so on. How different then are these putatively distinct 
structural representations? And how can they be distinguished even in cases of literal 
language use (Wearing, 2006: 317)? 
Stern’s account also has unwelcome implications for how novel metaphors are understood. 
One such consequence is that metaphors ought to be paraphraseable (so long as we have a 
rich enough vocabulary to do so) because, in a given context the presupposition set is 
determinate (2000: 250; 268f). That metaphors are amenable to paraphrase is not widely-
held in the field (for a dissenting view see Hills, 2008. Cf. Wearing, 2012), but Stern lends 
support to his view by criticising the hypothesis that metaphors can communicate an 
indeterminate range of properties: 
“Are these authors claiming that if we actually try to state the content of a particular 
metaphor, we in fact find ourselves going on and on, mentioning feature after 
feature, proposition after proposition, literally never coming to an end? As a matter 
of practice, I know of no evidence (fortunately) that this is ever true.” 
(Stern 2000: 270) 
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Not only does Stern deny that the interpretation of metaphors is indeterminate, he makes a 
false prediction: that no speaker or community of speakers would ever consider a 
metaphorical utterance to be open to a truly endless range of interpretations. Paradigm 
cases of such ‘limitless’ re-interpretation of metaphors can be found in religious mystical and 
exegetical traditions (Stern himself does seem to be aware of at least the latter in his other 
writings, e.g. Stern, 2009). Can anyone familiar with, for example, religious exegetical 
traditions of medieval Judaism and Islam really claim that interpretive communities do not in 
practice keep adding features with no end? It can certainly be done, and the reader is invited 
to explore a good many of the examples in this thesis along those lines. One clear case of 
potentially endless reinterpretation has been based on the following: 
(15) God is the Light of the heavens and the earth. The likeness of His light is as a 
niche, in which is a lamp. The lamp is in a glass. The glass is as though it were a pearly 
star lit from a blessed tree, neither of the east nor the west. […]  
(Quran 24: 35. My translation) 
The literature on this one verse alone is vast (see de Boer, 1995: 122b-123b; Elias, 2001: 
186f. See especially al-Ghazālī, 1998: 25-43). Is it really not true that commentators on the 
verse in (15) are interpreting the metaphors therein in just the ‘endless’ fashion that Stern 
denies? Moreover, even if we agree with Stern that the content which is understood by the 
hearer to be communicated by a particular metaphor can be and in many cases is relatively 
determinate, we do not have to agree that all metaphors communicate equally determinate 
content. Unlike dead metaphors, an example such as (15) is likely to be interpreted very 
subjectively. 
Where Stern does address simile directly, it raises a number of further problems38. Firstly, he 
sees simile as a ‘one-place’ relation (2000: 230). The logical (propositional) form of a simile is 
                                                          
38 Stern’s distinction between m-figures and i-figures is also inadequate (2000: 237). He 
proposes separate analyses of at least metonymy and synecdoche, so even within the 
category of m-figures he must endorse different operators at the level of logical form, and so 
still greater ambiguity (ib.: 323-8. Cf. Wearing, 2006: 316f). 
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not a relationship between two nouns or noun phrases, but a property ascribed to just one 
element in the form of a predicate: 
 (16a) Achilles is like a lion. 
 (16b) LIKE-A-LION(Achilles). 
This would suggest that, on Stern’s account, simile is very much like metaphor, except with 
only one position in which mthat could occur (outside the predicate). He accepts Goodman’s 
proposal that simile is essentially a metaphor (or that the difference between them is 
‘negligible’. 1976: 77f), and explains the fact that one can deny a simile but assert a 
metaphor without contradiction (as in (17)) in the following terms: 
 (17) Juliet is not like the sun, she is the sun. 
“’[L]ike’ functions as a hedge, or qualifier on the content [...] What is denied in the 
first clause is the qualification, not the content simpliciter, which in turn is affirmed 
with emphasis in the second clause. Both clauses, however, are interpreted 
metaphorically.” 
(Stern, 2000: 232). 
The near ‘interchangeability’ (not to be confused with identity) of metaphor and simile, with 
simile functioning as a ‘hedged’ metaphor, is a widespread assumption. Some similar claims 
will be discussed in Chapter 4, §§4.2-3 and I will propose my own explanation for examples 
such as (17) in Chapter 5, §5.1 (see discussion of example (13)). 
Interestingly, it may be possible to solve the emergent property problem on Stern’s account. 
Because the operator ‘fetches’ information from the context, this can presumably include 
assumptions which are not directly associated with the tenor or vehicle concepts, but are 
part of the potential context of the utterance for some other reason than processing those 
concepts. However, Stern does not appear to address the problem directly, perhaps seeing it 
as only posing a challenge to accounts like that of relevance theory (Cf. id., 2006: 248ff). 
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3.4 Metaphor as elliptical simile 
The view that metaphors are figurative comparisons is supposedly the ‘traditional view’ 
(Miller, 1993: 357; Ricoeur, 2003: 239), yet few claim to support it. Fogelin gives the most 
sustained defence of this view (1988), which boils down to the claim that metaphor is an 
‘elliptical’ or ‘abbreviated’ simile. Fogelin takes pains to argue that critics of the 
comparativist view have falsely accused comparativists of arguing that the figurative 
meaning of a metaphor can be explained by the literal meaning of a simile (Leech appears to 
take this view. 1969: 156). But unless we can find a satisfactory account of how any similes 
are interpreted figuratively, then explaining metaphor as simply ‘being’ simile will be circular 
(Searle, 1993: 95). 
Fogelin rightly argues that one must justify the claim that anything can be like anything else 
in some respect or other by means of a deductive argument (which I paraphrase here. 1988: 
60f): 
 Premise 1: A is similar to B if there is at least one thing which is true of both. 
 Premise 2: For any A and any B there is at least one thing which is true of both. 
 Conclusion: For any A and any B, A is similar to B. 
Because both premises are necessarily true, we ought to expect that the conclusion is also 
necessarily true: so anything is like anything else. Every comparison is true in some respect 
or other, that is, for any A and any B, A and B share some property Φ for which A is Φ and B 
is Φ are both true. 
Fogelin claims that, because similarity claims are interpreted in a ‘directional’ fashion, this 
means that the above argument is invalid, for example: 
 “[B]each chairs look like clothespins, but not the other way round.” 
 (id., ib.: 83) 
Because Beach chairs look like clothespins means something different to Clothespins look like 
beach chairs, then similarity statements cannot be universal (id., ib.: 62ff). Fogelin has here 
confused utterance meaning with sentence meaning, and he has not given an account of 
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what the sentence meaning of these utterances is. It would be interesting to see what 
contribution like makes to the semantic representation of a sentence, but the way in which 
comparisons are interpreted makes this very difficult to determine (see Chapter 5). But just 
because an utterance is interpreted as directional does not mean that ‘likeness’ itself has a 
direction, whatever that would mean. Fogelin has conflated being similar with saying that 
something is similar. Therefore the intuition that anything can be like anything else, 
something can be like nothing, something can be like itself, and so on (see §3.2 above), is 
robust. 
Let us assume, with Fogelin, that metaphors simply are (figurative) similes (id., ib.: 34). So 
(18a) and (18b) are semantically identical: 
 (18a) Achilles is a lion. 
 (18b) Achilles is like a lion. 
Let us also assume that we already have an account of how similes are understood, which 
explains why they have their characteristic effects. If we can only explain the ‘metaphoricity’ 
of certain predications like (18a) in the same way as the ‘figurativeness’ of (18b), then what 
about cases of metaphor use where there are no simile paraphrases available, or where the 
simile appears not to capture the metaphor (Levinson, 1983: 156)? This is a problem which 
will be inherited by implicated simile accounts of metaphor understanding. 
For Fogelin, a simile is a comparison between two unlike things (1988: 35. Cf. Corbett and 
Connors, 1999: 396). As I will explain in Chapter 5 (§5.2.2) it seems much more likely that 
‘conceptual distance’ between tenor and vehicle in poetic similes is epiphenomenal. But if 
we take this characterisation as a definition, we ought to predict that (i) comparing things 
which are alike should not produce the characteristic effects of similes, and (ii) comparing 
any unlike things should produce such effects. However, example (19a) does not appear to 
be any less poetic than (19b), even though Achilles and Romeo are conceptually rather close 
(protagonists from literature): 
 (19a) Achilles is like Romeo. 
 (19b) Achilles is like a lion. 
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One might immediately object that Achilles and Romeo are not alike: by comparing Achilles 
to Romeo we suggest that he has properties which are more suited to romantic protagonists 
than mythical warriors. It might seem plausible that this is how utterances such as (19a) are 
ultimately interpreted, but ‘conceptual distance’ is here being proposed as an explanation of 
how certain comparisons achieve their effects. If similes with conceptually ‘close’ tenors and 
vehicles can yield the same effects as similes with conceptually ‘distant’ ones then 
conceptual ‘distance’ cannot be what causes these effects. I will explain in Chapter 5, §5.2 
how the typical conceptual relationships between tenor and vehicles in similes are in fact 
epiphenomenal of how comparisons are understood. The ‘directionality’ of A is B-type 
metaphors is explained on the relevance theoretic account by the fact that only B 
communicates something radically different to the lexically-encoded concept. 
On this view, we ought to get the characteristic effects of a simile whenever we compare any 
two unlike things, but this is not the case, as the difference between (20a) and (20b) shows: 
 (20a) His words are like radiators. 
 (20b) His words are like honey. 
If conceptual distance were all that is at issue in explaining why certain comparisons are 
interpreted figuratively, we ought to expect that (20a) and (20b) will both be very poetic, as 
the concept WORDS is clearly just as different from RADIATORS as it is from HONEY. It cannot be 
‘conceptual distance’ alone which explains why similes are interpreted the way they are. 
Fogelin also does not explain why comparing things which are alike can also yield a 
(figurative or poetic) simile: 
 (20c) This food is like honey. 
Whether (20c) is interpreted as literal or figurative depends on what this food is. If it is a 
dessert, for instance, then it is more likely that (20c) is communicating that the food is sweet 
like honey. That’s a slightly more determinate interpretation than would be available if this 
food denoted a savoury dish. One could say, as Fogelin might, that this proves that 
conceptual distance is central to why certain comparisons are interpreted figuratively: honey 
and desserts are conceptually closer because they are more likely to share the property 
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SWEET. But everything is like everything else in some respect or other. So honey and savouries 
would have to be ‘conceptually close’ from the perspective of those shared properties 
(FOODSTUFF, HEALTHY, etc.). Thinking about the figurativeness of similes in terms of the 
relatedness or otherwise of the denotations of the tenor and the vehicle is a dead end. What 
matters is what is communicated by the utterance of a comparison. 
Fogelin explains dead metaphors briefly in terms of metaphorical meaning which has ‘turned 
into’ literal meaning, but provides no further discussion (1988: 44). But there is a bigger 
problem in his account: if, as he claims, metaphors are elliptical similes, then predications 
are elliptical comparisons too (1988: 70): 
 “’Harold is a pig’ literally means the same as ‘Harold is like a pig’.” 
(id., ib., 1988: 55) 
For Fogelin dead metaphors will not be metaphors unless they are elliptical similes: where a 
conceptual element corresponding to the word like forms some part of the semantic 
representation recovered in understanding the utterance. But the above quote expresses a 
rather controversial position. It appears to be a much stronger claim than the initially 
plausible one that metaphors and similes are so easily interchangeable that their semantic 
equivalence ought to be the null hypothesis (id., ib.: 42). But if simile paraphrases are not 
available for every metaphor, this cannot be true. I give further evidence against such a 
hypothesis in Chapter 4. 
As Leezenberg has pointed out (2001: 77, 77n1), Fogelin has a somewhat confused 
relationship with Grice: he acknowledges his debt to Grice (1988: 4) and sometimes writes 
that A is B “conversationally implies” that A and B share salient features (id., ib.: 79). But, 
unlike Grice, he gives no explanation of “the conditions under which we give a sentence a 
reading as an ellipsis” (id., ib.: 29f n3). This is most unsatisfactory. But Grice’s account also 
has serious limitations of its own. 
3.5 Metaphor as implicated simile 
One account of metaphor understanding which involves principles of inferential pragmatics, 
and also makes predictions about the metaphor-simile relationship is that of Grice (1989: §2. 
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Cf. Searle, 1993; Morgan, 1993). As I explored in Chapter 2, there are a number of general 
objections which relevance theorists make to the Gricean account of conversational 
cooperation. I focus here on the specific failings of Grice’s account of how metaphors are 
understood, but Grice’s account suffers from many of the limitations of the view of 
metaphor as elliptical simile which I addressed in the previous section. 
For Grice there are two types of particularised conversational implicature: those which occur 
due to observation of a particular maxim (a subset of what Levinson calls ‘standard 
implicatures’. 1983: 104), and those which arise due to the speaker making it overt that they 
have violated a maxim, and so must be presumed to be communicating something else in 
order to preserve the spirit of the cooperative principle. Because the cooperative principle is 
‘robust’, even blatant deviation from individual maxims will not override the presumption 
that an interlocutor is being cooperative (id., ib.: 109). Grice explains metaphor in terms of a 
flouting of the first submaxim of quality (Do not say that which is false): 
“Metaphor: Examples like You are the cream in my coffee characteristically involve 
categorial falsity, so the contradictory of what the speaker has made as if to say will, 
strictly speaking, be a truism; so it cannot be that that such a speaker is trying to get 
across. The most likely supposition is that the speaker is attributing to his audience 
some feature or features in respect of which the audience resembles (more or less 
fancifully) the mentioned substance.” 
(Grice, 1989: 34. His italics. Cf. Searle, 1993: 103) 
The above quote from Grice remains somewhat open to interpretation (the word simile does 
not appear in Grice, 1989). Authors of a Gricean persuasion like Searle and Martinich are 
careful not to state that their views entail that metaphors implicate similes in every case 
(Searle, 1993; Martinich, 1984/1991). But, if they do not do so, then Gricean theorists’ 
explanations will have to rely upon a theory of conceptualization which lies outside Grice’s 
theory of communication to supply the appropriate content of the metaphor for those cases 
which are not based on implicated similes (see following sections).  
On my, admittedly exaggerated, account of Grice’s approach to metaphor, when (21a) is 
uttered, the hearer recognises that ‘what is said’ is ‘literally’ false: 
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 (21a) Utterance: Terence is a dachshund. 
Specifically, the supermaxim of quality remains in force, so some true proposition is taken as 
being communicated (id., ib. 2002/2012: 49). This will be something like the implicature in 
(21b)39: 
 (21b) Implicature: Terence is like a dachshund. 
For most of the cases Grice discusses, implicatures provide communicated information in 
addition to ‘what is said’. In Grice’s account of metaphor and the other tropes which appear 
to violate the maxim of truthfulness, the implicature given in (21a) provides a meaning 
which is communicated instead of ‘what is said’ (Wilson and Sperber, 2002/2012: 52f). 
Grice argued that calculability was one of the defining features of implicature (for which see 
Huang, 2007: 32-35; Levinson, 1983: 118-122; Ariel, 2010: 124-6). Nevertheless, Grice 
expressed doubt about the possibility of providing a working out procedure for every 
instance of implicature (Grice, 1989: 42f. Cf. Harnish, 1976/1991: 333f). But if we want to 
explain how (21a) is understood on the model suggested by Grice then we will need to 
employ a ‘working-out procedure’ such as follows: 
(i) The speaker S has said that Terence is a dachshund 
(ii) There is no reason to think that S is not observing the maxims 
(iii) S could not be doing this unless he thought that Terence is like a dachshund 
(iv) S knows (and knows that the hearer H knows that he knows) that H can see 
that he thinks that the supposition that he thinks that Terence is like a 
dachshund is required 
(v) S has done nothing to stop H from thinking that Terence is like a dachshund 
(vi) S intends H to think, or is at least willing to allow H to think, that Terence is 
like a dachshund 
(vii) And so, S has implicated that Terence is like a dachshund 
                                                          
39 It must be emphasised that at no point in Studies in the Way of Words does Grice claim 
that all metaphors communicate similes (1989). 
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(Cf. Blakemore, 1987: 35; Grice, 1989: 31) 
Grice’s working out schema is “not recognizable as a standard logical argument”, and it is 
not clear (a) which steps are premises and which are conclusions, and (b) how the content of 
q in step (iii) can be derived from (i), (ii), or both (i) and (ii), if it can be so derived at all 
(Blakemore 1987: 35). 
On this account, dead metaphors will not be of particular interest. There is an easily 
available explanation: only ‘live’ metaphors will be expressive, or poetic, because they 
violate the first submaxim of quality. Dead metaphors, on the other hand, are ‘literally’ true, 
and so cannot implicate a simile as in the explanation of (21a):  
“[S]tored metaphors are different from fresh metaphors in that they are not 
processed by first trying to make sense of the literal meaning, then, failing, trying to 
construe it as a figure of speech.”  
(Morgan, 1993: 129) (his italics) 
But there is a glaring omission for any Gricean account of metaphor understanding. Once the 
implicated simile has been computed, how is the simile understood? Is the implicated simile 
really a literal comparison (as Searle allows for some types of metaphor, e.g. at 1993: 105 on 
Sam is a pig), or is it still ‘figurative’? If the latter, then we have a circular explanation. If the 
former, then we still need to explain how (non-poetic) comparisons are understood. 
The Gricean view that the literal meaning of an utterance must be computed before its 
figurative meaning is not borne out by psycholinguistic research (e.g. Glucksberg, 2008; 
Gibbs, 1994; Gibbs and Colston, 2012). According to Glucksberg, literal meaning is not 
processed ‘first’ and found wanting, then replaced by a figurative interpretation. Rather, 
metaphor comprehension is automatic and mandatory (2008: 80). Moreover, metaphors 
and similes are not always interchangeable (id., ib.; see also Chapter 4, §4.2). 
Grice’s account also fails to explain why tropes which are generated on the basis of the 
flouting of the same submaxim can generate such different interpretations. Grice gives 
examples of irony (22a), metaphor (22b), meiosis (22c) and hyperbole (22d) as tropes which 
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come about by virtue of violation of the first submaxim of quality (Do not say that which is 
false): 
(22a) He is a fine friend. [irony] 
Implicates: He is not a fine friend. 
(22b) You are the cream in my coffee. [metaphor] 
Implicates: I think very highly of you. 
(22c) He was a little intoxicated. [meiosis] 
Implicates: He was very intoxicated. 
(22d) Every nice girl loves a sailor. [hyperbole] 
Implicates: Nice girls typically love sailors. 
(Based on Grice, 1989: 34) 
But comparison of these supposedly related tropes suggest they differ greatly in terms of 
what they communicate. Not only do the interpretations of (23a-c) differ from each other, 
they also differ from more poetic cases of each of the ‘tropes’ which are meant to be 
explained by the same violation of a submaxim (I omit an example of poetic irony for 
simplicity of explanation): 
(23a) You are a sphinx.  [poetic metaphor] 
(23b) You won’t lack tears. [poetic meiosis] 
(after Virgil, Aeneid 5.172) 
(23c) […]EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
  [poetic hyperbole] 
(Elliott Smith, The Biggest Lie. Album: Elliot Smith. 1995. Kill Rock Stars) 
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How could it be that the same violation produces such radically different interpretations as 
metaphor and irony? Also, how can this account of implicature go through in the case of 
non-declarative utterances (questions, requests, and so on), where nothing false has been 
asserted or even said? Furthermore, all of these tropes would also be in violation of the 
supermaxim of manner (Be perspicuous) (Sperber and Wilson, 2005/2012: 19). 
To return to metaphor in particular, if metaphors communicate similes, then we ought to be 
able to identify the simile that each metaphor communicates in every case. But simile 
‘paraphrases’ (such as (24a)) often do not appear to capture the thrust of the metaphor at 
all. Levinson gives example (24): 
(24) The interviewer hammered the senator.  
(24a) What the interviewer did to the senator was like someone hammering a nail. 
An utterance of (24a) would not usually be recognized by native speakers of English as 
expressing the same as (24). It is scarcely comprehensible at all (Levinson, 1983: 155f). 
Moreover, do we want such a hard dividing line between literal and figurative instances of 
predications as the one suggested by Grice, where metaphors do not ‘say’ anything? Take 
Levinson’s example given here as (25) (1983: 151): 
(25) Your defence is an impregnable castle. 
There is no kind of semantic anomaly (let alone the overt kind of untruthfulness that a 
‘flouting’-based account requires) whether we take (25) as literal, metaphorical, or involving 
a pun on both ways of interpreting the utterance. Also, if we imagine that Freud’s old home 
had been converted into an analyst’s office, an utterance of (26) could be both literal and 
figurative at the same time: 
(26) Freud lived here.  
(id., ib.: 157; Pilkington, 2000: 86) 
An utterance of (26) can, in certain circumstances, implicate (26a): 
 (26a) Freud’s legacy lived on in the practices of the people who work in this place. 
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Although it might seem that a Gricean account is a step in the right direction, in that it allows 
for metaphors to have implicit content, there are two major problems with the implicatures 
which metaphors actually evoke. Firstly, whereas other types of ‘flouting’ which Grice gives 
appear to involve largely determinate implicatures (e.g. 1989: 32ff), poetic metaphors do 
not. Secondly, Grice claims that, in the case of metaphor, the implicature is communicated 
instead of ‘what is said’. This introduces a major theoretical problem for Grice. With 
metaphors and other tropes, the speaker merely ‘makes as if to say’ that, for instance, 
Terence is a dachshund (id., ib.: 34). Wilson and Sperber (2002/2012: 52) draw attention to 
Grice’s claim that implicatures are generated, in a sense, to preserve the “spirit, though 
perhaps not the letter, of the maxim” which is flouted (1989: 370; Neale, 1992: 526). The 
recovery of implicatures is meant to restore the assumption that the maxims have been 
observed, or their violation was justified in the circumstances. But with irony, metaphor, 
meiosis and hyperbole, the implicature generated does not provide the requisite 
justification: 
“[W]hat justification could there be for implicitly conveying something true by saying 
something blatantly false, when one could have spoken truthfully in the first place?” 
(Sperber and Wilson, 2005/2012: 18) 
In the case of floutings of the first submaxim of quality, this would mean preserving the 
truthfulness of what the speaker said (Do not say that which you believe to be false. 
Emboldening for emphasis). Even if we were to loosen our notion of what a speaker says, it 
is not the case that speakers of a metaphor are typically taken as having said the simile a 
Gricean account would claim is implicated by their utterance40. Furthermore, if speakers only 
‘make as if to say’ the ostensibly false sentences of metaphors, then what maxim has been 
violated (Clark, 1996: 143)? 
                                                          
40 Wilson and Sperber introduce another set of problems if we take the maxim of 
truthfulness as meaning: Do not assert propositions you believe to be false (2002/2012: 52. 
My emboldening). They suggest that assertion entails speaker commitment to the truth of 
the proposition asserted, and this would make the maxim redundant in the analysis of 
tropes.  
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But the biggest problem for a Gricean account of metaphor understanding is that 
communicators are not constrained by a presumption that their utterances will (standardly) 
be true. It is not truth, but relevance, which communicators aim for (see Chapter 2). For 
example, an utterance of the question in (27) is likely to elicit a response such as (27a) for a 
casual acquaintance, but (27b) for a tax inspector: 
 (27) How much do you earn in a year? 
 
 (27a) £19,000  
 (27b) £18,534 
 (examples due to Blakemore, 1992: 109; based on Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 233) 
If truth were at issue, then it would be odd that people typically give approximate amounts 
rather than precise ones in answer to questions such as (27). 
Moreover, Grice admits that it is relevance which plays a role in determining ‘what is said’ in 
cases of disambiguation, as in (28) (repeated from Chapter 2, example (12)): 
 (28) Yousef: [outside the ticket office] What time does the film start? 
 Claire: I haven’t got my glasses. 
Yousef understands Claire as meaning that she does not have her spectacles because if she 
had been talking about drinking vessels her utterance would be irrelevant, even though it 
would probably be true. 
For Grice, the maxim of quality (Be truthful) was the most important of the principles which 
underlie conversational cooperation: 
“False information is not an inferior kind of information; it just is not information.” 
(Grice, 1989: 371) 
However, it could be argued that it is relevance, not truthfulness, which seems “to spell out 
the difference between something’s being and (strictly speaking) failing to be, any kind of 
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contribution at all” (wording by Grice ib.; see Wilson and Sperber, 2002/2012; Sperber and 
Wilson, 1995): 
“If verbal communication were guided by a presumption of literalness, every second 
utterance would have to be seen as an exception.” 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1990/2012: 89) 
Moreover, one can make the argument that a tendency towards prioritising truthful 
information may be derivative of considerations of relevance: 
“Relevant information is information worth having. False information is generally not 
worth having; it detracts from cognitive efficiency.” 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 264) 
Although one can easily think of cases where speakers are untruthful, “it is hard to construct 
responses that must be interpreted as irrelevant” (Levinson, 1983: 111. His emphasis). 
Relevance theory explains why utterances are assumed to be relevant as well the role 
relevance plays in understanding utterances, including utterances containing metaphors. 
3.6 Conceptual structure-mapping and metaphor understanding 
The work of Gentner and colleagues in metaphor studies has had two main strands. The first 
is accounting for the figurative meaning of metaphor in terms of a psychological process of 
conceptual alignment and elaboration known as ‘structure-mapping’ (Gentner and Bowdle, 
2008). The second is a theory of lexical change known as ‘the career-of-metaphor 
hypothesis’ (id., ib.: 115ff). The first strand is relevant to simile studies because it accounts 
for metaphorical meaning in terms of a process of analogical reasoning, that is, one based on 
similarity, which generalises to simile understanding (Gentner and Bowdle, 2008: 119f). 
Moreover, the career-of-metaphor hypothesis claims that novel figurative utterances are 
understood most readily in the form of similes, while the more conventionalized a ‘mapping’ 
becomes, the more likely it is to be expressed in the form of a metaphor. Gentner and 
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Bowdle appear to treat metaphor and simile as lying on a continuum, and as being part of 
the same category: ‘figuratives’ (e.g. id., ib.: 115)41. 
Gentner and colleagues have proposed a two-stage comprehension procedure for 
metaphors which relies upon a psychological process of comparison. This comparison 
process involves forming a ‘mapping’ between concepts based on their shared properties 
followed by the ‘projection’ of candidate inferences (discussion and examples below from 
Ritchie, 2013: 30f. Figures 2.2 and 2.3). 
Although some metaphors appear to reflect quite clearly an analogical relationship between 
tenor and vehicle, in particular those which appear to specify certain respects in which two 
concepts are similar (e.g. Achilles is a brave lion), structure-mapping theorists recognise that 
not all metaphors can be easily paraphrased into the form of an analogy(Gentner, 1982; 
Gentner and Bowdle, 2008: 110). But Bowdle, Gentner and Wolff have proposed that novel 
metaphors are interpreted as ‘comparisons’ (Bowdle and Gentner, 1999; 2005; Gentner and 
Bowdle, 2001; Wolff and Gentner, 2000. See Gentner and Bowdle, 2008: 115-119 for a 
summary). By being ‘interpreted as comparisons’ they mean that both metaphors and 
similes necessitate the same process of conceptual comparison. This involves first aligning 
the concepts being compared, then selecting appropriate overlapping properties shared by 
the concepts, and extrapolating further information on the basis of this initial alignment and 
selection42. For example, an utterance of (29) forces a hearer to set up a certain analogical 
relationship, as given in (29a): 
 (29) Men are wolves. 
 (29a) Wolves:animals::men: women 
In the underlying analogy in (29a), wolves are to the animals they prey upon as men are to 
women. This analogy is required as a prerequisite for understanding (29) because it allows 
                                                          
41 Only Gentner and Bowdle use figurative as a noun in Gibbs (Ed.), 2008. 
42 This is of course different from my claim that (linguistically realised) similes are a type of 
(linguistically realised) comparisons. 
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the concepts men, wolves, animals and women to be aligned as in Figure 3.1, and for further 
‘candidate inferences’ to be derived on the basis of this structural mapping, as in Figure 3.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
FIGURES REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
Figure 3.1 Structural alignment of WOLVES and 
MEN in Men are wolves. (based on Ritchie, 
2013: 30 Figure 2.2) 
Figure 3.2 Projecting candidate inferences in 
understanding Men are wolves. (based on 
Ritchie, 2013: 31 Figure 2.3) 
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For instance, the fact that men are motivated by instinct, as are wolves, allows the inference 
that MEN can be motivated in a similar way to WOLVES, even though the aims of their 
motivation are different. This suggests a way in which Men are wolves is comprehensible. 
How are the many possible alignments selected in cases of novel metaphor? With Achilles is 
a lion, it could be the lion’s swiftness, or determination, or savageness which are at issue, or 
all at once. Are different competing alignments entertained at the same time? The way 
Gentner and Bowdle describe this process is one of automatic, bottom-up selection of 
properties (2008). Gentner and colleagues have proposed that a ‘Structure Mapping Engine’ 
(Falkenhainer, Forbus and Gentner, 1989; Forbus, Ferguson and Gentner, 1994; Gentner and 
Bowdle, 2008: 111ff) automatically aligns concepts in an initially ‘symmetric’ fashion, with 
directionality emerging later in processing (id., ib.: 116) (for more on the problem of 
‘directionality’ in simile, see Chapter 5, §5.2.1). 
However, when we find creative, novel metaphors, even simple ones such as (30a), the 
overlap of properties shared by tenor and vehicle does not appear to play a necessary role in 
how they are understood: 
 (30a) Achilles is a lion. 
 Shared properties: ANIMAL, KILLER, POWERFUL, BRAVE, FEARLESS, etc.  
 Properties communicated by lion: BRAVE, FEARLESS, etc. 
In (30a), although all the shared properties given above may be communicated, only a few of 
them are likely to be essential to understanding (30a). Therefore, only a subset of the shared 
properties is communicated. In (30b), many of the shared properties are hardly likely to be 
communicated at all: 
 (30b) His words are honey. 
Shared properties: ENTITIES, OF-ANIMAL-ORIGIN, PLEASANT, etc. 
 Properties communicated by honey: PERSUASIVE, SEDUCTIVE, PLEASANT, etc. 
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It appears that, contrary to the structure-mapping hypothesis, the more creative the 
metaphor, the less the shared properties between the lexically-encoded concepts are 
relevant. 
One might assume that similes would be extremely important to the advocates of the 
structure-mapping theory of metaphor interpretation. Since they claim that metaphors are 
understood by analogical processes, and there are certain constructions which are akin to 
analogy when interpreted literally (non-poetic comparisons) and akin to metaphors when 
interpreted figuratively (similes), poetic similes ought to be the key desideratum for such a 
theory. Nevertheless, Gentner and colleagues pay little attention to the kind of poetic similes 
I am concerned with. If they had looked at such examples, they may have found that when 
we understand the most creative similes, it is often difficult to give any respects in which the 
comparison is taken to hold. This observation will form an important part of my hypothesis 
about how similes are understood (see Chapter 5). 
But clearly the selection of properties which are ultimately predicated of the tenor in 
metaphors (a lion’s BRAVERY of Achilles in Achilles is a lion, for instance) is constrained by 
certain assumptions about what the speaker means by saying Achilles is a lion. Discourse 
objectives, previously processed utterances, and so on, will all have an effect. But there 
appears to be no role for these factors in the structure-mapping model of metaphor 
understanding. Some other process must be involved in selecting which is the appropriate 
set of candidate inferences. There is a problem here akin to the context selection problem 
described in Chapter 2. 
It is sometimes said that all comparison theories of metaphor understanding assume that 
some kind of mapping of shared properties has to happen first (Gibbs and Colston, 2012: 
132). This is indeed a problem for Fogelin, Grice and Gentner: many metaphors are not 
understood this way. Beardsley gives the nice example of My sweetheart is my 
Schopenhauer: we are likely to be unaware to whom my sweetheart refers, and 
understanding the metaphor plays a role in understanding who that person is and what they 
are like. There can be no prior ‘structural alignment’ in such cases (1962: 296). But if we 
unhitch simile understanding from conceptualisation, and think about what it means to 
communicate a comparison, a completely different approach to simile arises, one I develop 
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in Chapter 5. I am not committed to the view that some (or all) metaphors are conducive to 
such an analysis, because relevance theoretic views of metaphor understanding are 
grounded in the continuity of loose uses described in Chapter 2, §§2.9f.  
As Ritchie points out (2013: 33), the model Gentner and colleagues proposes seems to be 
more suited to scientific analogy than to metaphor understanding (Cf. Gentner and Jeziorski, 
1993), and Gentner and colleagues appear to have similar reservations about the application 
of the model to literary cases. Gentner and Bowdle say that ‘surface matches’ are 
particularly common in literature (2008: 110). But why should this be the case? Is not the 
point of accounting for the ‘force’ of metaphors in terms of analogical reasoning to explain 
their creative dimension? To suddenly dismiss the most creative cases as peripheral would 
be a significant reversal. Moreover, the example Gentner and Bowdle give of ‘surface match’ 
(Hair is like spaghetti) is not particularly poetic (id., ib.). 
It is only when certain ‘abstractions’ have become conventionalised by repeated access that 
a new category (such as that supposed by Glucksberg and colleagues, and analogous to an 
ad hoc concept) emerges. This is known as the ‘career of metaphor hypothesis’, the 
predictive value of which has been challenged (Gentner and Bowdle, 2008. Cf. Glucksberg, 
2008: 75ff). I do not discuss the merits or otherwise of the career of metaphor hypothesis 
here, but even if the career-of-metaphor hypothesis can account for ‘dead’ metaphors in 
terms of a different type of conceptualisation process, this will not tell us how creative 
figurative language is understood. But it makes a particular prediction about general 
patterns of metaphor and simile use: we ought to expect that the most creative cases of 
figurative language use will be similes. Although I believe that creative similes have not 
received the attention they deserve, they are not particularly common, even in comparison 
with creative, novel metaphors. If metaphors are universal and similes are not, then this 
poses problems for any theory which requires similes and ‘equivalent’ metaphors to mean 
the same thing (Glucksberg, 2008: 75. See Chapter 4, §4.1).  
Moreover, structure mapping does not appear to work in the emergent property metaphor 
cases raised above, such as examples (3a-d) repeated here as (31a-d): 
 (31a) Robert is a bulldozer. 
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 (31b) Sally is a block of ice. 
 (31c) That surgeon is a butcher. 
 (31d) His words are honey. 
As analogy is a four-place relation, where do the properties which are aligned come from? A 
plausible attempt at analogy paraphrases for (31a-d) might be as in (32a-d): 
 (32a) Robert treats people as bulldozers treat physical structures. 
 (32b) Sally is cold the way ice is cold. 
 (32c) That surgeon treats patients the way a butcher treats meat. 
 (32d) His words are sweet the way honey is sweet. 
However, (31a-d) and (32a-d) do not appear to have equivalent effects. Moreover, only (32c) 
appears to provide a justification for the emergent property (in the interpretation that the 
surgeon is incompetent). The analogies given in (32a), (32b) and (32d) are misleading 
precisely because they direct the hearer away from relevant points of comparison: Sally is 
cold, and ice is cold, but not in the same way; Robert does not ‘literally’ bulldoze people; and 
his words are only metaphorically sweet. Also, which analogy should we choose? As none of 
the grounds for comparison are linguistically specified in (32a-d), one could appeal to any 
number of comparisons to facilitate processing (31a-d), such as those in (33a-d): 
 (33a) Robert is hard to motivate the way bulldozers are difficult to drive. 
 (33b) Sally is losing weight the way ice melts. 
 (33c) That surgeon earns the same amount as a butcher. 
 (33d) His words irritate me the way honey makes my allergies worse. 
Structure-mapping alone cannot address the problem of why we typically do not find 
interpretations consonant with (33a-d). Relevance theorists would claim that such 
assumptions as (33a-d) would rarely (if ever) contribute to a relevant interpretation.  
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3.7 Conceptual metaphor theory  
Conceptual metaphor theory has had an incomparable impact on metaphor studies since the 
first publication of Lakoff and Johnson, 2003 in 1980. Most researchers of all theoretical 
persuasions allow (or at least hint at allowing) the central mechanism of conceptual 
metaphor theory – pre-existing associations or ‘mappings’ between concepts known as 
conceptual metaphors – to play some role in the understanding of metaphors, or in how we 
ought to explain how metaphors are understood (e.g. Glucksberg and Keysar, 1993: 419f; 
Wilson, 2011; Fogelin, 1988: 83-86; Stern, 2000: 176ff)43. Although the experimental 
literature is vast (see Gibbs and Colston, 2012 for a readable and thorough survey of most of 
the issues), McGlone (2011) refers to research which suggests that many such experiments 
are subject to hindsight bias. However, I maintain that conceptual metaphor theory is 
founded on a perspective on metaphor use which is ostensibly appealing but fundamentally 
flawed. Moreover, it is of least use as a theoretical framework when we come to cases of 
novel figurative language use. 
Gibbs is representative of the conceptual metaphor theory approach in seeing the key 
question of metaphor research to be the ‘paradox’ that metaphors can be both creative on 
the one hand and ‘rooted’ in bodily experience on the other (2008: 5). Lakoff and Johnson 
see metaphor as a matter of “experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another” (2003: 5. 
Emphasis removed). Metaphor is primarily a matter of conceptualization, and only 
derivatively of linguistic expressions. 
For instance, we conceptualize LOVE in terms of JOURNEYS, ARGUMENTS in terms of WAR. Table 
3.2 gives a range of examples which Lakoff and Johnson take as justifying the conceptual 
‘mappings’ LOVE IS A JOURNEY and ARGUMENT IS WAR.  
LOVE IS A JOURNEY ARGUMENT IS WAR 
Look how far we’ve come. Your claims are indefensible. 
                                                          
43 I find the widespread acceptance of conceptual metaphor theory disappointing for 
reasons that will become clear in this section and the following (§3.8). See also McGlone’s 
contribution to Glucksberg (2001: 90-107). 
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We’re at a crossroads. 
We’ll just have to go our separate ways. 
We can’t turn back now. 
Etc. 
 
He attacked every weak point in my 
argument. 
His criticisms were right on target. 
Etc.  
 
Table 3.2 Examples of linguistic realisations of conceptual metaphors LOVE IS A JOURNEY and 
ARGUMENT IS WAR (examples from Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 4, 44f) 
Note that there need be no occurrence in the utterances of the ‘Source’ (JOURNEYS, WARS) or 
the ‘Target’ (LOVE, ARGUMENTS). Arguments against individual cases as evidence for conceptual 
metaphors notwithstanding (and one can think of many), because there are so many 
examples which appear to follow each of the patterns, it seems difficult to argue that 
conventional associations between LOVE and JOURNEYS play no role in why we produce and 
how we understand apparently related utterances. Conceptual metaphors are not the 
underlying form of an A is B-type metaphor, despite the labels being of the form LOVE IS A 
JOURNEY and so on, and despite the term ‘conceptual metaphor’. Rather, they simply are the 
association between concepts, instantiated as real neural links at least for ‘primary 
metaphors’ (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 54; Lakoff, 2008). The details of how these 
associations are formed do not concern us here (For overviews see Lakoff and Johnson, 
1993: 254ff; Lakoff, 2008: 26ff. For evidence that the mappings are partial, see Lakoff and 
Johnson, 2003: 12f; Croft and Cruse, 2004: 202). 
Clearly conceptual metaphor theory lays emphasis on the shared thought processes which 
are said to underlie a given community’s use of metaphor. Therefore, convention is crucial to 
how conceptual metaphor theory works. But there are limitations to conceptual metaphor 
theory’s treatment of even mundane and ‘dead’ metaphors. A major problem arises when 
we try to make generalisation about conceptualization on the direct basis of expressions like 
those in Table 3.3. Although conceptual analysis like this ‘uncovers’ conceptual metaphors, 
their explanatory value resides in the hypothesis that they are directly meaningful because 
they arise from ‘embodiment’, that is, physical experience (e.g. Lakoff, 2008). A ‘complex’ 
metaphor such as LOVE IS A JOURNEY is actually connected to a network of other conceptual 
metaphors which ultimately ‘ground’ the metaphor in physical experience (see Table 3.3). 
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Metaphor: LOVE IS A JOURNEY 
Source Domain: JOURNEY 
Target Domain: LOVE 
Mapping: 
 
Travellers → Lovers 
Vehicle  → Relationship 
Destinations  → LifeGoals 
ImpedimentsToMotion  → Difficulties 
Evokes: 
 
PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS Metaphor, with DESTINATIONS = 
Self.Source.Destinations PURPOSES = Self.Target.LifeGoals 
 
DIFFICULTIES ARE IMPEDIMENTS TO MOTION Metaphor, with IMPEDIMENTS TO MOTION = 
Self.Source.ImpedimentsToMotion DIFFICULTIES = Self.Target.Difficulties 
 
INTIMACY IS CLOSENESS Metaphor, With CLOSENESS = Self.Source. 
ClosenessOfTravelersInVehicle  
 INTIMACY = Self.Target.IntimacyOfLovers 
 
A RELATIONSHIP IS A CONTAINER Metaphor, With CONTAINER = Self.Source.Vehicle 
 RELATIONSHIP=Self.Target.Relationship 
Table 3.3 Example conceptual analysis for LOVE IS JOURNEY (adapted from Lakoff, 2008: 36f) 
The arrows in the diagram correspond to “linking circuits” which are specific neural bindings; 
this allows primary metaphors to “ground” the system of conceptual metaphors in 
experience (Lakoff, 2008: 37). Conceptual metaphors are meant to explain not just why 
people produce metaphors (because they think of LOVE in terms of JOURNEYS, for instance) but 
how they understand them. For the purposes of this thesis, we are concerned entirely with 
the issue of how certain phenomena are understood. If we take the utterance We’re at a 
crossroads, are Lakoff and Johnson claiming that we cannot understand what that means 
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without the metaphorical mapping LOVE IS JOURNEY? Most instances of such an utterance 
probably have nothing to with LOVE, and they certainly do not have to. More worryingly, 
conceptual metaphor theory is a theory of conceptual organisation, not metaphor 
understanding. Conceptual metaphor theorists do in fact think that the way concepts are 
organised and integrated determines how metaphorical utterances are understood (Lakoff, 
2008). But it is entirely possible to find Lakoff’s evidence of enduring conceptual associations 
convincing, whilst advocating a completely different theory of utterance understanding 
(such as the one defended in Chapter 2). 
A further problem with Lakoff and colleagues’ account of how mundane (or even ‘dead’) 
examples of metaphor are understood is that many of the proposed conceptual metaphors 
overlap, as indicated in Table 3.4. How then does one pick the ‘correct’ conceptual 
metaphor? If the ‘neural theory’ of metaphor is correct, then it is difficult to see how 
metaphors which share a ‘target’ but differ in the ‘aspects of the concept’ which are shared 
are chosen between (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 98f).  
AN ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY AN ARGUMENT IS A CONTAINER AN ARGUMENT IS A BUILDING 
content content content  
progress progress progress 
directness basicness basicness 
obviousness strength strength 
 clarity structure 
Table 3.4 Shared aspects of concepts in conceptual metaphors: AN ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY; AN 
ARGUMENT IS A CONTAINER; and AN ARGUMENT IS A BUILDING. Based on Lakoff and Johnson (2003: 
98f) 
Lakoff and Johnson want to demonstrate that the mappings between source and target are 
partial and differ from each other. But the degree of overlap between the mapped elements 
in these three conceptual metaphors is unclear, especially if they are all mandatorily 
activated as Lakoff’s neural theory suggests. The problem of clashing conceptual metaphors 
is made even more difficult by the level of abstraction of some of the mappings and the 
presence of their exact opposite (such as GENERIC FOR SPECIFIC and SPECIFIC FOR GENERIC) (see 
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Jackendoff and Aaron, 1991)44. Psycholinguistic evidence of the ‘directionality’ of metaphor 
interpretation is explicable in other terms than that the target is “conceptually scaffolded” 
on the source (McGlone, 2011: 569; Cf. e.g. Miller, 1993: 368ff). 
Lakoff and Johnson’s original work makes use of circular arguments (McGlone, 2011: 567, 
572; Pilkington, 2000: 111): we say X, Y and Z because we think A is B, and we know we think 
A is B because we say X, Y and Z. If taken at face value, such arguments involve the fallacy of 
affirming the consequent: If P, then Q; Q; therefore, P. To make a valid argument out of this 
inference, then the first premise must be replaced by a biconditional: if and only if P, then Q. 
But the claim that we can say We’ve come to the end of the road if and only if we have a 
conceptual metaphor like LOVE IS A JOURNEY is patently false (we could say the same thing 
literally when we reach a traffic junction). 
The notion of ‘embodiment’ can be seen as a way out of this bind. If the conceptual 
metaphor itself can be justified on the basis of non-linguistic evidence, then the circular 
arguments of metaphor use in Lakoff and Johnson (2003) constitute circumstantial evidence 
for mappings which can be established independently. For instance, Johnson argues that the 
primary conceptual metaphor AFFECTION IS WARMTH explains why the emergent property 
metaphor Sally is a block of ice is not understood in terms of similarity between tenor and 
vehicle concepts: it is understood in terms of AFFECTION IS WARMTH instead (2008: 46). The 
existence of the primary metaphor AFFECTION IS WARMTH can be argued for independently, 
either by other attested verbal realisations of the metaphor (the primary methodology of 
Lakoff and Johnson, 2003), through experiments which demonstrate that people (or a 
particular linguistic group) reason about the world in terms of that metaphor (one claim for 
                                                          
44 One proposal to avoid conceptual metaphor clashes is the so-called ‘invariance 
hypothesis’ (Lakoff, 1993: 215), which dictates that the interpretation of metaphors must be 
consistent with an individual’s perceptual experience of the source domain (e.g. with 
JOURNEYS in LOVE IS A JOURNEY), but this invites the problem of why certain schematic attributes 
are typically mapped from source to target and why others are typically not (e.g. not all 
JOURNEYS are difficult, but this is often the aspect of journeys which is most relevant to 
utterances such as We’ve come to the end of the road) (McGlone, 2011: 566f). 
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such evidence regarding AFFECTION IS WARMTH is made in Williams and Bargh, 2008), but most 
often through appeals to correlations in experience (such as receiving affection whilst being 
embraced45. See e.g. Kövecses, 2005: 2f). But, as shown in Table 3.3, a conceptual metaphor 
is not determined by the primary metaphors (those grounded in direct experience) it is 
linked to. Therefore, appeals to embodiment fail to be explanatory at least in such cases. 
Conceptual metaphor theorists are not always entirely clear about whether conceptual 
metaphors pre-exist utterance understanding or emerge during the process of 
understanding utterances. But if these mappings motivate what we say, then they must be 
logically prior to the creation of utterances. This invites an acquisition problem which is not 
raised by the other approaches to metaphor understanding mentioned in this thesis. 
Moreover, it necessitates the existence of unutterable metaphors: that is, nonsensical 
strings which cannot be ascribed a metaphorical interpretation because no hearer will have 
the appropriate conceptual metaphor to do so. There must be ‘failed’ metaphors (e.g. Lakoff 
2008). The problem here is that it is hard to think of a single grammatical string containing, 
for instance, a noun which could never be interpreted metaphorically. Is it really the case, as 
the conceptual metaphor theory theorist Ruiz de Mendoza Ib  ez suggested (2009: 194f), 
that there are ‘adjustments’ which are not possible, or is the impossibility of interpreting 
certain metaphors simply a dogma?  
The case of what I here call ‘perverse’ metaphors, such as (33) suggests that metaphor 
‘failure’ is a dogma: 
 (34) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
(Linkous (Sparklehorse), Saturday. 1995. Album: Vivadixiesubmarinetransmissionplot. 
Plain.)46  
                                                          
45 These explanations are, of course, open to challenge. 
46 Intuitions vary about the felicity of utterances of ‘perverse metaphors’. But I am confident 
in claiming that (34) is comprehensible, and that many accounts of metaphor understanding 
would have difficulty in explaining why any interpretation is available at all. 
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Perverse cases like these can only be tackled by an extremely flexible notion of what 
metaphorical utterances are used to communicate. There is little room here for conceptual 
metaphors such as (34a-d) to assist in ad hoc concept construction: 
 (34a) PEOPLE ARE MACHINES. 
 (34b) PEOPLE ARE CARS. 
 (34c) PEOPLE ARE BUILDINGS. 
 (34d) PEOPLE ARE HOSPITALS. 
The proposed conceptual metaphors in (34a)-(34d) do not get us far along the way to 
understanding what the singer of (34) might have meant, even as part of a post-hoc 
rationalisation of the interpretation of (34). Most cases of poetic metaphor seem to lie 
somewhere on a continuum between the extremely challenging (‘perverse’) examples such 
as (34) and more mundane metaphors, and relevance theory predicts that this additional 
effort will correlate with the weaker effects typically associated with poetic metaphors 
(§§2.6-2.7). 
Lakoff himself gives an example of ‘metaphor failure’. It seems from the neural theory 
advanced by Lakoff that a ‘failed’ (linguistic) metaphor cannot be a metaphor (that is, a kind 
of conceptual connection). Presumably, if such an example is interpretable at all then it is 
either (i) not a metaphor, interpreted some other way, or (ii) it is a ‘one shot’ novel case 
(more on which below), which for some reason does not work. Lakoff’s example of a ‘failed’ 
metaphor is given here as (35) (2008: 27): 
(35) My job is an aardvark. 
Lakoff claims that this can work as a metonymy, such as a zookeeper saying (35) to mean 
that his job is taking care of an aardvark. But it ‘fails’ as a metaphor (id., ib.). But the 
conceptual metaphor theory prediction here is wrong. It predicts only one way in which the 
concept communicated by aardvark can be relevant. Which contextual assumptions are 
made available (by accessing encyclopaedic assumptions attached to the lexically encoded 
concepts in the utterance as an initial step) will determine how the metaphor will be 
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interpreted. I propose that My job is an aardvark in longer exchanges such as (35a-c) can be 
understood as a metaphor: 
(35a) I may look friendly, but all I do is prey upon real workers. My job is an aardvark. 
Required contextual assumptions: Aardvarks eat ants. Ants can be workers. etc. 
(35b) I am invisible within the corporation. Nobody even notices my role unless they 
go through the roster alphabetically. My job is an aardvark. 
Required contextual assumption: ‘Aardvark’ is one of the first words in the dictionary. 
(35c) My job is an aardvark. Nobody knows what I do. 
Required contextual assumption: Aardvarks are very unfamiliar animals. 
Although there is not scope in this thesis to treat all the different ways in which conceptual 
metaphor theorists have attempted to integrate more novel, creative cases of metaphor into 
their theories (although see §3.8 below for one approach which integrates aspects of 
Fauconnier’s blending theory: Fauconnier, 1997; Fauconnier and Turner, 2002; 2008), the 
limitations of such approaches tend to inherit the emphasis of, for instance, Lakoff and 
Turner (1989) on conventional conceptual associations and their combination. 
The three types of creative metaphor use which are mentioned in Lakoff and Johnson (2003) 
involve either ‘extensions of the ‘used part’ of a metaphor’ (36), unused parts of a ‘literal’ 
metaphor [sic] (37), or ‘novel’ metaphors (38): 
(36) These facts are the bricks and mortar of my theory 
(37) His theory has thousands of little rooms and long, winding corridors. 
(38) Classical theories are patriarchs, who father many children, most of whom fight 
incessantly. 
(examples from id., ib.: 53) 
An utterance of (36) exploits the BRICKS element of the putative THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS 
conceptual metaphor which is usually involved in the interpretation of other examples, but 
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in a novel way. An utterance of (37) exploits other features of BUILDINGS from THEORIES ARE 
BUILDINGS which are usually not involved in the interpretation of other examples. No 
explanation is given for ‘novel’ metaphors such as (38) in Lakoff and Johnson (2003), other 
than that they add a new way of thinking about something, are ‘marginal’ and ‘relatively 
uninteresting’ for the authors’ purposes (id., ib.: 54). In Lakoff and Turner (1989) such novel 
metaphors were treated as ‘one shot’, image metaphors (id, ib.: 91f). Conceptual metaphor 
theory research into poetic cases in general seems geared towards explaining why poetic 
metaphors appear to be “built up out of simpler metaphors” (Lakoff, 2008: 17), but it has 
been recognised by reviewers that the authors fail to demonstrate that poetic metaphors 
are compositional in this way (Jackendoff and Aaron, 1991: 333ff). Worse than that, many of 
the examples given in that work are similes, not metaphors, a distinction that many 
conceptual metaphor theorists have not observed consistently (compare Steen, 2004, an 
article which concerns a song with at least two similes in it but contains no mention of 
simile, with Steen, 1999). 
However, the biggest problem with conceptual metaphor theory-based accounts of novel, 
creative metaphors is that they emphasize what is least interesting about them, namely, the 
aspects of their meaning which are conventional. Gibbs and Colston see this as a virtue, as it 
can explain why figurative language use appears to be deep and meaningful: it can “allude to 
enduring allegorical themes” (2012: 153). But to justify the conceptual metaphor theory 
approach, we need more than ‘allusion’. Such symbolic relationships need to be pre-
requisites of utterance understanding. 
Moreover, although conceptual metaphor theorists’ descriptions of how metaphors are 
understood are cognitive-linguistic in nature, many of the analyses they want to give of what 
metaphorical meaning is seem to locate meaning in public symbols which have meaning by 
virtue of their relationship to each other. ‘We’ say We’ve come to the end of the road 
because ‘we’ have the conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY which structures ‘our’ actions 
and thoughts (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 55). But who is ‘we’? Lakoff and Johnson want 
to claim that (i) meaning is always meaning ‘to’ someone, and that (ii) we can make 
generalisations about the ‘meanings’ of “a real person or a hypothetical or typical member 
of a speech community” (ib.: 184). But projecting public meanings (and relationships 
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between ostensibly related public meanings) of a speech community onto mental 
organisation of an idealised individual from within that speech community does not change 
the nature of the explanation. It is still akin to a structuralist explanation47 and, as Sperber 
has argued, it is hard to reconcile symbolic cultural explanations with the commitments of 
cognitive science (e.g. 1996: 43-47; 1975). 
Given the three different types of metaphors alluded to above, the most creative ones, the 
ones which evoke most poetic effects, are the ones which receive least attention: ‘novel’ or 
‘one-shot’ metaphors. What do these consist of? I will leave aside questions of cognitive 
architecture, which may pose their own problems given Lakoff’s view of how conceptual 
metaphors relate to one another (see Table 3.5). One possibility is that novel A is B-type 
metaphors are understood via the creation of a connection between the tenor and vehicle 
concepts, producing a metaphor which has a similar form to the utterance. Let us assume 
that one must have acquired or created one of the conceptual metaphors in (39a-d) in order 
to understand an utterance of (39) in a situation where one has never heard similar 
utterances to (39): 
                                                          
47 Many conceptual metaphor theorists’ explanations are subject to further objections which 
also apply to structuralist explanations of meaning. This is because: (i) they see symbolic 
relationships (metaphorical mappings) in public symbols, non-communicative human 
behaviours, and thought in general, and so are eclectic in the type of data they see as 
evidence of conceptual relationships (which constitute the meaning of these symbols); (ii) 
they emphasise standardised meanings, and (even if we allow for ‘blending’ and so on) they 
account for linguistic meaning evidenced by language use in terms of these standardised 
meanings independent of language use (Cf. Sperber, 1975: 5; 8), e.g. we talk about LOVE in 
terms of LOVE IS A JOURNEY because LOVE ‘inherits’ some of the meaning of JOURNEYS; (iii) they do 
not make sufficient distinction between mere ‘pairing’ (correlated concepts and emotions, 
for instance) and ‘encoding’ (Cf. id., ib.: 14f); (iv) they see all knowledge (or all linguistically-
relevant knowledge) as structured by mappings, missing the insight that the ‘symbolic’ value 
of even a monomorphemic natural-kind term like fox depends upon encyclopaedic 
knowledge about foxes (id., ib.: 108).  
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 (39) Achilles is a lion. 
 
 (39a) Conceptual metaphor: ACHILLES IS A LION. 
 (39b) Conceptual metaphor: SOLDIERS ARE LIONS. 
 (39c) Conceptual metaphor: PEOPLE ARE LIONS. 
 (39d) Conceptual metaphor: PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS. 
Which of the conceptual metaphors is the appropriate one? The potential multiplicity of 
conceptual metaphors will pose a direct problem for any account of metaphor 
understanding. Lakoff seems to think that the automatic activation of concepts through a 
network of interconnected, and hierarchically organised, conceptual metaphors, will mean 
that there is only one interpretation of metaphors like (39) available (2008). In order to test 
such a hypothesis, we should at least be able to say which metaphors are activated, and I am 
not sure conceptual metaphor theory is fine-grained enough to say. 
If we assume a kind of ‘brute-force’ association, that understanding (39) means that one has 
to construct a conceptual metaphor of the form in (39a), then this would call into question 
the necessity of much of the theory as presented in this chapter. That Lakoff thinks that this 
is not an acceptable approach is clear from his prediction that there are ‘impossible’ 
metaphors (see above). But conceptual metaphor theorists do propose that there are one-
off conceptual metaphors which are available for only one or a very narrow range of 
expressions. For example, in her monograph on compounding in English, Benczes appeals to 
the conceptual metaphors given in Table 3.5 (2006: 206): 
Compound utterance Conceptual metaphor 
Chicken hawk. A COWARDLY PERSON IS A CHICKEN. (Benczes, 
2006: 102f) 
Information highway. THE INTERNET IS A HIGHWAY. (id., ib. 76) 
Meadow mayonnaise. [=cowpat] A MEADOW WITH A COWPAT IS A DISH WITH 
MAYONNAISE TOPPING. (id., ib. 99f) 
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Table 3.5 Proposed conceptual metaphors in English compounds. Data from Benczes, 2006. 
Although the first example might be argued to involve a stable conceptual metaphor, as we 
can use the word chicken on its own to describe a coward, the second is less plausible. It 
seems to be available (to this speaker at least) only in the conventional expression 
information superhighway, and then only as an alternative for the internet. The problem is 
not that the argument is circular here, rather, there appears to be nothing to explain: this is 
a very ‘dead’ metaphor, and attempts to ‘resurrect’ it sound trite and comical: The e-mail 
sped down the information superhighway, Google overtook Microsoft on the information 
superhighway, and so on. I have never heard the phrase meadow mayonnaise before, but I 
would not interpret it along the lines of the conceptual metaphor that Benczes proposes. 
The mapping Benczes proposes is entirely in terms of shared physical properties. But calling 
a cowpat meadow mayonnaise is clearly meant to evoke disgust, in part through the 
unpleasantness of describing faeces by a foodstuff, in part through clashes which one might 
feel between the elaborate encyclopaedic information (including memories of sensory 
representations) one has about interacting with the denotations of the concepts. There is no 
role in conceptual metaphor theory for the kind of weak effects which form a part of the 
interpretation of utterances containing meadow mayonnaise. Moreover, it seems 
implausible that such conceptual metaphors serve as enduring or conventional conceptual 
association. Whatever the correct analysis of English compounds, the fact that conceptual 
metaphor theory allows for patently ad hoc mappings like A MEADOW WITH A COWPAT IS A DISH 
WITH MAYONNAISE TOPPING can be seen as a reductio ad absurdum of such simplistic conceptual 
metaphor theory-based approaches to figurative language understanding.  
3.8 Conceptual metaphor, hybrid theories and emergent properties 
Recent developments within conceptual metaphor theory have led to a gradual 
rapprochement between conceptual metaphor theory and relevance theory. Important 
theorists such as Gibbs (Gibbs and Tendahl, 2006; 2008; Gibbs and Colston, 2012) and 
Kövecses (2011) seem particularly optimistic about the results of such collaboration. 
Researchers within several competing frameworks, including relevance theory, have 
advocated making use of the conceptual ‘mappings’ of conceptual metaphor theory (see 
start of previous section). Wilson (2011), Carston (2002a: 355f) and Wilson and Carston 
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(2006) have suggested that conceptual metaphor theory and relevance theory might be 
mutually compatible in this sort of way. 
Let us assume that enduring conceptual mappings exist which (i) are consistent with the 
broad outlines of Lakoff and colleague’s presentation of conceptual metaphors, and (ii) 
which contribute to utterance understanding by causing assumptions associated with the 
Source (vehicle) term to be made more manifest automatically when the Target (tenor) term 
is processed. In understanding (40), the conceptual metaphor in (40a) is automatically 
activated: 
(40) Sally is a block of ice  
(40a) Conceptual metaphor: EMOTIONAL WARMTH IS PHYSICAL WARMTH.  
Because two concepts, let us call them [PHYSICAL-WARMTH] and [EMOTIONAL-WARMTH], are 
directly linked to one another by the conceptual metaphor in (40a), properties associated 
with EMOTIONAL-WARMTH are made available by accessing PHYSICAL-WARMTH. Processing the 
words block of ice will provide access to the latter. Tendahl and Gibbs (2008) see conceptual 
mappings as explaining these sorts of cases (also Tendahl, 2009: 146). And this does seem 
like a relatively parsimonious explanation. 
One might think that an analysis such as this will simply generalise to the other cases of 
emergent properties raised above (§3.1). But it is not easy to see which conceptual 
metaphor is supposed to do the trick for example (41) (repeated from above, example (3c)): 
(41) That surgeon is a bulldozer. 
We can see the problem here quite clearly if we look at Lakoff’s own proposal for the 
interpretation of (41). We should note that not only does it rely upon the kind of circular 
argumentation which was used in Lakoff and Johnson (2003), it also does not match certain 
other accounts of emergent property metaphors from the same theoretical perspective (see 
Kövecses, 2011). According to Lakoff, we understand (41) as meaning That surgeon is 
incompetent because we have stereotypes about surgeons and butchers as evidenced by 
expressions such as those in (42a-b) and (43a-b) (from Lakoff, 2008: 32f): 
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 (42a) My lawyer presented the case with surgical skill. 
 (42b) Ichiro slices singles through the infield like a surgeon. 
 
 (43a) My lawyer butchered my case. 
 (43b) Frank Thomas hacks at the ball like a butcher. 
The typical interpretation of (41) is possible, claims Lakoff, because there is a conceptual 
metaphor A PERSON WHO PERFORMS ACTIONS WITH CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS IS A MEMBER OF A PROFESSION 
KNOWN FOR THOSE CHARACTERISTICS (id., ib.: 32f). Lakoff’s proposed conceptual metaphor does 
not really look like a ‘mapping’ between two concepts to me. It looks like the formulation of 
some kind of rule, perhaps a default rule. But the reason I focus upon this analysis is that it 
demonstrates two tendencies which the conceptual metaphor theory approach promotes: 
(i) the conflation of metaphor and simile ((42b) and (43b) are both similes); and (ii) the 
preference for explanation in terms of conventions rather than processes.  
Tendahl has proposed a hybrid model of metaphor understanding which sees conceptual 
metaphor theory and relevance theory as both providing insights into how metaphors are 
understood (2009. Tendahl and Gibbs, 2008; Gibbs and Tendahl, 2006)48. He uses blending 
theory (Fauconnier and Turner, 2002; 2008; Grady, Oakley and Coulson, 1999) within a 
relevance theoretic framework to explain examples such as That surgeon is a butcher 
(Tendahl, 2009: 132). Note that Lakoff himself sees ‘blends’ as resulting from “neural 
bindings, mental spaces, and [conceptual] metaphors”, not as a separate process (2008: 33). 
But for Tendahl, when an utterance of (41) is heard, this activates a conceptual mapping 
process which can be depicted as in Figure 3.3 (Cf. Kövecses, 2011: 19, for a still more 
elaborate variant). 
                                                          
48 Other ‘hybrid’ proposals include Ruiz de Mendoza Ib  ez and Pérez Hernández, who argue 
that explicatures and implicatures are derived on the basis of salient conceptual metaphors 
in specific cognitive environments (2003). 
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By constructing a ‘blended space’ on the basis of what the source and target have in 
common (the ‘generic space’) and the importing of features from the source and the target, 
the interpretation of incompetence arises from a clash of features: 
“[Considering Figure 3.3] it becomes obvious that the blend is characterized by an 
incompatibility of the means-to-end relation. More particularly, we see that with the 
means of butchery (e.g. using a cleaver) the goal of surgery (i.e. to heal a patient) is 
pursued. This is a relation that calls up the notion of incompetence, because a 
surgeon who works with butchers’ tools certainly is incompetent at what he is 
doing.” 
(Tendahl, 2009: 132) 
However, the content of the blended space is surely compatible with a non-figurative 
interpretation of (41), where a real surgeon moonlights as a butcher, for instance (Vega 
Moreno, 2007: 80f). Tendahl is vague in asserting that a certain contrast will ‘call up the 
notion of incompetence’49. Moreover, a lot of other contrasts would serve the same 
purpose, treating an operating room as an abattoir, for instance. Also, the blended space will 
presumably be uniform across different examples, but reversing surgeon and butcher in (41) 
does not produce the same interpretation50. It would require some other theory of how such 
information is made use of in understanding such utterances. 
Despite the popularity of a détente between relevance theory and conceptual metaphor 
theory in recent years (in addition to the above Stöver, 2010 ms; 2011), I would argue that 
they are fundamentally incompatible, for a number of reasons: (i) conceptual metaphor 
theory denies a modular view of the mind, in particular, in relation to the language faculty 
                                                          
49 Similar charges can be levelled at all the accounts surveyed in Kövecses (2011), including 
that of Sperber and Wilson (2008/2012). 
50 I suspect that such theorists would argue that the mappings are unidirectional. The 
question then becomes: is this not a new source of circularity for conceptual metaphor 
theory-based accounts? Metaphors are directional because mappings are directional, and 
mappings are directional because metaphors are directional. 
167 
 
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 480, 495), relevance theory affirms it (e.g. Sperber, 2002/2012); 
(ii) conceptual metaphor theory denies conceptual atomism (concepts do not have 
boundaries, merely degrees of ‘connectedness’ to other concepts), relevance theory 
requires it for ad hoc concept construction to be motivated in the first place (see Chapter 2); 
and (iii) conceptual metaphor theory endorses relativist explanations of linguistic variation 
(e.g. Lakoff, 1987), relevance theory is a theory of ostensive-inferential communication 
which is based on a universal principle of cognitive organisation (Sperber and Wilson, 1995). 
It seems to me that combining relevance theory and conceptual metaphor theory would 
introduce many unwelcome theoretical complications, and few advantages.  
168 
 
 
• FIGURES REDfgfgfACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
FIGURE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
Figure 3.3 Conceptual integration network for That surgeon is a butcher 
(adapted from Tendahl, 2009: 133). 
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3.9 Conclusion 
In the light of the competing accounts of metaphor understanding I have discussed in this 
chapter, the relevance theoretic-account of how metaphors are understood remains 
convincing, explaining how dead metaphors evolve, why novel or creative metaphors have 
the characteristic effects they do, and has clarified an important (still unresolved) issue in 
the theory, namely the question of where emergent properties in certain metaphors ‘come 
from’ (see also Chapter 6, §6.3). But the relevance-theoretic account of metaphor 
understanding cannot be generalised to incorporate similes. Most theoretical approaches to 
the metaphor-simile relationship are heavily weighted towards explaining metaphor and do 
not systematically evaluate which are the relevant desiderata for an account of simile. There 
is little agreement on what the metaphor-simile relationship is, other than that it must be 
close. I believe that the metaphor-simile relationship is not as close as all the theories 
outlined above (with the exception of relevance theory) suggest. Accounting for simile 
understanding entirely in terms of metaphor understanding is unsatisfactory because: (i) it 
has not been demonstrated that they are the same; and (ii) all the theories I have explored 
remain incomplete with respect to their primary desideratum, metaphors. Because my 
proposals run counter to the prevailing pre-theoretic assumptions in the field, and because 
the conflation of metaphor and simile is perhaps one of the most widely agreed upon 
assumptions in the field (although cf. Tirrell, 1991; Sperber and Wilson, 2008/2012; Carston, 
2002a; Carston and Wearing, 2011; O’Donoghue, 2009; Israel, et al., 2004; Glucksberg and 
Haught, 2006; Roncero, et al., 2012), I return to first principles in the following chapter. 
What are the appropriate intuitions, observations and generalisations which are pertinent to 
an account of simile understanding? 
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Chapter 4: Evaluating claims on the metaphor/simile relationship 
In the previous chapter I rebutted attempts to capture the characteristic effects of simile in 
terms of indexicality (§3.3), conceptual structure-mapping (§3.6), and conceptual metaphors 
(§3.7). I also outlined some of the limitations of current relevance theory accounts of 
metaphor understanding (§3.1). The inadequacy of current accounts of metaphor 
understanding suggests that claims similes are to be understood in the same way are, at 
best, premature. Claims that metaphors simply ‘are’ (elliptically, or by implicature) similes 
(§3.2) or that metaphor and simile are equally irrelevant to understanding language use are 
also misleading. I suggest a different tack altogether: to treat similes as a species of 
comparison, and to explain what it is about how certain linguistic comparisons are 
understood that makes them amenable to the communication of poetic effects. 
The deployment of similes can achieve a wide range of different cognitive effects in an 
audience. It would be impossible to conduct a complete survey of every such type of 
cognitive effect. Some have argued that this is even more challenging a prospect than 
investigating metaphor in this regard: 
“Just because simile is not so peculiar in form as metaphor is, it leaves open a much 
wider range of ways of comparing one thing to another. It is hardly to be imagined 
that one could make a survey of the various things simile can do.” 
(Nowottny, 1965: 67) 
Chapters 1-3 have established a framework for investigating the weak effects of certain 
types of expressions which is grounded in a theory of cognition and communication. 
However, one cannot simply extrapolate from theory alone which questions are of 
theoretical interest. We also need to compare apparently related phenomena in order to 
make the right distinctions. For instance, much of the theoretical literature on simile from 
the perspectives of linguistics, communication and philosophy of language has focussed on 
simile’s relationship to metaphor. As Chapter 3 in particular demonstrates, such accounts of 
metaphor understanding are still hotly debated. The incompleteness of metaphor theory is 
not in itself a problem for explaining simile understanding. However, when such accounts of 
metaphor either explicitly or implicitly assume that there is an existing account for simile, it 
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should be of particular concern for researchers in this area that no such account of simile as 
an independent phenomenon has been forthcoming. 
A secondary issue, often raised in previous research but rarely fleshed out, is the interaction 
between metaphor and simile. I address this topic in §6.3 using the theory of simile 
understanding that I advance in §6.1. I propose we abandon the pre-theoretic category of 
‘simile’ and instead focus upon a more theoretically-sound notion of poetic comparisons. It 
should come as no surprise to those familiar with relevance theoretic research on figurative 
language that the classical categorisation of tropes fails to stand up to sustained scrutiny 
(see e.g. Sperber and Wilson, 1990/2012; Sperber and Wilson, 2008/2012), as Sperber and 
Wilson make clear: 
“Rhetoric has no proprietary subject matter to study because the phenomena and 
issues it claims as its own amount to a disparate set of items rather than an 
autonomous category. The set should be dismantled and the individual items studied 
within a broader framework of a cognitive approach to human communication.” 
(id. 1990/2012: 96) 
By clarifying the relevant issues further, this chapter seeks to establish that the null 
hypothesis should be that similes simply are a type of comparison. Assumptions (1)-(9) 
below, some of which lie behind the theories outlined in Chapter 3, are addressed directly: 
are these assumptions valid (are there no immediate objections which could be raised to 
them)? Are they relevant? And, if they are both accurate and relevant, do such assumptions 
suggest how similes are understood (as claimed by some of the theorists whose views were 
explored in Chapter 3), or might these observations be accounted for in other terms? I 
answer the final question in Chapter 5 (§5.2). 
However, there is a secondary strand to my argument here. I wish to establish that (i) similes 
are not well understood by researchers in the field, and that (ii) they do deserve further 
attention. In this chapter I focus upon a number of assumptions which appear explicitly or 
implicitly both in much of the work on metaphor which makes predictions about how similes 
are understood, and in certain literary studies of particular authors or genres. No individual 
theorist holds all of them, but many hold several. Most researchers on figurative language 
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have focussed upon only those issues which relate to the metaphor-simile distinction. 
However, consideration of this wider range of assumptions throws up a variety of 
observations which have been ignored in the theoretical literature in particular. I claim that 
any account of simile which aims to be comprehensive must address these particular aspects 
of simile use. They are discussed at length in §§4.1-9. Despite their varied provenance, none 
of the following claims stands up to extensive scrutiny: 
(1) Both metaphors and similes are universal:  
(2) Metaphors and similes are intersubstitutable in terms of (i) content and/or (ii) 
effects.  
(3) Similes are hedged metaphors.  
(4) Similes (typically or elliptically) come with explanations.  
(5) Similes tend towards extension.  
(6) Similes are miniature narratives.  
(7) Metaphor is ‘better’ than simile.  
(8) Similes ‘succeed’ and ‘fail’ for different reasons to metaphor.  
(9) Similes can be easily distinguished from literal comparisons.  
An example of a poetic simile such as (1) will help to establish both what can be said 
immediately about how similes are understood and the difficulties involved in investigating 
poetic simile: 
 (1) Her voice is like the ev’ning thrush,  
That sings on Cessnock’s banks unseen,  
While his mate sits nestling in the bush; 
An’ she has twa sparkling, roguish een! [two, eyes] 
(paraphrases of dialect words given in square brackets) 
(Burns, The Lass of Cessnock Banks. Stanza 12. Lines 45-8. Low (Ed.), 1993. 77) 
Before addressing the generalisations which I think are either incorrect or irrelevant to 
theorising about how similes are understood, I outline here a few observations about the 
simile given in (1), some immediately obvious, some less so. Firstly, enumerating ‘points of 
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comparison’ is not at issue in the understanding of (1). The simile in (1) is formally (that is, 
syntactically) identifiable as a comparison. But a paraphrase such as (1a) would not be all 
that (1) is typically taken as having communicated. The ‘point’ of (1) is not (1a) (the explicit 
content), but rather something more like (1b): 
 (1a) Her voice is like that particular thrush’s voice. 
 (1b) Her voice is beautiful in a particular, (at least partly) thrush-like way. 
Moreover, even a paraphrase such as (1b) is not exhaustive of the content taken to be 
communicated by the simile in (1). The fact that (1) communicates poetic effects (see §2.10) 
needs to be explained. As Bredin put it, comparison does not exhaust the meaning of simile, 
even though there is clearly “a sort of special relationship between comparing and likening” 
(1998: 68). But in order to be more precise about this, we would need to specify how similes 
differ from ‘literal’ comparisons. Is it a matter of the ‘degree of overlap’ between the 
properties belonging properly to the tenor and the vehicle separately? Or is it a matter of 
how ‘poetic effects’ (see §2.6) are achieved? I make a case for the latter view. 
One major problem with similes such as (1) is that the tenor (her voice) is, in many respects, 
not thrush-like at all. In how many respects is her voice ‘thrush-like’? Because anything can 
be ‘like’ anything else (e.g. Carston, 2002a: 357; Goodman, 1976; Davidson, 1978/1984), it 
follows that her voice is thrush-like and sparrow-like and robin-like and tractor-like and 
planet-like, and one could go on in this fashion indefinitely. Take the following potential 
objections one could make to (1) by uttering (1c) and (1d): 
 (1c) Her voice isn’t like a thrush, it’s like a sparrow. 
 (1d) Her voice isn’t like a thrush, it’s like honey. 
By producing utterances of (1c) and (1d), one is not expected to be able to specify the 
respects in which one is objecting to the comparison. However, the alternative comparisons 
given suggest a different way of perceiving her voice. Moreover, it is striking how different 
the objections in (1c) and (1d) are. An utterance of (1c) is taken as objecting to the 
comparison of her voice to that of a thrush, in that her voice is not beautiful at all: the songs 
of sparrows are typically taken to be less beautiful than those of thrushes. However (1d) is 
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taken as objecting not to her voice being beautiful but as communicating that her voice is 
not beautiful in such a way as could be expressed by comparing her voice to a thrush. An 
alternative comparison (like honey) is offered which the speaker considers will more reliably 
give access to the right interpretation. In other words, (1c) involves objecting to the implicit 
content of the comparison in (1), whereas (1d) objects to the way in which that content is 
derived.  
Let us assume that (1) can only achieve relevance by at least communicating one of the 
implicatures (2a) and (2b): 
 (2a) Her voice is beautiful to hear. 
 (2b) Her voice is unpleasant to hear. 
If a hearer/reader does not recover (2a) or (2b) they cannot be said to have understood (1) 
at all. But none of the encyclopaedic assumptions associated with THRUSH are required for 
the reader/hearer to recover (2a), as they typically would. This is not to say that 
encyclopaedic knowledge about thrushes is irrelevant to the interpretation of (1). But one 
may not have assumptions such as (3) associated with a stable concept THRUSH in order to get 
to (2a): 
 (3) A thrush’s voice is beautiful to hear. 
Rather, if one does not have a concept THRUSH prior to the utterance, one can still infer from 
(1) assumptions such as (3a): 
 (3a) A thrush is a songbird. 
Once one has an assumption such as (3a) attached to a concept THRUSH, as long as 
assumptions in (3) and (3a) are correctly identified as part of the intended context of 
utterance, that will suffice to license an implicated conclusion such as (2a). This is because 
(1) communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance, and (1) is likely to achieve 
relevance as providing evidence of why the poet holds the woman referred to by her in high 
esteem. 
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Crucially, even if the hearer/reader does have a stable concept THRUSH, communication of 
which makes more manifest assumptions such as (3) and (3a), there is still a degree of 
indeterminacy in what is communicated by (1). This legitimates the exploration on the part 
of the speaker/hearer of a wide range of weak implicatures. Furthermore, the elaboration 
upon the simile in (1) does not significantly mitigate this indeterminacy. The ‘additional’ 
description in (1) does not ‘narrow down’ the way in which, for example, the subject in (1) is 
‘thrush-like’ in a helpful fashion, namely, in a way which would facilitate establishing an 
overlap between the properties of the tenor and the vehicle. In this case, her voice could be 
like that of a thrush in that it is high-pitched, or sounds sweet, or makes the poet feel a 
particular way. But the details given in (1) are mostly physical details of the thrush’s 
environment. They elaborate upon a description which achieves relevance as a description 
of the thrush, not as a description of the girl at all. Yet the description still plays a role in 
allowing the hearer to get access to those effects. Relevance theory can explain how this 
happens and why such ‘indirectness’ gives rise to the effects typically elicited by poetic 
comparisons. Exploring how such ‘explained’ similes might be understood will be dealt with 
in Chapters 4 (§4.4, §4.6) and 5 (§5.4). 
One methodological consideration, in addition to those raised in the introduction, is what 
significance one ought to place on more ‘standardised’ comparisons such as (4a-d) (Cf. 
Wikberg, 2008; Moon, 2008): 
 (4a) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS (Plath, The Bell Jar. 1966: 8) 
 (4b) [...]EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS (Plath, The Bell Jar. 1966: 5) 
 (4c) like a coiled spring. 
 (4d) like opening an oven door. 
Standardised comparisons such as (4a-d) tend to contribute a largely uniform conceptual 
content on each occasion of use. For example, (4a) means silent, (4b) means very attractive 
or attracting very strongly, (4c) is a cliché expression meaning very excitable, just as (4d) 
almost always means very hot. It is likely that the conceptual contribution such comparisons 
make to the explicit content of utterances is as uniform as the contribution of an encoded 
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concept to an explicature. The novel, creative comparisons we deal with in this thesis are not 
like this at all, although standardized examples such as (4a-d) can be made to generate weak 
effects (for a wider range of similar examples which do generate poetic effects see Chapter 
5, §5.2). 
To overemphasise examples such as (4a-d) would be misleading in that it is precisely the 
weak effects of simile which distinguish them from what is normally considered to be ‘literal’ 
comparison (the notion of ‘literal’ language being itself problematic. Gibbs, 1994 §2; Sperber 
and Wilson, 1995; 2005/2012: 10-16; Wilson and Sperber, 2002/2012: 82). These 
standardised cases are not going to help us to understand that. If they achieve poetic effects 
at all, it is at least possible that they do so by a process of conceptual adjustment of coded 
conceptual material, much like metaphors: 
 (5) I was [DUMB-AS-A-POST]*. 
If (5) suggests the correct analysis for such examples, it will be because there is a conceptual 
address for the conventionalised phrase ‘dumb as a post’ ([DUMB-AS-A-POST]) which would 
provide access to the assumptions required for the process of ad hoc concept construction. 
Whether such examples are appropriate or not requires some awareness of what effects 
similes are used to achieve and I maintain that we can only explain the conventional cases if 
we have an account of how more creative and (especially) novel cases are interpreted. My 
approach contrasts with that of Lakoff for whom novel metaphors are (typically) parasitic on 
standardised ones, and, by analogy, so are similes (e.g. Lakoff, 2008). In addition, 
overemphasis on standardised cases can lead to a problem in explaining how the 
standardised cases came to have meant what they now mean. In Chapter 5 (§5.4) I outline 
how poetic similes of this form are understood. 
Carston gives four possible metaphor-simile relations which have been argued for 
extensively in the theoretical literature (Carston, 2010a: 297 n3): 
(i) Metaphors are elliptical similes 
(ii) Similes are hedged metaphors 
(iii) Metaphors and similes are distinct tropes with very similar effects 
(iv) Metaphors and similes are distinct tropes with very different effects 
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Carston claims that the fourth possibility is the most likely. However, the evidence given in 
support of such a position by Carston and her colleagues (e.g. Carston, 2010a; Carston and 
Wearing, 2011; O’Donoghue, 2009) do not suffice to establish the nature of the difference in 
effects between metaphors and similes. This whole chapter, indeed this thesis, can be seen 
as an attempt to clarify whether the two claims, that metaphor and simile are distinct, and 
that they have very different effects, are valid, and what this ought to mean for research into 
simile and other aspects of the relation between lexical choice and style (usually thought of 
in classical rhetorical terms as the study of ‘tropes’). 
The usual approach hitherto on the relationship between metaphor and simile has focussed 
upon the following sort of example: 
 (6a) Her eyes are stars. 
 (6b) Her eyes are like stars. 
In addition, utterances such as (6c) have been taken to be indicative of the relative ‘strength’ 
of metaphors vis-à-vis similes: 
 (6c) Her eyes are not like stars, they are stars. 
For many researchers in metaphor studies, comparison of examples such as (6a) and (6b) 
generates intuitions about the relative ‘strength’ of metaphors and similes, their typical 
effects, and so on. In defence of such an approach, experimental testing of speaker 
evaluations of the relative ‘strength’ of metaphor and simile suggests that such evaluations 
are both inter-rater reliable and repeatable (for a summary of findings on this issue see 
Glucksberg, 2008: 76-9). Sections §4.2 and §4.3 below challenge the thesis that simple 
comparison between metaphors like (6a) and similes like (6b) can provide direct insight into 
how metaphors and similes achieve their effects. I explain in Chapter 5 (especially §5.1) that 
(6c) is problematic for other reasons. 
If we can establish that metaphor is not akin to simile in how it achieves its effects, then 
there is another problem on the horizon: if similes are instead a species of comparison, then 
we cannot simply identify similes as those comparisons which achieve poetic effects. 
Comparisons which we would not readily identify as similes (just like a whole range of non-
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figurative, non-tropic language) can be shown to achieve poetic effects for reasons other 
than their being comparisons (Cf. Sperber and Wilson, 2008/2012: 118f on haiku). 
The discussion in this chapter (especially §4.2) suggests that we cannot use ‘equivalent’ 
metaphors as a diagnostic for similes. It is wrong to assume that a comparison equivalent 
such as (6b), derived from a metaphorical utterance such as (6a) by the addition of like, is a 
figurative comparison just because the metaphorical equivalent is figurative. ‘Figurativeness’ 
is as much a pre-theoretic notion as ‘literalness’ (Wilson and Sperber, 2002/2012). Relevance 
theorists argue that the role of ad hoc concept construction in eliciting poetic effects is a 
sounder notion for investigating metaphor than is ‘figurativeness’ (Sperber and Wilson, 
1990/2012; 2008/2012). Is there an equivalent principle on which to ground a framework for 
simile research? In order to give a fair assessment of whether a given comparison is 
figurative or not, we would do better to look at such comparisons against other types of 
comparison which achieve poetic effects than to compare them with different phenomena 
(such as metaphors) whose relatedness is at issue. 
The hypothesis which I develop in Chapter 5 is that the ‘weakness’ of poetic comparisons 
can be compared to that of the ‘weakness’ of the explicit content of metaphors, with 
important differences. While (creative, novel) metaphors communicate an ad hoc concept 
which is a significant departure from a lexically-encoded concept, developed on the 
responsibility of the hearer, similes involve the free enrichment of the explicature in a 
different sense (for the superiority of free enrichment as a notion over ‘hidden indexical’ 
accounts see Carston, 2002a: 197-206). What is ‘different from’ the lexically-encoded sense 
of the words used is not a single conceptual element but a range of conceptual material 
which contributes to the relevance of an otherwise uninformative comparison: the 
comparison-relevant content. The ‘surface’ meaning of similes is always uninformatively 
(although not trivially) true51. To say that A is like B, for any A and for any B, will always be, 
strictly-speaking, true (see Chapter 3, §3.4). In the poetic examples which make the 
investigation of similes so interesting, a comparison achieves relevance as evidence towards 
                                                          
51 If similes were trivially true, their negations would be trivially false. This is not the case. I 
owe this observation to Iván García-Alvárez (p.c.).  
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the development of both an indeterminate range of comparison-relevant content and a 
wide array of weak implicatures. 
Developments in lexical pragmatics (particularly the account of metaphor understanding in 
e.g. Carston, 2002a; Sperber and Wilson, 2008/2012; Pilkington, 2000 §4; Wearing, 2006; 
Carston and Wearing, 2011; Vega Moreno, 2007) allow us to draw an important distinction 
between the contribution of lexical choice to style which involves weakness at the explicit 
level in one way (underdetermination of explicit content at the level of an individual lexical 
item, such as metaphor, metonymy, certain uses of hyperbole, and so on) and those which 
involve weakness at the explicit level in a different way (poetic comparisons and potentially 
a wide range of other phenomena). Such a perspective provides the potential for an account 
of rhetorical ‘tropes’ which manages to overcome the ‘dilemma’ of rhetorical theory: 
accounting for the ubiquity and comprehensibility of figurative meaning without succumbing 
to the temptation to give up on any notion of context invariant contributions to meaning 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1990/2012: 86). Relevance theory allows us to develop a theory of the 
linguistic devices traditionally called ‘tropes’, which reside in the repertoire of not just 
specialists (poets, novelists, songwriters) but also ‘ordinary’ language users, which can: (i) 
provide optimal empirical coverage; (ii) remain explanatory; and (iii) not obscure the key 
feature of the phenomenon in question, namely their ability to communicate far more than 
the concepts linguistically encoded by the words used and their syntactic combination 
provides (Chapter 2, §§2.9-12). In the case of simile, this must involve distinguishing similes 
from non-poetic comparisons (§4.9). 
4.1 Both metaphors and similes are universal  
Metaphor is widely accepted to be found in all languages. Stern claims in passing that the 
processes underlying metaphor understanding are “presumably universal” (2000: 30). 
Researchers from the very different conceptual metaphor theory tradition propose that 
certain conceptual metaphors are themselves universal (see e.g. Kövecses 2010 §13). It is 
also usually assumed that metaphor is present in all registers of language use and in all eras 
of literary history.  
As the discussion in Chapter 3 showed, we need to be quite precise about what we mean by 
metaphor. Relevance theorists see metaphor and simile as primarily issues of linguistic 
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communication. Others, particularly those sympathetic to conceptual metaphor theory, see 
metaphor in maths, the visual arts, music, and many other phenomena (see e.g. Gibbs (Ed.), 
2008 Part V; Ritchie, 2013: 16f). Because there are fewer words than communicable 
concepts (Sperber and Wilson, 1998/2012), it stands to reason that all speaker communities 
would use lexical items in this way (as loose uses) at least for the purpose of communicating 
unlexicalised concepts. Some such uses will also communicate poetic effects. Although ad 
hoc concept construction is not limited to cases of figurative language use, it does seem 
reasonable to assume that because language users (i) can use a word which lexically-
encodes one concept to communicate a related, but unlexicalised concept, and (ii) this 
process can involve the communication of poetic effects, that (creative, novel) metaphors 
are likely to be found in all speaker communities. It is an empirical question whether 
metaphors are universal, but there is no prima facie reason to doubt this. 
There are so many different ways of explicitly communicating a comparison in English that it 
seems, prima facie, extremely likely that comparison is also a phenomenon which is used by 
all speaker groups in all languages. This would be another empirical question. However, 
when it comes to a specific subset of comparisons which do not just achieve poetic effects 
but do so by virtue of being a comparison (my notion of poetic comparisons), then there is 
some evidence to suggest that this is not a universal phenomenon in literature, and hence 
not likely to be a universal phenomenon in linguistic communication (otherwise poets might 
be expected to have exploited it). A relevance theoretic account such as the one proposed 
here makes no prediction about whether comparisons which achieve relevance primarily by 
means of poetic effects are universal or not. But if relative judgements of metaphor and 
simile in English are central desiderata in theorising about both phenomena, and if poetic 
comparisons are not found in certain genres or eras of world literature, then the absence of 
simile in certain literary traditions (despite the presence of metaphor) would require 
explanation. 
Steen and colleagues (e.g. Steen, Dorst et al., 2010: 57ff; 2011) argue that similes are a type 
of ‘direct metaphor’ (Steen appears not to have used the term as late as his survey of 
metaphor in discourse in id., 2007). The details of their theoretical proposals and statistical 
findings are not discussed here, as they rely heavily upon conceptual metaphor theory as the 
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basis for a corpus-based analysis of metaphor in discourse (see §3.4). However, their 
metaphor identification methodology suggests that ‘at most’ 1% of all metaphors in 
discourse (as understood in Steen’s take on conceptual metaphor theory) are ‘direct 
metaphors’ (2011: 51), of which similes constitute a large part. Although it is debatable 
whether conceptual metaphors (understood as conventional, embodied associations 
between conceptual domains) are really the appropriate object of linguistic investigation, or 
whether they even exist, one might suspect that similes would be far easier to identify by a 
coding procedure than metaphors. Even if one were to follow Steen in discounting all the 
standardised senses of similes, as Steen does in attributing most metaphor understanding to 
a process of lexical disambiguation between conventionalized senses (2011: 54, 59), this 
figure is particularly low. It seems that simile is, as far as we can tell, rare in English (see also 
Moon, 2008; Wikberg, 2008). 
However, the focus of this thesis is on poetic uses of comparisons. The important question 
for an ostensive-inferential theory of communication is what such linguistic phenomena can 
tell us about how weak effects are exploited by poets. In relation to this question, it is 
irrelevant that simile is infrequent. Moreover, emergent property metaphors are also rare. It 
is ad hoc concept construction in general which is widespread, sometimes resulting in 
metaphors, sometimes hyperboles, sometimes approximations, and so on. Even in the case 
of emergent property metaphors, their importance lies not in their ubiquity, but in what 
they can tell us about ostensive-inferential communication. Nevertheless, when we narrow 
our focus to extant poetry, poetic similes, according to the theoretical and critical literature, 
are not found in every literary tradition. 
The first problem with claims about the universality of metaphor and simile is that scholars 
have made a countervailing claim, that the relative frequency of metaphors and similes has 
changed over time, at least in the literary history of English, as illustrated by the following 
quote: 
“Considering the deep-rooted involvement of metaphor in the [sc. historical] 
development of language and its presence in almost every kind of expression, it is 
somewhat surprising to find how small a part it plays in [English] literature before 
Shakespeare. In the earlier periods simile predominates.” 
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(Ousby (Ed.), 1992: 915b) 
Similar claims have been made about the historical development of Greek literature, 
emphasising the relative rarity of metaphor in early authors such as Homer (although see 
Moulton, 1979). There are a number of objections one could make to such claims. For 
instance, without an awareness of the distinction between stable, encoded concepts and ad 
hoc applications of lexical items usually associated with those concepts (as could be 
provided by, for instance, a native speaker) how can we be sure that a given expression is 
not metaphorical? But similes face no such obstacle, as the sense of the vehicle explicitly 
communicated is close to the lexically-encoded concept. Similes are easy to spot, and many 
of those who have explored their use have observed both changing tendencies in simile use 
in certain speech communities, and, bringing us to the next problem, their complete absence 
in others. 
For instance, it has been claimed that simile is non-existent in Old Icelandic and Old Norse 
(Brogan, 1994: 273). With regards to Old English, Tolman even claimed that “simile and 
allegory are too conscious and elaborate for the Anglo-Saxon mind” (1887: 28). Such 
groundless speculations aside, all three traditions include kenningar (singular: kenning), 
which are poetic metonymies usually based on perceived similarities (examples in (7a) and 
(7b) are cited selectively from a list of Old English kenningar given in Gardner, 1969). Poets 
can deploy examples such as those in (7a) and (7b) as alternative expressions to denote the 
same thing as the words given in square brackets: 
(7a) merehengest ‘sea-horse’; yþhof ‘wave-house’  [=ship] 
(Gardner, 1969: 112) 
(7b) eorþærn ‘earth-place‘, eorþgrap ‘earth-grasp’, foldærn ‘earth-place‘, gærsbedd 
‘grass-bed‘, hellsceaþa ‘hell-foe‘, moldærn ‘earth-house‘  [=grave]  
(Gardner, 1969: 112) 
However, the extent to which these figurative expressions rely upon perceived similarities 
varies. Some (those in (7a), standing in for ship) appear to be more based on, in this case, 
perceptual resemblance than others (such as those in (7b), meaning grave). Moreover, there 
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is no evidence that they are to be treated as comparisons. They are far more like 
metonymies52 as in (8): 
 (8) The Crown [meaning the representatives of the legal authority of the Queen] 
rests its case. 
The concept communicated by merehengest in (7a) is not the same as that of ship would be. 
Nevertheless, it does share a denotation with the concept SHIP, namely, ships. The fact that 
‘sea-horse’ can, in this literary tradition, be used as an alternative label for anything which 
can be denoted by the word ship means that the poet can use the alternative for metrical 
reasons, or to make more manifest certain assumptions which would not be made more 
manifest by the use of ship. Certain noun-adjective compounds seem to exhibit similar 
properties (my emphasis): 
(9a) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
  
(Dylan Thomas, Under Milk Wood. Thomas, 1954: 1)53 
 
(9b) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
(Scott (The Waterboys). The Whole of the Moon. 1985. Album: This is the Sea. Island 
Records.) 
                                                          
52 Fabb identifies kenningar as metaphors (1997: 268). The question of whether metonymies 
ought to be identified simply as referentially used metaphors or should be seen as sui 
generis is not at issue here. In any case, there is certainly no easily identifiable paraphrase 
for e.g. example (8). 
53 Carston and Wearing attribute this example to my supervisor, Diane Blakemore (Carston 
and Wearing, 2011: 297 n11). The discussion here calls into question the idea that such 
examples can “be thought of as truly elliptical simile” (id. ib.), although this was my original 
view. 
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Goatly gives a range of similar constructions (1997, especially Table 8.3 pp238f). As I will 
argue in Chapter 5, there are syntactically-identifiable comparisons which achieve relevance 
in a particular way, through the evocation of poetic effects, and these comparisons appear 
to comprise most of the poetic cases of simile we would want to account for in a theory of 
simile understanding. Are (7a)-(9b) similes on this account? Their formation by 
morphological composition, and the fact that they contain no clear marker of comparison 
such as like or as, suggests that they do not form a class with similes such as Achilles is like a 
lion. Whether (7a)-(9b) count as similes are not requires a much fuller account of how 
similes are understood (Cf. Chapter 6, §6.1). 
There are also cases involving compounds with the adjectival suffix -like such as in (9c), 
which appear to be more like cases of ad hoc concept construction than poetic comparisons: 
(9c) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
  
(Larkin, Toads. Line 25f. Larkin, 1988: 89) 
The relationship between poetic comparisons proper and kenningar on the one hand and 
novel noun-adjective compounds on the other is a matter for further investigation. However, 
it is clear that none of the examples in this section involve syntactically identifiable 
comparisons. This would preclude their inclusion in the category of poetic comparisons 
which I introduce in Chapter 5. 
It seems quite likely that similes are not universal. Why might this be problematic for those 
who would have metaphors and similes manifestations of the same phenomenon? Firstly, on 
the relevance theoretic account, metaphors are simply more marked examples of a rather 
general process: ad hoc concept construction (§2.7). As such, they will be available in any 
language. Therefore, they will be able to be exploited by poets in pursuit of generating the 
kind of effects which are characteristic of poetic metaphors in any language. Conceptual 
adjustment, on this view, is a ‘trigger’ for poetic effects in the case of metaphor and other 
types of conceptual adjustment. But the way in which similes achieve their characteristic 
effects has, until now, been inadequately explored. If, as my account of simile understanding 
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in Chapter 5 will claim, similes achieve their characteristic effects by means of a 
speaker/author putting comparison to a particular use, there are ex hypothesi many other 
phenomena which might be used in that way. Unlike in the case of poetic metaphor, which is 
akin to poetic hyperbole and poetic metonymy in both the effects it can achieve and the way 
in which those effects are achieved, the class of utterances which can achieve poetic effects 
in ways other than conceptual adjustment will be large and heterogeneous. There is no 
reason to suppose that simile is a privileged member of that set, and so no reason to 
suppose that all or even most cultures will exhibit evidence of using comparisons in order to 
achieve those effects. 
4.2 Metaphors and similes are intersubstitutable in terms of (i) content and/or (ii) effects  
Any theorist who proposes that metaphors are elliptical similes, or that metaphorical effects 
can be explained in terms of implicated similes, must be committed to the claim that they 
are intersubstitutable in terms of their content or their effects or both (Cf. Chapter 3, §§3.4-
5). This appears to be a very widely-held view in the field of metaphor studies. As Glucksberg 
puts it: 
“A basic assumption underlying virtually all theories of metaphor is that metaphors 
and similes are, fundamentally, equivalent: they mean the same thing.” 
(Glucksberg, 2008: 74) 
Stern claims that metaphors and similes express the same (semantic) content, but differ 
“rhetorically or pragmatically” (2000: 232). Researchers rarely spell out what the ‘rhetorical’ 
difference between metaphors and similes is supposed to be (see below, §§4.3, 4.7). The 
idea that a metaphor (in English) can be paraphrased by an ‘equivalent’ simile by addition of 
like has been thoroughly refuted in the theoretical literature. There are no metaphor 
‘equivalents’ available for extended similes (Cf. Steen, 2007: 333ff) and no simile 
‘equivalents’ for many verbal metaphors (O’Donoghue, 2009: 128). A more cautious 
‘equivalence’ view is given in the following subsection. 
From the perspective of relevance theory, one could argue that the processes involved in 
metaphor understanding (see e.g. §2.12, §3.1) generalise to cases of simile. For instance, 
Hernández Iglesias (2010: 175f) has argued that an account of simile understanding 
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consistent with the spirit of the relevance theory approach to metaphor would involve a 
process of modifying the conceptual contribution of a simile to the explicature analogous to 
ad hoc concept construction in metaphor54. On this view, (10a) would be an explicature of 
(10): 
 (10) Mary is like a bulldozer. 
 (10a) Mary is [like a bulldozer]*. 
However, there are a number of objections which might be made to such an approach. 
Firstly, this would require that similes have similar content and equivalent effects to 
metaphors. This is an empirical question which has not yet been answered. Although I am 
sceptical of the reliability of pre-theoretic intuitions about the relative ‘strength’ of 
metaphors and similes to theorising about simile (see §4.7), the fact that there are any such 
intuitions challenges the claim that they are identical in terms of both content and effects. 
Secondly, the more complex examples adduced in this chapter would be very difficult to 
explain in terms of the creation of a single conceptual element in the way Hernández Iglesias 
proposes (see also Carston, 2010b: 255f). 
Similar approaches from different theoretical perspectives, such as Stern’s ‘indexical 
operator’ account of metaphor understanding (§3.3), or a similarly ‘semantic’ account 
involving the ‘loosening’ of a predication rather than the linguistically-encoded concept55, 
would likely suffer in the light of the same counterexamples. For instance, on one formal 
semantic approach, at least some adjectives can be treated as one-place predicates (see e.g. 
Bhat, 1994: 245). This is not uncontroversial. Chomsky warned in 1995 that “we still have no 
good phrase structure theory for such simple matters as attributive adjectives[...]” (1995: 
382 n22). But on this model, adjectival metaphors could be subsumed under an account 
                                                          
54 Hernández Iglesias claims that [LIKE A BULLDOZER]* actually is an ad hoc concept (2010: 176). 
He introduces the approach explored in the text as an alternative relevance theory account 
of simile understanding. It is not clear that he endorses this approach. 
55 This proposal was suggested by Iván García-Alvárez in a question posed to Robyn Carston. 
Master-class on ‘Lexical pragmatics and metaphor’, University of Salford, April 2011. 
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involving the ‘loosening’ of a predication. Therefore, the predicative adjective in (11a) 
COLD(x) could be ‘loosened’ at the level of the semantics to give another predication COLD*(x). 
A similar account can be argued for cases of attributive adjectives as in (11b) (the relevant 
aspects of the semantics of the utterances are suggested by the paraphrases in square 
brackets): 
 (11a) Her heart was cold. 
 [BE-COLD*(heart)] 
 (11b) Her cold heart stopped. 
 [STOPPED(heart) & BE-COLD*(heart)] 
However, this approach fails when we turn to metaphorical transitive verbs, such as (11c): 
 (11c) He froze her heart. 
There is no place in the proposed formal semantics for the ‘loosening’ to take place. Part of 
the appeal of the conceptual metaphor approach is that it allows examples such as (11a) and 
(11c) to be unified: they both reflect an underlying putative conceptual metaphor such as 
EMOTION IS HEAT (see e.g. Kövecses, 2010: 371). One could also propose a lexical-
decompositional approach, where an element of the lexical semantics of the verb is subject 
to the appropriate contextual adjustment (e.g. FREEZE = CAUSE TO BE COLD, and it is the COLD 
element which is interpreted metaphorically) (see e.g. Murphy, 2010 §4). But to argue either 
solution would be to commit oneself to a view of lexical semantics which is not compatible 
with that of relevance theorists, who adopt Fodor’s conceptual atomism (1998; Carston, 
2002a: 141, 214 n31; Sperber and Wilson, 1998/2012). Any semantic ‘loose predication’ 
approach (which would be rejected by the conceptual metaphor theorists in any case. See 
Lakoff and Johnson, 2003: 195-209) will still not explain the generation of the weaker effects 
which we are concerned with in this thesis, nor are there any comparison ‘equivalents’ to 
examples such as (11a-c). It would be bizarre to suppose without further justification that 
such an account is capable of being generalised to the comparison cases. Moreover, such an 
account would struggle to provide an explanation for lexical semantic change, as against, for 
instance, the relevance theoretic account of metaphor (see e.g. Falkum, 2011 ms §4.3.2). 
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A different relevance theoretic approach to simile is that of O’Donoghue (2009). She rightly 
identifies that ‘paraphrase’ and ‘equivalence’ are not coextensive notions (id., ib.: 129), but 
illustrates this point with the following examples (12a-b): 
 (12a) My mind is a computer. 
 (12b) My mind is like a computer. 
According to O’Donoghue, an utterance of (12a) communicates that my mind is very good at 
processing information, but (12b) communicates that my mind is like a computer in certain 
respects. The problem we have here is that (12a) also communicates that my mind is like a 
computer in at least one respect, namely in processing information. However, relevance 
theory would predict that (12a) explicitly communicates (12c), while (if my hypothesis that 
similes are comparisons is correct) (12b) explicitly communicates at least the content 
described in (12d) (my view on the explicit content of comparisons is further developed in 
Chapter 5). Both (12a) and (12b) typically will also strongly implicate (12e), and (12e) is likely 
to be the main point of the utterance for both (12a) and (12b): 
(12c) My mind is a COMPUTER*. 
[where a COMPUTER* is very good at processing information, the ad hoc concept 
denoting both COMPUTERS and some MINDS] 
(12d) My mind is like a COMPUTER. 
(12e) My mind is very good at processing information. 
It is not necessarily the case that A is like B-similes communicate that A and B are alike in 
particular respects, that is, there may be cases where the hearer does not have to recover 
the precise respects in which a comparison holds (points of comparison) (§4.4). My view of 
what comparisons communicate about the respects in which a comparison holds is 
developed in Chapter 5. But a more pressing objection can be given against O’Donoghue’s 
examples: What weak effects does an utterance of (12b) typically communicate? Probably 
not many. I would argue that examples such as (12b) can hardly be seen as typical of the 
more poetic examples of simile I have found. O’Donoghue does not explain why (12b) should 
be interpreted as a (what I call) non-poetic comparison rather than a simile. 
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To summarise, the content of metaphor- and simile-utterances overlaps in certain respects, 
but is clearly distinct in others. While metaphorical utterances communicate ad hoc 
concepts as part of their explicature, and one can typically clearly identify the word which is 
used to communicate that concept, there is no such method available to identify what is 
communicated explicitly by a simile. Much of the same implicit content can be 
communicated by both a metaphor and an ‘equivalent’ simile. I will argue in Chapter 5 that a 
distinction in how the two phenomena are processed is why accounts which conflate 
metaphor and simile all fail to account for the data. But there is a further problem. If we are 
trying to account for the ‘overlap’ in effects, then our definition of what is an ‘equivalent’ 
metaphor and simile ought to change. We should not expect that metaphors and similes 
generate their characteristic effects in the same way, nor should we expect that formally 
similar metaphors and similes (such as A is B/A is like B) are equivalent in their effects. If this 
is the case, ought we to expect that there are any ‘equivalent’ metaphors and similes which 
we can treat as minimal pairs? 
There are, of course, researchers who take the view that metaphors and similes are not 
intersubstitutable (e.g. Aisenman, 1999. See also the works cited in §3.9). But such accounts 
tend to assume that the difference between how metaphors and similes are understood can 
be attributed to the difference between two types of conceptual processing (in Aisenman’s 
case, structure-mapping for similes and class-inclusion for metaphors. 1999: 46). The 
account of comparison understanding I will develop in Chapter 5 will not make such an 
appeal to independent processes of concept manipulation. 
4.3 Similes are hedged metaphors  
One slightly more specific variant of the previous claim is that metaphors and similes have 
the same content and generate the same type of effects in a similar way, but that a 
metaphor will be interpreted as more ‘forceful’ than an equivalent simile (‘stronger and 
deeper’ in Zharikov and Gentner’s terminology, 2002. Cf. Kennedy and Chiappe, 1999). 
Chiappe and Kennedy cite Max Black (1979), Glucksberg and Keysar (1990; 1993), Morgan 
(1993) and Roberts and Kreuz (1994) to the effect that metaphors makes stronger claims 
than similes (Chiappe and Kennedy, 2000: 372). Lakoff and Turner say that similes are the 
same as conceptual metaphors, they just make a “weaker claim” (1989: 133). 
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Many seek to account for this felt difference between metaphors and similes by ‘hedging’ 
(see below). The account I give of simile understanding in Chapter 5 is incompatible with 
such a view. But there is a more general problem. How reliable are intuitions with respect to 
what is communicated by a particular metaphor or simile? Novel, creative metaphors are 
typically very context sensitive. Any ‘felt difference’ between A is B-metaphors and A is like 
B-similes in the same context might tell us very little about how either phenomenon is 
understood. Furthermore, even if intuitions about the relative ‘strength’ of metaphors as 
opposed to similes are inter-subjectively consistent, what does this mean (see particularly 
§4.7 below)? Moreover, a more detailed investigation of such claims from a conceptual 
metaphor theory perspective (that of Croft and Cruse, 2004) suggests that all ‘hedging’ 
accounts will fail to account for how similes are understood56. 
In order to claim that similes function as ‘hedged’ metaphors, the word like must make a 
similar sort of contribution to an utterance as less controversial hedges such as as it were, 
and so as to say (e.g. Leezenberg, 2001: 226; Veale and Hao, 2007: 683. Note that Goatly 
does not give like as a hedge for metaphor. 1997: 176ff). I focus here on one particular 
approach to similes as ‘hedged’ metaphors which highlights some of the problems that all 
such accounts are likely to face. For most in the cognitive linguistics tradition, metaphors are 
understood according to conceptual metaphor theory or its variants (such as blending 
theory, or hybrid metaphor theory. See §3.7). For Croft and Cruse in particular, the ‘felt’ 
difference between metaphor and simile can be accounted for in terms of ‘profiling’: 
“In Langackerian terms, A is like B profiles the resemblance, while A is B profiles the 
properties predicated.” 
(Croft and Cruse, 2004: 212f) 
                                                          
56 Guttenplan also calls like a hedge (2005: 170-3), but he makes clear that even literal 
comparisons should be treated according to his ‘semantic descent’ account of metaphors 
(id., ib.: 203ff). 
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‘Profiling’ (see Langacker, 2008: 66ff) is a notion from cognitive linguistics. Essentially, 
profiling allows cognitive linguists to explain the different ‘construals’ of, for instance, active 
sentences and their passive equivalents in terms of conceptual salience: 
(13a) The boy hit the ball.  [active sentence] 
(13b) The ball was hit by the boy.  [passive sentence] 
Utterances of (13a) and (13b) are taken as expressing the same conceptual content: an 
agent (A) acted upon a patient (B). But the roles that A and B play are ‘profiled’ differently. 
In (13a), A is the ‘trajector’ (the focal, or most prominent participant), and B the ‘landmark’. 
The event described by (13a) is in terms of something that the boy did. In (13b), that 
situation is reversed. The event described by (13b) is in terms of something that happened 
to the ball (discussion due to Evans and Green, 2006: 541f). ‘Profiling’ is therefore an issue of 
the relative conceptual salience of members of a given conceptual relationship. 
However, Croft and Cruse are not explicit about how such a process of profiling would apply 
to similes. Take the metaphor (14a) and the ‘equivalent’ simile (14b): 
 (14a) His words are honey. 
 (14b) His words are like honey. 
Firstly, the difference between (14a) and (14b) is far less pronounced in terms of its weak 
effects than many of the other examples given in this thesis. If (14b) profiles the conceptual 
relationship between WORDS and HONEY, which bit of the mapping is profiled? Those which 
involve ‘resemblance’? It is not clear what this would entail. It should also be noted that 
nobody appears to have claimed that there is a WORDS ARE HONEY or WORDS ARE SWEETENERS 
conceptual metaphor, although WORDS ARE FOOD is attested in the theoretical literature (See 
Jing-Schmidt who thinks this conceptual metaphor is “likely to be universal”. id. 2008: 259)). 
One could attempt a solution based on ‘blending theory’ (see §3.8, especially Figure §3.3). 
But why would profiling ‘resemblance’ pick out only one part of ‘blended space’ and not 
another? Moreover, it is hard to see what the significance of the claim that ‘similes profile 
resemblance’ could be on any definition of ‘resemblance’. The claim that the use of like 
makes likeness more salient is of little epistemic value; little follows from it, not least an 
192 
 
explanation of the perceived difference between metaphor and simile, rather than a 
reformulation of the question at hand. ‘Hedging’ accounts of metaphors and similes appear 
to be a dead end. 
For Glucksberg the effect of ‘hedges’ on metaphor interpretation is “highly systematic” 
(2000: 46f). He claims that the following examples demonstrate that the most ‘categorical’ 
expressions, including counterintuitive examples such as (15a), are judged as being most 
metaphorical, the least ‘categorical’, such as (15g), as being the least metaphorical: 
(15a) Cigarettes are literally time bombs. 
(15b) Cigarettes are time bombs.  
(15c) Cigarettes are virtual time bombs.  
(15d) Cigarettes are like time bombs. 
(15e) In certain respects, cigarettes are like time bombs. 
(15f) Cigarettes are deadly, like time bombs. 
(15g) Cigarettes are as deadly as time bombs. 
It would be quite odd if such variegated constructions reliably produced the kind of graded 
judgements that Glucksberg suggests. The problem is exacerbated by comparison with other 
constructions which appear to achieve similar effects to the ‘hedges’ Glucksberg gives. For 
instance, (15h-i) is certainly a type of utterance one hears: 
 (15h) Cigarettes are metaphorical time bombs. 
 (15i) Metaphorically speaking, cigarettes are time bombs. 
Where in the scale of (15a-g) do (15h-i) belong? Moreover, Glucksberg seems to be 
overlooking the central importance of higher-level explicatures in how such constructions 
achieve their effects. The following example (16) is from a song: 
 (16) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
 (James, et al. (James). Sometimes (Lester Piggott). (1993) Album: Laid. Mercury.) 
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Here the connection between the higher-level explicature and the effects achieved is clear. 
One central higher-level explicature of (16) is something like (16a): 
(16a) The speaker swears that sometimes when he looks in another person’s eyes he 
can see their soul. 
The ‘strength’ of the metaphorical interpretation of (16) is connected to the degree of 
commitment of the speaker to the proposition expressed. One could say that the 
‘figurativeness’ of the interpretation does not vary between (16) and (17) below, but rather 
the presence of (16a) as a higher-level explicature for (16) accounts for the felt difference 
between the interpretations. Both (16) and (17) will share a higher-level explicature such as 
(17a), but only (16) will communicate (16a): 
 (17) Sometimes when I look in your eyes I can see your soul. 
(17a) The speaker says that when he looks in another person’s eyes he can see their 
soul. 
Moreover, as the following sections will make clear, the way that the specification of 
respects in which a comparison holds (see (15e)) affects understanding of similes is poorly 
understood. Example (15g) is also problematic for other reasons (see §5.3). 
It is not clear that the subjective participant judgements Glucksberg relies on are reliable. 
For instance, Chiappe and Kennedy (2000) present experimental evidence that respondents’ 
judgements about metaphors and ‘equivalent’ similes disappear when they are presented as 
stimuli in isolation from each other. Moreover, what would a ‘very metaphorical’ 
interpretation be like? From a relevance theoretic perspective, metaphors and similes, as 
with a wide range of utterances, can vary as to how much they achieve relevance by means 
of poetic effects. Is (15a) more poetic than (15g)? How is (15e) less categorical than (15d)? 
Moreover, ought we not to expect that poets exploit the putatively systematic differences to 
make their language more ‘metaphorical’? One does not find many examples like (15a) even 
in modern English poetry, but Glucksberg appears to be claiming that this is the most 
‘metaphorical’ way of using a metaphor. 
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4.4 Similes (typically, or elliptically) come with explanations  
There are two ways in which this claim has manifested itself in the literature. The first is that 
similes have an obligatory ‘third component’ beside the tenor and the vehicle: a point or 
points of comparison (this is called the ‘ground’ by Max Black, 1962. Cf. Fishelov, 1993: 5). It 
would then be the task of the hearer to either decode the point of comparison when it is 
explicitly communicated (enriching it as necessary) or to supply a point of comparison 
inferentially in order for the simile to be comprehensible. The second is that similes ‘tend to’ 
have additional linguistically-specified material by comparison with metaphors or ‘literal’ 
comparisons (e.g. Fishelov, 1993: 6 on ‘length’ of similes as opposed to literal comparisons). 
I argue that the best explanation of the data is not that similes require that a hearer supply a 
point of comparison, or that a speaker supply additional linguistically-encoded material to 
aid the hearer in constructing a point of comparison. Instead, similes simply are 
comparisons. Some of them involve one or more linguistically specified points of 
comparison, some do not. Some are surrounded by additional linguistically-specified 
material which contributes to a hearer’s understanding of a simile, and others are not. The 
absence of linguistically-specified ‘clues’ to the respects in which a comparison holds does 
not necessarily prevent a simile from being understood. But, more tellingly, when such clues 
are present, they appear to subtly ‘redirect’ how the comparison contributes to relevance. 
One piece of evidence for my approach is the way ‘explained’ similes are typically 
understood. What appears to have evaded the notice of researchers is that when 
linguistically-specified points of comparison are given by poets, the interpretation of a simile 
is not ‘narrowed’ (see the discussion of example (1) above), as one might expect. If this were 
the case, most of the poetic examples I give in this thesis involving what looks like a point of 
comparison are narrowed in precisely the ‘wrong’ way (see §5.4). In example (1), the 
relevance of the simile lies not in the specific way in which the poet’s beloved’s voice is 
thrush-like. Undue focus on thrush-like respects would ruin the intended effects of the 
simile, which are developed on the basis of additional linguistically-encoded material which 
does not directly relate to the voice of either the beloved or the thrush described in the 
vehicle of the simile. Therefore the ‘specification’ of points of comparison, when it does 
occur, appears to be a device which allows poets to guide a hearer’s search for relevance 
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towards a particular range of weak effects, not merely to supply them with a set of common 
features between tenor and vehicle. 
Roncero, Kennedy and Smyth (2006) found that similes on the internet were more likely to 
be accompanied by explanations than their ‘equivalent’ metaphors. The above discussion 
should alert the reader to the question-begging nature of such formulations: the degree of 
equivalence between metaphors and similes is precisely what is at issue in such research, 
but Roncero and colleagues simply assume that metaphors have simile equivalents. 
Nevertheless, it may be true, and of some theoretical interest, that comparisons in discourse 
typically come with explanations. This is an empirical question, but would require a 
definition of simile which distinguishes it from non-figurative comparison, something 
Roncero and colleagues fail to accomplish adequately: 
“A figurative relation usually can be expressed as either a metaphor or a simile using 
the same word pairs. Crime is like a disease, without the word like, has the same 
sense as crime is a disease. Literal comparisons cannot drop or add like with 
impunity. Fords are like cars is incorrect.” 
(Roncero, et al., 2006: 74. Their italics) 
Roncero and colleagues do not explain what “has the same sense” means, nor how Fords are 
like cars is “incorrect”. The sentence is not ungrammatical, but rather is anomalous for some 
semantic or pragmatic reason. The kind of example they have in mind are those such as the 
following, which they provide: 
(18) Time is like money – only retired executives have a lot. 
(id., ib.: 76)57 
Example (18) is clearly a kind of joke. The explanation only retired executives have a lot 
subverts the usual way in which TIME would be understood to be like MONEY (it is a precious 
resource, and so on). There are lots of such verbal jokes which take the form of similes like 
                                                          
57 No source cited. Despite searching using several popular search engines I did not find a 
single attested case of this example outside of the article cited. 
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(18) (they are a favoured rhetorical device in freestyle rap battles). But we are concerned 
here with providing an account of how certain comparisons achieve poetic effects. What if 
(18) achieves poetic effects because it is a joke? This seems plausible, and, if so, such 
examples are not really relevant to theorising about the metaphor-simile relationship. By 
explaining the comparison in (18), a speaker communicates that (18) will achieve relevance 
in a particular way: by specifying (some of) the respects in which the comparison should be 
taken to hold. What is humorous about (18) is not the assumption that the concept TIME 
shares certain properties with MONEY, but rather the surprising respects in which the speaker 
claims the comparison holds. The comparison form is crucial to how (18) is understood. But 
does it produce similar effects to uncontroversial cases of simile, such as Achilles is a lion? 
My intuitions suggest not. 
If we focus more narrowly on the kind of ‘explanation’ known as a tertium comparationis, or 
point of comparison, we find that such a specification of the respects in which tenor and 
vehicle are meant to be similar is neither obligatorily provided by the speaker/author, nor is 
it clear that such respects are required to be recovered by the hearer in order to understand 
the simile. The point of comparison as a desideratum in rhetorical theory has a long history 
(for further discussion see Gargani, 2009 ms: 20ff) and there are many variants of the 
assumption that similes require the recovery of an implicit point of comparison in order to 
be understood (e.g. Ortony, 1975: 52). One more sophisticated version of the assumption 
that similes typically come with explanations is Croft and Cruse’s notion of a ‘restricted 
mapping’: 
“Most of the discussion one encounters in the literature on the relation between 
metaphor and simile centers [sic] around examples of simile that are not 
prototypical. In fact, examples of the simile of the form X is like Y are comparatively 
rare: in the vast majority of similes, there is a specification of the respect in which 
the resemblance holds, without which a proper interpretation is not possible.” 
(Croft and Cruse, 2004: 213) (my emboldening, their italics) 
Croft and Cruse claim that this contrasts with prototypical metaphors where the 
correspondence between source and target domains does not form a closed set (id., ib.). If 
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one looks at all the ways in which poetic comparisons are deployed, then A is like B–type 
similes are indeed rare. However, that is not because the tertium comparationis is in fact 
required, and when such points of comparison are signalled, they often serve to alter the 
way in which the simile is interpreted by changing the context in which the simile is 
understood (see §6.3). Literary theorists tend not to take the view of Croft and Cruse, 
perhaps as it is hard to defend in light of the data from poetry. One example of a contrary 
view is that of Nowottny: 
“Simile (when simple) does not indicate the respect in which one thing is like another 
thing. It says the things are alike: it is up to us to see why; the things may be alike in a 
large number of ways.” 
(Nowottny, 1965: 66) 
Croft and Cruse also undermine their position by introducing similes which involve ‘open 
mapping’ and metaphors which involve ‘restricted mapping’: 
(19) She was gone in a flash of red, like a vengeful queen on her way to order armies 
to march in on us. 
(examples (19)-(21) cited by Croft and Cruse, 2004: 213f, from Cornwell, 2000) 
Croft and Cruse say that example (19) is more ‘metaphor-like’ than other similes, but do not 
explain why. Other examples of metaphors they claim are like similes are those in (20) and 
(21): 
(20) ...her breath smoking out [= came out like smoke, because it was a cold day, and 
it condensed]. 
(21) Grass was a thick, stiff carpet [because it was frozen] 
How is (20) ‘simile-like’? It would seem that it is simply a metaphor, involving ad hoc 
modification of the concept encoded by the adjective ‘smoking’ (SMOKING*), which is the 
concept communicated as part of the explicature. It is interesting that, for this ad hoc 
concept to be constructed, some kind of visual simulation of the typical motion and 
appearance of smoke appears to be necessary. But whether an assumption of the form A is 
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like B is communicated is (i) a question which has not yet been resolved and (ii) independent 
of whether a given utterance contains a simile or not. Considerations of effort might 
preclude such an analysis in any case. Worst of all, Croft and Cruse have already proposed 
conversion of simile into metaphor as a diagnostic for whether a simile is figurative or literal 
(see below). For metaphor to be capable of paraphrase into simile in this way threatens that 
explanation. 
The ‘explicit tertium’ hypothesis (see e.g. Ben-Porat, 1992: 745ff) fares worst of all in the 
following (admittedly extremely rare) case (discussed in Addison, 1993: 412): 
(22) [...] And in their own dimensions like themselves 
The great seraphic lords and cherubim 
In close recess and secret conclave sat[…] 
 (Milton, Paradise Lost I.793-5. In Baldwin (Ed.), 1998: 24.) 
In example (22) Milton compares the size of the angels to themselves, the implication being 
that there is nothing which could be compared to them in size. But note that the poet does 
not say simply like themselves, but gives linguistically-specified point of comparison (roughly 
paraphrased as in terms of their size). One ought to expect that this point of comparison 
‘narrows’ the interpretation, in Croft and Cruse’s terminology, ‘restricting’ the mapping 
further than would otherwise be the case (in alternative terminology, making it less ‘open’. 
See Ben-Porat, 1992: 746). However, both tenor and vehicle are conceptually identical, as 
the paraphrase in (22a) shows: 
 (22a) The ANGELS were like the [same] ANGELS in terms of size.  
What is compared in (22) is the same set to itself. How can the points of comparison be 
further specified when there is complete, exhaustive overlap? Similes therefore appear not 
to be interpreted solely in terms of the overlap of properties between two concepts. 
Moreover, in precisely those cases we are interested in, poetic similes, points of comparison 
contribute far less to relevance. 
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But if ‘explanations’ are not present to facilitate comprehension by explicating a point of 
comparison between tenor and vehicle, what function do they serve? In example (18), the 
‘explanation’ assists the hearer in finding humour in the comparison. But this is not the 
typical case (see §5.4). Nevertheless, the presence of additional linguistically encoded 
content in an utterance does provide evidence that this content contributes to the relevance 
of the utterance. There is more than one way in which it can do so. For example, poets can, 
and often do, incorporate contextual ‘clues’ to the interpretation of metaphors. These can 
include similes: 
(23) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
 
  
  
(Hughes, Wind. Lines 16-18. NA: 1811) 
Note that, for example (23), it is far easier to see how the metaphor SHATTER* (a house being 
impossible to SHATTER in the lexically-encoded sense) is relevant in the vicinity of the simile 
like some fine green goblet than would otherwise be the case. But the poet does not say that 
the HOUSE was a GOBLET (or GOBLET*), nor that the house was like a goblet. What is being 
compared is the RINGING* of the house to the RINGING of a goblet. In processing the simile, the 
reader has to access certain contextual assumptions which are (as a result of processing) 
made manifest or more manifest. That means that the most relevant interpretation of 
shatter (SHATTER*) will typically be one based upon assumptions which were made more 
manifest in understanding like some fine green goblet in the note. It is in light of such 
analyses that points of comparison appear not as ‘restrictions’ on properties to be mapped, 
but clues to the direction in which relevance is to be sought, which, perhaps more often than 
not, do not involve limiting the ways in which tenor is like vehicle but provide evidence for 
the fuller exploration of poetic effects. 
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4.5 Similes tend towards extension 
Because extended similes are found in some genres of world literature (especially the 
Classical epic poetic tradition, and also in later epic poets, including Dante, Milton, and 
Walcott), some have assumed that length is a defining feature of simile, particularly in 
comparison to metaphor. This assumption appears to be related to assumption (4): because 
similes (allegedly) require more linguistically-specified material than metaphors do, a poet 
can achieve their aims by extending tenor and vehicle in a simile in a way which is impossible 
with metaphor. I claim, on the basis of the RT theory of metaphor understanding, that, while 
it is true that metaphor cannot be so extended (metaphor being essentially a lexical 
pragmatic phenomenon), there is an important theoretical reason why this is so, which only 
a fuller account of simile can elucidate. However, extended similes are of a variety of types. 
Some involve the communication of extremely weak impressions (often by virtue of 
‘interaction’ with metaphor). Producing a ‘neater’ or ‘fuller’ analogy between tenor and 
vehicle does not preclude a simile from achieving relevance primarily by means of the poetic 
effects it evokes. Other similes are far more like ‘literal’ comparisons than the theoretical 
literature has perhaps recognised (see §4.7)58.  
It is not entirely clear what is meant by the claim that similes, unlike metaphors, ‘tend’ 
towards extension (Whalley 1988: 252). A charitable interpretation would be that what is 
being claimed is that similes are at their best when they are ‘longer’. But most of the poetic 
similes I have found are not extended. Moreover, neither length of vehicle nor the number 
of ‘correspondences’ between tenor and vehicle can explain why certain extended 
comparisons are felt to be more poetic than others. I propose that we instead focus on what 
effect extending a simile has on how a simile is understood, and that we do that in terms of 
an account of how the additional linguistically-specified content affects the implicit content 
(the poetic effects). 
                                                          
58 This fact may lie behind the use of similes which are both didactic and poetic in function. 
Interesting observations have been made regarding the degree of ‘correspondence’ in 
Lucretius’ use of didactic similes by Sedley (2007: 60ff. Cf. e.g. Marković, 2008: 96; Garani, 
2007). 
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Steen compares an extended simile (Homer Iliad 17.722-734. Citing Ben-Porat, 1992) with an 
extended analogy from scientific prose comparing radio waves to sound waves (I paraphrase 
this in (24a)) (Steen, 2007). He observes that whereas the epic simile has multiple points of 
correspondence between the content of the tenor and the vehicle, the analogy from 
scientific discourse has a narrow range of linguistically-specified points of comparison which 
are only mentioned in relation to the tenor (from Mayer, 1993: 570, which I paraphrase in 
(24a) and summarise in (24b)): 
 (24a) Paraphrase: The echoes of radio waves are like acoustic echoes. 
 Sound waves echo off structures and are heard shortly after. 
For short sharp sounds, if the speed of sound is known, the interval between making 
the sound and hearing its echo is a measure of its distance. 
Radar exploits the same principle. 
 
(24b) Structure: A is like B. 
 A does a certain thing. 
 B does the same. 
In (24a), and in the original, what is explicitly communicated is that A is like B, and then B is 
further described in order to inform us about A. In relevance theoretic terms, this 
comparison is relevant as providing evidence for an understanding of the similarity between 
the two phenomena which allows one to draw inferences about one of the phenomena 
(radio wave echoes) on the basis of what one can infer about another (acoustic echoes). But 
the way in which the similarity obtains, namely which properties are shared by the two 
phenomena, is not spelled out (Steen, 2007: 336). This contrasts with many cases of 
extended epic simile such as (25):  
(25) […] Her beauty was increased by flight. But since the youthful god  530 
Could stand no longer to waste his blandishments, and as love 
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Itself was moving him, he pursues her footsteps at top speed. 
Just as when a Gallic hound has spotted a hare in an empty field, 
And the one heads for [its] prey on foot, the other safety: 
One of them seems to be about to latch on the other and now, even now, 535 
Hopes to hold [it] and grazes [its] footsteps with his muzzle outstretched; 
The other is in doubt whether she has been caught and 
Is snatched out of his very teeth [lit. bites] and leaves behind the encroaching jaws; 
Thus [were] the god and the maiden, he swift in hope, she in fear.  
[the narrative continues to describe the closeness of Apollo’s pursuit of Daphne] 
(Ovid, Metamorphoses 1.530-539. Latin text from Miller, 1921: 38, 40) 
(My translation. Line numbers given for reader’s convenience) 
There are a number of points of comparison in (25) which the linguistically-specified content 
of the simile makes available, for example, the fact that the pursuit happened at speed, and 
the emotions (hope and fear) of the greyhound and the hare and Apollo and Daphne 
respectively. These are good candidates for linguistically-specified points of comparison. The 
key point of the simile is to bring out how the pursuit of the hare happened in fits and starts 
and the reader is left with the impression that this is how Apollo’s pursuit of Daphne took 
place. When the poet writes that the greyhound hopes (line 536), this suggests that Apollo 
had similar beliefs. These are possibly implicit points of comparison. Yet elucidating these 
points of comparison, interesting as it is as a post hoc exercise, is not equivalent to 
enumerating the effects of the simile. There is a much more weakly communicated 
impression that one gets. This may involve visualising the stages of the god’s pursuit of the 
nymph alongside that of the hare by the dog, or the representation of the states of mind of 
Daphne and Apollo as a whole, which are far less easy to paraphrase. It is weak effects such 
as these which form the basis of the rhetorical impact of the simile, not its ‘didactic’ role in 
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justifying the recovery of further inferences about the pursuit of the nymph on the basis of 
the comparison with the pursuit of the hare. 
A different kind of didactic analogy to (24a), this time from Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance, 
demonstrates how comparisons do not become ‘poetic’ by virtue of their length. Example 
(26) compares the (possible) development of conventional meanings from spontaneous 
inference in communication: 
(26) This [sc. the development of coded meanings in communication] is reminiscent 
of the story of how Rockefeller became a millionaire. One day, when he was young 
and very poor, Rockefeller found a one-cent coin in the street. He bought an apple, 
polished it, sold it for two cents, bought two apples, polished them, sold them for 
four cents... After one month he bought a cart, after two years he was about to buy a 
grocery store, when he inherited the fortune of his millionaire uncle. We will never 
know how far hominid inference might have gone towards establishing a full-fledged 
human language. The fact is that the development of human language was made 
possible by specialised biological endowment. 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 53) 
This is another didactic analogy inasmuch as it presents the (possible) evolution of linguistic 
communication as similar to the story of Rockefeller’s financial situation (his wealth growing 
incrementally before an unexpected fortuitous event made him extremely rich). Some of the 
points of comparison are specified (gradual progression followed by a sudden ‘leap 
forward’), others are implicit: for instance, the skills Rockefeller developed during his period 
of gradual success are likely to have proved beneficial after he inherited a large amount of 
money, just as, in Sperber and Wilson’s presentation of how linguistic communication could 
have evolved, the growth of metacognitive and inferential abilities in hominids could have 
found a new, powerful application when a separate mental module dedicated to linguistic 
(grammatical) abilities emerged for independent (biological) reasons. 
The comparison in (26) achieves relevance primarily by strongly communicating the fact that 
gradual processes of change and sudden changes or ‘saltations’ can work together to 
produce a particular outcome (what appears to be a sudden, ‘explosive’ change in mental 
204 
 
abilities). However, there are further, weaker effects of the comparison. These weaker 
effects can contribute to the didactic function of the comparison. For instance, Sperber and 
Wilson’s comparison weakly communicates that apparent sudden changes can have complex 
underpinnings, and that overlooking potential distinctions in underlying causes can lead us 
to oversimplify phenomena. It warns against both seeing Rockefeller’s success as either 
entirely due to his own hard work or entirely due to good fortune, and seeing the 
development of communication as uniformly incremental (see e.g. Wharton, 2009: 176-193). 
The cognitive effects of this didactic analogy are varied. There are some strong effects and a 
wide range of weaker ones. Therefore there is no inherent conflict between the ‘cognitive 
value’ of a didactic comparison or analogy and the poetic effects that may be elicited (for a 
different view see Garani, 2007: 99ff). 
Many examples of similes from poetry exhibit this ‘borderline’ status between full analogies 
which strongly communicate a comparison for a didactic purpose and those which achieve 
relevance primarily through the communication of weak effects. Examples (26a) and (28) 
demonstrate that this is not unique to examples from poetry. The above discussion suggests 
that it is useful to view comparison as varying along two continua: (i) the strength of the 
implicatures communicated, on the one hand; and (ii) the degree of linguistically-specified 
content which contributes to understanding the simile, on the other. Although my account 
in Chapter 5 may prove useful in such an endeavour, the following observations serve only 
to clarify that denying a constitutive role for linguistically-specified points of comparison, 
whilst emphasising that they subtly affect how comparisons are understood, is the best way 
to proceed. 
Poetic analogies (or ‘conceits’, e.g. §4.9 example (39)) are particularly associated in English 
poetry with the metaphysical poets, and are also rather frequent in Shakespeare’s sonnets. 
Overall, my experience in finding data suggests that they are relatively rare (compared with, 
for example, the kind of examples given in §5.2). But metaphysical conceits often involve 
linguistically-specified points of comparison of this type. 
Some poetic analogies involve the strong communication of degree: 
(27) With instantaneous joy I recognised 
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That pride of nature and of lowly life, 
The venerable Armytage, a friend 
As dear to me as is the setting sun. 
(Wordsworth, The Ruined Cottage. Lines 36-39. NA: 769) 
In (27), Wordsworth strongly communicates an analogy which can be summarised in a 
paraphrase given in (27a) (the notation adopted here is modelled after e.g. Gentner and 
Jeziorski, 1993: 449): 
(27a) DEAR(Armytage, me)::DEAR(setting sun, me) 
It is strongly communicated that Armytage is dear to the poet as much as the setting sun is 
dear to him. However, this is not where the main point of the utterance lies. The poet 
communicates that he loves or is as ‘close’ (metaphorically) to Armytage as he is to the 
setting sun, not so that the degree of ‘dearness’ can be precisely understood by the 
hearer/reader, but rather in order to communicate poetic effects. 
Similarly, in (28), Tennyson communicates the analogy given in (28a): 
(28) Sweet Hesper-Phosphor, double name 
 For what is one, the first, the last, 
 Thou, like my present and my past, 
Thy place is changed; thou art the same. 
(Tennyson. In Memoriam. Stanza 121. Lines 17-20. NA: 1004) 
 
 (28a) STAY-THE-SAME(Hesperus, Phosphorus)::STAY-THE-SAME(my present, my past)] 
Here, even more so than in (27), the degree interpretation is extremely uninformative, and 
so for (28) to achieve relevance it must be interpreted as weakly communicating far more 
than the analogy. The key point communicated appears to me to be how the poet feels 
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about the permanence of the heavenly body, but there are other implicatures, such as that 
the poet is aware that the evening star and the morning star are the same heavenly body 
despite being referred to by different names, that he is intelligent enough to know that fact, 
and so on. What is crucial here is that the poetic effects generated are not by virtue of the 
comparison being weakly communicated, but by the ‘gulf’ between the uninformativeness of 
the strongly communicated comparison and the reader’s expectations of relevance. 
I have identified at least two other phenomena which appear to be related to ‘poetic 
analogies’ like (27) and (28). The first are genuinely elliptical analogies in poetry, such as 
those in (29a-c). In these cases the hearer/reader must supply the elliptical material 
specified in brackets in order to have understood the utterance: 
(29a) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
(Plath, Lady Lazarus. Stanza 28. Line 84. NA: 1845) 
 
(29b) But often on this cottage do I muse/ As [sc. I muse] on a picture [.] 
(Wordsworth, The Ruined Cottage. Lines 117f. NA: 771) 
 
(29c) As [sc. one might open] a shut bud that holds a bee,/ I warily oped her lids [.]  
(Browning. Porphyria’s Lover. Lines 43f. NA: 1010) 
These are cases of syntactic ellipsis. It is true that the ellipsed material must be supplied for 
the comparison to hold in any respect. However, resolving the ellipsed material does not 
‘supply’ the properties in respect of which the comparison holds. 
The second type of phenomena which are reminiscent of poetic analogies are those 
involving the interaction of metaphors with similes (this phenomenon will be explored at in 
more depth in §6.3). One such example is (30), where the poet appears to be equivocating 
between descriptions relevant to the tenor (your mind) and the vehicle (wedding cake): 
(30) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS  
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(Rich, Snapshots of a Daughter-in-Law. Stanza 1. Lines 77-11. NA: 1791) 
Here the comparison your mind [is] MOLDERING* like wedding cake provides access to a range 
of contextual assumptions which assist in the construction of several ad hoc concepts 
(HEAVY*, RICH*, CRUMBLING*, etc.). The effects are particularly weak here in large part because 
of the effort involved in the equivocation between one set of linguistically-encoded and ad 
hoc concepts (which are relevant to the vehicle WEDDING CAKE: HEAVY**, RICH**, CRUMBLING** 
etc.) and the ad hoc concepts which are relevant to the tenor. Wedding cake is HEAVY1 in one 
sense, but your mind is HEAVY2 in another, and so on. The hearer has to keep assumptions 
associated with both the ‘cake’-concepts and the ‘mind’-concepts in mind throughout. 
One side-effect of the approach defended here is that some cases of simile, including classic 
examples from the theoretical literature, have more in common with non-figurative 
comparisons than with poetic comparisons. For example, example (31), despite 
communicating a range of weak effects (including affectual responses, such as pity, to the 
content), does so on the basis of a strongly communicated comparison59: 
(31) These things the famous singer sang. But Odysseus 521 
Melted, and a tear wetted his cheeks beneath his eyelids. 
As a woman might wail, throwing herself around her dear husband 
Who has fallen in front of his own city and people, 524 
                                                          
59 Observation due to a question raised by Robyn Carston at a paper I delivered at Metaphor 
and Cognition, Cagliari, 12th-14th May 2011. Faculty of Education Sciences, University of 
Cagliari, Cagliari, Italy. 
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Whilst warding off the pitiless day [sc. of death] from the town and [his] children, 
She, seeing that he is dying and gasping, 
Having thrown herself around him shrieks loudly; but they [sc. the enemy] 
Strike from behind with [their] spears her back and shoulders 
Take her off to slavery, to endure toil and suffering; 
And her cheeks waste away in most pitiful grief. 530 
So did Odysseus shed a pitiful tear from beneath his brows. 
(Homer, Odyssey 8.521-31. Greek text from Murray, 1919a: 296) 
(My translation. Line numbers given for reader’s convenience) 
Example (31) has much in common with non-poetic comparisons. The poet says that 
Odysseus cried as a woman cried, and points of comparison are suggested. But despite 
relatively determinate respects in which the comparison is understood to hold, and despite 
the vehicle contributing to relevance as a description, there are still poetic effects evoked by 
(31). 
In summary, elaborating upon points of comparison does not always ‘narrow’ 
interpretations. Points of comparison are not constitutive of simile, nor do they need to be 
obligatorily recovered in every case. What matters is the contribution the ‘additional’, 
linguistically-specified content makes to overall relevance (see §5.4). A further observation 
from this section is that it is entirely plausible that some comparisons could achieve 
relevance to different hearers/readers as either ‘didactic’ analogies or poetic comparisons. 
Moreover, there is no ‘default’ length of similes. 
4.6 Similes are miniature narratives 
The claim that similes are miniature narratives can really only apply to extended epic similes 
(such as in the poetry of Homer). Although there are cases where one could argue that the 
vehicle of a simile provides a narrative description, these are not common outside of the 
epic tradition, or those derivative of it, such as the mock-heroic poems of Alexander Pope 
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(perhaps, for formal reasons: there is less ‘space’ for a writer to experiment with more 
extended similes in shorter utterances). On the one hand, the more ‘separable’ a vehicle is 
from its surrounding narrative as a narrative episode in itself, the more ‘literal’ its 
interpretation tends to be (see example (31) above). 
Some scholars of literature have noted that extended similes can function as miniature 
narratives. As such, they can offer ‘pause’ in moments of narrative excitement (e.g. 
Grandsen, 1984: 118; Hainsworth, 1991: 28), or ‘variation’ in an otherwise monotonous 
narrative (e.g. Kirk, 1962: 346f). These are not the kinds of function we are concerned with in 
this thesis. But what ought to be noted is that in all such cases where the vehicle offers 
description of a ‘separable’ scenario that I have found, these involve either exemplifications 
(such as (32)) or ‘historically specific’ scenarios (my terminology) as in (33a-b) (my 
emphasis):  
(32) But now, like one who rows, 
Proud of his skill, to reach a chosen point 
With an unswerving line, I fixed my view 
Upon the summit of a craggy ridge, 
The horizon’s utmost boundary; far above 
Was nothing but the stars and the gray sky. 
(Wordsworth. The Prelude. Book I. Lines 367ff. NA: 783)  
 
(33a) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
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(Walcott, Omeros 3.31.1. Lines 30-33. 1990: 162) 
 
(33b) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
  
 
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
 
  
(Walcott, Omeros 1.5.1. Lines 62-70. 1990: 26f)  
It is striking that the ‘specificity’ of the episode in, for example, the second underlined 
comparison in (33b) does not in any sense limit the range of weaker effects which are 
generated. Even though there is a great deal of ‘additional’ linguistically-specified material, 
which suggests a highly specific comparison, this can yield a range of weak implicatures. As I 
will argue in §5.4, the ‘additional’ material plays an important role in how weak effects are 
evoked: similes such as those in (32)-(33b) give the hearer/reader access to a wider range of 
concepts, each of which is associated with encyclopaedic assumptions, thus encouraging the 
reader to derive a wider range of cognitive effects. But extended, ‘narrative’ vehicles are not 
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the default form of similes. Nor do they require any special type of processing which 
distinguishes them from other similes. 
4.7 Metaphor is better than simile  
This assumption manifests itself in two ways in the theoretical literature. Firstly, many have 
assumed that there is a preference for metaphor in all contexts which must be explained by 
theory. As Glucksberg admits, the ‘general agreement’ that metaphors are ‘richer and more 
striking than similes’ is based mainly on intuition (2011: 12. See also Barnden, 2012: 275). 
Glucksberg and Keysar say that while similes can be ‘intensified’ by putting them in the form 
of metaphors, the reverse is not true (Glucksberg and Keysar, 1993: 406). Miller seems to 
think that metaphors require more work from the reader, which makes them more 
“interesting” than similes (Miller, 1993: 375). While metaphors are ‘pregnant’ with meaning 
(a phrase due to Empson), for Cavell “[s]imiles are just a little bit pregnant” (1969: 79). 
I argued above (§4.3) that the ‘felt’ difference between the two phenomena is not strong 
evidence for how either metaphors or similes are understood. Given my account of simile 
understanding in Chapter 5, experimental participants will often favour metaphors over 
equivalent similes not because of an inherent ability of metaphors to achieve certain effects 
which similes cannot, but rather because similes do not achieve their effects in the same 
way as metaphors do. Therefore the experimental stimuli used (‘equivalent’ metaphors and 
similes) do not constitute minimal pairs. The second way in which such a claim has been 
made is that metaphor is somehow more ‘poetic’ than simile. As O’Donoghue has argued 
(2009), and as many examples in this thesis exemplify, this view can hardly be maintained. 
On my account, poets use similes to achieve some effects which could otherwise be 
achieved by the deployment of metaphors, but often to achieve effects which could not be 
achieved by equivalent metaphors. Metaphors and similes are like apples and oranges. 
Poetic comparisons often achieve their weaker cognitive effects in a more ‘incremental’ way 
than metaphors do. The idea that metaphor is ‘better’ than simile is not one which is 
endorsed by the practice of English poets at least since the 16th century, nor was it in the 
Republican and Augustan eras of Roman literature, nor in the pre-Classical Greek epic 
tradition, nor in classical Arabic, nor in amongst the metaphysical and Romantic poets in 
English (see also §4.1). According to Bradley, similes are the most common figure of speech 
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in rap music (2009: 93). This suggests that we are dealing with some kind of prejudice 
against simile. 
Zharikov and Gentner reported on experiments by which they investigated why metaphors 
“seem stronger and deeper” (2002: 976) than similes. The first problem with such a pursuit 
is that not everyone would agree with the assumption that all metaphors exhibit these 
properties more than all similes, and the examples I have found suggest that such 
formulations are reductive, unhelpful and not always true. Zharikov and Gentner give no 
justification for such a judgment other than that ‘people report’ such a distinction and are 
more ‘conservative’ in using metaphors than similes (id., ib.), although they attribute a 
similar judgement to Glucksberg and Keysar (1990). Metaphors and similes are, to Zharikov 
and Gentner, different ‘forms’ of the same thing, and, hence, the issue of which is the more 
‘basic’ form is of prime importance. They appear to want the distinction between 
categorisation and comparison to carry the weight of an explanation: 
“[T]he grammatical form of figurative statements has psychological force, with 
metaphor being the stronger, more categorical form.” 
(Zharikov and Gentner, 2002: 976). 
It would be uncharitable to assume that Zharikov and Gentner are equivocating between the 
claims ‘metaphor is a form of categorization’ and ‘metaphor is itself categorical’. But unless 
they do mean this, there is no explanation for why they think it would suggest that 
metaphors are ‘stronger than’ similes. More worryingly, their methodology in the 
experiments they report is open to criticism (see id., ib.: 978). A context was given to the 
participants in the form of a paragraph of text and then they were asked to choose either 
the metaphor or its simile equivalent. At best, all this could establish is that the A is B-form is 
preferred to the similar A is like B-form under certain circumstances, but not that metaphors 
are ‘better than’ similes. Their concluding discussion (especially id., ib.: 980, Table 3) 
suggests that they are more concerned with etymology (figurative expressions being 
conventionalised, first appearing as novel similes, then metaphors, then as stable encoded 
senses of a lexeme) than with creative examples.  
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The idea that metaphors and similes differ in ‘quality’ somehow has long been criticised. 
Ortony cites the following from a poem by Longfellow (cited in Ortony, 1975: 51), repeated 
here in example (34): 
(34)...Her hair 
Is like the summer tresses of the trees, 
When twilight makes them brown, and on her cheek 
Blushes the richness of an autumn sky, 
With ever-shifting beauty. Then her breath, 
It is so like the gentle air of Spring, 
As, front the morning's dewy flowers, it comes 
Full of their fragrance, that it is a joy 
To have it round us, and her silver voice 
Is the rich music of a summer bird, 
Heard in the still night, with its passionate cadence. 
(Longfellow, The Spirit of Poetry. Reproduced in Ortony, 1975: 51) 
According to Ortony, Longfellow “fail[s] to see any important cognitive differences between 
[metaphor and simile]” (id., ib.: 52). Even if this is too strong a claim (that the metaphors and 
similes here have commensurate effects), surely it is possible that metaphors and similes are 
‘better’ at doing different things (see O’Donoghue, 2009 for a similar view)? Until we are 
clearer about what metaphors and similes are used for, and how these effects are 
generated, judgements about their relative merit are irrelevant to our theoretical 
considerations. Moreover, as §4.5 demonstrated, similes can be didactic and poetic at the 
same time (especially on a model of inferential communication which attributes genuine 
cognitive content to even weaker effects). 
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A related claim which has been advanced is that similes are preferred over metaphors only 
when the ‘mapping’ between tenor and vehicle is novel. In other words, whether metaphor 
or simile is ‘better’ depends upon the conceptual relationship between tenor and vehicle. 
This is an assumption endorsed by the comparison theorists such as Gentner and her 
colleagues who have advocated the ‘career of metaphor’ hypothesis. Some shortcomings of 
this approach have been addressed in the previous chapter (§3.6). I will not return to the 
hypothesis here. However, in order to assess the validity of such a claim we would require a 
definition of novel simile in advance, and this definition would have to allow for comparison 
between examples of metaphor and examples of simile. If the two phenomena achieve their 
effects in such radically different ways as I claim in this thesis, then assessing metaphor-
simile ‘preference’ will not be possible by the experimental methodology adopted by 
Gentner and colleagues, as well as many others, because simile and metaphor are sensitive 
to context in different ways. In any case, such questions are of primary interest to 
etymologists and historical linguists, as their relevance to the issue of how metaphors and 
similes are processed is undermined by the data adduced here. 
Moreover, one can make the exact opposite argument: 
“The difference between simile and metaphor is not merely technical. After all, there 
has to be some reason why similes so outnumber [sc. novel, or creative] metaphors 
in rap. […] Similes shine the spotlight on their subject more directly than do 
metaphors. They announce their artifice from the beginning, leaving little room for 
confusion. On a more practical note, similes are more immediately comprehensible 
to listeners, a virtue in rap’s rapid-fire lyricism.” 
(Bradley, 2009: 94) 
I do not think that the relative ‘comprehensibility’ of similes over metaphors (whatever the 
fact of the matter turns out to be) is central to the difference in use of similes and 
metaphors. To use an example from Bradley, I’m like new money is scarcely more 
comprehensible than I’m new money (id., ib.). However, Bradley’s argument is based on the 
same vague intuitions about the ‘directness’ of metaphor as opposed to simile as many in 
the field of metaphor studies, yet he argues that this is a positive factor in fast 
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comprehension of a form of oral poetry. This demonstrates how unhelpful such assumptions 
are in theoretical work on figurative language understanding. 
I leave aside arguments about the ‘vividness’ of metaphor being directly related to the way 
in which metaphors are processed. For instance, Ortony argues that metaphors, unlike 
similes, do not require specification of the characteristics which the speaker wishes to 
“transfer” as a “coherent chunk” from the vehicle to the tenor. Hence metaphors “avoid 
discretizing the perceived continuity of experience and are thus closer to experience and 
consequently more vivid and memorable” (1975: 53). One of the assumptions of conceptual 
metaphor theory appears to be that metaphor ‘is’ how we understand the world, so 
linguistic realisations of underlying conceptual metaphors will inherit much of the vividness 
of experiences from which they are derived (see e.g. Lakoff, 2008; Ritchie, 2013 §5). What is 
missing from such analyses is a focus on metaphor as a feature of language use, rather than 
cognition tout court. And if metaphorical vividness is a property of cognition, then why 
shouldn’t simile inherit the same ‘vividness’? I believe that the views I critiqued in §4.3 
above and those of this section are co-dependent: simile has to be a hedged metaphor to 
preserve the ‘insight’ that metaphor processing involves a privileged form of cognitive 
creativity. 
4.8 Similes succeed and fail for different reasons to metaphor  
I argue that claims such as (8), that the ways in which metaphors ‘fail’ differ radically from 
the ways in which similes ‘fail’, require extensive reformulation in the light of the full range 
of data. As everything is like everything else ‘in endless ways’ (Davidson, 1978/1984: 254), 
strictly speaking, similes can never ‘fail’. Because the first interpretation consistent with the 
presumption of relevance communicated is the one that is accepted as the intended 
meaning of the utterance, similes can only really be said to ‘fail’ when the presumption of 
relevance they communicate turns out to be false, that is, where the hearer is not able to 
find any optimally relevant interpretation. As similes can achieve relevance by means of 
weak implicatures, we find that there are many cases where similes communicate 
indeterminate content which is relevant to establishing the respects in which the 
comparison holds. 
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Whereas, with metaphors, a certain kind of ‘failure’ can be interpreted in terms of the 
construction of the ‘wrong’ ad hoc concept, one which contributes to an overall 
interpretation which does not resemble the thought communicated by the speaker/author 
closely enough, there is no analogous way in which poetic comparisons can be said to ‘fail’. 
This is because their contribution to the explicature does not undergo conceptual 
adjustment in the same way. There is a different kind of ‘indeterminacy’ involved (see §5.1). 
This claim is the most difficult one to justify. It is quite unclear what researchers mean by 
‘success’ and ‘failure’ in either simile or metaphor. For instance, (35a) might be far easier to 
understand than (35b): 
 (35a) Death is a tax-collector. 
 (35b) Death is a postman. 
In interpreting (35a), there are a number of contextual assumptions which might facilitate 
the construction of the appropriate ad hoc concept TAX-COLLECTOR*, such as the proverbial 
inevitability of ‘death and taxes’. The fact that I find (35b) more effortful to interpret makes 
(35b) potentially weaker than (35a). But is (35b) uninterpretable? Some may find (35b) far 
easier to construe, as ‘postmen’ come to your door to deliver the post, and such an 
assumption might give more direct access to the interpretation that death is inevitable. If an 
interpretation can be assigned, then how is it a ‘failure’? Similar problems arise with claims 
of simile ‘failure’: 
 (35c) Death is like a tax-collector. 
 (35d) Death is like a postman. 
The interpretation of (35c) is similar to that of (35a), and it comes about on the basis of 
similar contextual assumptions. Pilkington claims that some similes, such as (36), do fail: 
 (36) Black as the inside of a wolf’s throat. 
(Pilkington, 2000: 119. Originally from Coombes, 1963.) 
However, (36) is still interpretable, and one can imagine a context in which it achieves a wide 
range of weak effects. I think that Pilkington’s intuition that it is extremely difficult to 
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interpret (36) is sound. However, one can (and this reader does) find an optimally relevant 
interpretation when we take into account the poetic effects which such an utterance evokes. 
An utterance of (36) may fail to achieve relevance, but so could any other utterance. The 
burden in the case of (36) falls upon the hearer/reader to find the optimally relevant 
interpretation of the utterance, and some readers (such as Pilkington) will find that (36) does 
not justify the (subjectively) gratuitous effort that the presumption of relevance puts them 
through in order to come to a relevant interpretation, while others (such as myself) find that 
the effort is not gratuitous. Because I can find an interpretation of (36) which is consistent 
with the presumption of relevance (involving a degree of ‘ominousness’ which would not 
typically be communicated by, for example, Black as night), the utterance guarantees that 
this interpretation, which is partially paraphraseable and partially not, which is characterised 
by emotional effects, is the one communicated. Two important points emerge from 
discussion of such examples as (36). Firstly, ‘failure’ is a subjective judgement. Secondly, the 
‘failure’ of (36) identified by Pilkington is a kind of ‘utterance failure’: failure of an utterance 
as a whole to achieve relevance, not failure of a linguistic expression to contribute anything 
to the explicature. 
There is another sense in which comparisons can ‘fail’. Poets often lament their inability to 
describe something fully by means of a comparison, as in (37a-c): 
(37a) Shall I compare thee to a summer’s day? 
Thou art more lovely and more temperate. 
(Shakespeare, Sonnets. 18.1f. Bevington (Ed.), 2004: 1716) 
 
(37b) In all eternal grace you have some part, 
But you like none, none you, for constant heart.  
(Shakespeare, Sonnets. 53.13f. Bevington (Ed.), 2004: 1723) 
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(37c) What thou art we know not; 
 What is most like thee? 
From rainbow clouds there flow not 
 Drops so bright to see 
As from thy presence showers a rain of melody. 
(Shelley, To a Skylark. Stanza 7. Lines 31-35. NA: 877) 
The point of (37a-c) appears to be the same: not that the implied comparisons are 
uninterpretable, but that their interpretations will fall short of capturing the nature of the 
object (the beloved, the skylark) which the poet is attempting to describe. But note the 
subtle distinction Shelley makes between what thou art and what is most like thee: the poet 
does not know what the skylark is, but attempts to describe the object by comparisons 
which are necessarily insufficient. But most utterances fall short of communicating the 
thought they represent (Chapter 2). It is interesting that poets often see meditation of the 
achievements (and failings) of similes as a way of communicating the fact of, and their 
feelings towards, this ‘gulf’ between public and private representations. 
4.9 Similes can be easily distinguished from literal comparisons  
The claim that similes can be easily distinguished from literal comparisons is often associated 
with the claim that metaphors are easily distinguishable from literal predications. Levinson 
argues that comparisons are literally true, but similes are (“arguably”) literally false (1983: 
154f). However, metaphors are not always easily distinguishable from literal predications 
(hence the ‘continuity view’ of metaphor, hyperbole, approximation and literal uses given in 
§2.7) (see also id., ib.: 151, example (182)). I argue not only that similes and non-poetic 
comparisons are often difficult to distinguish (and hence do not constitute a natural kind), 
but also that this fuzzy boundary between the ostensibly distinct phenomena is due to the 
fact that ‘comparisons’, the real natural kind, can vary in the type of contribution they make 
to relevance along two dimensions: (i) whether and to what extent they contribute to the 
generation of poetic effects; and (ii) to what extent those poetic effects are generated by 
virtue of the comparison instead of on the basis of contextual assumptions which are not 
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relevant to the comparison but to some other factors, such as the expected discourse goals 
of the speaker/author. 
Croft and Cruse proposed a diagnostic to determine whether a formal comparison is a 
‘metaphorical simile’, by which they appear to mean what I call here a simile (2004: 211). 
They claim that ‘metaphorical similes’ transform readily into metaphors by deletion of like, 
and ‘statements of similarity’ (non-poetic comparisons) do not. However, this produces false 
positives for some typical (non-poetic) comparisons which are rendered patently false by 
deletion of like, as in (38a-b): 
(38a) You are like your father. 
(38b) You are your father. 
An utterance of (38b), if it is comprehensible at all, must be understood as a metaphor60. I 
explore other ‘diagnostics’ for simile in Chapter 5, §5.2. 
There are a range of cases where ‘literal’ (strongly communicated) comparisons achieve 
poetic effects. These include ‘borderline’ cases (such as, perhaps, (25)-(27), section §4.5) as 
well as, less controversially, clearly non-figurative comparisons which nonetheless achieve 
poetic effects (such as (39)): 
(39) Our two souls therefore, which are one, 
Though I must go, endure not yet 
A breach, but an expansion, 
Like gold to airy thinness beat. 
                                                          
60 Croft and Cruse give as examples of this like-deletion diagnostic *My house is (like) yours 
and *Nectarines are (like) peaches (2004: 211). These are not similes because like-deletion 
does not yield a metaphor. Despite their use of a symbol for anomalous utterances, the 
former, without like, is comprehensible. I have heard exactly this utterance. In Spanish it has 
become proverbial. It is not clear that the latter cannot be understood as a certain type of 
loose use either (a kind of approximation). 
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If they be two, they are two so 
As stiff twin compasses are two; 
Thy soul the fixed foot, makes no show 
To move, but doth, if th'other do. 
 
And though it in the center [sic] sit, 
Yet when the other far doth roam, 
It leans, and hearkens after it, 
And grows erect, as that comes home. 
 
Such wilt thou be to me, who must 
Like th' other foot, obliquely run; 
Thy firmness makes my circle just, 
And makes me end, where I begun. 
(Donne, A Valediction Forbidding Mourning. Stanzas 6-9. Lines 21-36. NA: 306f) 
Even though (39) has been widely discussed in the theoretical literature as a simile (Addison, 
1993; Fogelin, 1988: 102; Carston, 2010a: 296 and others) this does not mean that (39) is a 
prototypical simile. The poet communicates a large amount of linguistically-specified content 
as evidence towards the respects in which a comparison holds. Crucially, (39) achieves 
relevance (at least in part) by the determination of the respects in which the comparison 
holds, and the poet provides evidence for those respects. Although (39) does appear to 
achieve poetic effects, it is not necessarily the linguistically-specified content relevant to 
those respects which contributes primarily to the weak effects. And weak effects are what 
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we are primarily concerned with here. If examples such as (39) do have a great deal in 
common with non-poetic comparisons, this could well be why ‘metaphysical conceits’ such 
as (39) have been seen by some critics as poor examples of simile (see e.g. Mazzeo, 1952). 
A more clear-cut case of a comparison which is not likely to be classed as a simile, but which 
nevertheless achieves poetic effects is the following from Sophocles’ Ajax (my translation): 
(40) O child! Be more fortunate than [your] father, 
But in every other respect alike.61 
(Sophocles, Ajax. Lines 550-1. Greek text from Jebb, 1897: 185) 
There are a range of weak effects which are generated by Ajax’s utterance. These may 
include a range of implicatures about his state of mind. This is a particularly poignant 
moment in the play, as the audience is well aware by this point that Ajax has suffered 
numerous indignities despite his bravery and fame, and that Ajax has already resigned 
himself to the inevitability of his suicide. But such poetic effects are secondary to the 
comparison itself. It is not the fact that a comparison is being made which gives rise to poetic 
effects, but the interaction of the strongly communicated comparison and a range of 
contextual assumptions which have been communicated elsewhere in the play (which will 
therefore be more manifest to the audience than would otherwise be the case). In short, the 
fact that a comparison generates poetic effects is not a sufficient condition for simile. How 
those effects are generated is important. 
Another diagnostic which has been proposed for the purpose of distinguishing similes and 
non-poetic comparisons is that the latter are symmetrical while the former are not: tenor 
and vehicle can be reversed in a literal comparison “without there being any consequential 
change in meaning” (Bredin, 1998: 73; Ortony, 1993) (see also Chapter 5, §5.2.1). For 
instance, while utterances of (41a) and (41b) intuitively express the same comparison, and, 
hence, have much the same meaning, (42a) and (42b) do not: 
 (41a) Lions are like tigers. 
                                                          
61 My discussion also applies if we translate be like him for alike (line 551: homoios). 
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 (41b) Tigers are like lions. 
 
 (42a) Soldiers are like lions. 
 (42b) Lions are like soldiers. 
Bredin explains the difference between the symmetrical and ‘predicative’ comparisons by 
comparison with identity statements such as (43a) and predications such as (43b): 
 (43a) Elton John is Reginald Dwight. 
 (43b) Elton John is a songwriter. 
‘Symmetrical comparisons’ like (41a-b) are akin to (43a) because “each identifies the other”, 
but ‘predicative comparisons’ like (42a-b) are like (43b) because “one of them describes the 
other” (id. ib.: 74). Hence, non-poetic comparisons involve a ‘statement of a relation’ and 
similes involve ‘a statement of the character of the subject (id., ib.: 75). Plausible as these 
assumptions may be, I will explain ‘directionality’ in simile interpretation as emerging from 
simile understanding, rather than causing a comparison to be interpreted figuratively 
(§5.2.1). We often find non-symmetrical comparisons whose meaning would be intuitively 
classed as ‘literal’. An utterance of (44a) is likely to communicate a ‘literal’ comparison which 
holds in different respects to that in (44b): 
 (44a) Be more like your father. 
 (44b) May your father be more like you. 
For Ortony, ‘ordinary’ comparisons (‘similarity statements’) communicate that the tenor and 
the vehicle share certain predicates, whereas similes do not: 
“The interpretation of ordinary similarity statements can therefore be regarded as 
involving the determination of shared high-salient predicates [...]. The point about 
similes is that this procedure will produce no such shared predicates at all, unless 
those predicates are themselves interpreted metaphorically.” 
(Ortony, 1993: 348. His emphasis) 
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However, there are certain problems with taking such a strong distinction between similes 
and other comparisons. Firstly, it seems to suggest that similes are the same as metaphorical 
predications. Secondly, it suggests that similes cannot be both cognitive (in the sense of 
communicating any truth-evaluable content beyond the truism A is like B) and poetic. But, as 
example (26) in §4.5 demonstrates, even didactic analogies can evoke poetic effects by 
virtue of communicating a comparison which sets up a high degree of correspondence 
between tenor and vehicle. The distinction Ortony wants here is far too strong. 
4.10 Desiderata in a theory of simile understanding 
Most of my findings in this chapter have been negative, but my discussion points to a 
number of positive conclusions: 
(i) Similes are different to metaphors in how they are understood, but sometimes have 
similar effects. 
(ii) Points of comparison are not always directly relevant to how similes achieve poetic 
effects. 
(iii) Something about how similes are understood means that, perhaps unlike metaphors, 
they can never ‘fail’. 
(iv) Similes are not always easily distinguishable from (non-figurative) comparisons. 
Some of these claims will be more controversial than others. Many metaphor theorists will 
be happy with the first two claims, but less so with the other two. But the above four 
desiderata, which I claim any theory of simile understanding must confront, are compatible 
with the following hypothesis: Similes are comparisons deployed to communicate poetic 
effects. This forms the core of my account of how similes are understood in the following 
chapter. 
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Chapter 5: How similes are understood 
This thesis addresses how similes are understood from the perspective of an ostensive-
inferential theory of utterance understanding. I am not advocating a theory of how concepts 
are judged to be similar or not (see e.g. Tversky, 1977. Cf. the articles in Vosniadou and 
Ortony (eds.), 1989 Part I). What matters for theorists of communication is why 
communicating that A is like B can generate poetic effects by virtue of the communication of 
a comparison in some cases and not in others. Another departure from most previous work 
on simile is that I do not conflate metaphor and simile (see Chapters 3 and 4. Exceptions to 
this trend include Tirrell, 1991; Sperber and Wilson, 2008/2012; Carston, 2002a; Carston and 
Wearing, 2011; O’Donoghue, 2009; Israel, et al., 2004; Glucksberg and Haught, 2006; 
Roncero, et al., 2012). In fact, the account I give here of simile is also radically different from 
the account of metaphor understanding current in relevance theory (e.g. Carston, 2002a; 
Sperber and Wilson, 2008/2012; Carston, 2010a; see §2.7 and §3.1). As Chapter 4 of this 
thesis makes clear, there are a range of competing intuitions about the relationship between 
metaphor and simile, and it is an open question which intuitions are relevant to theorising 
about how similes are understood. When I talk of ‘my account of comparison 
understanding’, what I mean is the account of those expressions (comparisons) which may 
be interpreted as either non-poetic comparisons (which some describe as ‘literal’ 
comparisons) or poetic comparisons (that is, similes). For reasons of simplicity, I focus only 
on cases which have a particular syntactic form. Many similes are of one of the following 
forms: 
 (i) A is like B. 
 (ii) A VERBs like B. 
 (iii) A is as Φ as B. 
My account of how comparisons are understood generalises across these cases. I discuss 
examples like (i) and (ii) in §5.1 and (iii) in §5.4. 
Unlike certain theorists (e.g. Glucksberg, 2001; Fogelin, 1988; Lakoff and Johnson, 2003. See 
Chapter 3) I do not see metaphor and simile as being understood in the essentially the same 
way. Metaphors are not a type of (elliptical, or implicit) simile, nor are similes a type of 
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(‘hedged’) metaphor. If this is the case, then we need a different hypothesis about how 
similes are understood. My account begins with a simple hypothesis: that similes are 
comparisons. More precisely, similes are a particular use of certain types of comparison 
(such as those of the forms given in (i)-(iii)). The question which then needs to be addressed 
is: if similes are understood as comparisons, then does the fact that they are comparisons 
explain why they have the effects they typically do (poetic effects)? I answer in the 
affirmative. 
In Chapter 4 I argued that there is little evidence that metaphors and similes are understood 
in a similar way, even though this is a widespread assumption. But even if we accept that 
they are understood in a similar way, there is no general agreement on what the relevant 
similarities between metaphor and simile are. Moreover, if we are concerned with how 
utterances are understood, the important question is not whether metaphors and similes 
are similar in terms of their syntax (even though similes are far more similar to comparisons 
than they are to metaphors), or whether they are even similar in terms of their effects. We 
need to explain how the form of the utterance in each case causes the effects such 
utterances typically cause. 
As Sperber and Wilson put it, “[s]tylistic differences are just differences in the way relevance 
is achieved” (1995: 224). Because utterances communicate a presumption of their own 
optimal relevance, the form of the utterance is understood to be the optimally relevant one. 
In the case of the relevance theoretic account of metaphor understanding defended in 
Chapter 2 (§2.7), the fact that a particular lexical item is used to communicate a concept 
which it does not encode, and whose construction will require an (effortful) expansion of the 
context of utterance on the part of the hearer, justifies the hearer in assuming that a wide 
range of assumptions which are made marginally more manifest during that process form 
part of the intended, optimally relevant content of the utterance. There is a causal link 
between (a) the relationship of the lexically-encoded concept to the concept communicated, 
and (b) the poetic effects that are generated. What is it about certain comparisons which 
causes the communication of poetic effects? Why do these comparisons evoke poetic effects 
and not others, which are also of the forms given above in (i)-(iii)? 
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In §5.1 I define simile as a particular use of comparison. Although my view cuts against the 
consensus, there are researchers who pay attention to the formal identity between similes 
and certain comparison constructions (e.g. Wikberg, 2008: 141; Barnden, 2012: 265). Certain 
comparisons achieve relevance by virtue of the fact that communicating that A is like B in 
certain respects is relevant. These are non-poetic comparisons (Tigers are like lions, His 
jacket is as blue as his jeans, and so on). But because determining the respects in which a 
comparison holds is the responsibility of the hearer/reader, a speaker/author can 
communicate that A is like B in the expectation that her utterance will achieve overall 
relevance primarily not by virtue of determination of the respects in which the comparison 
holds, but by virtue of the weak implicatures that the utterance communicates. It is these 
comparisons which I call poetic comparisons (The soldiers are like lions, His jacket is as blue 
as the clear Saharan sky, and so on). In the poetic cases, the determination of points of 
comparison is less important to the achievement of overall relevance than the 
communication of poetic effects. The result of mutual parallel adjustment in the 
interpretation of a poetic comparison will often involve a wide array of weak implicatures 
(poetic effects). This weakly communicated implicit content constitutes the bulk of the 
relevant overall interpretation of the utterance. But an extremely indeterminate set of 
points of comparison may or may not be communicated as part of what I call the 
comparison-relevant content. The term ‘poetic comparison’ picks out a class of phenomena 
which overlaps significantly with the types of poetic simile we wish to explain. The question 
at this point becomes: does the determination of the comparison-relevant content 
constitute part of the implicit or the explicit content of the utterance? This is discussed in 
the following section. 
Because the pre-theoretic category of simile is not necessarily commensurate with the 
phenomena my account explains, when I talk about ‘simile’ what I mean is ‘poetic 
comparison’. I use the terms interchangeably from now on (unless otherwise specified). One 
consequence of my reformulation of the definition of simile (as poetic comparison) is that it 
suggests that previous attempts at distinguishing simile from ‘literal’ (what I call ‘non-
poetic’) comparison by means of diagnostics based upon conceptual relationships between 
tenor and vehicle are flawed. None of the proposed diagnostics pick out just similes from the 
class of comparison constructions. Moreover, my account helps to explain why such 
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generalisations about the conceptual relationships between tenor and vehicle tend to hold 
(§5.2). A further prediction which my hypothesis about simile understanding makes is that 
qualifying simile (A is very like B, A is quite like B, and so on) should not significantly affect 
how ‘poetic’ a simile is judged to be (§5.3). In addition, I have observed in the literary data 
that when points of comparison (explained in §5.1) are linguistically specified in similes (A is 
like B in terms of C, A is as ADJECTIVE as B, and so on), they affect the poetic effects generated 
by a simile in a particular way (§5.4). How ‘explained’ and ‘extended’ similes (see §4.4, §4.5) 
are understood can be captured in these terms. 
5.1 When is a comparison a simile? 
The key to how similes are understood lies in the relationship between similes and other 
comparisons, not between similes and metaphors (see also e.g. Ortony, 1993; Israel, et al., 
2004: 124). I focus upon those sorts of comparison which can be interpreted in a ‘poetic’ and 
a ‘non-poetic’ way. The simplest examples are of the form A is like B, A VERBs like B or A is as 
ADJECTIVE as B, with variations upon each pattern. In order to capture the difference between 
what is communicated by poetic and non-poetic comparisons, I use the following notation as 
exemplified in (1)-(1a): 
 (1) Utterance: A is like B. 
(1a) Comparison-relevant content [in square brackets]: A is like B [in terms of 
{PROPERTY1, PROPERTY2, ...}] 
A speaker of (1) commits themselves at least to the content of the utterance as specified in 
(1a). What I mean by the ‘comparison-relevant content’ of the comparison is that content of 
the utterance (whether it is explicit or implicit) which must be recovered by the hearer in 
order for the utterance to be optimally relevant and which can be captured in terms of the 
respects in which the comparison holds (points of comparison). As the following will make 
clear, there is conflicting evidence over whether this contributes to explicit content of the 
utterance or not. But, as I will explain, the key feature of my account is that (i) the recovery 
of such content constitutes one way in which comparisons can achieve relevance, and (ii) 
even when such content is not determinate, the fact that a comparison is being 
communicated plays a role in the hearer’s optimally relevant interpretation. 
228 
 
Because anything can be ‘like’ anything else (see Goodman, 1976: 77), an utterance of (2) 
cannot communicate only the explicature in (2a): 
 (2) Pies are like chocolate. 
 (2a) Explicature: ?Pies are like chocolate.  
If (2a) simply constituted the relevant interpretation of (2) then it would fail to be 
informative. No positive cognitive effects could be inferred from (2a) alone. In other words, 
(2a) would never be relevant to an individual without either: (i) further specification of the 
respects in which the comparison holds; or (ii) providing access to assumptions which could 
contribute to an optimally relevant interpretation as implicatures of the utterance. 
Therefore, the speaker of a comparison (as in (1) or (2)) is understood as claiming that a 
similarity between A and B obtains in terms of certain properties (which I give in (1a) in SMALL 
CAPS in {braces}). These properties are constructed on the responsibility of the hearer 
because the guarantee of optimal relevance communicated by the comparison necessitates 
the determination of such respects in a particular context. I call these properties points of 
comparison. The set of points of comparison is potentially open-ended because it is 
determined on the responsibility of the hearer in order to develop an overall interpretation 
of the speaker’s utterance which is optimally relevant. 
What is the nature of these properties? The communicative principle of relevance justifies 
certain hypotheses about the nature of the properties communicated as part of the set of 
points of comparison. An uncontroversially non-poetic comparison is given in (3): 
 (3) Utterance: Soldiers are like sailors. 
An utterance of (3) will likely communicate at least the comparison-relevant content as given 
in (3a): 
(3a) Soldiers are like sailors [in terms of being {BRAVE, MILITARY-PERSONNEL, etc.}] 
It cannot be the case that (3) communicates that Soldiers are like sailors in any respects at 
all. In order for any assumption about the comparability of soldiers and sailors to enter into 
valid inferences, it must be determinate to some degree. We can capture that determinacy 
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in terms of the points of comparison which are communicated on a particular occasion of 
utterance. Given these observations, (2a) is insufficient as a characterisation of the content 
of (2) in any context. 
Is the comparison-relevant content part of the explicature of the utterance? The way non-
poetic comparisons are understood may be taken as evidence that the set of points of 
comparison communicated by a comparison do form part of the explicit content. For 
instance, comparisons can be used as indirect answers to questions as in (4) and (5): 
(4) Adrian: Terry’s a xenophobe. [Where Terry is a soldier.] 
Beatrice: Soldiers are like sailors. 
Beatrice’s utterance in (4) guarantees its own optimal relevance. In order to have relevant 
contextual effects in Adrian’s cognitive environment it is likely to make more manifest 
assumptions which either reinforce or contradict the assumption communicated by Adrian 
that Terry is a xenophobe. In order to license the appropriate inferences, Beatrice’s 
utterance has comparison-relevant content such as that in (4a), which allows Adrian to infer 
the implicature in (4b): 
(4a) Comparison-relevant content: SOLDIERS are like SAILORS [in being {TRAVELLING-A-LOT, 
ADVENTUROUS, PROFESSIONAL-MILITARY, BRAVE, etc.}] 
(4b) (Strongly) implicated conclusion: Terry is not (likely to be) a xenophobe. 
Because Terry is a soldier, and Beatrice’s utterance communicates (in part) that soldiers 
travel a lot and are adventurous, then this legitimates the implicated conclusion that Terry is 
not (or is not likely to be) a xenophobe. The comparison-relevant content of Beatrice’s 
utterance depends upon contextual assumptions which are: (i) made more manifest by 
access to the concepts SOLDIER and SAILOR; but (ii) are not limited to the overlap of 
encyclopaedic assumptions between the two concepts. Moreover, it is not just assumptions 
about the vehicle concept SAILORS which play a part in the determination of the comparison-
relevant content of her utterance in (4). Expectations of the way in which her utterance will 
achieve relevance, and assumptions made more manifest by the tenor concept SOLDIERS also 
play a role in: (i) determining which properties are communicated as points of comparison; 
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and (ii) determining the centrality of the points of comparison communicated. The potential 
point of comparison, made manifest by both tenor and vehicle concept, that soldiers and 
sailors are stereotypically BRAVE, is not necessarily communicated. Whether Beatrice’s 
utterance communicates that point of comparison (amongst others) depends upon the 
context. Those properties which are most likely to be communicated as part of the 
comparison-relevant content I list first (from left to right) in the braces. It should be noted 
that my account raises no theoretical objection to the set of points of comparison being 
open (hence my use of ellipses in (3a) and (4a)). 
The interpretation of (4) contrasts radically with the identical, non-poetic comparison 
uttered by Betty in (5): 
 (5) Alan: Tim’s a bigamist. [Where Tim is a soldier] 
 Betty: Soldiers are like sailors. 
(5a) Explicature: SOLDIERS are like SAILORS [in being {HAVING-MULTIPLE-RELATIONSHIPS, 
TRAVELLING-A-LOT, ADVENTUROUS, PROFESSIONAL-MILITARY, BRAVE, etc.}] 
Here, the expectation that Betty’s utterance will be relevant to Alan determines a differently 
structured set of points of comparison as part of the explicit content of her utterance. If Alan 
already has an assumption associated with the concept SAILOR that (for instance) Sailors can 
have multiple families in different ports he need merely access such an assumption as part of 
the context of utterance. But, Alan need not have that stereotypical assumption about 
sailors in order to understand Betty: he merely needs to construct a property such as HAVING-
MULTIPLE-RELATIONSHIPS as part of the set of points of comparison. And the presumption of 
optimal relevance communicated by Betty guarantees that he will have to entertain 
(whether he already does so or not) an assumption such as that. This assumption provides 
the appropriate property which licenses inferences such as (5b): 
 (5b) (Strongly) implicated conclusion: Tim is (or is likely to be, or could be) a bigamist. 
We can be sure that the points of comparison have to be supplied by either (i) encyclopaedic 
assumptions made manifest by either the tenor or the vehicle, or (ii) other contextual 
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assumptions which are manifest for reasons other than the use of particular lexical items 
(such as discourse objectives, recently processed utterances, and so on). 
At this stage, the evidence that (i) points of comparison are central to the comparison-
relevant content of a comparison to different degrees and (ii) that the comparison-relevant 
content plays a role in determining certain implicatures of an utterance of a comparison, is 
compatible with the view that the comparison-relevant content forms part of the explicit 
content of the utterance. Moreover, speaker intuitions about the truth or falsity of a (non-
poetic) comparison suggest that utterances of comparisons say that something is like 
something else in certain respects. For example, one can disagree with (6) and (7): 
 (6) This chair is like a Chippendale. 
 (7) Wasabi is like mustard. 
What does disagreeing with (6) and (7) consist in? The exchange in (6a) suggests that the 
comparison-relevant content of (6) must be understood by Bella as something like that 
indicated in (6b): 
(6a) Alex: This chair is like a Chippendale  
 Bella: No it’s not. [i.e. It’s cheap and flimsy.] 
(6b) This chair is like a Chippendale [in being {HIGH-QUALITY, EXPENSIVE, BEAUTIFULLY-
CONSTRUCTED, etc.}] 
Similarly, in (7a), the content which is understood as communicated by the comparison must 
include properties such as those indicated as part of the set of points of comparison in (7b): 
 (7a) Alex: Wasabi is like mustard. 
 Bella: No it’s not. It’s like horseradish. 
 (7b) Wasabi is like mustard [in being {CONDIMENT, HOT, SAVOURY, etc.}]. 
Moreover, Bella could have replied to Alex’s comparison in (7a) with (7c): 
 (7c) Bella: No it’s not. It’s more like horseradish. 
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The fact that one can deny that A is like B as Bella does in (6a) suggests that the explicit 
content of the comparison includes specific respects in which the comparison is taken as 
holding. Also, the content of the comparison indicated in (7b), for instance, suggests that the 
comparison-relevant content in a given context does not include irrelevant properties (such 
as that wasabi and mustard are both VEGETABLE-IN-ORIGIN, and so on). Bella is not denying that 
wasabi is like mustard in any respects whatsoever, rather that the comparison-relevant 
content which Wasabi is like mustard makes available in that context is not optimally 
relevant. Moreover, Bella’s response in (7c) suggests that the content communicated by two 
different comparisons can be compared. But what exactly is being compared? It cannot be 
the case that Bella is expecting Alex to recover all the respects in which wasabi is like 
mustard and all the respects in which wasabi is like horseradish, because these sets of 
shared properties will be vast. Rather, it is far more plausible that she is claiming that it is 
more relevant to say Wasabi is like horseradish in this particular context. Why would that be 
the case? Because, from Bella’s point of view, the properties which Wasabi is like 
horseradish make available in the context as part of the comparison-relevant content of the 
utterance are more relevant in terms of the ease with which they are accessed and in terms 
of the assumptions which they make available as part of the implicit content of the 
utterance (implicated assumptions such as if you don’t like horseradish, you won’t like 
wasabi, and so on). 
Are the properties which are accessed as points of comparison conceptual? Because they 
play a part in inferential processing, they must form proper constituents of conceptual 
representations, and, hence, they must be concepts. But, as the discussion in Chapter 2, §2.9 
outlines, concepts are addresses or nodes in memory, not definitions. Moreover, there are 
many non-lexicalised concepts (including perhaps the concept HAVING-MULTIPLE-RELATIONSHIPS 
which I have suggested as a point of comparison in (4a)). As current relevance theoretic 
lexical pragmatics sees content words as typically encoding conceptual schemas rather than 
well-defined concepts (Sperber and Wilson, 1998/2012; Carston, 2002a: 359ff), and these 
conceptual schemas need to be inferentially enriched in order to contribute to an 
explicature, it is reasonable to generalise about a large proportion of stable concepts which 
might serve as points of comparison. These, too, could be conceptually schematic, and the 
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context-specific conceptual content they contribute to the set of points of comparison is 
likely to be ad hoc. 
But does the evidence that the comparison-relevant content (i) can contribute to 
implicatures, (ii) can be denied, and (iii) can be evaluated in contrast with the comparison-
relevant content of other comparisons, guarantee that the comparison-relevant content 
constitutes part of the explicature of a comparison? This is not necessarily the case even for 
non-poetic comparisons. It follows from the relevance-theoretic view of communicated 
concepts that when confronted with an utterance such as (7), a hearer must find the 
appropriate concept communicated by the vehicle mustard on the basis of the concept 
lexically-encoded by that word, as in (7d): 
 (7d) Wasabi is like MUSTARD*. 
Although I have used an asterisk to mark that the concept communicated is non-identical 
with the lexically-encoded concept mustard, we should remember that the communicated 
concept MUSTARD* is not likely to be as radical a departure from the lexically-encoded 
concept as in the metaphorical cases (e.g. Achilles is a lion communicates Achilles is a LION*). 
The concept MUSTARD* is narrower in terms of its denotation as opposed to the lexically-
encoded concept MUSTARD (see Chapter 2, §2.9). But the communicated concept does not 
provide access to irrelevant properties that the lexically-encoded concept MUSTARD provides 
access to. 
On this view, points of comparison are merely properties which feature in contextual 
assumptions which are made accessible by processing the vehicle. These assumptions will 
play a role in deriving implicatures, as in examples (4) and (5). Whether these properties 
form part of the explicit content of the utterance or not remains an open question. In the 
following I will defend the view that the comparison-relevant content of comparisons 
constitutes part of the explicit content of an utterance62. But one important issue in 
                                                          
62 In an earlier stage of this research I was agnostic over whether comparison-relevant 
content counted as explicit or implicit content, but suggested that comparison-relevant 
content is more likely to be part of the implicit content of an utterance. As a result of a 
number of discussions with my supervisor Diane Blakemore and the responses of the 
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developing an account of comparisons is that it is sometimes difficult to tell if we are dealing 
with a poetic or a non-poetic comparison. An utterance of (8a) is likely to be interpreted as a 
non-poetic comparison, and (8b) a poetic comparison, but intuitions about (8c) may vary: 
(8a) Bagheera [my pet panther] is like a lion [in being {FELINE, CARNIVOROUS, etc.}]. 
(8b) Achilles [a Greek leader] is like a lighthouse [in being {PROVIDING-GUIDANCE, etc.}]. 
(8c) Achilles [a Greek warrior] is like a lion [in being {BRAVE, etc.}]. 
Even though I have already used examples such as (8c) to illustrate my argument, one could 
argue that an utterance of (8c) would communicate few, if any, poetic effects, and that the 
comparison-relevant content of (8c) is likely to be determinate (as in (8d)), consisting of a 
single point of comparison which is standardly accessed by the hearer in understanding the 
string like a lion: 
(8d) Achilles [a Greek warrior] is like a lion [in being {BRAVE}]. 
So far, it might seem parsimonious to argue for an account where utterances of non-poetic 
comparisons such as (8a) communicate comparison-relevant content as part of the 
explicature (as does the ‘standardised’ example in (8d)), whereas poetic comparisons like 
(8b) communicate implicit comparison-relevant content. This is because we are trying to 
explain why (8b) tends to correlate with weak effects whereas (8a) does not. I raise a 
number of objections to this approach below. 
If we concede the possibility that there are standardised simile vehicles, even if (8c)/(8d) 
constitutes a borderline case, and that similes containing such vehicles are interpreted in a 
similar way to dead metaphors (see Chapter 3, passim), then this raises the question of 
where such standardised interpretations come from. My claim is that it is far easier to argue 
that novel uses of comparisons, interpreted as in (8c), stabilise over time into standardised 
expressions which communicate a very narrow, determinate and explicit comparison-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
examiners for this thesis, Robyn Carston and Domenyk Eades, I decided that it simply could 
not be the case that comparison-relevant content is implicit. 
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relevant content and few poetic effects, than an account which claims that the comparison-
relevant content in (8c) is implicit but that in (8d) is explicit. 
Further circumstantial evidence for the explicitness of comparison-relevant content can be 
found in comparing poetic comparisons to certain other constructions which involve the 
concepts related to similarity. Utterances of (9a-b) do not appear to evoke the same sorts of 
poetic effects as the poetic comparisons examined above, even though they clearly 
encourage the hearer to compare the tenor and the vehicle in order to understand the 
utterance: 
 (9a) Achilles resembles a lion. 
 (9b) Achilles is similar to a lion. 
Why might Achilles is like a lion evoke poetic effects while Achilles resembles a lion does 
not63? A further piece of evidence in this regard is that it appears from the secondary 
literature that not every era of poetry exhibits similes (see §4.1). If this constitutes evidence 
that not every linguistic community has comparison constructions which are amenable to 
the evocation of poetic effects, and if examples such as (9a-b) suggest that not every 
comparison construction can be used to evoke poetic effects in the way poetic comparisons 
do, then one might ask whether certain comparisons require contextual elaboration of 
                                                          
63 I here am in disagreement with Israel, Harding and Tobin, who claim that “any 
construction which can express a literal comparison should in principle be available to form a 
simile” (2004: 125. See also Chapter 4, §4.1. They give examples involving is the equivalent 
of, the character of, to think of A as B, and to view A as B, but do not explain them at length. 
They do not address cases like A resembles B. The quote above contrasts with what they 
write on the same page: “Broadly speaking, any construction which prompts the 
conceptualization of two distinct figures [sc. Concepts, or entities] and an assessment of the 
similarities and differences between them will count as a comparison” (id., ib.). This seems 
to be even further from my view, and might encompass any sort of conceptual mapping (see 
Chapter 3, §§3.6-7). It would also make utterances such as Look! Achilles! Look! A Lion! 
similes. 
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comparison-relevant content and others do not, and hence can achieve relevance primarily 
through the communication of poetic effects. One way of capturing this difference might be 
that (9a) communicates that Achilles is like a lion in certain respects, and that those points of 
comparison form part of the explicature of the utterance, whereas in poetic comparisons the 
comparison-relevant content forms part of the implicit content (implicatures which are 
derived on the basis of the explicit content). 
Carston has given the following definition of explicature (also cited in Chapter 2, §2.8, q.v.): 
Explicature: An assumption (proposition) communicated by an utterance is an 
‘explicature’ of the utterance if and only if it is a development of (a) a linguistically-
encoded logical form of the utterance, or of (b) a sentential subpart of the logical form. 
(Carston, 2002a: 124) 
Although my proposal for how similes are understood allows a great degree of freedom in 
how the hearer goes about the process of enriching the explicature, perhaps even more so 
than in cases where a single (ad hoc) conceptual element is supplied as part of the 
explicature, as in the relevance theoretic account of metaphor outlined in Chapter 2, §2.12, 
it is clear that the comparison-relevant content of (4a), (5a), (6b) and (7b) above counts as a 
‘development’ of a sentential subpart of a linguistically-encoded logical form: namely, the 
string like B in the comparison itself. 
The role of determining sets of points of comparison raises a particular possibility on a 
relevance theoretic framework. The presumption of relevance communicated by a 
comparison guarantees that the comparison is relevant. It does not guarantee that 
determining the set to a high degree of determinacy will be relevant. The implicit content of 
a comparison can also contribute to the relevance of the utterance, and this implicit content 
can include weak implicatures. It is those comparisons which achieve relevance primarily 
through a wide array of weak implicatures (poetic effects) which we can properly call poetic 
comparisons. This category of poetic comparisons overlaps to a significant degree with the 
pre-theoretic notion of ‘simile’ with which I began this thesis. In short, my account, whether 
comparison-relevant content turns out to be part of explicit content or not, predicts that 
some comparisons will achieve relevance in this way. The two conditions which must be met 
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for a comparison to achieve relevance as a poetic comparison are: (i) that the comparison 
construction does not require that a determinate set of points of comparison be recovered 
in understanding the utterance (ruling out cases such as (9a) and (9b)); and (ii) that such a 
determinate set of points of comparison is not easily recoverable (as in (8a), understood as a 
typical non-poetic comparison, or (8d), as a ‘standardised’ comparison). 
At this point, it may seem that I am arguing that every comparison (including poetic 
comparisons) communicates a set of determinate properties for the utterance to be 
understood. But comparison-relevant content is not always determinate. An utterance of 
(10) is comprehensible whether: (i) one understands it as communicating that Achilles leapt 
like a lion leaps (that is, with resolution of syntactic ellipsis); or (ii) one understands the 
comparison as obtaining more loosely, as suggested by the following paraphrase: Achilles 
leapt in such a way as would remind one of a lion: 
 (10) Achilles leapt like a lion. 
The second way of interpreting the comparison in (10) might not hold in terms of the lion’s 
LEAPING, but rather in terms of Achilles’ BRAVERY in so conducting himself, his APPEARANCE, his 
INTENT, or indefinitely many other respects (or structured sets of respects). It is precisely this 
second ‘reading’ of the simile in (10) which is of most interest in terms of the understanding 
of poetic simile. Focussing on determinate points of comparison would be misleading. 
Moreover, even with the first ‘reading’ there is room for a poetic interpretation64. 
Nevertheless, in many cases of poetic comparison, certain properties can be inferred to be 
properly applicable to the tenor on the basis of the vehicle. This explains why non-poetic 
comparisons are often taken as communicating primarily that A and B share certain 
properties, but allows for poetic comparisons to communicate merely that comparing A and 
B will be relevant. For many (but not all) of the poetic examples, there is no determinate set 
of properties, whether stable concepts or ad hoc concepts, which can be taken as being 
                                                          
64 I have raised the possibility that is a lion is to some extent standardised in the foregoing 
text. However, it seems likely that example (10) Achilles leapt like a lion will be interpreted 
as a poetic comparison in most contexts. 
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communicated by the utterance. For example, the following constructed exchange in (11) 
can help to illustrate what makes a comparison a simile: 
 (11) Odysseus: The odds are against him. Is he going to survive the battle? 
Ajax: Achilles is like a lion. 
Odysseus has to identify what Ajax meant in uttering Achilles is like a lion. Because Ajax’s 
utterance communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance, Odysseus is justified in 
interpreting his utterance as communicating implicatures such as the following: 
 (11a) Achilles is brave. 
 (11b) Achilles is going to survive the battle. 
A communicated assumption such as (11b) is crucial to Ajax’s utterance achieving relevance. 
But, in order for Odysseus to validly infer the implicated conclusion in (11b), Ajax’s utterance 
in (11) has to make manifest certain contextual premises such as (11c)-(11d): 
 (11c) Lions are brave. 
 (11d) If someone is brave they will survive the battle. 
But, importantly, the following inference is not valid: 
 Premise 1: Achilles is like a lion. [Developed from utterance (11)] 
 Premise 2: Lions are brave. [(11c)] 
 Conclusion: Achilles is brave. [(11a)] 
Ajax must be expecting his utterance to achieve relevance as contributing to an implicature 
like (11b) by means of a contextual assumption such as (11a). Comparisons such as Ajax’s 
utterance in (11) must therefore communicate explicatures which are informationally richer 
than propositions such as premise 1 above. So premise 1 must be more specific, as in the 
following inference 
 Premise 1: Achilles is like a lion [in being {BRAVE, etc.}] 
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 Premise 2: Lions are brave. [(11c)] 
 Conclusion: Achilles is brave. [(11a)] 
But Ajax’s utterance in (11) also provides access to wide range of weak implicatures. So is 
(11) a poetic comparison or a non-poetic comparison? This will depend on how it is 
interpreted by the hearer: whether it provides access to a relatively determinate 
comparison-relevant content, and few poetic effects, or whether it will achieve relevance 
primarily through the evocation of poetic effects.  
The indeterminacy of the explicit content of certain comparisons becomes clearer still where 
the set of points of comparisons is itself more indeterminate. In (12), there is no highly 
manifest property (such as BRAVE) which can be said to be a necessary member of the set of 
points of comparison: 
 (12) Odysseus: Who do you love most of the men in our army? 
 Ajax: Achilles is like a lion. 
Here Ajax’s utterance has the same linguistic form as that in (11). But he is clearly using the 
comparison in (12) to communicate something different to that of his utterance in (12). So 
what is he communicating? A wide range of weak implicatures which contribute to an 
impression of Achilles as being a certain way, and which justify a stronger implicature such 
as (12a), which is understood to be strongly communicated: 
 (12a) Ajax loves Achilles most of the men in [his and Odysseus’] army. 
But, importantly, the weaker impression about Achilles is also communicated. Why? Because 
Ajax’s utterance is indeterminate on at least two levels: (i) he is providing indirect evidence 
for an implicated conclusion such as (12a), not a representation of that assumption (such as I 
love Achilles most); (ii) he is doing so by means of an expression which is itself indeterminate 
at the level of explicit content. This explicit indeterminacy justifies the pursuit of weaker 
effects on the part of the hearer/reader (here, Odysseus). 
Ajax’s utterance in (11) communicates not only the explicit content required to license the 
appropriate strong implicatures, but also a range of weak implicatures. How do we know? If 
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Ajax had intended to provide access to the assumption that Achilles is brave, he could have 
simply said so. His utterance guarantees its own optimal relevance, and so other 
assumptions which are made more manifest by the utterance fall under Ajax’s 
communicative intentions as part of the intended context, and provide a guarantee to 
Odysseus that a wider range of contextual effects are part of the implicit content of the 
utterance. In (12), it is far harder to see what the explicit content of Ajax’s utterance might 
be, other than that Achilles is like a lion in some respect or other. Does Ajax fail to 
communicate anything? Absolutely not. He communicates many of the same weak 
implicatures as he does in (11). But it is clear that (12) is weaker than (11), even though the 
utterance is identical. Can the self-same utterance vary in explicitness? It depends what the 
thought communicated might be. But the set of points of comparison and the range of weak 
implicatures are arrived at by a process of mutual parallel adjustment. 
It seems that (11e) is a far better approximation of the explicit content of Ajax’s utterance in 
(11) than (11a) or (11b): 
 (11e) Achilles is like a lion in being {BRAVE*, WILD*, FIERCE*, HUNGRY*, HANDSOME*, etc.} 
The properties given in (11e) in braces are all ad hoc (hence the asterisks). They represent 
particularly lion-like ways of being brave, wild and so on. The set is likely to include 
properties which are not just ad hoc concepts derived from stable lexically-encoded 
concepts, but perhaps also unlexicalised but communicable concepts (see e.g. Sperber and 
Wilson, 1998/2012: 45). 
The difference in interpretation of the utterances of similes in (11) and (12) lies in which 
properties are required for the comparison between Achilles and a lion to hold. So which 
properties are required? We can make some generalisations. Example (11) will communicate 
a more determinate set of points of comparison than (12). It is also likely to have fewer 
poetic effects. Ajax’s utterance in (11) will often communicate an assumption which is very 
similar to (11d). But Ajax has greater confidence in (11) that his utterance will be understood 
in a particular way than he does in (12) because the comparison-relevant content of his 
utterance is more determinate. What does it mean for the set of points of comparison to be 
indeterminate? Because the overall relevance of the utterance relies more upon the weak 
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implicatures which are derived on the basis of the utterance than on the explicit content of 
the utterance, the hearer will have greater freedom in how he arrives at those weak 
implicatures. A wide range of differently constituted sets of points of comparison could help 
him arrive at the weak implicatures which form the optimally relevant interpretation (the 
first one he arrives at consistent with the presumption of relevance). Odysseus’ 
understanding of Ajax’s utterance in (12) is far ‘riskier’ than that of (11) because Odysseus 
needs to explore less and less manifest contextual assumptions in order to find the relevant 
weak implicatures. The process of mutual parallel adjustment is therefore far likelier to stop 
sooner in (11) than in (12) mutatis mutandis, because the hearer, here Odysseus, is (to some 
extent) constrained by the expectation that the explicit content will support the implicated 
conclusion that Achilles is brave, and the process of mutual parallel adjustment affects 
simultaneously the explicit and the implicit content of the utterance. Whether the 
comparison-relevant content is part of the explicature or is constituted by implicatures 
would not change the prediction. 
By spelling out the differences in the comparison-relevant content of the same utterance on 
different occasions of use, we can see how complex the relationship between an explicitly 
communicated comparison and weak effects can be. A narrow set of points of comparison 
can give access to weak implicatures, as can a more indeterminate range. The indeterminacy 
of the comparison-relevant content of Ajax’s utterance in (12) correlates with a wider range 
of weak implicatures, and hence the same utterance in (12) seems more ‘poetic’ than in (11). 
But they do not communicate the same explicature, or even the same comparison-relevant 
content. Moreover, they are ‘poetic’ inasmuch as they provide access to a wide array of 
weak implicatures. 
The above view of how poetic (and non-poetic) comparisons are understood is compatible 
with the comparison-relevant content contributing to either the explicit or (solely) the 
implicit content of the utterance. But one particular desideratum does not help us to 
determine what the correct analysis is. One assumption which is found in the theoretical 
literature (e.g. Stern, 2000: 232) is that utterances such as (13) suggest that the content of 
metaphors and similes is different in quality: 
 (13) The general is not like a lion, he is a lion. 
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 (italics used to represent stress)65 
The argument boils down to the observation that utterances such as (13) are interpreted as 
communicating that the general has more lion-like properties that would be communicated 
by The general is like a lion. On this view, (13a-c) communicate that Achilles shares a 
different range of properties with LIONS: 
 (13a) The general is not a lion. 
[i.e. he has no properties in common with the concept LION] 
 (13b) The general is like a lion. 
[i.e. he has some properties in common with the concept LION] 
 (13c) The general is a lion. 
[i.e. he has more properties in common with the concept LION] 
My first objection to this kind of reasoning is that it is not clear how having more properties 
in common would correlate with achieving the characteristic effects of metaphors and 
similes. It is not the explicature of a metaphor which makes it poetic: there are many 
‘mundane’ metaphors which involve ad hoc concept construction. But only those metaphors 
which communicate poetic effects by virtue of being metaphors are of interest to us here. 
A more significant problem with this argument is that all we are able to infer from (13) is 
that the metaphor is interpreted as ‘better than’ the simile in the same context. This follows 
from the presumption of optimal relevance. That is, the form of (13), is relevant as well as 
the conceptual content. The fact that two clauses are being contrasted (one negated, the 
other not) communicates that their contrast is optimally relevant in a context which is 
                                                          
65 For ease of explanation I have avoided the obvious example Achilles is like a lion. However, 
a similar explanation will follow if either (a) interpreting Achilles involves accessing a set of 
concepts (HUMAN, WARRIOR, GREEK, etc.) which could contribute to finding the comparison 
relevant content, or (b) Achilles corresponds with a single conceptual element or mental file 
(although see Recanati, 2012: 234 n10). 
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relevant for the utterance as a whole. Whatever felt difference there is between the 
comparison and the metaphor in the same context is not necessarily relevant to the 
difference in ‘strength’, ‘richness’ and so on of the interpretations of metaphors and similes 
in any context (see §4.7). Moreover, as Carston has explored, it is entirely possible for the 
use of a negation to negate content which forms part of a higher level explicature (2002a 
§4). On this view, an assumption such as (13d) is communicated by (13): 
(13d) One cannot say The general is like a lion truthfully, but one can say The general 
is a lion [=LION*]. 
The negation of the comparison in (13) does not mean that the speaker is denying that the 
comparison would be optimally relevant in any context, and so is irrelevant as a desideratum 
for investigating how metaphors and similes are understood. But it is also irrelevant for the 
issue of whether the comparison-relevant content of comparisons forms part of the 
explicature or not. 
Because this is such a widespread assumption, and the reader might not yet be convinced 
that utterances such as (13) are irrelevant to investigating the metaphor-simile relationship, 
I adduce here a further argument. If (13) were relevant, then we ought to expect that 
metaphors and similes communicate different degrees of overlap of shared properties 
between tenor and vehicle even in utterances such as (13e-f): 
(13e) Achilles is not a lion, he’s like a lion. 
(13f) ?Achilles is not a lion, he is a lion. 
An utterance of (13e) communicates that the general does not share all relevant properties 
with LIONS but does share some. This is compatible with my account of comparison 
understanding, and would also be accepted by the advocates of arguments based on 
utterances like (13). But why does (13f) not communicate the same thing? For (13f) it is 
obvious that the felt infelicity is due to both clauses being interpreted in the same context, 
as either clause on its own is perfectly felicitous (the first as a denial, the second as a 
metaphor). I am merely pointing out that we should look at (13) in the same way. 
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One advantage of my account is that it predicts that negated comparisons are far less likely 
to achieve relevance as poetic comparisons. For example, (13g) is unlikely to communicate 
many poetic effects: 
 (13g) The general is not like a lion. 
Because a comparison can achieve relevance either as a non-poetic comparison or a poetic 
comparison, and because the optimally relevant interpretation will be the first one which 
generates sufficient cognitive effects, then, unless there is some other reason for the 
hearer/reader to discount the least effortful interpretation that (13g) is denying that there 
are any relevant points of comparison, that will be the optimally relevant interpretation. If 
this analysis is right, then the use of examples like (13) to argue that metaphors are ‘better 
than’ similes (see §4.7) is open to challenge.66 
The hearer’s task in interpreting a non-poetic comparison or a simile (a poetic comparison) is 
the same: (i) the speaker guarantees that the comparison communicated is optimally 
relevant; and (ii) this comparison can achieve relevance either (a) by the contextual 
saturation of a determinate set of points of comparison, or (b) by the comparison achieving 
relevance by virtue of the fact that comparing the two things (from the point of view of the 
hearer/reader: seeking the points of comparison which are relevant) will generate a wide 
range of weak implicatures which themselves contribute to an overall interpretation which is 
optimally relevant.  
Whether a comparison is poetic or not is an outcome of the process of comparison 
interpretation through mutual parallel adjustment. Communicating that a comparison is 
optimally relevant does not necessarily specify how the comparison will contribute to 
                                                          
66 We do get negated comparisons which achieve poetic effects: (fn2) EXAMPLE REDACTED 
FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS                                 (Marr and Morrissey (The Smiths), Hand in 
Glove. Album: The Smiths. 1984. Rhino.). But the assumption that our love and other loves 
are not similar is what plays a role in the derivation of poetic effects. The search for respects 
in which tenor and vehicle may be similar is crucial to how poetic comparisons achieve their 
effects. 
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relevance. Some will achieve relevance primarily through allowing the hearer/reader to 
determine relevant points of comparison (non-poetic comparisons), others will do so 
primarily by providing access to relevant weak implicatures. But the hearer/reader does not 
necessarily know in advance which route to relevance (enrichment of the explicature, or 
evocation of poetic effects) will turn out to provide the optimally relevant overall 
interpretation until the first interpretation which is consistent with the presumption of 
optimal relevance is found.  
My account entails that whether comparisons are poetic or otherwise is a matter of degree: 
some will be more poetic than others. However, there is a subset of comparisons which do 
form a natural kind: those comparisons which achieve relevance through the generation of a 
wide range of weak implicatures rather than the determination of a set of points of 
comparison. In the poetic cases, the set of points of comparison which the hearer seeks in 
pursuit of a relevant interpretation will remain indeterminate. Why? The optimally relevant 
interpretation depends upon the poetic effects generated, and these effects, although the 
hearer/reader gains access to them by exploring potential points of comparison, could be 
generated in pursuit of any number of points of comparison. These are poetic comparisons. 
Poetic comparisons include most of the cases we would pre-theoretically call simile. 
5.2 Simile and comparison diagnostics 
As far as I am aware, this thesis has addressed a fuller range of types of simile than has ever 
been attempted within the field of pragmatics. Yet the simplest hypothesis, so I claim, 
remains that similes are poetic comparisons. I am not alone in arguing that similes are a 
species of comparison. However, as far as I know, no other researcher has attempted to 
explain in any depth why certain patterns of comparison use (poetic comparisons with 
additional content, different types of metaphor and comparison interaction) tend to 
correlate with poetic effects. 
There is a further set of advantages to my account of simile understanding, beyond 
theoretical parsimony, empirical coverage and relevance to pragmatic stylistics. It also 
provides explanations for certain patterns which have been discerned in how similes are 
understood. Unfortunately, these assumptions have sometimes been argued as either 
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necessary or prototypical of similes in contrast to non-poetic comparisons. If this were the 
case, then my account of simile understanding would be open to challenge. 
If comparisons can be definitely distinguished from similes, by means of exhibiting particular 
tenor-vehicle relationships, then it is possible that similes are understood in a radically 
different way to (non-poetic) comparisons. I argue that as putative necessary conditions of 
simile understanding these assumptions do not make the right predictions. But the general 
tendency of poetic comparisons to be non-reversible as opposed to reversible non-poetic 
comparisons, or for the one to exhibit a more specific relationship between the tenor and 
the vehicle than the other, does require explanation if such generalisations are legitimate. 
One of the advantages of my account is that it explains why similes tend to but do not 
always exhibit such tenor-vehicle relationships. Moreover, appeals to default tenor-vehicle 
relationships will threaten theoretical parsimony on a relevance theoretic approach to 
comparison understanding. If these relationships provide hearers/readers with interpretive 
heuristics (such as, if one of these hypotheses does apply, then what would otherwise be a 
comparison is interpreted as a simile) then similes would require determination of this 
relationship prior to utterance understanding. 
The conceptual relationships I investigate in this section are: (i) ‘directionality’ (that is, ‘non-
reversibility’), of the tenor-vehicle relationship (see also §§3.4, 6f; §4.9); (ii) ‘tension’ 
between tenor and vehicle; (iii) ‘abstractness’ of the tenor versus ‘concreteness’ of the 
vehicle; and (iv) ‘unfamiliarity’ of the tenor versus ‘familiarity’ of the vehicle67. Examples 
(14a-b) demonstrate the ‘reversibility’ and ‘tension’ hypotheses: 
                                                          
67 Fishelov gives eight different dimensions along which ‘successful’ poetic similes can differ 
from literal comparisons. I here give my own labels for these dimensions and paraphrases of 
the relationship which, according to Fishelov, typifies literal comparisons in brackets: (1) 
order (tenor-vehicle); (2) length (tenor and vehicle are commensurate); (3) explicitness 
(tenor, vehicle, ground or comparison marker are close to the encoded meaning); (4) 
interpretation of ground with respect to tenor (comparison-relevant content is salient for 
the tenor); (5) interpretation of ground with respect to vehicle (comparison-relevant content 
is salient for the vehicle); (6) familiarity of tenor and vehicle (vehicle more familiar than 
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 (14a) Achilles is like Odysseus. 
 (14b) Achilles is like a lion. 
In terms of the tenor-vehicle tension hypothesis, in (14a), Achilles and Odysseus are 
conceptually close (they are both human beings, Greek warriors, etc.). In (14b), Achilles is 
human, but a lion is not. Therefore, there is conceptual ‘tension’ or ‘distance’ between tenor 
and vehicle in (14b). Example (14a) is a non-poetic comparison, and (14b) is a simile. 
Accordingly, it is argued that ‘tension’ between tenor and vehicle is a diagnostic for simile. 
The other two types are discussed in §§5.2.3-4. 
5.2.1 The non-reversibility of similes 
The reversibility hypothesis predicts that an utterance of (15a) does not mean the same as 
(15b), but (16a) and (16b) are equivalent: 
 (15a) Soldiers are like lions. [in being {BRAVE*, WILD*, etc.}] 
 (15b) Lions are like soldiers. [in being {BRAVE*, VIOLENT*, etc.}] 
 
 (16a) Soldiers are like sailors. [in being {ARMED*, DISCIPLINED*, etc.}] 
 (16b) Sailors are like soldiers. [in being {ARMED*, DISCIPLINED*, etc.}] 
Bredin contrasts ‘symmetrical comparisons’ like (16a-b) with ‘predicative comparisons’ like 
(15a-b). Just as the copula verb can be used to express a symmetrical identity statement 
(Elton John is Reginald Dwight) or an asymmetrical predication (Elton John is a songwriter) 
(Bredin, 1998). While in identity statements and symmetrical comparisons the vehicle is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
tenor); (7) connotation (connotations of vehicle and tenor are not contradictory); (8) 
conceptual ‘distance’ (tenor and vehicle are taken from distinct categories) (1993: 6-14). All 
of these ‘dimensions’ can be equated to the types of tenor-vehicle relationship I discuss 
below or (with respect to (2)) can be better explained by my account of comparison 
understanding. 
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identified with the tenor, and so they are interchangeable, with predications and predicative 
comparisons “one of them describes the other” (id., ib.: 74) 
But my account predicts why the interpretations of (15a) and (15b) are different: because 
the respects in which the similarity holds is different. The ‘comparison’ itself is not 
asymmetrical, whatever that might mean. A proposition of the form A is like B would mean 
the same thing as B is like A in the same context. But to say that A is like B means to commit 
oneself to the similarity obtaining in a particular way, that is, in terms of the relevant points 
of comparison. What makes some comparisons asymmetrical is that the properties which 
are provided by the vehicle will simply be ‘ranked’ differently. 
Accessing the concept LION makes a set of encyclopaedic assumptions more manifest. But 
some assumptions will be more manifest than others. Even though the determination of 
points of comparison (whether it ultimately contributes to the relevance of the utterance or 
not) will provide a set of properties which overlap to a certain degree for both (15a) and 
(15b), it follows that: (i) some of the ‘overlapping’ assumptions will be entertained to a 
different degree of manifestness in each case, and (ii) there will be some assumptions which 
are not made sufficiently manifest to the hearer to provide the properties in which he will 
consider the communicated comparison to hold. Moreover, as a prediction of how even 
non-poetic comparisons are understood, the reversibility hypothesis is clearly false. 
An utterance of (16a) is likely to have similar comparison-relevant content to (16b), but it 
does not necessarily have the same implicit content, nor will it have the same comparison-
relevant content in every case. Assumptions such as (17a) and (17b) can support 
implicatures such as (18a) and (18b) (for the interpretation of (16a-b) respectively), but not 
vice versa: 
 (17a) Contextual assumption: Sailors are disreputable. 
 (17b) Contextual assumption: Soldiers are reputable. 
 
 (18a) Implicature: Soldiers are disreputable. [i.e. because they are like sailors] 
 (18b) Implicature: Sailors are not disreputable. [i.e. because they are like soldiers] 
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Even ‘literal’ (i.e. non-poetic) comparisons like (16a-b) (Soldiers/sailors are like 
sailors/soldiers) are not reversible salvo sensu. They can differ as to their implicit content 
because of the contextual assumptions which the vehicle makes available, and this 
difference in implicit content can occur even when the explicit content is extremely similar. 
In any case, my account predicts that the explicit content of (16a-b) is not likely to be 
identical, because the properties which form part of the set of points of comparison are not 
likely to be made equally more manifest by accessing the concepts SOLDIERS and SAILORS. 
Rather, the outcome of mutual parallel adjustment is likely to be very similar, but not 
identical, sets of points of comparison for the comparison-relevant content of (16a-b). 
The pertinent question is not why similes are not reversible (Cf. Glucksberg, 2001: 44f), but 
why any comparisons are. My prediction is that utterances of comparisons will only be 
reversible in terms of their explicit and their implicit content when both tenor and vehicle 
make highly manifest a very similar range of encyclopaedic assumptions. We can compare to 
(16a-b) above the straightforward literal comparison in (19): 
(19) My computer is like your computer [in being {SLOW, OLD, UGLY, etc.}] 
An utterance of (19) is more ‘reversible’ than (16a-b), that is, it is understood as 
communicating the same comparison-relevant content as (19a), because both the tenor and 
the vehicle make more manifest the same sorts of properties: 
 (19a) Your computer is like my computer [in being {SLOW, OLD, UGLY, etc.}] 
In other words, the non-reversibility of similes is epiphenomenal. It does not cause a 
figurative interpretation of a comparison, but can often be identified post hoc because of the 
way utterances like (15a-b) achieve relevance. 
Example (19a) is a straightforwardly reversible non-poetic comparison, and whether (18a-b) 
are equivalents (that is, reversible) depends upon how they are interpreted by the hearer. 
Therefore some (non-poetic) comparisons are reversible, and some are not. However, the 
other side of the reversibility hypothesis, that poetic comparisons are always ‘directional’ 
(that is, non-reversible) is also open to challenge. For example, in (20) it is unclear whether 
the comparison is a non-poetic comparison (communicating that honey and vinegar share 
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relatively determinate points of comparison), a poetic comparison, or even a ‘failed’ 
comparison (see also Chapter 4, §4.8): 
 (20) Honey is like vinegar. 
I will return to the issue of simile failure in Chapter 6, §6.4. But one must acknowledge that 
there is at least the possibility that the distinction between poetic and non-poetic 
comparisons is (at least in some cases) unmarked. Because it is extremely difficult to 
determine what the explicit content of (20) is, it is just as difficult to claim that (20a), where 
tenor and vehicle are reversed, has a radically different interpretation to (20): 
 (20a) Vinegar is like honey. 
In sections §§5.2.3-4 below I will look at whether there is a ‘privileged order’ of tenor and 
vehicle concepts which might provide an alternative to reversibility as a diagnostic for poetic 
and non-poetic comparisons. The basic idea can be illustrated by contrasting the following 
two examples: 
 (21a) His words are like honey. 
 (21b) Honey is like his words. 
Tenor and vehicle cannot be reversed in (21a) salvo sensu, as evidenced by (21b). Moreover, 
WORDS and HONEY are conceptually more different than, for instance, SOLDIERS and SAILORS, that 
is, they share fewer highly-salient properties. HONEY, which describes something which can 
be experienced by direct perception, is a more concrete concept than WORDS, which are 
more abstract. Example (21a) (so it might be argued) achieves relevance at least in part by 
providing the hearer with access to highly-salient properties of HONEY which are only of low-
salience for WORDS. In this sense, what is meant by honey is more ‘familiar’ than his words. 
Before I look at the three additional dimensions of the tenor-vehicle relationship which have 
been proposed as diagnostics for simile as opposed to comparison (conceptual tension, 
concreteness, and familiarity. See below) it should be recognised that (21b) is not entirely 
incomprehensible. Like (20) and (20a), it is very unclear how (21b) ought to achieve 
relevance. But if it does achieve relevance, the comparison-relevant content of (21b) is far 
more indeterminate than (21a) (see e.g. Fishelov, 1993, where he proposes that violation of 
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the typical order of a comparison can make a comparison more poetic). The problem with 
analysing such comparisons is that while the indeterminacy of their comparison-relevant 
content makes them potentially suitable for the communication of a wide range of poetic 
effects, the author takes a risk in making the search for comparison-relevant content so 
difficult for the reader: it is possible that no sufficiently relevant interpretation is found. An 
utterance of (21b) could be very poetic, but it could also easily ‘fail’ (see also §5.2.5). 
5.2.2 Conceptual tension between tenor and vehicle in similes 
My account predicts that some poetic comparisons will be ‘striking’ (that is, will evoke a 
wide range of poetic effects) because increasing the cognitive effort involved in ascertaining 
the way in which a comparison is relevant can contribute to the widening of the context of 
the utterance, and hence to a wider array of weak effects. One way in which the exploration 
of a wider context can be elicited is by a speaker/author communicating a comparison 
between two things which are conceptually ‘distant’, that is, by saying A is like B where the 
concepts lexically-encoded by A and B do not have many properties in common. Relevance 
theory predicts that concepts can share properties inasmuch as they share features of their 
logical entry (that is they can enter into the same sort of inference rules. e.g. DOG and CAT are 
similar in that they both allow inferences to be drawn on the basis of belonging to the 
superordinate category of ANIMAL) or the degree to which they provide access to similar 
encyclopaedic assumptions (those which contain similar conceptual content. e.g. Stroking 
DOGS is relaxing and stroking CATS is relaxing).  
The process of understanding a comparison exhibiting tenor-vehicle tension would then be 
more effortful than would otherwise be the case, and would correlate with a wider range of 
weaker effects as opposed to one which did not, analogous to the way in which the cognitive 
effort required by the hearer in constructing an ad hoc concept in metaphor understanding 
can correlate with weaker effects (Sperber and Wilson, 2008/2012: 118-122). This can be 
related to the tenor-vehicle-tension hypothesis that semantic (strictly speaking, conceptual) 
distance between the tenor and vehicle concepts ‘precipitates the simile into a figurative 
mode’ (to borrow the terminology of Bethlehem, 1996: 215). So (14a) is a non-poetic 
comparison, and (14b) is a poetic comparison (examples repeated here): 
 (14a) Achilles is like Odysseus. 
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 (14b) Achilles is like a lion. 
One variant of the hypothesis is exemplified by Wikberg: 
“A simile can be defined as a figurative expression used to make an explicit 
comparison of two unlike things by means of the prepositions like, (as) ... as or the 
conjunctions as, as if, as though.” 
(Wikberg, 2008: 128) (her italics, my emboldening) 
Carston comments briefly on claims that metaphors require the hearer to conceive of two 
unlike things being the same, whereas similes invite comparison of unlike things, but is 
rightly cautious about such a diagnostic (2002a: 357). Others claim that “the paradox of 
unlike things compared” explains ‘successful metaphor’ (Glucksberg, 2008: 72; Lanham, 
1991: 140. Richards, 1936: 125). Others argue that comparing A to B where A and B are 
unlike each other causes a figurative interpretation (e.g. Semino, 2008: 230; Miller, 1993: 
373; Martindale, 1981: 224; Ben-Porat, 1992: 738; Whalley, 1988; Israel, et al., 2004: 124). 
According to the latter definition of simile, example (22b) would be more like a simile than 
(22a) because in (22a) the tenor and the vehicle both belong to the same superordinate 
category (of a particular type of electronic device), whereas in (22b), there is some ‘category 
crossing’: 
 (22a) This tablet PC works like a smartphone. 
 (22b) This tablet PC works like a donkey. 
However, while there must be some gap between the concept encoded by the word and the 
concept communicated in the case of metaphor understanding, the gap is not really 
between the encoded tenor concept and the encoded vehicle concept, but between the 
encoded vehicle concept and the communicated vehicle concept. Even if the conceptual 
distance between tenor and vehicle in metaphor were relevant to their understanding, we 
cannot simply extrapolate to simile without justification. Moreover, we get identity simile, 
and one cannot get less conceptually distant than that (see §4.4, example (22)). Example 
(22b) does involve such tension, but it does not generate a particularly wide range of weak 
effects on that basis. Rather, (22b) achieves its effects as evidence of an attitude towards 
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this tablet PC, whereas whether (22a) provides such evidence is far more dependent upon 
context. In other words, (22b) implicitly communicates the speaker’s attitude in most 
circumstances. But implicitness alone does not a simile make. 
Moreover, if anything can be like anything else in some respect or other, everything will be 
‘unlike’ a particular thing in certain respects. In (22a) my computer is like a smartphone in 
being an electronic device which can perform certain functions, but differs in size and in a 
wide range of functions that it can perform but the smartphone cannot, and vice versa. If 
understanding a simile requires identifying the degree to which the tenor and the vehicle are 
conceptually distant, this is at least as effortful a task as identifying the degree to which they 
are similar. When would this process stop? There is no reason why (22a) should not be 
interpreted as a simile if there are so many ways in which smartphones and tablet PCs can 
be different. 
As a hypothesis for why certain comparisons are interpreted figuratively and others are not, 
the tenor-vehicle-tension hypothesis fails. The null hypothesis that similes simply are 
comparisons remains intact. However, it is true that many similes exhibit just the kind of 
‘tension’ the tenor-vehicle-tension hypothesis predicts. For instance, Achilles is not a LION or 
any other BIG-CAT in (23a), words are not ‘literally’ made of HONEY in (23b), and so on: 
 (23a) Achilles is like a lion. 
 (23b) His words are like honey. 
So why is there any correlation at all between whether a certain comparison can be used as 
a simile and whether the tenor and the vehicle are from the same category or not? I predict 
that certain comparisons are more amenable to the communication of poetic effects 
precisely because the respects in which a comparison might hold are difficult for the 
hearer/reader to determine. Sometimes this is because of the relationship between the 
tenor and the vehicle, but we must understand this relationship in terms of the very 
different encyclopaedic assumptions which the vehicle and tenor make available, or at least 
that the tenor concept makes certain encyclopaedic assumptions highly manifest which the 
vehicle only makes weakly manifest and vice versa. 
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In understanding (23a), for instance, the encyclopaedic assumptions about Achilles (related 
to concepts whose denotation he falls under, such as MAN, SOLDIER, HERO, and so on) are very 
different than those made accessible by accessing the concept LION. In the case of metaphor 
understanding (such as (23c)), some of the assumptions which LION makes manifest are 
predicated of the tenor: 
 (23c) Achilles is a lion. [=LION*] 
The tenor and the vehicle in (23c) make very different encyclopaedic assumptions more 
manifest, and, because (23c) is relevant as a predication, it is clear that some properties, 
which are either part of the hearer’s encyclopaedic knowledge about lions or are derived on 
the basis of assumptions which LION makes manifest or more manifest, are to be predicated 
of Achilles. The ‘tension’ is here between the set of assumptions made manifest by LION and 
the properties which must be predicated of Achilles on the hearer’s responsibility. 
In understanding the simile in (23a), determining a set of shared properties may be relevant, 
or the fact that the speaker/author is communicating that some shared properties exist may 
be sufficient to justify the hearer in taking certain contextual implications as weak 
implicatures of an utterance of (23a). The process of mutual parallel adjustment in 
understanding an utterance of (23a) is justified by the presumption of relevance, not a more 
specific process whereby determining the comparison-relevant content is of greater 
importance than accessing the relevant weak implicatures. Because the tenor and vehicle 
concepts are likely to provide access to largely non-overlapping encyclopaedic assumptions, 
the comparison in (23a) is more likely to achieve relevance as a poetic comparison, that is, as 
a simile. But, crucially, the ‘tension’ in metaphor between the lexically-encoded concept and 
the concept communicated is a necessary feature of metaphor understanding, whereas, on 
my account, what makes a poetic comparison poetic is whether the comparison achieves 
relevance primarily on the implicit side of communication or not. It is not a matter of 
conceptual relationships, either between the lexically-encoded tenor and vehicle concepts, 
or between the concept lexically-encoded by the vehicle and the ad hoc concept that the 
vehicle is used to communicate. 
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5.2.3 Concrete-to-abstract conceptual mapping in similes 
Examples (24a-b) demonstrate the concrete-to-abstract-mapping hypothesis: 
(24a) A roundabout is like a rollercoaster. 
(24b) Love is like a rollercoaster. 
In (24a), ROUNDABOUTS and ROLLERCOASTERS are equally concrete concepts, which we are 
capable of experiencing as objects through sense perception. In (24b), LOVE is more abstract 
than a ROLLERCOASTER. Example (24a) is a ‘literal’ (non-poetic) comparison and (24b) is a 
simile. Therefore, on this view, a mapping between a concrete vehicle and an abstract tenor 
is a diagnostic for simile. 
For example, in (25) the vehicle (a DUNGEON) is understood as a more concrete entity than 
the tenor (your HEART): 
 (25) Your heart is like a dungeon. 
According to the concrete-to-abstract-mapping hypothesis, the fact that a certain 
relationship obtains between the tenor and the vehicle is taken as causing a figurative 
interpretation, with all the characteristic effects that such an interpretation might entail. If 
this were a sound hypothesis, then it would provide both an explanation for why some 
comparisons are poetic and some are not, and suggest why poetic comparisons are so 
interpreted. 
Within the conceptual metaphor theory literature on metaphors, some researchers have 
investigated the hypothesis that the default ‘mapping’ from vehicle concept to tenor 
concept is between a more concrete vehicle entity and a more abstract tenor for both 
metaphors and similes. This is related to the general methodological commitment in 
conceptual metaphor theory to finding ‘embodied’ explanations (that is, in terms of more 
concrete concepts) for how humans can reason about more abstract concepts (see e.g. 
Lakoff, 2008. Gibbs calls it the ‘cognitive wager’. Gibbs, 1998: 88). Some have also argued 
that similes are sometimes preferred over metaphors if they express this relationship 
between tenor and vehicle. For instance, Gibb and Wales reported on two experiments 
indicating that similes were preferred for concrete vehicles over ‘equivalent’ metaphors 
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(which were preferred for abstract vehicles) (1990: 199). I have elsewhere raised doubts 
about the validity of such a notion as ‘equivalence’ between metaphor and simile 
paraphrases of metaphor by the addition of ‘like’ (e.g. Chapter 4, §4.2), but, if such 
experiments are reliable, they are likely to reflect some genuine difference between how the 
experimental stimuli are understood. Gibb and Wales give as an example of the two tropes 
utterances which are repeated here as (26a) and (26b) (id., ib.): 
 (26a) His devotion was a burr on my back.  
 (26b) His devotion was like a burr on my back. 
One concern which might be raised about examples such as these is that in (26a) what is 
communicated by the metaphor burr on my back is not so much ‘abstract’ as ‘divergent from 
the encoded concepts’, or, in relevance theoretic terms, ad hoc. As ad hoc concept 
construction in metaphor crucially involves broadening of the lexically encoded concept in at 
least some respects (see Carston, 2002a: 365 for the theoretical importance of a unified 
conception of conceptual narrowing and broadening), does that mean that all ad hoc 
concepts in metaphor are ‘abstract’? If so, then ‘abstractness’ as a diagnostic is not much 
use. All metaphors will by necessity be more abstract than the tenors of the ‘equivalent’ 
similes, and so a ‘concrete metaphor’ will be very hard to find. Gibb and Wales try to argue 
that (26b) would be preferred to (26a) because a burr on my back is more concrete and 
similes privilege concrete tenors. In the discussion of their results (id., ib.: 208), Gibb and 
Wales argue that their results support Perrin’s view that a metaphor vehicle involves an 
‘abstract’ idea (1987), much as in Glucksberg’s category inclusion account of metaphor (e.g. 
2000; 2008) or the relevance theory account of metaphor as ad hoc concept construction 
(Carston, 2002a; Sperber and Wilson, 2008/2012. See Chapter 2, §2.7). 
One immediate obstacle to postulating a concrete-abstract (default) mapping for poetic 
comparisons is that we do not always get concrete vehicles and abstract tenors in poetic 
comparisons. We get abstract vehicles even in Homer (a battle over a wall is compared to a 
boundary dispute between landowners at Iliad 12.421ff. See Kirk, 1962: 346). We also get 
lots of concrete-to-concrete mappings, such as Lucan’s similes comparing battle to other 
types of conflict (in particular, gladiatorial combat) in his civil war epic Bellum Civile (see e.g. 
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Ahl, 1976: 82-115; Leigh, 1997). One example of violence compared to violence in Lucan is 
the simile in (27): 
(27) Then, when no chance was given of engaging in killing, 
Gradually the furious anger falls away and their minds cool; 
Just as wounded breasts [sc. of some sort of fighter] endure greater spirits 285 
While there is grief and a recent wound, and warm blood 
Supplies a motive impetus to the sinews, and the bones have not yet 
Brought the skin back together: if the winner, knowing that his sword has been 
driven in 
Stands still and has held back his hand, then a cold numbness binds 
His limbs and his spirit when force has been withdrawn, 290 
After the congealing blood has bound together his dry wounds. 
(Lucan, de Bello Civili 4.283-291. Latin text in Duff, 1928: 194, 196) 
(My translation. Line numbers are given for the reader’s convenience) 
In (27) it is not even clear that the vehicle comes from a non-martial context. It could well be 
the experience of one soldier being compared to another (hypothetical, remembered, or 
stereotypical) soldier. Nevertheless, (27) is a poetic comparison, generating poetic effects by 
virtue of the communication of a comparison between angry participants in battle and angry 
participants in fighting (perhaps gladiatorial combat, or martial combat, or something else). 
The generalisation that simile tenors are often abstract and simile vehicles are often 
concrete can be explained by my account of simile understanding. Because a comparison 
communicates that comparing A with B will be relevant in one of two ways, both of which 
rely upon the encyclopaedic assumptions which the vehicle concepts in particular make 
more manifest, a speaker is unlikely to rely upon the hearer recovering assumptions which 
are made only weakly manifest by the vehicle. The reason that the concrete-to-abstract 
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mapping hypothesis does not account for all similes is that poets often do take this risk, 
making a wide range of weak implicatures marginally more manifest by deploying an 
abstract vehicle, as I explore below. 
More often, the impression communicated by poetic similes is determinate in some respects 
and indeterminate in others. For this impression to be at all determinate would require that 
the vehicle of the simile make highly manifest some encyclopaedic assumptions. ‘Concrete’ 
concepts, that is, those whose denotation will include natural kind terms and other entities 
about which we are likely to have a great deal of general knowledge, including assumptions 
about how we relate to such entities, are bound to make more encyclopaedic assumptions 
more highly manifest than ‘abstract’ concepts will. And the assumptions one can have about 
concrete natural kind terms such as CATS, for instance, will also differ in kind from the 
assumptions one has about an abstract concept such as LOGIC. Assumptions relating to one’s 
perception of and interaction with natural kind terms will be more amenable to making the 
kind of assumptions required in simile understanding to either (i) determine points of 
comparison, or (ii) evoke poetic effects, or (iii) a combination of both. But the conceptual 
relationship between tenors and vehicles in similes is not uniform, and my account respects 
the diversity of conceptual tenor-vehicle relationships which actually obtains in similes.  
5.2.4 Familiar-to-unfamiliar conceptual mapping in similes 
The familiar-to-unfamiliar-mapping hypothesis is slightly different from the above three 
hypotheses. It does not claim that similes can be identified by mapping properties associated 
with a familiar vehicle concept onto a less familiar vehicle concept, as many ‘literal’ 
comparisons, such as (28a) are of this form: 
(28a) Wasabi is like mustard. 
The concept MUSTARD is likely to be more familiar to a Western hearer/reader than WASABI. As 
was discussed above, examples like (28a) have been claimed to be reversible salvo sensu, so 
the ‘direction’ of the mapping would be irrelevant68. Rather, what advocates of this 
                                                          
68 I argued against this above. But I am currently evaluating these assumptions about tenor-
vehicle relationships on their own merits. 
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approach to poetic simile appear to mean is that poetic similes will be successful only if they 
conform to this pattern. So (28b) would be more successful as a poetic simile than (28c): 
(28b) Achilles is like a lion. 
(28c) Achilles is like a civet. 
In (28c), one is less likely to have stereotypical assumptions which could properly be shared 
by a human like Achilles which are associated with the concept CIVET than those associated 
with LION. 
In the constructed example (29), the vehicle (a seamstress threading a needle) is a kind of 
activity which is likely to be more immediately familiar to most people than the particular 
way in which a bird feeds her offspring: 
 (29) The mother bird fed her chicks like a seamstress threading a needle. 
This hypothesis is particularly associated with the study of epic simile. In Homer for instance, 
Ford claims that the majority of the poet’s similes come from the ‘quotidian’ (1992: 31). But 
Homer’s simile vehicles describe a whole range of entities and activities, from the sounds of 
birds to earthquakes (Gargani, 2009 ms: 30f; see especially Mueller, 1984: 108-124). Are all 
those vehicles more ‘familiar’ than, for instance, the soldiers in battle they are compared to 
for a given audience? What about Homer’s ‘original’ audience (most likely in Ionia at some 
point in the 8th century BCE or earlier, if Homer actually existed)? Such claims are not limited 
to the discussion of Homer (Nowottny hints at a similar observation in relation to 
Shakespeare. 1965: 63). However, if we look at a wider range of vehicles in poetic 
comparisons, we can see that neither ‘familiarity’ nor ‘concreteness’ are of primary concern 
to poets in their choice of vehicles. 
Firstly, we get poetic comparisons whose vehicles are certainly not ‘familiar’, such as those 
lifted from mythology as in (30): 
(30) […] there are spread 
On the blue surface of thine aëry surge 
Like the bright hair uplifted from the head 
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Of some fierce Maenad, even from the dim verge 
Of the horizon to the zenith’s height, 
The locks of the approaching storm. 
(Shelley. Ode to the West Wind. Section 2. Stanzas 7f. Lines 18-23. NA: 872f) 
When Shelley compares the wind to the hairs on a Maenad’s head, one cannot seriously 
claim that the vehicle is more ‘familiar’ than the tenor. One type of poetic comparison which 
is extremely common involves a tenor drawn from the personal experience of the speaker, 
such as (31a-b): 
(31a) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
(Plath. The Bell Jar. 1966: 1) 
 
(31b) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
 
(Plath, The Bell Jar. 1966: 17) 
It is impossible for the experience of the narrator of The Bell Jar to be more ‘familiar’ to the 
reader than the tenor which is described in the narrative. 
In (31c), the deictic expression ‘yonder’ suggests a specific light which the speaker can see at 
the point of utterance, but, as in (31a-b), this is within the speaker’s experience, not the 
hearer’s: 
(31c) To dream and dream, like yonder amber light, 
Which will not leave the myrrh-bush on the height[.] 
(Tennyson, The Lotos-Eaters. Stanza 5. Lines 102f. NA: 990) 
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Similar ‘experiential’ vehicles can often be quite vague, possibly attributable to the speaker 
or author, but possibly not, such as in (31d): 
(31d) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
  
  
  
  
(Rich, Snapshots of a Daughter-In-Law. Stanza 8. Lines 81-5. NA: 1794) 
The concrete-to-abstract- and familiar-to-unfamiliar-mapping generalisations might be 
thought to provide insight, in that, if they hold as generalisations, then we might suppose 
that, when confronted with a comparison exhibiting this ‘default’ relationship, a hearer or 
reader can assume that the comparison is to be interpreted figuratively. However, as 
empirical claims, the concrete-abstract and familiar-to-unfamiliar generalisations do not 
stand up in the light of a wide range of examples. If we look again at examples (25) and (29) 
(repeated here) we can see two immediate problems: 
 (25) Your heart is like a dungeon. 
 (29) The mother bird fed her chicks like a seamstress threading a needle. 
Firstly, it is not uncontroversial that your heart is more abstract than a dungeon. Your heart 
is likely to stand in a metonymic relationship to some concept which denotes a person’s 
emotional core. It is quite plausible that this concept is stable over different contexts. 
Circumstantial evidence for the stability of such a concept might be found by looking at 
conceptually-related public expressions in a given language, such as the English idiom warm-
hearted (relating to this same concept). Likewise, it is not uncontroversial that a seamstress 
is more familiar than a mother bird feeding her chicks. Nevertheless, both (25) and (29) are 
the kind of poetic simile we would want a theory of simile understanding to explain. 
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Secondly, if ‘rating’ a tenor and vehicle for concreteness or familiarity were a necessary part 
of the processing of such comparisons, then, as the previous problem highlighted, identifying 
even a tenor or vehicle for instance as either abstract or concrete would likewise involve a 
high degree of cognitive effort, whichever way the tenor or vehicle was rated. If such a 
process of prior evaluation of tenor-vehicle relationships were necessary, then we would 
expect all comparisons to communicate a wide range of weak implicatures (see Chapter 2, 
§2.6 on the relationship between cognitive effort and poetic effects). It seems far more likely 
that a general impression that one may have that vehicles are typically more concrete and 
more familiar is due to general issues of informativeness in utterance understanding. 
If even such broad generalisations as the concrete-to-abstract-mapping and the familiar-to-
unfamiliar-mapping hypotheses are unable to account for the understanding of poetic 
comparisons, this suggests that no account which requires a particular relationship to obtain 
between the tenor and the vehicle will be successful in accounting for how the full range of 
poetic comparisons are understood. Furthermore, neither generalisation provides an 
explanation for how the characteristic effects of similes (poetic effects) are generated. 
5.2.5 Difficult similes 
One particular advantage of my account of simile understanding is that it can explain why 
certain similes, whose vehicles are effortful to understand, still manage to communicate 
something. They do not ‘fail’ (see Chapter 4, §4.8). Looking at such examples alongside each 
other highlights the flexibility which an account of simile understanding must incorporate. 
Moreover, it is clear that these examples provide counterexamples to the generalisations 
explored in this section, if such generalisations are taken to be constitutive of simile. 
I have identified two main types of such ‘unlikely’ vehicles: those for which the hearer’s 
previous experience is unlikely to provide a precedent for understanding the situation 
described in the vehicle; and those which are impossible to imagine as real scenarios. For 
instance, in (32a), Coleridge compares a sound to that of Elfins in particular circumstances: 
(32a) Such a soft floating witchery of sound 
As twilight Elfins make, when they at eve 
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Voyage on gentle gales from Fairy-Land, 
Where Melodies round honey-dripping flowers, 
Footless and wild, like birds of Paradise, 
Nor pause, nor perch, hovering on untamed wing! 
(Coleridge The Aeolian Harp. Lines 20-25. NA: 805f) 
Nobody has the experience of little elves doing this, nor, in the second comparison, has 
anybody experienced birds of paradise never failing to settle because they have no feet (a 
false assumption which was prevalent in Coleridge’s day. See NA: 806 n3). Yet this does not 
preclude (32a) from being understood. 
Another type of ‘unlikely’ vehicle is given by Plath in (32b): 
(32b) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
 
(Plath, The Bell Jar. 1966: 10) 
Here the author compares a feeling to a (visual) image which is entirely imaginary. The 
‘speaker’ (the narrator of the novel) has never actually seen it before. But by describing it in 
the way she does, she gives the reader access to the kind of assumptions required to 
imagine the precise way she felt that she was (figuratively) ‘disappearing’.  
The second comparison in (32c) is ‘unlikely’, not in the sense of ‘not experienced’ but rather 
‘not possible to experience’: 
(32c)  Like many a voice of one delight, 
 The winds, the birds, the ocean floods, 
The City’s voice itself is soft like Solitude’s. 
[…] I see the waves upon the shore 
Like light dissolved in star-showers, thrown[.] 
264 
 
(Shelley, Stanzas Written in Dejection, Near Naples. Stanzas 1f. Lines 7-9; 12f. NA: 
870) 
Solitude does not have a voice, except metaphorically, and it is unclear how light might 
dissolve. Similarly, in (32d), silence cannot flow: 
(32d) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
(Hollander, Variations on a Fragment of Trumbull Stickney. Stanza 2. Line 4. NA 1777) 
In (32e), the moon cannot be as large as logic because LOGIC is about as abstract a concept as 
one can get: 
(32e) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
  
  
  
  
(Porter, An Exequy. Lines 88-92. NA: 1790) 
One should note here that the fact that LOGIC does not have physical properties does not 
preclude the audience from coming to an interpretation, nor does it preclude the poet from 
conjoining it with another vehicle (the stars) which does have physical extension. In (32e), 
the interpretation than the moon is very large is easy to derive. But such ‘impossible’ 
vehicles are often associated with a very weak kind of impression which is much harder to 
narrow down, even in part. One such example is (32f): 
(32f) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
(Gunn, My Sad Captains. Stanza 2. Lines 7f. NA: 1771) 
The tenor a cloak of chaos is very hard to imagine. What might such an entity be? The fact 
that a speaker cannot predict what kind of entity will be imagined by the hearer exemplifies 
265 
 
one of the ways in which poetic comparisons can achieve weaker effects69. But it is not the 
cognitive effort required in understanding a vehicle alone which makes a comparison poetic. 
Examples (32a-f) are not the only type of simile to achieve poetic effects. In fact, they are 
rare. 
To summarise, the tenor-vehicle relationships exhibited by many (but not all) similes 
explored in this section can be explained by my account of the understanding of poetic 
comparisons: 
1. The non-reversibility of similes is irrelevant. The comparison-relevant content 
of even non-poetic comparisons (Soldiers are like sailors) is likely to be 
different in terms of content and/or structure when reversed (Sailors are like 
soldiers). 
2. Conceptual ‘tension’ between tenor and vehicle is likely to be found in similes 
because the less easily a hearer/reader can arrive at a determinate 
comparison-relevant content for a comparison, the more likely the 
comparison will be optimally relevant as a means of communicating poetic 
effects. 
3. The concrete-abstract-mapping hypothesis and the familiar-unfamiliar-
mapping hypothesis do not account for many clear cases of poetic simile. 
There may be a tendency for vehicles to be more concrete and familiar than 
tenors in similes, due to how easily a hearer/reader can arrive at an optimally 
relevant interpretation of the comparison communicated, but this is of little 
theoretical interest. 
                                                          
69 Although this is of less theoretical interest, we do also get ‘impossible’ tenors, such as in 
the following: (fn3) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS    
        (Ramanujan. Snakes. Lines 13-16. 
NA: 1801). However, from a relevance theory perspective, the tenor the twirls of their hisses 
rise is interpreted metaphorically in any case. 
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5.3 How qualified similes affect interpretation 
If there are two ways in which comparisons can achieve relevance, through an interpretation 
which includes a determinate comparison-relevant content or through the communication 
of poetic effects, what should my account predict about how ‘qualified similes’ such as (33a-
d) are understood70? 
(33a) Achilles is exactly like a lion. 
(33b) Achilles is very like a lion. 
(33c) Achilles is somewhat like a lion. 
(33d) Achilles is not very like a lion at all. 
One (largely implicit) account of simile understanding which can be compared in this regard 
is that of Stern. If we modify his account to fit with certain principles of relevance theory 
then we can see what such an account would predict about ‘qualified’ similes. If 
comparisons communicated an explicature which was an ad hoc modification of a one-place 
predicate such as in (34) (see §3.1 and Stern, 2000: 230), we should expect that (33a) should 
communicate the unmodified predicate, and (33b-d) should communicate more radical 
departures from the encoded conceptual content of BE-LIKE-A-LION ([BE-LIKE-A-LION]** etc.): 
(34) [BE-LIKE-A-LION]*(Achilles) 
So (33a) should be the most non-poetic comparison, and (33d) should be the most poetic 
comparison. There should be a straightforward relationship between the ‘qualification’ of 
the comparison and the weak effects evoked. Similar generalisations could be made for 
accounts which see similes as linguistic realisations of conceptual metaphors (see §6.3 below 
for a different conceptual metaphor-based account), or as realisations of category 
statements (Glucksberg claims that certain similes are so understood, 2008: 80). 
Do we see such gradability in the weak effects (if any) generated by (33a-d)? My intuitions 
suggest not. Moreover, it appears, in light of the real examples explored below, that 
                                                          
70 The argument which follows also provides evidence against Waɫaszewska’s view of like in 
similes as a procedural item (2013. See also Chapter 1, §1.3, footnote 10). 
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linguistically specified qualifications of comparisons do not change how poetic a simile 
appears to be. But a theory of simile understanding which predicted such gradability would 
not account for how (33a-d) are typically interpreted either. Where does the paradigm case 
(Achilles is like a lion) fit into such a scheme? Do (33a-d) differ significantly in interpretation 
when they are used as poetic comparisons? Such qualifications of similes are rare in 
literature, and when we do find them the interpretations do not appear to differ significantly 
from unqualified similes (see below). 
My account of comparison understanding could be used to make two (contradictory) 
predictions about how such ‘qualified’ similes are understood: (i) a signalled ‘strengthening’ 
of a comparison ought to encourage the hearer/reader to interpret the comparison as 
communicating a more determinate comparison-relevant content, and, hence, should 
produce fewer poetic effects mutatis mutandis; (ii) a signalled strengthening of a 
comparison ought to encourage the hearer/reader to expend greater effort in determining 
the comparison-relevant content by expanding the context of the utterance, but the 
comparison-relevant content may or may not ultimately contribute to the optimally relevant 
interpretation. The second prediction would be compatible with a situation where (i) 
qualifying non-poetic comparisons makes the comparison-relevant content more 
determinate than would otherwise be the case, but (ii) qualifying poetic comparisons makes 
very little difference to how the comparison achieves overall relevance. This might explain 
why we find so few qualified similes in poetry, and why they are largely indistinguishable 
from unqualified similes in terms of their weak effects when they do occur. 
An utterance of (35) is likely to achieve relevance as a poetic comparison. It is likely to evoke 
poetic effects: 
 (35) His words are like vinegar. 
However, (35a-d) which are ‘strengthened’ poetic comparisons, are likely to evoke a similar 
range of poetic effects: 
 (35a) His words are rather like vinegar. 
 (35b) His words are a lot like vinegar. 
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 (35c) His words are so like vinegar as makes no difference. 
 (35d) His words are exactly like vinegar. 
Utterances of weakened poetic comparisons such as (35e-f) also evoke a similar range of 
poetic effects: 
 (35e) His words are quite like vinegar. 
 (35f) His words are a little bit like vinegar. 
My claim is not that qualified poetic comparisons communicate the same thing as 
unqualified poetic comparisons. This would be far too strong a conclusion. All utterances 
convey a presumption of their own optimal relevance. The length of an utterance is an issue 
which is pertinent to the style of an utterance because the more conceptual content which 
must be processed by the hearer/reader mutatis mutandis, the greater the cognitive effort 
he has to expend in order to understand the utterance, and hence the more cognitive effects 
he is justified in expecting for his efforts (see Chapter 2, §2.10). Therefore a wide range of 
weak implicatures would fall under the speaker’s communicative intention as part of the 
content of the utterance. But, if my account is correct, then qualifying poetic comparisons 
will not provide precise enough evidence to direct a hearer/reader in determining the 
weaker effects of the utterance. Specifying the degree to which his words are like vinegar 
neither helps nor hinders the hearer/reader in arriving at the relevant overall interpretation 
because qualifying the degree of similarity communicated would only facilitate a 
hearer/reader if he were engaging in a task of identifying the points in which the comparison 
holds. But this task is required by the hearer/reader only in the case of non-poetic 
comparisons, where a more determinate comparison-relevant content is communicated. 
Therefore we should predict that qualifying comparisons should only affect how non-poetic 
comparisons are understood significantly enough for speaker and hearer intuitions to differ 
regarding the meaning of qualified and non-qualified comparisons. 
My account predicts that the range of points of comparison which are communicated by 
non-poetic comparisons will differ when a comparison is qualified. To say that A is a lot like B 
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is likely to communicate that a wider range of points of comparison will be relevant than A is 
like B, and so on. So the interpretation of (36) and (36a-f) will vary: 
 (36) My car is like a Chevrolet. 
 
 (36a) My car is rather like a Chevrolet.  
 (36b) My car is a lot like a Chevrolet. 
 (36c) My car is so like a Chevrolet as makes no difference. 
 (36d) My car is exactly like a Chevrolet. 
 (36e) My car is quite like a Chevrolet. 
 (36f) My car is a little bit like a Chevrolet. 
The set of points of comparison is likely to be widest for (36d), and narrowest for (36f). But 
this does not affect whether and to what extent the comparison is poetic: the availability of 
any highly manifest points of comparison makes a poetic interpretation of (36) very unlikely, 
and it is hard to think of a context where (36) would be interpreted as a poetic comparison. 
When we do find ‘strengthened’ poetic comparisons in literature, it is extremely difficult to 
see how they might differ from their unqualified equivalents, such as in (37): 
(37)[Church bells] falling on mine ear 
Most like articulate sounds of things to come! 
(Coleridge, Frost at Midnight. Lines 32f. NA: 811) 
How does the interpretation of most like articulate sounds of things to come in (37) differ 
from that of like articulate sounds of things to come? Are the church bells in (37) more like 
premonitions or prophecies than they would have been had the poet described them merely 
with an unqualified comparison? The strengthened comparison is exactly what the poet is 
communicating, but what this might mean at the explicit level is extremely unclear. It is 
certainly possible that the comparison-relevant content of most like articulate sounds of 
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things to come is more determinate than that of an utterance containing like articulate 
sounds of things to come.  But both versions would still achieve poetic effects. My view is 
that this is because the comparison-relevant content is indeterminate enough in both cases 
for the utterance to achieve overall relevance primarily through the evocation of poetic 
effects. By communicating that the tenor is most like the vehicle, the poet merely suggests 
that there will ultimately be many points of comparison, not that the set of points of 
comparison will be determinate (making the comparison ‘more non-poetic’). In fact, the two 
versions are so difficult to distinguish in terms of their effects that they appear to be 
essentially variants of each other which could be deployed at will for metrical convenience.  
A further complication for any analysis of qualified similes is that a poet can explicitly 
communicate a strict correspondence by means of a comparison, and this communicated 
strict correspondence can be used to generate poetic effects, such as in (38): 
 (38) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
  
  
(Paulin, Mount Stewart. 1987: 38) 
In (38) the poet explicitly communicates a comparison which involves the equivalence of a 
precise degree. In short, the poet communicates, amongst other things, that it is not his 
idea. In this sense, we are dealing not with a poetic comparison, but with a kind of ‘reverse’ 
exemplification (see §6.5), as the putative paraphrase I give in (38a) suggests: 
(38a) It is not my idea, just as [=to the same extent as] sucked sugar-cane or falling 
stars and figs were not my idea. 
Examples such as (38) ought to communicate points of comparison most strongly. Example 
(38) is not amongst the examples I have found which evoke the weakest effects, so it is 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that strengthening a poetic comparison evokes more poetic 
effects.  
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When we look at the types of weakened similes which are actually found in English poetry, 
examples such as (39a-c) evoke a similar range of weak effects to non-qualified equivalents 
(qualification indicated by underlining):  
(39a) […] steps 
Almost as silent as the turf they trod. 
(Wordsworth, The Prelude. Lines 324f. NA: 782) 
  
(39b) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
(Paulin, Where’s This Big River Come From? 1987: 28) 
 
(39c) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
  
  
  
  
  
  
(Paulin, Mount Stewart. 1987: 39) 
If there is little difference in terms of the poetic effects generated by qualified and 
unqualified poetic comparisons, why would poets use qualified poetic comparisons at all? 
Perhaps, for instance, saying I felt like a bishop (instead of I felt a bit like a bishop in (39b)) is 
felt to be too easily comprehensible, and hence not to generate enough poetic effects. That 
may explain some cases of qualified poetic comparisons, but perhaps not all. It should be 
noted that although A is a bit like B seems to convey that A is like B in fewer respects than A 
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is like B for non-poetic cases, the qualification in no way specifies the ways in which A is like 
B. So what do such qualifications achieve in the poetic cases? The situation here is very 
unclear. One avenue for further investigation might be to conduct a corpus-study of non-
qualified poetic comparisons and their qualified equivalents which share a vehicle. Another 
might be to see if there is any felt difference between a single author’s use of qualified and 
unqualified poetic comparisons, either from the perspective of the reader or from that of 
the poet herself. But my prediction is clear enough: that most cases of qualified poetic 
comparisons will not differ from their non-qualified equivalents in terms of their weak 
effects. I have as yet found no counterexamples to this prediction. 
5.4 Additional conceptual content as a means of broadening context 
If poetic and non-poetic comparisons form a continuum, and hearers/readers pursue a set of 
points of comparison as part of the comparison-relevant content of the utterance of a 
comparison, what effect should linguistically-specifying parts of that content have on how 
poetic comparisons are understood? What effect should linguistically-specified additional 
content which is not directly relevant to the respects in which the comparison holds have on 
how poetic comparisons are understood? Answering these questions will help us to 
understand why we find ‘explained’ and ‘extended’ similes in poetry (see §§4.4-5). 
There are a number of ways in which similes actually found in poetry can differ from the 
forms of simile which I outlined at the start of this chapter (see also (40a-c) below). I have 
also had little to say thus far about the third type (A is as ADJECTIVE as B). This seems to differ 
from the other two in that the adjective seems to provide not just a point of comparison, but 
often the main respect in which the comparison is taken to hold. Similarly, a speaker/author 
can modify the vehicle of the A is like B- and A VERBs like B-type similes in such a way as to 
suggest points of comparison. Therefore, (40a-c) suggest particular respects in which Achilles 
is like a lion, or like a particular lion: 
 (40a) Achilles is like a brave lion. [i.e. in terms of bravery] 
(40b) Achilles leaps like a lion pouncing on its prey. [i.e. in terms of the particular way 
in which a lion pounces on its prey] 
 (40c) Achilles is as brave as a lion. [i.e. in terms of bravery] 
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As (40a-c) are all usually understood to be similes (hence, poetic comparisons) this may 
suggest that my claim that poetic comparisons do not achieve relevance primarily through 
the hearer/reader deriving determinate points of comparison as part of the comparison-
relevant content is incorrect. However, there are also clear cases of poetic simile where 
description of the vehicle does not provide the hearer with linguistically-specified clues to 
points of comparison (examples (41a-c)). Rather, this ‘additional content’ is not relevant to 
the comparison: 
  (41a) Achilles is like a lion on the savannah. 
 (41b) Achilles leaps like a lion on the savannah. 
 (41c) Achilles is as brave as a lion on the savannah. 
We find lots of similes which have such comparison-irrelevant, additional content in poetry, 
and I discuss some examples below. If such examples can be subsumed under my account of 
simile understanding, then all extended similes can be so explained. Moreover, the 
explained similes I looked at in Chapter 4, §4.4 pose the same theoretical problem as 
examples (40a-c). For reasons of simplicity, I call examples such as (40a-c) explained similes 
and (41a-c) extended similes. 
Explained similes involve the linguistically-specified communication of comparison-relevant 
content, and extended similes involve the linguistically-specified communication of content 
which is not directly relevant to the derivation of points of comparison. One of the strengths 
of my hypothesis regarding simile understanding is that, far from (40a-c) and (41a-c) 
providing counterexamples to my account, my account would predict that additional content 
would often make a comparison more poetic, whether that content was comparison-
relevant or not (Cf. Ortony, 1993: 350). This is because the more linguistically-specified 
content is communicated by the speaker/hearer, the broader the potential context of the 
utterance based upon the concepts communicated, and hence the wider the array of weak 
implicatures (poetic effects) which are evoked. 
At this point I need to make clear that my explanation of these types of similes applies 
whether the comparison-relevant content of (poetic and non-poetic) comparisons 
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contributes to the explicature of the utterance or constitutes part of the implicit content. In 
(40a) the concept BRAVE is lexically-encoded by brave and also forms part of the comparison-
relevant content. This suggests that a concept related to BRAVE is communicated as part of 
the explicature of the utterance. But this does not mean that, in every case, part of the 
explicature corresponds to part of the comparison-relevant content. The explicature of 
(41a), for instance, will involve conceptual elements corresponding to the additional content 
on the savannah. But this is not necessarily relevant to the points of comparison between 
Achilles and a lion. So what role does this additional content play in how (41a) is 
understood? 
For the poetic cases of both explained and extended comparisons, the comparison-relevant 
content ultimately contributes to relevance far less than the weak implicatures 
communicated. Therefore, we should expect that specifying what forms part of the 
comparison-relevant content should not contribute directly to the relevance of the 
comparison (as it might in explained, non-poetic comparisons, such as He’s like my brother in 
that I can trust him). Specifying elements of comparison-relevant content should affect 
overall understanding in the same way as linguistically-specified content which does not 
contribute to the comparison-relevant content. That is, ‘extended’ and ‘explained’ similes 
should work the same way: through providing evidence for how the hearer/reader should 
expand the context in order to come to the optimally relevant interpretation. 
Examples such as (42a-b) are often considered to be typical of simile: 
 (42a) She is as happy[*] as the day is long[*]. 
 (42b) She is as happy[*] as the grass is green[*]. 
I have indicated by the use of asterisks [*] where the concept lexically-encoded by the word 
used requires some significant adjustment at the level of the explicature. Utterances of (42a-
b) communicate not that she is HAPPY tout court, but rather that she is happy in a particular 
way and to a particular degree (HAPPY*). Both (42a-b) communicate that she is very happy. 
The reason that this is how they are understood appears to be that DAYS are understood as 
being prototypically LONG* (even though they are short compared to weeks, years, aeons and 
so on. See Searle, 1993: 92, for similar observations regarding stereotypical properties in 
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metaphor understanding) and GRASS as prototypically GREEN* (the particular shade of green 
that grass can be said to typify). But if the understanding of (42a-b) were merely a matter of 
determining the degree of correspondence between her amount of happiness and the 
typicality of a particular property for some other entity (that is, if the only content were the 
comparison-relevant content), then we should predict that (42a-b) could be paraphrased 
without loss as (42c): 
 (42c) She is very happy. 
Clearly the linguistically specified content of the vehicles of the similes in (42a-b) provides 
access to other assumptions, which may or may not form part of what is communicated as 
part of the comparison-relevant content of (42a-b). Similarly, what is communicated by the 
comparison vehicle in an utterance of (43) cannot be limited to the communication of the 
degree of NEED the speaker is feeling: 
 (43) I need that like I need a hole in the head. 
For (42a-b), the ad hoc concept construction mandated by the contextual adjustment of the 
concepts lexically-encoded by the adjectives does not elicit weak effects on its own. In many 
cases, (42a-b) will not communicate a wide range of weak effects at all. This provides further 
evidence that the weak effects of similes cannot be traced to ad hoc concept construction, 
as they can with metaphor (see Chapter 2, §2.12). In (43), if there are any weak effects, 
these are also not evoked by the determination of a set of points of comparison between 
the speaker needing something and the speaker needing a hole in the head: this set will 
contain only the determination of the degree to which the speak NEEDS that. We can contrast 
here (44), which is likely to communicate poetic effects: 
 (44) I need you like I need the sun. 
The open-endedness of the set of points of comparison communicated by (44) invites the 
hearer to explore a wider and wider context, in particular that made available by the vehicle 
of the simile, in pursuit of contextual effects which justify that effort. 
One of the strongest pieces of evidence that explained and extended poetic comparisons are 
understood in similar ways is that it is often difficult to tell whether the additional content 
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contributes to the comparison-relevant content or not. Utterances of (45a-b) will likely 
communicate at least that comparison-relevant content suggested in square brackets in 
(45a-b) respectively: 
(45a) Life is like a fairy-tale with a beginning, a middle and an end. 
(45b) Life is like a fairy-tale with a twist at the end. 
Clearly the additional content in (45a-b) suggests that the structure of life and fairy-tales 
constitutes a point of comparison, as suggested by the contents of the square brackets in 
(46a-b): 
(46a) Life is like a fairy-tale [in being {STRUCTURED*, etc.}] with a beginning, a middle 
and an end. 
(46b) Life is like a fairy-tale [in being {STRUCTURED**, etc.}] with a twist at the end. 
Although the STRUCTURE of LIFE and FAIRY-TALES is being compared in both cases, it is certainly 
not the same property which is being compared in (45a-b). What the additional content does 
is to make more manifest to the hearer/reader particular properties which the tenor and 
vehicle have in common, and the outcome of that process will be very different properties as 
part of the comparison-relevant content (STRUCTURED* and STRUCTURED**). But this does not 
necessarily exhaust the comparison-relevant content which may be communicated. It is 
unlikely that the ad hoc concept STRUCTURED* simply denotes those things which have a 
beginning, a middle and an end, and STRUCTURED** those which have a twist at the end 
because (45a-b) will achieve relevance at least in part by the poetic effects they evoke. This 
will have an effect which comparison-relevant content is communicated, as well as how 
strongly communicated it is. 
The difficulty one has in determining whether the additional content in (45a-b) counts as 
explanation or extension is precisely because the comparison-relevant content is 
indeterminate. And why would (45a-b) achieve relevance as poetic comparisons in the first 
place? Because the additional content provides access to contextual assumptions about 
stories which in many contexts are likely to be more relevant to the hearer/reader than the 
assumption that LIFE and FAIRY-TALES share a certain structure. These weak implicatures of the 
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utterance could include all kinds of assumptions, such as that fairy-tales have a cast of 
characters, that fairy-tales are a kind of diversionary pastime, and so on, as well as weaker 
impressions, perhaps including some kind of representation of the emotions one might feel 
when listening to or reading a fairy-tale. It is hard to imagine a context where the 
comparison-relevant content of (45a-b) would be more relevant to a hearer/reader than the 
poetic effects evoked because the context which the vehicle makes available (especially in 
light of the context made available by the additional content) is so broad. 
O’Donoghue argued from a relevance theoretic perspective that “the intrinsic focus of the 
simile form on precise points of similarity between two concepts” or on the “certain 
respects” in which a comparison holds is one of the main reasons for simile having distinct 
effects to metaphor (O’Donoghue, 2009: 125; 131). I have already challenged the idea that 
similes and metaphors do have distinct effects (see Chapter 4, §4.7). Rather, they are 
processed differently (§5.1), and the overall interpretation of both metaphors and similes 
can be, but need not be, similar. If the ‘intrinsic focus’ of similes on the comparison-relevant 
content meant that similes are more explicit than metaphors, this contrasts with 
O’Donoghue’s claim that “similes are no more explicit in the clues they give to how 
utterances are ultimately intended to be interpreted than metaphor” (id., ib.: 143, my italics). 
I would go further than O’Donoghue on this point. If we limit our focus to the distinction 
between poetic and non-poetic comparisons, then ‘how utterances are ultimately 
(understood by the hearer/reader to be) intended to be interpreted’ determines whether 
the comparison-relevant content contributes to the optimally relevant overall interpretation 
or not. 
If determining points of comparison were essential to how poetic comparisons are 
understood, then we ought to expect that providing linguistically-specified evidence towards 
the construction of those properties ought to facilitate understanding, reducing the 
cognitive effort required in identifying the relevant points of comparison and, hence, leading 
to a narrowing of the range of poetic effects generated than would otherwise be the case. 
But explained and extended similes can be just as ‘poetic’ as those which are not. Moreover, 
when we look at extended similes in particular, we can see that as the amount of additional 
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content of a comparison increases (as the vehicle gets elaborated), the more likely it is to be 
interpreted poetically71. 
A typical example of a simile with additional content is (47a): 
(47a) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
  
  
  
(Gunn. “All Do Not All Things Well.” Lines 20-23. NA: 1773) 
In (47a), the additional content suggests a more precise way in which the engine part shines 
than would be the case if the poet had just written shining like tar. The reader is likely to find 
the comparison evocative or not on the basis of whether imagining fishing tar out of water, 
and the sunlight reflecting on its surface, and so on, contributes to the relevance of the 
comparison as a whole. But relevance is achieved primarily in terms of the weak effects 
which are weakly communicated by the comparison. 
The additional linguistically-specified material in (47a) (fished out into the sun) does not 
contribute primarily to finding a narrow set of points of comparison. All we can say for sure 
that a hearer/reader must recover in order to have understood (47a) is that a car part shines 
in a certain way, that is, the way wet tar shines. But the way (47a) is understood is not the 
same as (47b) or (47c): 
 (47b) The car part shone like tar. 
(47c) The car part shone like wet tar. 
What is the difference between how (47a) and (47b-c) are understood? An utterance of 
(47a) does not communicate merely that the car part SHONE* like tar (as in (47b)), or SHONE** 
                                                          
71 For reasons of length I limit myself to relatively short examples. But my account 
generalises to so-called ‘epic’ similes, no matter how long. 
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like wet tar in the sun (as in (47c)), or even that it SHONE*** like wet tar freshly removed 
from water into the particular kind of sunlight one might expect when fishing for tar. Rather, 
the additional content in (47a) makes manifest or more manifest a range of encyclopaedic 
assumptions associated with the lexically-encoded concepts which may contribute to both 
the determination of the comparison-relevant content and the poetic effects which (47a) 
evokes. The process of mutual parallel adjustment will also affect which particular ad hoc 
concept is communicated by the word shone as part of the explicature of the utterance. 
When (47a) is understood, certain assumptions are made more manifest by the lexically 
encoded concepts in the additional content. These can include assumptions such as (47d-f) 
which contribute to relevance as weak implicatures of the utterance (as well as weaker 
impressions). But these assumptions are not limited to those about the activities being 
compared: 
 (47d) Removing a car part is an effortful activity. [i.e. like fishing for tar] 
(47e) It was a beautiful day when the car part was removed. [strictly speaking, only 
true of the description of fishing for tar on a sunny day] 
 (47f) Removing the transplant was a dirty but enjoyable activity. 
 etc. 
Utterances of (47b) and (47c) are also likely to be poetic. But whereas (47b) and (47c) are 
likely to achieve poetic effects because certain comparisons have indeterminate 
comparison-relevant content in a certain context (inviting the construction of a set of shared 
properties which is the responsibility of the hearer/reader), in (47a) the poet has, by 
explicitly communicating concepts which add further to the context by means of the 
encyclopaedic assumptions they make more manifest, guaranteed that the comparison is 
relevant in a context which contains some of those assumptions. A comparison can achieve 
relevance in two different ways, as a poetic or non-poetic comparison, so the optimally 
relevant overall interpretation will require whichever route to relevance involves least effort. 
By gerrymandering the context, as it were, by communicating certain concepts which add to 
the potential context, and thereby making a determinate comparison-relevant content more 
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effortful to derive, authors/speakers are able to subtly redirect how readers/hearers 
interpret comparisons. 
Examples such as (48a) are not rare in English poetry. In (48a) the second poetic comparison 
exhibits what some have referred to as ‘simile within metaphor’ (see §6.3 for a fuller 
exposition of this type of simile): 
(48a)  Thou wert as a lone star whose light did shine 
On some frail bark in winter’s midnight roar; 
Thou hast like to a rock-built refuge stood 
Above the blind and battling multitude. 
(Shelley, To Wordsworth. Lines 7ff. NA: 863) 
(simile underlined) 
Wordsworth only metaphorically stood above the masses and the poetic comparison 
contributes not so much to the specification of the way in which he excels, but rather to a 
range of other impressions, such as, perhaps, the permanence of his excellence, and many 
far weaker effects. 
If we were to focus strictly upon the points of comparison between buildings and 
Wordsworth’s attitude (the two things being compared) we would miss the fact that the 
implicit content of (48a) is what makes it poetic. My account emphasises the role that (i) the 
linguistically-specified additional conceptual content as well as (ii) the search for relevant 
points of comparison which communication of any comparison elicits play in how similes 
achieve their weak effects. In the case of (48a), one might comment that the points of 
comparison which apply to both Wordsworth’s ‘standing’ and the ‘standing’ of a rock-built 
refuge are ad hoc, or metaphorical. This is only part of the explanation. In order to get to the 
bottom of why comparisons are amenable to the type of effects they are deployed to evoke 
we need to explain the relationship between the role of points of comparison in simile 
understanding and poetic effects. Crucial to this relationship is not just that the properties 
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which form the set of points of comparison can be ad hoc, but also that the set itself can be 
indeterminate. 
Further examples from poetry can help clarify this point. In (48b), highways and new loves 
can be built up in very different ways (loosely speaking, ‘literally’ and ‘metaphorically’ 
respectively). The concept encoded by the word raw is far closer to being appropriate as a 
description of new loves than it is as a description of highways, but speedy exhibits the 
opposite relationship:  
(48b) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
  
  
(Sexton. And One for My Dame. Stanza 16. Lines 46ff. NA: 1765) 
(additional content underlined) 
If determining the points of comparison communicated by a simile were the primary task of 
the hearer/reader, and if the additional content in (48b) served merely to provide 
appropriate properties as members of that set, then the set of points of comparison 
communicated by the simile in (48b) would be radically heterogeneous. However, (48b) does 
not seem particularly difficult to interpret. Rather, the additional content provides access to 
further contextual assumptions attached to the lexically-encoded concepts which may 
contribute to the determination of the set of points of comparison, but are most important 
for the kinds of weak implicatures that poetic comparisons typically communicate. 
Examples like (48b) are extremely common in English poetry. I give (48c-e) as further 
examples, and (48f) provides a still more complex example: 
(48c) This City now doth, like a garment, wear 
The beauty of the morning[.] 
(Wordsworth, Composed upon Westminster Bridge, 3rd September 1802. Lines 4f. NA: 
795) 
282 
 
 
(48d) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
  
(Snyder, Four Poems for Robin. An autumn morning in Shokoku-ji. Lines 29f. NA: 
1818) 
 
(48e) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
    
(Wright, As Our Bodies Rip, Our Names Turn into Light. Lines 1f. NA: 1867) 
 
(48f) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
  
  
(R. S. Thomas, January. Lines 2ff. Alvarez (Ed.), 1966: 80)  
A city can WEAR* beauty, but not in the way one does a garment; a memory can CHOKE* one’s 
throat, but not the way that vomit can; and the sky can UNROLL*, but not the way a rug does, 
and so on. In (48f), the lexically-encoded concept SOFT is more appropriate as a description of 
EXCREMENT than the EXPLOSION which it modifies, but the reverse is true of BOLD: it is easier to 
see how an EXPLOSION might be properly described as bold than a ROSE. But do these 
comparisons achieve relevance primarily as poetic comparisons or by means of the weak 
implicatures necessitated by construction of the ad hoc concept construction required to 
interpret wear, choke and unroll? 
When we compare these examples to extended and explained similes, we can see that the 
same explanation suffices: what matters is the optimally relevant interpretation. The search 
for comparison-relevant content is one way comparisons can be understood, and, because 
283 
 
this is a possible route to relevance, a hearer is likely to explore this during the process of 
utterance understanding. However, in part because examples like (48a-f) involve the 
communication of ad hoc concepts, and in part because comparisons can be understood as 
poetic comparisons, the utterance achieves relevance primarily through the communication 
of poetic effects. In §6.3 below I argue that this is a better way of addressing the issue of 
metaphor-simile interaction than competing accounts, and explore the possibility that 
Carston’s ‘second mode of metaphor processing’ might be investigated in these terms 
(Carston, 2010a; 2010b; Carston and Wearing, 2011). 
Another advantage of my account is that although the determination of points of 
comparison can contribute to the relevance of a comparison, it allows for even large, partly 
determinate sets of points of comparison to remain open in certain poetic cases. For 
instance, there are many poetic comparisons which, in terms of the points of comparison 
they communicate, appear to be very determinate. In (49a), the interpretation of the 
underlined (conjoined) comparison must be related primarily to the degree of ‘wildness’ and 
‘variety’ which the poet wishes to communicate:  
(49a) And many idle flitting phantasies, 
Traverse my indolent and passive brain, 
As wild and various as the random gales 
That swell and flutter on this subject Lute! 
(Coleridge, The Aeolian Harp. Lines 40-43. NA: 806) 
(comparison underlined) 
The interpretation of (49a) is likely to communicate that the poet’s thoughts were very wild 
and various. Similarly, in (49b), the poet communicates that the savage place was very holy 
and enchanted: 
(49b) A savage place! As holy and enchanted 
As e’er beneath a waning moon was haunted 
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By woman wailing for her demon lover! 
(Coleridge, Kubla Khan. Lines 14-16. NA: 809) 
(comparison underlined) 
However, these poetic comparisons achieve relevance not merely as descriptions of very 
wild and various mental impressions in (49a) or a very holy and enchanted place in (49b), but 
rather through a range of weakly communicated impressions involving phenomena of affect, 
such as the poet’s attitude to the descriptions. 
My account of simile understanding recognises that the set of points of comparison remains 
open in poetic comparisons. So even if the comparison-relevant content appears to be 
determinate to some extent, this does not mean that obvious points of comparison exhaust 
the content of the comparison. This is why comparing something to itself can still 
communicate poetic effects, as in the identity simile introduced in §4.4 (example (22), 
repeated here as (50)): 
(50) [...] And in their own dimensions like themselves 
The great seraphic lords and cherubim 
In close recess and secret conclave sat[…] 
(Milton, Paradise Lost I.793-5. In Baldwin (Ed.), 1998: 24) 
What is odd about (50) is that the simile (i) compares something to itself (suggesting a 
complete overlap of properties) and (ii) even provides a clue as to the properties which are 
likely to be more central in the set of points of comparison (in their own dimensions suggests 
that the set of points of comparison is structured as follows: [in being {LARGE, etc.}]). So how 
can the simile in (50) still evoke poetic effects just like other, ‘non-identity’ similes? My view 
is that such a comparison can be poetic in this context because readers have certain 
expectations which will not be fulfilled if the comparison achieved relevance as a non-poetic 
comparison (in terms of a determinate set of points of comparison). For this reason, the 
reader must expand the context in pursuit of weak implicatures which will allow the 
utterance to achieve relevance, considering less central properties as part of the set of 
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points of comparison, and adjusting the concepts which are communicated as part of that 
set. In the case of (50), it is very likely that the concept LARGE is not specific enough to license 
a sufficient range of weak implicatures, so something more specific, the extreme size of the 
angels, for instance, must be communicated as part of the comparison-relevant content. It is 
unclear to me how competing accounts would explain identity similes such as (50), unless 
one treated them as sui generis. 
At this point I make an empirical prediction: (i) because poets can deliberately broaden the 
context in which a comparison is interpreted by extending it; and (ii) because the broader 
the context is the more likely a comparison is to communicate weak implicatures; then (iii) 
extending a comparison which would otherwise be interpreted as a non-poetic comparison 
without the extension ought to precipitate a poetic interpretation (i.e. as achieving 
relevance primarily through the evocation of poetic effects). For instance, an utterance of 
(51) communicates that Odysseus and a (prototypical) FOX share the property CUNNING to the 
same degree: 
 (51) Odysseus is as cunning as a fox. 
An utterance of (51) is likely to be interpreted as a non-poetic comparison. But (51a) is a 
poetic comparison: 
(51a) Odysseus is as cunning as an arctic fox which disappears suddenly from the 
polar bear’s gaze, only to leap out from behind the beast and dart off into the 
distance. 
The additional content of (51a), which is not directly comparison-relevant, makes the 
context in which the comparison is interpreted very broad. In understanding (51a), as in (51), 
the hearer/reader has to determine an ad hoc concept CUNNING* which will be consistent 
with the description of the arctic fox in the vehicle of the comparison. This is likely to involve 
a significant departure from the lexically-encoded concept CUNNING through a process of 
mutual parallel adjustment: it has to be the right concept to justify the weak implicatures 
which arise from (51a), meaning that it has to be consistent with the weak implicatures 
which are suggested by the (extended) content of the vehicle of the comparison. Why 
shouldn’t we consider the poetic effects evoked by (51a) to be caused by the effort entailed 
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by ad hoc concept construction? My claim is that (51b) will communicate much the same 
implicit content as (51a): 
(51b) Odysseus is like an arctic fox which disappears suddenly from the polar bear’s 
gaze, only to cunningly leap out from behind the beast and dart off into the distance. 
(change to the vehicle of the comparison in bold type) 
Not only does (51b) share the same weak implicatures as (51a), an utterance of (51b) is likely 
to communicate that Odysseus shares much the same properties with the arctic fox as (51a) 
does. Why? Because the comparison-relevant content has to come from a similar context, 
made available by the same or similar lexically-encoded concepts. 
5.5 Conclusion 
I maintain that similes are not metaphors and that similes are not processed in the same way 
as metaphors: they are processed as comparisons. They nevertheless communicate certain 
effects that metaphors also communicate: that is, poetic effects. Because ‘equivalent’ 
metaphors and similes (such as Achilles is a lion and Achilles is like a lion) require the hearer 
to access the same sorts of concepts and their associated encyclopaedic assumptions in 
understanding the utterance, the weak implicatures they communicate will have much in 
common. The fact that they can communicate similar effects follows from these 
considerations: one cannot infer from such examples that metaphors and similes are 
understood in the same way. My account in particular explains not only that metaphors and 
similes can have similar effects, but also why any comparisons (similes being a species of 
comparison) can produce such effects at all. 
I claim that similes are a type of comparison (poetic comparisons), but they are different 
from non-poetic comparisons in that they do not achieve relevance primarily through the 
determination of a set of points of comparison, but rather through the weak effects that 
communicating a comparison can achieve (§5.1). I am not alone in emphasising that the 
correspondence between tenors and vehicles has little to do with how similes achieve their 
effects (see e.g. Mueller, 1984: 115f on a particular simile in Homer’s Iliad). Moreover, my 
account explains why certain relationships between tenor and vehicle concepts often obtain 
in poetic comparisons (§5.2). My account accurately predicts that qualifying similes makes 
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little difference to how they are interpreted (§5.3). It also predicts that when poets provide 
additional conceptual content to a comparison (whether within the vehicle or as an 
ostensible point of comparison) this will likely make the comparison more poetic by making a 
wide range of contextual assumptions more manifest which will simultaneously make 
certain properties more manifest which can serve as points of comparison: hence 
explanation or extension of similes makes the set of points of comparison more 
indeterminate, and, hence, the comparison more poetic (§5.4). This is why similes are often 
‘extended’ in a way metaphors are not (Cf. Chapter 4, §§4.4-6). 
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Chapter 6: Implications: the scope and utility of poetic comparisons 
In Chapter 4 I outlined certain assumptions which are prevalent in the theoretical literature 
about similes (and, in particular, their relationship with metaphor on the one hand and 
‘literal’, that is, non-poetic, comparison on the other) and I rebutted them. Given my 
account of how similes (poetic comparisons) are understood, I am now in a position to 
explain from a theoretical perspective why these assumptions turn out to be mistaken: 
1. It is not the case that metaphors and similes are universal. My account would not predict 
that every type of comparison construction is amenable to poetic effects, only those 
which invite the construction of a set of points of comparison, but do not demand that 
this set be saturated. Hence, we should not necessarily predict that a certain class of 
comparisons which is amenable to the communication of poetic effects is available in 
every language. Moreover, only some types of comparison in English appear to be able 
to communicate poetic effects the way poetic comparisons do. 
2. Similes are not the same in terms of content and effects as metaphors. But they can be 
used to achieve similar effects, and, in certain circumstances, they can communicate that 
the tenor shares certain properties with the vehicle. The explicit content of a particular 
simile on a particular occasion of use can be similar to that of a metaphor. The properties 
which are predicated of Achilles in Achilles is a lion may be similar to those properties 
which form the set of points of comparison in Achilles is like a lion. Certain properties are 
predicated of Achilles in the metaphor case (those captured by the ad hoc concept LION*) 
in order for the hearer/reader to come to an optimally relevant interpretation (typically 
in terms of the wide array of weak implicatures which constructing the ad hoc concept 
allows the hearer/reader to access). In understanding the simile, the optimally relevant 
interpretation does not depend upon there being a particular (strongly communicated) 
set of properties communicated as part of the explicature. 
3. Because similes are not understood in the way that metaphors are, similes are not 
hedged metaphors. Moreover, qualifying similes (see §6.3) does not reduce the poetic 
effects they communicate either.  
4. Similes do not typically or elliptically come with explanations. The reason that poets add 
‘explanation’ to similes is that this allows them to subtly redirect the way in which these 
comparisons achieve relevance (§6.4). 
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5. Similes can be extended (in terms of additional explicit content in the tenor) but this 
changes how the simile is interpreted (§6.4). There is not a default type of simile 
(extended simile) which other similes are derivative of. Similes are simply a use of 
comparisons. 
6. Similes are not ‘miniature narratives’. Similes simply are a particular use of comparisons. 
Two scenarios can be compared to each other, and one such scenario can be particularly 
elaborate. That is, in itself, of little theoretical interest. However, as I explain below, 
there are certain cases of simile where the vehicle is elaborated as if it were part of the 
narrative. This is compatible with my account. It is difficult to see how any account which 
conflates metaphor and simile could explain such cases.  
7. Similes can be used to achieve effects which cannot be achieved by metaphors. This is 
perhaps one reason why poets deploy similes. If similes were always indistinguishable 
from metaphors in terms of their effects, why would similes remain in use? 
8. Similes rarely, if ever, ‘fail’. Because comparisons can so readily be deployed to elicit 
poetic effects, they can often be understood even when there are no points of 
comparison strongly communicated, that is, when the set of points of comparison is 
indeterminate. In fact, it is precisely these comparisons (poetic comparisons) we would 
want to call ‘similes’. This is why it is so difficult to think of a case of a ‘failed’ simile. 
9. Similes cannot always be easily distinguished from non-poetic comparisons. This is 
because similes are comparisons. 
Another consequence of my account is that one important source of intuitions about the felt 
difference between metaphors and similes (see Chapter 4, §§4.3, 7) turns out to be relevant 
to theorising about simile understanding in a way which the. Utterances such as (1) have 
been used to argue that similes are less effective than metaphors (see also §5.1): 
 (1) Achilles isn’t like a lion, he is a lion. 
 (appropriate intonation suggested by italics) 
However, according to my account, the comparison Achilles isn’t like a lion will be 
interpreted in a particular way. Unless the comparison-relevant content is determinate, then 
negating a comparison will not have positive contextual effects in a hearer’s cognitive 
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environment. If Achilles isn’t like a lion communicated that there are no possible points of 
comparison between Achilles and a LION, then it would be communicating a false 
assumption. So (1) must be communicating that Achilles does not share certain properties 
with LIONS, but he does have other properties which can be communicated by LION*. It is not 
the case that the denial of the comparison in (1) is interpreted in a null context before the 
metaphor is understood. The intonation indicated by italics suggests that speakers are aware 
of the need to highlight this contrast in order for utterances such as (1) to be understood as 
they are intended, that is, with both the comparison and the metaphor interpreted in the 
same context. What is the typical interpretation of an utterance like (1)? It has something to 
do with the prototypicality of assumptions which LION* makes available (such as that Achilles 
is exceptionally BRAVE). It is unlikely that a truly novel metaphor will elicit the same sort of 
interpretation. For instance, Achilles is not like an alabaster slab he is an alabaster slab, 
seems less felicitous than (1). 
Moreover, a comparison in isolation (Achilles is like a lion) is also likely to communicate that 
Achilles is BRAVE*. What differs in (1) is that uttering is like a lion does not provide access to 
the contextual assumptions which provide the appropriate ad hoc concept as readily as 
uttering is a lion does in the same context of utterance. The reason for this is that the ad hoc 
concept construction necessitated by the communication of a metaphor is far more effortful 
than the determination of points of comparison would be in a given context. There are likely 
to be many points of comparison between the tenor and the vehicle in almost any context. 
But predicative metaphors by their very nature involve the predication of properties which 
are not central to the lexically-encoded concept of the word used in the tenor: they involve 
radical departures from the lexically-encoded concept. Because comparisons can be either 
determinate or indeterminate in terms of the set of points of comparison they 
communicate, in understanding (1) a hearer’s priority will be to settle on an appropriate ad 
hoc concept for the metaphor: this is a task which is necessary, while the determination of 
the points of comparison will only be sought if relevance cannot be achieved some other 
way (such as through weak implicatures). Given the difference in interpretation between the 
comparison and the metaphor which the contrastive intonation communicates, an utterance 
such as (1) communicates that this comparison will have different points of comparison to 
the properties which LION* makes available. It is simply untrue that examples such as (1) 
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demonstrate that comparisons and metaphors always communicate a different relationship 
between the tenor and vehicle. 
Furthermore, if we are concerned with the poetic effects of similes (poetic comparisons), 
then it does not make sense to focus upon negations of comparisons. Similes achieve their 
effects on the implicit side of communication, through the weak communication of a wide 
array of weak implicatures. But implicatures do not fall under the scope of the natural 
language equivalents of the logical operators. This is true of both strong implicatures and 
weak implicatures. If one denies a comparison, then that utterance can achieve poetic 
effects. But to deny a comparison does not mean that one is negating the poetic effects 
which would be achieved by the comparison without the negation operator: negated 
comparisons are not necessarily relevant desiderata for the issue of how non-negated 
comparisons (including poetic comparisons) are understood. 
In the rest of this chapter I explore certain other ramifications of my account. Firstly, which 
phenomena count as poetic comparisons and which do not? Secondly, are there any 
emergent property poetic comparisons (Cf. §3.6)? Thirdly, what should an account of 
metaphor-simile interaction which is grounded in my account of simile understanding look 
like? This may have particular ramifications for the development of Carston’s ‘second mode 
of metaphor processing’. Fourthly, given that it is true that anything can be like anything else 
(§3.4), what would it mean for a simile to ‘fail’? Finally, I look at a particular type of simile 
which has to my knowledge not been identified as worthy of further investigation, namely 
similes whose vehicles intrude into the narrative. My account can handle such cases 
adequately. 
6.1 Simile-related phenomena 
Now that I have a definition of simile (as poetic comparison) which captures how certain 
comparisons achieve poetic effects, which phenomena fall under this definition? I here look 
at a couple of types of comparison which appear to work the way poetic comparisons do and 
a couple which do not. The first type we might call ‘poetic exemplifications’: 
(2) He went like one that hath been stunned, 
And is of sense forlorn [.] 
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(Coleridge, The Rime of the Ancient Mariner. Part VII. Lines 622f. NA: 828) 
The linguistic form of the utterance in (2) is the same as with the types of simile I have 
addressed above. But such examples (which are not uncommon, at least in certain periods of 
English poetry72) appear to differ from the other types of simile I have looked at in that the 
vehicle is merely an exemplification. However, many similes, even Achilles is like a lion, 
involve an indefinite vehicle. Why should these be processed any differently? In cases such 
as (2), the comparison-relevant content will include properties shared between the tenor 
and the ‘exemplification’ (simply an indefinite description) of the vehicle. The explanation of 
how they achieve poetic effects remains the same. 
Another group of examples (again, not uncommon in English poetry73) one could call ‘poetic 
counterfactual comparisons’, such as (3): 
(3) […] the Maiden sang 
As if her song could have no ending [.] 
(Wordsworth, The Solitary Reaper. Lines 25f. NA: 803) 
Here the maiden’s singing is being compared to a counterfactual scenario involving the 
maiden herself singing under conditions which do not obtain in the situation described in the 
narrative. My account of simile understanding can easily account for how these comparisons 
are understood. Just as comparing one thing to itself can still evoke poetic effects (see (54) 
in §5.5) as long as this will contribute to an optimally relevant interpretation, so comparing 
something to itself in a different scenario can achieve the same things as the similes looked 
at in §5.1. The search for comparison-relevant content in terms of points of comparison 
                                                          
72 Other examples I have found are: Keats, To Homer. Lines 1-4 (NA: 906); Tennyson, The 
Lady of Shalott. Lines 127-131 (NA: 987); Keats, On First Looking into Chapman’s Homer. 
Lines 9-14 (NA: 905); Dante, Inferno 24.25-8 (Cf. Addison, 1993: 412). 
73 Other examples I have found are: Wordsworth, The Solitary Reaper. Lines 25f (NA: 803); 
Poe, The Raven. Lines 55f (NA: 978); Coleridge, Kubla Khan. Lines 17f (NA: 809); Coleridge, 
Dejection: An Ode. Lines 35f (NA: 829); Tennyson, Ulysses. Lines 22-24 (NA: 993). 
293 
 
between the vehicle (a counterfactual description) and the tenor is crucial to how poetic 
effects are evoked, even if the comparison-relevant content is not determinate and strongly 
communicated. 
There are many sorts of construction which appear to be understood at least in part by a 
hearer/reader comparing one thing to another, and those which share the syntactic form of 
comparisons I have treated in this thesis (A is like B, A VERBS like B, A is as ADJECTIVE as B). 
Ought we to treat every such construction as a poetic comparison if the utterance containing 
this construction achieves relevance through the communication of poetic effects? It is less 
clear whether such uses can be subsumed under my account. For instance, there are cases 
of what could be called ‘genitive poetic comparison’ which we find in poetry, such as (4): 
(4) And his eyes have all the seeming of a demon’s that is dreaming 
(Poe, The Raven. Line 105. Stanza 18. NA: 980) 
The pertinent question related to such examples is whether, like comparisons, there is an 
element of the content which can be communicated by such comparisons which makes 
them particularly amenable to the communication of poetic effects. When I compared 
poetic with non-poetic comparisons in §6.1, it became clear that non-poetic comparisons 
communicate as part of the explicature a set of points of comparison. If we compare (4) with 
a similar construction whose interpretation does not involve weakly communicated poetic 
effects, such as (4a), there is no similar feature of the content which we can point to which 
plays a role in the evocation of poetic effects in (4): 
 (4a) The aircraft travels at the speed of sound. 
Rather, it seems more plausible that the contextually mandated adjustment of the explicit 
content of (4) takes place at the level of the individual conceptual elements which 
correspond to words in the utterance. In other words, (4) is far more like a metaphor: what 
is communicated by the seeming of a demon’s that is dreaming includes a conceptual 
element SEEMING* (that is, corresponding to a very particular type of appearance, or visage). 
Whether this account accurately accounts for the full range of such constructions is beyond 
the scope of this thesis. But my account of poetic comparisons allows us to formulate such 
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questions in such a way as to generate falsifiable hypotheses. My hypothesis is that (4) 
communicates poetic effects in a way similar to metaphors. 
Another type of poetic utterance which appears to involve psychological comparison we can 
call ‘morphological poetic comparisons’, such as (5) (relevant lexical item underlined): 
(5) Rulers who neither see, nor feel, nor know, 
But leechlike to their fainting country cling [.] 
(Shelley, England in 1819. Lines 4f. NA: 871) 
What is communicated by leechlike is a certain conceptual content which is related to the 
lexically-encoded concept LEECH, and, at least if this item is met for the first time, may require 
a hearer/reader conceptualising what properties leeches and rulers could have in common. 
Moreover, the conceptual content communicated by leechlike appears to change according 
to context, as evidenced by (5a-b): 
 (5a) I’ve got a leechlike girlfriend. 
 (5b) I’ve got a leechlike scab on my feet. 
One can felicitously compare the suffix -like to other adjectival endings such as -ish or -y, for 
which a comparison analysis would be difficult to argue. Goatly gives a range of what he calls 
‘metaphorical’ suffixes (-like, -y, -ish, -oid, -ous, etc.) which vary in their productivity (1997: 
95f). His account is based on conceptual metaphor theory (see §3.8), and he does not 
appear to address prefixes such as quasi- (op. cit.). For Goatly, at least, while –like merely 
signals that the affixed element is to be interpreted metaphorically, suffixes such as –oid (‘of 
the shape/substance’) and –ous (‘having plenty of’) are more specific in how the meaning of 
the whole departs from the encoded meaning of the noun to which the suffix is composed. 
From a relevance theoretic perspective, the way in which the meaning of the free 
morpheme (e.g. leech, bridge) is modified will be by lexical pragmatic processes, perhaps 
constrained in how the properties of the concept attached to the free morpheme are 
modified according to each suffix (although Goatly’s paraphrases given in brackets above for 
–oid and –ous are not entirely plausible). Moreover, (5a-b) do not appear to be poetic. 
Because the contribution of these expressions to the explicature takes the form of a 
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modification of a lexically-encoded concept I would be inclined to group them with 
metaphors, but it appears that these sorts of example can be profitably investigated in 
comparison with poetic comparisons. 
6.2 Are there any emergent property similes? 
One of the main research questions in metaphor studies is how to account for the problem 
of emergent properties (see §3.1). The typical interpretation of emergent property 
predicative metaphors such as (6a-b) is difficult to account for because the properties taken 
to be predicated of the tenor do not come from encyclopaedic assumptions associated with 
the vehicle alone: 
 (6a) Sally is a block of ice. 
 (6b) Stephen is a bulldozer. 
An utterance of (6a) communicates that Sally is a BLOCK-OF-ICE*, where BLOCK-OF-ICE* includes 
properties such as being NON-EMPATHETIC, CRUEL and so on, which are not properties 
associated with the concept lexically-encoded by block of ice. Similarly, (6b) communicates 
that Stephen is INCONSIDERATE, and so on. Real BLOCKS-OF-ICE and BULLDOZERS do not have these 
properties because they are inanimate. I explained in §3.1 that emergent property 
metaphors pose a problem even for the ad hoc concept account of metaphor understanding 
in relevance theory because the relevance theory account appears to entail that properties 
of ad hoc concepts are derived from the exploration of encyclopaedic assumptions attached 
to lexically-encoded concepts, as well as the exploration of assumptions associated with 
concepts within those encyclopaedic assumptions, and so on. If one does not have 
psychology-related assumptions attached to the concepts BLOCK-OF-ICE and BULLDOZER, how do 
they end up being communicated by the words which encode those concepts? 
If we compare the similes (7a-b), which use the same tenor and vehicle as the emergent 
property metaphors (6a-b), we might predict that there will be a similar problem: 
 (7a) Sally is like a block of ice. 
 (7b) Stephen is like a bulldozer. 
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Utterances of (7a-b) are taken as typically communicating that similar properties obtain for 
the tenors Sally and Stephen as (6a-b) do. But one consequence of my account of simile 
understanding is that comparisons can be understood in two different ways. The emergent 
property problem can be understood in my model as applying only to non-poetic 
comparisons. The difficulty of finding appropriate points of comparison would preclude this 
route to relevance for (7a) and (7b): they cannot be understood merely by exploring the 
contextual assumptions the vehicle concepts make available in search of points of 
comparison. But there is another way in which they might achieve relevance. Therefore, I 
predict that all potentially emergent property comparisons will be understood as similes 
(poetic comparisons). There are, strictly speaking, no emergent property similes because 
‘emergent property comparisons’ can only achieve relevance by virtue of the poetic effects 
they communicate, not in terms of the comparison-relevant content they communicate. 
So where do the ‘pseudo-emergent’ properties in (7a-b) come from? The overall 
interpretation of (7a-b) is likely to include such implicatures as Sally is not empathetic and 
Stephen is inconsiderate, but it is not a theoretical obstacle that the emergent properties (as 
elements of implicatures) do not come from the context made available by the vehicle 
concept alone. It is clear where they come from. Utterances of (7a-b) are likely to achieve 
relevance as evidence towards such implicated assumptions. Why do utterances of (7a-b) 
then communicate that similar properties obtain of the tenor in each case if they achieve 
relevance primarily through an indeterminate range of weak implicatures? All kinds of 
conceptual and non-conceptual mental associations might contribute to this (including the 
kind of stable conceptual associations Wilson suggests conceptual metaphors might reflect. 
Wilson, 2011). Moreover, the inter-subjective stability of the interpretations of (6a-b) and 
(7a-b) might be extremely rare. I have come across metaphors such as those in (8) in song-
writing and poetry, which clearly require the construction of emergent properties (repeated 
from Chapter 3, §3.7 example (34)): 
(8) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
(Linkous (Sparklehorse), Saturday. 1995. Album: Vivadixiesubmarinetransmissionplot. 
Plain.) 
(communicated ad hoc concepts suggested by asterisks [*]) 
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But the interpretation of the metaphors in (8) is radically indeterminate, far more so than 
the metaphors in (6a-b). But they still communicate poetic effects. If one attempts to 
construct emergent-property metaphors, they have more in common with the examples in 
(8) than in (6a-b). Might difficult metaphors such as (8) be the theoretically pertinent (and 
more typical) case and the emergent property metaphors of the theoretical literature more 
marginal phenomena? I suspect that investigating how young children interpret examples 
such as (6a-b) and (8) might help us to identify whether emergent property metaphors are 
more a matter of the conventionality of certain conceptual associations than the processes 
which underlie utterance understanding. 
‘Pseudo-emergent-property’ similes like (7a-b) might provide a way of tackling the emergent 
property metaphor problem. Why should (6a-b) not also communicate a kind of comparison-
relevant content? There is no reason not to suppose that non-comparison constructions 
(such as metaphors) such as (6a-b) can communicate something like the comparison-
relevant content suggested in (9a-b) respectively: 
 (9a) Sally is a block of ice [in being {NON-EMPATHETIC, CRUEL, etc.}]. 
 (9b) Stephen is a bulldozer [in being {INCONSIDERATE, etc.}]. 
The properties communicated as part of the comparison-relevant content of (9a-b) is 
explained in the same way as that of (7a-b). On the current view all predicative metaphors 
would also have two ‘routes to relevance’: (i) as ad hoc concept predications, or (ii) in the 
same way poetic comparisons achieve relevance, namely the communication of comparison-
relevant content74. 
I am reluctant to allow my explanation of ‘pseudo-emergent property’ comparisons to 
generalise in this way because it threatens theoretical parsimony. I introduced the notion of 
comparison-relevant content (in §5) in order to capture the continuity of non-poetic and 
poetic comparisons, with a view to explaining why any comparisons might achieve poetic 
                                                          
74 My definition of poetic comparisons requires that there be a linguistically-specified 
comparison (with like or as). Therefore, even if metaphors can achieve relevance in the way 
described, they cannot strictly-speaking ‘be’ poetic comparisons. 
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effects in the way they do. If metaphors can be understood in this way, even though such an 
explanation would avoid the objections to the conflation of metaphor and simile (see e.g. 
§4.2), this would run counter to the important continuity that relevance theorists have 
identified between metaphor, hyperbole and ‘literal’ uses (see §2.9). Moreover, the 
presence of verbal and adjectival metaphors as well as nominal metaphorical vehicles as in 
(6a-b) would suggest that all utterances of concepts could communicate comparison-
relevant content if such an interpretation could contribute to overall relevance. How could 
such a prediction be tested? The cure might be worse than the disease in this case. In the 
following section I outline a much more productive line of inquiry which could be based on 
my account of poetic-comparisons. 
6.3 How are cases of extended metaphor and metaphor-simile interaction understood? 
One area of research which has been highlighted but rarely explored in depth has been that 
of metaphor-simile interaction. For instance, Davidson makes reference to the phenomenon 
in passing (1978/1984: 257f), as does Leech (1969: 157). Recently, Ritchie gives as an 
example of ‘metaphor development’ the interaction (although he does not use the word) of 
a ‘personification metaphor’ and a ‘rather odd simile’ in the opening two lines of a poem by 
Stephen Spender (2013: 192-195). Fogelin also addresses ‘the interaction of metaphors’ 
(1988: 106-112). Interestingly, for our purposes, Fogelin claims that competing views of how 
metaphors are understood fail in dealing with specific instances of the ‘genuine article’, that 
is, with “rich poetic metaphors” drawn from literature (id., ib.: 106f). Although Fogelin 
endorses a view of metaphor as elliptical simile which has been discredited (see §3.4), I see 
some merit in his view that the distinction between metaphors and similes seems least 
pronounced in the dense configurations of figurative language we often get in poetry. Croft 
and Cruse introduce the terminology of ‘simile within metaphor’ and ‘metaphor within 
simile’ in order to approach the relationship of local interaction between the two tropes 
from a cognitive linguistics (conceptual metaphor theory-based) perspective (2004: 215). 
What can my account of how similes are understood offer to this topic? Towards the end of 
this section I tackle Croft and Cruse’s proposals in some detail. But for now I outline how I 
think metaphor-simile interaction, as well as ‘extended metaphor’, might be explained in 
terms of the poet’s manipulation of the context in which a metaphor (or metaphors and 
similes) are understood by the hearer/reader. 
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As we have seen in Chapter 5 (§5.4), when concepts are communicated in close proximity to 
a simile, whether these concepts are ad hoc or not, this can alter the context in which the 
rest of the utterance is understood. This is because certain encyclopaedic assumptions will 
be made more manifest by the communication of a concept. The cumulative effect of this 
may be to make the optimally relevant interpretation of a dense configuration of metaphors 
(or metaphors and similes): (i) more likely to be one that achieves relevance by means of 
weak implicatures; and/or (ii) different to the interpretation that an individual metaphor or 
simile would have in isolation. The way howls is interpreted in different ways in example (10) 
has a lot in common with the examples discussed in §5.4: 
(10) […] his heart within him howled 13 
As a dog, having gone to its soft pups, 
[and] not recognising a man, howls and is minded to make battle, 15 
Thus did [sc. the heart] within him howl in his indignation at [their] evil deeds. 
(Homer, Odyssey 20.13-16. Greek text from Murray, 1919b: 274) 
(My translation and my emphasis. Line numbers given for convenience) 
Clearly the senses of howl (hylaktein) which are communicated in lines 13 and 16 of the 
extract are different from that of howl within the vehicle of the simile in line 15. While 
hearts can only howl in a metaphorical sense (HOWL*), the sense of ‘howling’ communicated 
within the simile is ‘literal’, that is, far closer to the encoded sense of the word (HOWL). Leidl 
gives a translated comment by the Ancient philosopher Porphyry about example (10) that 
after the “rather bold” metaphor, Homer “adds a simile which is consistent with it, 
confirming it, as though he considered its boldness well-taken” (2003: 38. Translation by 
Schlunk, 1993). Unfortunately, all metaphors involve a significant departure from the 
encoded sense of the concept lexically-encoded by the word used, so it is not clear how this 
metaphor is ‘bolder’ than others. Moreover, the simile does not ‘confirm’ the ad hoc sense 
of howl (HOWL*), but rather communicates a concept closer to the lexically-encoded sense 
(HOWL). 
One way of explaining how (10) is understood is to propose that the comparison-relevant 
content of the comparison (which is potentially non-poetic: comparing a ‘howling man’ to a 
300 
 
‘howling dog’ is likely to make a number of shared properties highly manifest because the 
concepts are so closely-related. See §5.2.2) and the two different ad hoc concepts 
communicated by the metaphors interact with each other directly. The process of 
understanding each metaphor and the poetic comparison is influenced by the fact that the 
others are being processed. But how this influence takes place remains unexplained. If 
metaphorical understanding involved a process of mapping between concepts, then there is 
no interaction here: the same conceptual metaphor (perhaps PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS) would be 
required to understand all the instances of howl in (10). It is unclear to me what conceptual 
metaphor theory ought to predict from a hearer repeatedly accessing the same conceptual 
metaphor. Moreover, the sense in which the dog howls in line 15 is not a radical departure 
from the lexically-encoded sense of howl, hence, not a metaphor from a relevance theory 
perspective. Croft and Cruse (whose relevant views are discussed below) do have a proposal 
regarding certain metaphor-simile interactions which describes just such reciprocal direct 
influence on the processes of understanding metaphors and similes. But my account of 
simile understanding proposes a much simpler one. 
On each occasion that the word howl is used, certain contextual assumptions, some 
associated with HOWL, some associated with derived senses (HOWL*, HOWL**) are made 
manifest or more manifest. The overall relevant interpretation of (10) will therefore be 
based on a heterogeneous context, one in which the ad hoc concepts actually 
communicated by the metaphors and the comparison-relevant content of the simile, as well 
as the poetic effects which constitute the main ‘point’ of the utterance, mutually affect one 
another. The only interpretation which can be consciously reflected upon, the optimally 
relevant interpretation, will give the impression of ‘direct influence’ between metaphors and 
similes because the interpretation of each is different than would otherwise be the case (e.g. 
his heart did not simply howl like a dog). But this is not because these metaphors and this 
simile are somehow different than other cases. It is because the interpretation of both 
requires contextual assumptions, and the poet has constrained how the process of utterance 
understanding takes place by: (i) making the reader/hearer search for relevant ad hoc 
concepts and the comparison-relevant content of the comparison; and (ii) communicating 
that (10) is optimally relevant given a particular context. 
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Davidson gives as an example where he claims “simile and metaphor interact strangely” the 
extract in (11) (1978/1984: 257): 
 (11) The barge she sat in, like a burnished throne, 
 Burnt on the water. 
(Shakespeare, Antony and Cleopatra II.2.201f. Bevington (Ed.), 2004: 1347.) 
An example such as (11) does not involve the same kind of ‘interaction’ as in (10). In (10), the 
tenor his heart HOWLED* and the dog HOWLING in the vehicle involve different concepts (ad 
hoc and lexically-encoded) which are communicated by related lexical items. But in (11) 
burnished and burnt are two different words, and so ex hypothesi, are attached to two 
different lexically-encoded concepts (see Fodor, 2008 §2). 
Example (11) compares the (metaphorical) BURNING* of Cleopatra’s barge to the implied 
‘burning’ of a burnished throne, as clarified by the paraphrase in (12a): 
 (12a) The barge burns (BURNS*) like a burnished throne [sc. burns (BURNS**)75] 
While barges can burn in one way metaphorically (they can also burn in the lexically-encoded 
sense, but the context of (11) makes clear that the barge is not on fire) and thrones can burn 
in another way metaphorically, there are two senses of burn which are relevant here. What 
is interesting from a theoretical point of view is that the concept BURN and the concept 
BURNISH share certain contextual assumptions. For instance, both concepts are likely to make 
more manifest certain assumptions such as (12b-d): 
 (12b) BURNING/BURNISHING involves fire. 
 (12c) BURNING/BURNISHING involves heat. 
 (12d) BURNING/BURNISHING involve a visible change of state of a material. 
                                                          
75 I am not claiming that BURNS** is communicated here, merely that, if it were, it would have 
to be a different ad hoc concept to BURNS*. 
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While (12b-d) are likely to be shared by BURNISH and BURN, they would not all be shared by 
BURNISH and BURN* (the concept communicated by the metaphor) if the utterance had 
stopped there (before the simile). However, BURN* and BURNISH will share something like 
(12d), given here as (12e): 
 (12e) BURNING*/BURNISHING involve a visible change of state of a material. 
In understanding (11) an encyclopaedic assumption which is highly manifest for thoughts 
about burnishing is made highly manifest for thoughts about burning because the whole 
utterance is optimally relevant. As all utterances will make manifest or more manifest 
certain contextual assumptions automatically, with only some of those assumptions forming 
part of the context of utterance (that is those which contribute to relevance), when a 
speaker utters a metaphor they make more manifest some assumptions which are not 
necessarily conducive to the construction of the relevant ad hoc concept as well as some 
which facilitate this process. In this case, an assumption such as (12e) is unlikely to play a 
large role in determining the ad hoc concept BURNING* in the absence of further clues, such 
as are provided by the linguistically-specified content of the simile. But an utterance of burnt 
in (12) will have made (12e) manifest, and its manifestness will be increased by the 
utterance of burnished in the vehicle of the simile. It is in this sense that there is ‘interaction’ 
between metaphor and simile in (12). 
A similar process is involved in understanding (13): 
 (13) Why, man, he [sc. Caesar] doth bestride the narrow world 
Like a Colossus. 
(Shakespeare, Julius Caesar. I.2.135f. Bevington (Ed.), 2004: 1058.) 
When the ad hoc concept BESTRIDE* is constructed, it will have to involve conceptual 
broadening to include in its denotation not a mundane sense of ‘straddling’ an object or a 
short expanse, but something as large as the world. It is from this perspective that world can 
be seen as narrow, so the concept communicated by narrow is also a departure from the 
lexically-encoded concept. Three elements interact here: (i) the metaphor bestride; (ii)the 
less radical departure from the lexically-encoded sense of narrow; and (iii) the contextual 
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assumptions made manifest or more manifest by comparing what (13) says Caesar is doing 
to what a Colossus does. It is not a phenomenon unique to a co-occurrence of metaphor and 
simile. But the way like a Colossus affects what is communicated by bestride and the 
‘interaction’ between NARROW* and BESTRIDE* are similar. They interact, inasmuch as they do, 
through the subtle way in which the context required for the interpretation of one element 
affects how another element is understood. However, the processes underlying such 
interaction are not unique to metaphor and simile. What we see here are conceptual 
elements making manifest or more manifest contextual assumptions which subtly affect the 
contribution other lexically-encoded concepts make to the explicit content. This is to be 
expected to varying degrees in all manner of utterances, not just ones we might want to 
class as figurative. But this is the kind of ‘interaction’ which theorists usually have in mind. 
My account of metaphor-simile ‘interaction’ differs radically from the conceptual metaphor 
theory-based account of Croft and Cruse. For Croft and Cruse, simile within metaphor is 
(“usually”) where a (figurative) comparison “serves to clarify the source domain, often 
because the key word in the metaphorical vehicle is one with a wide range of construals” 
(Croft and Cruse, 2004: 215). They give (14a)-(14d) as examples: 
(14a) Bizarre, angry thoughts flew through my mind like a thousand starlings. 
(14b) She was standing there, her eyes fastened on me like steel rivets. 
(14c) Grief tumbled out of her like a waterfall. 
(14d) This is really twisting my brain like a dishrag. 
(Examples (14a-d) and (15a-d) cited by Croft and Cruse from Cornwell, 2000). 
In examples (14d) and (14c), “[t]here are many different sorts of ‘twisting’ and ‘tumbling,’ 
but the similes function to narrow them down” (Croft and Cruse, 2004: 215). The problem 
with this claim, as I outlined in §4.4 in relation to explicit points of comparison, is that it is 
unclear how a poetic comparison is ‘narrower’ than a metaphor. Moreover, the outcome of 
ad hoc concept construction (TUMBLED*, TWISTING*) is a specific concept, but the properties 
required for this concept are in precisely the ‘wrong’ area of the ‘blended domain’ (see §3.8, 
Figure 3.3) that is pointed to. Dishrags are not TWISTED the way minds are TWISTED*.  
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The other type of metaphor-simile interaction which Croft and Cruse highlight is ‘metaphor 
within a simile’, where “the second term of the simile is itself a metaphor” (Croft and Cruse, 
2004: 215), for which they give the examples repeated here in (15a)-(15d): 
(15a) He looked tired, as if life has pushed him too far. 
(15b) Rose looked dejected and somewhat embarrassed, as if afraid that her being so 
upset had sent her spinning threads of truth into conviction. 
(15c) Talley made love as if he were starving. 
(15d) Bray’s tone had the effect of a metal box slamming shut. 
However, (15a-c) are all what Croft and Cruse call ‘speculations’ (2004: 211) (which I call 
‘counterfactual comparisons’ in §6.1). Moreover, (15d) has no linguistically specified marker 
of comparison (like or as), so what grounds do we have for taking it as a simile or any kind of 
comparison? Also, it is unclear what Croft and Cruse think (15a-d) demonstrate, other than 
that metaphors and similes can interact, and do so in different ways. I explore below why 
investigating metaphors in the vehicles of similes poses particular difficulties for researchers. 
My account of how similes and metaphors can ‘interact’ through the sharing of contextual 
assumptions also generalises to cases of extended metaphor. Steen’s definition of an 
extended metaphor can be used to highlight a particular problem from the perspective of 
relevance theory: 
“When two linguistic units of usage are involved, for instance in the form of 
independent clauses, the linguistic expression of a metaphor may be said to be 
extended [.]” 
(Steen, 2007: 238)76 
                                                          
76 This is not the type of metaphor extension which is discussed by, amongst others, 
Kövecses, whereby a ‘new’ (that is, non-conventionalized) conceptual element is introduced 
into the source domain of a conceptual metaphor (2010: 53). 
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Steen is a conceptual metaphor theorist. But the relevance theory definition of metaphor as 
a type of loose use concerns the relationship between one representation, or elements 
thereof, and another (e.g. Carston, 2002a: 378). Moreover, when we want to talk about 
multiple metaphors in a given utterance (even related ones, such as in (10)), the relationship 
between each metaphorically-used word and the concept it is used to communicate is a 
separate case of loose use. The relationship between each word and the concept it 
communicates can be different in each case. 
In cases of extended metaphor, as understood by Steen, what exactly is ‘extended’? It 
appears that what is meant by extended metaphor is the sharing of underlying conceptual 
associations between individual cases of what relevance theorists would call simply 
metaphors: that is, the use of a word which lexically-encodes one concept to communicate a 
different (but related) concept. In (16) there are a number of conceptually-related 
metaphors: 
 (16)  Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player 
 That struts and frets his hour upon the stage 
 And then it is no more. It is a tale 
 Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, 
 Signifying nothing. 
(Shakespeare. Macbeth 5.5.24-28. Bevington (Ed.), 2004: 1290.) 
The lexically-encoded concepts PLAYER, STAGE, TALE and even TELL (‘told’) are conceptually 
related to each other. Does this mean that the words associated with these concepts are 
used here as realisations of the same conceptual metaphor (such as LIFE IS A TALE)? Looking at 
the passage from this perspective is very misleading. Firstly, it excludes the first metaphor 
(life’s but a walking shadow) altogether. But the interaction of the walking shadow 
metaphor with the other metaphors is something we would want to explain. Moreover, it 
would downplay the difference between seeing life as a tale told by an idiot and so on and 
seeing life as just a tale. Furthermore, although one could argue that ‘plays’ are a type of 
tale, assuming that readers/hearers understand (16) in terms of the conceptual mapping LIFE 
IS A TALE would seriously downplay precisely those elements which make (16) so vivid. The 
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passage in (16) conveys the futility of life, which would not be implied by an assumption such 
as LIFE IS A TALE, by encouraging readers/hearers to reflect upon life as if it were a walking 
shadow, or an ephemeral performance, or the meaningless ramblings of a fool. Uttering (16) 
achieves these effects because these metaphor vehicles can make accessible assumptions 
about futility. But certain assumptions (such as life is ultimately futile) will be made much 
more manifest because they are reaffirmed by more than one metaphor. 
But this process is not linear. In (16) there are multiple metaphors, but they share contextual 
assumptions. All utterances communicate the presumption of their own optimal relevance. 
So (16), or, at the very least, the utterances of the two sentences which form (16), must 
convey a presumption of their own optimal relevance. Relevance will therefore be achieved 
in a particular context. It is simply not the case that hearers/readers compute ad hoc 
concepts in a linear fashion. So when the explicature of the utterance potentially 
necessitates multiple departures from the lexically-encoded concepts (‘multiple metaphors’) 
the hearer will be justified in expending a large amount of cognitive effort in pursuit of 
cognitive effects. This will likely give rise to a wide range of weak implicatures (poetic 
effects). Are the ad hoc concepts WALKING-SHADOW* and POOR-PLAYER* communicated as part 
of the explicature of (16)? It does not matter. Readers/hearers may differ in this regard. 
What matters is that the hearer/reader arrives at the optimally relevant interpretation. It 
makes little difference whether the utterance achieves relevance in precisely this way, so 
long as the weak implicatures of the utterance do contribute to an optimally relevant 
interpretation. The account I give here of examples like (16) differs from that of Carston 
(2010a) and Carston and Wearing (See id. 2011: 305ff for discussion of the same example) 
where a ‘second mode’ of metaphor processing is appealed to. I discuss this below.  
We can compare (16) with extended similes such as (17), where the comparison between 
tenor and vehicle does genuinely span more than one linguistic unit: 
 (17) Thus Satan talking to his nearest mate  192 
 With head up-lift above the wave, and eyes 
 That sparkling blazed, his other parts besides 
 Prone on the flood extended long and large 195 
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 Lay floating many a rood, in bulk as huge 
 As whom the fables name of monstrous size [...] 197 
 [follow various classical giants and monsters] 
 [...], or that sea-beast 200 
 Leviathan, which God of all his works 
 Created hugest that swim th’ocean stream: 
 Him haply slumbering on the Norway foam 
 The pilot of some small right-foundered skiff, 
 Deeming some island, oft, as sea-men tell, 205 
 With fixèd anchor in his scaly rind 
 Moors by his side under the lea, while night 
 Invests the sea, and wishèd morn, delays: 
 So stretched out huge in length the arch-fiend lay 
 Chained on the burning Lake [...] 210 
 (Milton, Paradise Lost I.192-197, 200-210. In Baldwin (Ed.), 1998: 6f.) 
 (line numbers given for reader’s convenience) 
My account of how similes are understood can easily subsume examples such as (17). What 
might be called ‘literary extended similes’ are simply examples of the poetic comparisons 
with additional content I addressed in §5.4. The linguistically specified content is significant 
in (17), with many lexically-encoded concepts providing potential points of comparison and 
specifying the vehicle in many ways. But neither (i) making the vehicle conceptually richer 
nor (ii) providing access to properties which might serve as points of comparison limits the 
poetic effects of the comparison. Rather, the richness of the context communicated by 
virtue of extension and explanation of the comparison contributes to how it achieves poetic 
effects. 
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Steen’s account of extended metaphors would have far less in common with genuine 
extended similes such as (17) than with multiple similes which are conceptually similar, as 
those in (18): 
 (18) For April sobs while these are so glad; 
  April weeps while these are so gay,- 
 Weeps like a tired child who had, 
  Playing with flowers, lost its way. 
 (Hunt Jackson, April. In Kleiser (Ed.), 1925: 268) 
In understanding (18), an assumption such as (18a) or (18b) is likely to be made manifest, 
and the understanding of the repeated use of closely-related lexically-encoded concepts to 
communicate the metaphors SOBS* and WEEPS* (18) can be accounted for rather straight-
forwardly by claiming that assumptions such as (18a) or (18b) play a role in assisting the 
hearer/reader to construct the right ad hoc concept: 
(18a) A season can WEEP*. 
(18b) April can do something which is like WEEPING in certain respects. 
My account of how figuratively used expressions can affect each other’s interpretation also 
raises some important questions about the nature of the second mode of metaphor 
processing proposed by Carston (2010a). Carston and colleagues have proposed that certain 
poetic cases of metaphor use involve the metarepresentation of extended representations 
of the literal meaning of an utterance. While many cases of metaphor, even those which 
achieve relevance primarily through the communication of poetic effects, are understood by 
means of ad hoc concept construction (see §2.7, §3.2), certain cases appear to require that 
the lexically-encoded concepts remain highly manifest to the hearer/reader throughout. 
Carston (2010a: 309f) and Sperber and Wilson (2008/2012: 121f) treat the same poem as an 
example, given here as (19): 
 (19) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
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 (Sandburg, Fog. Sandburg, 1916: 71.) 
For Sperber and Wilson, the effects of this extract rest primarily in the way the adjustment 
of conceptual content contributes to the generation of poetic effects: 
“[W]hat is part of the explicit content is that the fog comes ON-LITTLE-CAT-FEET*. And 
what is this concept? It is the concept of a property that is difficult or impossible to 
define, a property possessed in particular by some typical movement of cats […] and, 
according to the poem, by the movement of fog. How is this ad hoc concept ON-LITTLE-
CAT-FEET* arrived at? By taking the poet to be attributing to the coming of the fog that 
property which contextually implies the very ideas suggested by the phrase ‘little cat 
feet’.” 
(Sperber and Wilson, 2008/2012: 122) 
Carston, on the other hand, proposes that it is likely, at least for some readers, that: 
“[T]he literal meaning takes over and is metarepresented as a whole, along with the 
mental image of a large, soft, lightly padding but purposefully moving cat, and from 
these together are derived implications about the way the fog looks and feels.”  
(Carston, 2010a: 310) 
But surely relevance theory would predict that the literal meaning of the words used in (19) 
would affect how the whole is understood without appeal to a ‘second mode of metaphor 
processing’? Carston has rightly identified that contextual assumptions associated with the 
literal meaning of the words used plays a significant role in the optimally relevant 
interpretation, but it is not necessarily the case that the literal meaning is metarepresented 
as a whole. Relevance theory would predict that the overall optimally relevant interpretation 
would be that which communicates poetic effects on the basis of the communicated 
context. This can include assumptions associated with ad hoc concepts, but could also 
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include those associated with the lexically-encoded concepts so long as these contributed to 
the relevant weak implicatures. 
Carston’s elaboration of the earlier relevance theoretic account (which she played a 
significant role in developing. E.g. id., 2002a) to include a ‘second mode’ of metaphor 
processing is motivated by a number of apparent limitations of the earlier account. The 
earlier account (see especially Chapter 2, §2.12): (i) suggested that new ad hoc concepts 
must be constructed even for related metaphors where there is more than one metaphor in 
a given utterance; (ii) seemed to offer no account of extended metaphor; and (iii) allowed no 
role for the phenomenological evidence from introspection which does suggest that we can 
think, at least in part, in ‘images’ when we understand metaphors such as (19) (Carston, 
2010a). It seems plausible to me that assumptions which are activated not by ad hoc 
concepts but by lexically-encoded concepts can play an enduring and significant role in how 
extended metaphors and cases of metaphor-metaphor and metaphor-simile interaction are 
understood. My only hesitation with Carston’s proposal is that it is unclear to me how we 
might distinguish cases where “the literal meaning is inferentially insulated from the 
addressee’s beliefs about the world” through metarepresentation (Carston, p. c.) and cases 
where the literal meaning is seen to contribute to the understanding of the utterance as a 
whole not directly (that is, with the literal meaning being actively entertained) but through 
the fact that certain encyclopaedic assumptions associated with the lexically-encoded 
concepts will be remain more manifest than would otherwise be the case simply because 
the utterance made them more manifest. 
Relevance theory already predicts that an utterance will make certain higher-level 
assumptions about the utterance manifest to the hearer. In some cases these will be 
communicated as higher-level explicatures of the utterance (see Chapter 2, §2.8). But even if 
they are not taken to be endorsed by the speaker, it seems reasonable to assume that the 
fact that a higher-level explicature is more manifest in turn increases the manifestness of 
assumptions associated with the lexically-encoded meaning of the utterance. For instance, 
Simon’s utterance of a metaphor in (20) commits him to the content of (20a). A higher-level 
explicature such as (20b) may also play a role in how his utterance in (20) achieves 
relevance: 
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 (20) Simon: Zayd is a rhino. 
 
 (20a) Explicature: Zayd is a RHINO*. 
 (20b) Higher-level explicature: Simon said, ‘Zayd is a rhino’. 
What should be emphasised here is that whereas there is an ad hoc concept as part of the 
explicature in (20a), there is no such ad hoc concept as part of the higher-level explicature in 
(20b): the lexically-encoded concept RHINO forms part of the representation. My question at 
this point is: what justification can we have for Carston’s notion of ‘metarepresenting the 
literal meaning as a whole’ in cases of, for instance, extended metaphor, when higher-level 
explicatures are more manifest, and therefore capable of being actively represented, in any 
case? The fact that higher-level explicatures will be made more manifest by the utterance 
will be explanatory enough. In the cases Carston discusses in support of the second mode 
(ib.), we see evidence of assumptions associated with certain lexically-encoded concepts 
playing an enduring role in how metaphors are processed, not evidence of all the concepts 
lexically-encoded by the utterance being metarepresented as a whole. At this stage, 
Carston’s second mode, based on metarepresentation of literal meaning, appears to make 
similar predictions to my ‘processing history’ account, based on the manifestness of 
assumptions associated with the literal meaning, for extended metaphors and cases of 
metaphor interaction. It may turn out that there will be definitive evidence one way or the 
other but I am still unclear as to what that might be. 
My account of how similes are understood also challenges the possibility of there being any 
genuine cases of metaphor within simile. For conceptual metaphor theorists, any linguistic 
realisation of an underlying conceptual metaphor will count as a metaphor. But for 
relevance theorists, the pertinent question will be: are there any ad hoc concept vehicles in 
similes which achieve relevance by means of poetic effects, and whose interpretation cannot 
be accounted for in terms of how the comparison is understood? If we could find any clear 
examples of this phenomenon, then one could argue that at least some poetic comparisons 
are poetic not by virtue of communicating a comparison but by virtue of ad hoc concept 
construction (much like ‘poetic’ metaphors, metonymies and hyperboles). But it is extremely 
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difficult to find clear cases of such a phenomenon. One of the reasons for this might be that, 
as in the cases of metaphor-simile interaction given above, the optimally relevant 
interpretation may include implicatures which are derived on the basis of the concepts 
lexically-encoded by the words used. Researchers are then likely to notice that the lexically-
encoded concepts remain salient, because the assumptions associated with the lexically-
encoded concepts are at least as highly manifest as those which are not (that is, associated 
with the ad hoc concept communicated alone). 
There are obviously cases where some ad hoc concept is communicated as part of the 
vehicle: 
 (21) It was Autumn, and incessant 
  Piped the quails from shocks and sheaves, 
 And, like living coals, the apples 
  Burned among the withering leaves. 
(Longfellow, Pegasus in Pound. Longfellow, 1882: 27) 
The relevant part of the utterance can be taken as communicating an explicature such as 
(21a): 
 (21a) THE APPLES BURNED LIKE LIVING* COALS. 
But the ‘metaphorical’ element of (21) is only part of the vehicle. An utterance like (21) will 
achieve relevance as a comparison between APPLES and COALS, the latter under a certain 
description, the identification of which involves the adjustment of the adjective ‘living’ 
(LIVING*). 
It may be relevant in this regard to examine cases where we might expect there to be ad hoc 
concept construction within the vehicle for independent reasons. I look at two types of 
example. The first are similes where the vehicles do not, strictly speaking, exist, and so the 
concepts communicated by the vehicle are likely to involve a degree of imagination on the 
part of the hearer/reader, as in (22a-e): 
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(22a) James looks like evil personified 
(constructed example) 
 
(22b) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
  
(Paulin, Mythologies. 1987: 27) 
 
(22c)  EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
  
(Enright, The Proper Due. Stanza 2. Lines 6f. Alvarez (Ed.), 1966: 87) 
 
(22d) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
  
(Hughes, Pibroch. Hughes, 1995: 83) 
 
(22e) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
  
(Paulin, Defenester. 1987: 18) 
One might be inclined to interpret these as ‘metaphorical’ vehicles. But there are problems 
with such an analysis. Firstly, it is hard to say in what sense the putative ad hoc concept 
communicated differs from the lexically-encoded concept. Example (22a), for instance, does 
not include a radical departure from an encoded concept, although it appears some 
contextual adjustment must take place. Evil personified provides access to a range of 
contextual assumptions (from the encyclopaedic assumptions attached to EVIL) which are 
relevant to how the speaker is taken as presenting the appearance of James. A similar 
analysis presents itself for (22b). 
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Examples (22c)-(22d) are difficult for a different reason. Although (22b) is likely to involve a 
significant degree of ad hoc concept construction (a new concept ALMOST-LOVE has to be 
constructed on the basis of LOVE), (22c)-(22d) appear not to involve any at all. The vehicles in 
these examples concern NOTHING or NOTHINGNESS. If all that were relevant to the discussion of 
how these examples achieve poetic effects were the denotation of the concepts 
communicated in the vehicles, then these comparisons would be equivalent. However, it is 
the contextual assumptions which these vehicles provide access to which contribute to more 
‘global’ modification of the cognitive environment of the hearer. In pre-theoretic terms, it is 
through the connotative (rather than denotative) meaning of these expressions that 
relevance is achieved: the utterance is relevant as a means to generate a wide array of weak 
implicatures, resulting in a communicated impression which is derived on the basis of that 
explicit content. This impression is similar in at least (22c)-(22d): one of unfamiliarity. 
However, not all comparisons involving vehicles denoting NOTHING and related concepts are 
weak: (22e) is a non-poetic comparison, which lends itself to a complete analogical 
paraphrase (paraphrase: It didn’t exist, just as the void does not exist).  
Another way in which we can attempt to identify genuinely ad hoc vehicles is through 
reformulation. Ad hoc concept construction can be elicited by other phenomena than A is B-
type metaphor (i.e. a predication forcing the vehicle to be interpreted in an ad hoc fashion). 
One such way is by eliciting a hybrid representation (Blakemore, 2008). Although (23a-c) 
communicate a similar message, and all three evoke poetic effects, they are understood in 
slightly different ways: 
 (23a) My childhood days are gone, gone. 
[based on Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 221. Example (81)] 
 (23b) My childhood days are gone, vanished. 
 (23c) My childhood days have gone into exile, taken a one-way ticket to Mars. 
An utterance of (23a) (a form of epizeuxis) is understood as was explained in Chapter 2, 
§2.10. The form of the utterance, involving repetition of a particular element, communicates 
that the hearer will be justified in expending additional cognitive effort in exploring 
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contextual assumptions which the concept GONE provides access to. The hearer’s additional 
expenditure is offset by additional cognitive effects, namely, weak implicatures. An 
utterance of (23b) works slightly differently. While being vanished entails being gone, the 
reverse is not the case. Therefore, the concept lexically encoded by vanished is 
informationally stronger than that encoded by gone. But the speaker did not simply say my 
childhood days are vanished. Rather the relevance of her utterance lies (in part) in 
comparing the properties distinguishing having ‘vanished’ from merely ‘being gone’. 
Blakemore calls this intensification (2008), and she distinguishes it from cases such as (21c), 
which achieves relevance in a different way. The hearer must interpret the first sequence 
have gone into exile by a process of ad hoc concept construction according the account given 
in §2.7 (yielding EXILE*), but so must the second sequence taken a one-way ticket to Mars. 
Part of the process of understanding the first sequence will involve accessing concepts such 
as MOVED, TRAVELLED, DISAPPEARED, STRANDED and so on. The second sequence communicates 
that the reader is expected to extend the context of the utterance in a particular way, which 
will achieve relevance by virtue of implicatures which could not have been generated by 
either sequence alone. Blakemore argues that such examples involve a process of hybrid 
representation. As part of the process of understanding the second sequence, other ad hoc 
concepts may be recovered. 
Because hybrid representations such as those elicited by (23c) involve ad hoc concept 
construction which is not motivated by, for instance, a predication which is not taken to 
share the form of the thought communicated by the utterance (e.g. the speaker cannot 
mean by Achilles is a lion that Achilles is a type of cat), we might expect that similes which 
involve similar processes must also have ad hoc concepts as part of the explicature. The kind 
of reformulated similes we actually find in literature are quite varied. What we are looking 
for are, first, cases which are clearly ‘hybrid’ in the way in which (21c) is, and, second, any of 
those cases which can be seen to achieve poetic effects by virtue of this process of 
hybridisation, not by virtue of a comparison being communicated.  
One clear-cut case of asyndetically presented multiple vehicles of a simile is example (24): 
 (24) Oh! Why should the spirit of mortal be proud? 
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 Like a swift-fleeting meteor, a fast-flying cloud, 
 A flash of the lightning, a break of the wave, 
 Man passes from life to his rest in the grave. 
(Knox, Oh! Why Should the Spirit of Mortal Be Proud? In Kleiser (Ed.), 1925: 279) 
Far more frequent are multiple vehicles presented by disjunction (introduced by ‘or’) as in 
(25a-d) (my underlining): 
(25a) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
(Paulin, The Caravans on Lüneberg Heath. 1987: 58) 
 
(25b) The captive raised her face, it was as soft and mild 
As sculptured marbled saint, or slumbering unwean’d child. 
(Brontë, The Prisoner, A Fragment. Stanza 4. Lines 13f. NA: 1048) 
 
(25c) Thy light alone – like mist o’er mountains driven, 
 Or music by the night wind sent 
 Through strings of some still instrument, 
 Or moonlight on a midnight stream, 
Gives grace and truth to life’s unquiet dream. 
(Shelley, Hymn to Intellectual Beauty. Stanza 3. Lines 32-35. NA: 865) 
 
(25d) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
  
317 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
(Paulin, The Maiden that is Makeless. 1987: 12. Poet’s italics) 
In (25a) cucumber leaves are compared to glasspaper or emery skins77, both means of 
smoothing wood-work and the like. The question is what difference providing an alternative 
vehicle makes to how the comparison achieves relevance. Similar questions arise with (25b)-
(25d). In light of the variety of these ‘disjunct vehicles’ the simplest explanation appears to 
be, as with all the other examples, that what is explicitly communicated is simply that the 
tenor is ‘like’ the vehicles in certain respects. These vehicles contribute to relevance not by 
providing a set of shared properties formed by an overlap of the denotations of the vehicle 
concepts and the tenor concept, but rather through the generation of a wider range of 
poetic effects which are made accessible by the conceptual material in the vehicles. The 
multiple vehicles do not constitute a single hybrid representation, but they do ‘interact’ with 
each other in the same way as the ‘multiple’ metaphors in example (16) above: through the 
sharing of contextual assumptions. 
A similar explanation can be offered for similes involving multiple comparison vehicles, 
either conjoined by and (as with the first two comparisons in (26a)) or by syntactically 
parallel constructions (as in (26b)): 
(26a) Ah! Thel is like a watry bow, and like a parting cloud, 
                                                          
77 I assume this means the same as emery cloth or emery paper. 
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Like a reflection in glass, like shadows in the water, 
Like dreams of infants, like a smile upon an infant’s face, 
Like the dove’s voice, like transient day, like music in the air. 
(Blake, The Book of Thel. Section 1, stanza 2. Lines 12-15. NA: 737) 
 
(26b) O my luve’s like a red, red rose, 
 That’s newly sprung in June; 
O my luve’s like the melodie 
 That’s sweetly played in tune. 
(Burns, A Red Red Rose. Lines 1ff. NA: 759) 
It is not clear to me that there is any significant difference between conjunct or parallel 
comparisons in (26a) and (26b) and the disjunct examples in (25a-d). However, the more 
options are given by conjoining more vehicles, the weaker each individual comparison 
appears to be. My account offers an explanation for this: the broader the set of potential 
points of comparison becomes, the wider the range of weak effects which may be 
generated, and so the less likely that a determinate comparison-relevant content is 
communicated. 
One extreme case of this proliferation of comparisons is Stevie Wonder’s song As, the first 
verse of which is given here as (27): 
(27) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
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(Wonder, As. 1976. Album: Songs in the Key of Life. Universal.) 
The song contains at least eleven vehicles given for poetic comparisons, all of which share 
the same (postponed) tenor78. If points of comparison were crucial to the interpretation of 
poetic comparisons, then the repetition of vehicles adjoined to the same tenor ([I’ll be loving 
you] always) would be redundant, and would contribute to poetic effects only inasmuch as 
they involve repetition (epizeuxis) (see Chapter 2, §2.10 and example (22a) above). Yet the 
content of the vehicles is relevant to the weaker effects of these comparisons. I have one 
additional caveat. Each comparison, taken individually, strongly communicates that the 
speaker will love the addressee ‘always’. The songwriter merely gives examples of 
permanent phenomena. The poetic effects are not generated by virtue of the weakness of 
any individual comparison, as in the simple case of epizeuxis given in (22a) (My childhood 
days are gone, gone), but through encouraging the hearer to revisit contextual assumptions 
multiple times and over a longer period of time. In what sense this counts as ‘repetition’ 
remains to be seen. 
Although the examples in (24)-(27) do achieve weak effects, and ex hypothesi may involve ad 
hoc concept construction within the simile vehicle, are their characteristic effects 
determined by ad hoc concept construction? If they do involve a kind of ‘reformulation’ or 
‘hybridisation’, is this why they are poetic? Another type of poetic comparison, some of 
which have been partly addressed before in relation to the question of ‘extending’ and 
‘explaining’ poetic comparisons (see §5.4) involve additional linguistically-specified content 
communicated in addition to the vehicle, as a kind of apposed coda, such as (28a-c): 
(28a) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
  
  
                                                          
78 Whether these constitute poetic exemplifications, or poetic comparisons proper, is 
unclear. My account does not propose a strong distinction between the two phenomena in 
any case. 
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(Paulin, Now for the Orange Card. 1987: 10) 
 
(28b) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS  
 
(Plath, The Arrival of the Bee Box. Stanza 4. Lines 19f. Alvarez (Ed.), 1966: 68) 
 
(28c) Dust as we are, the immortal spirit grows 
Like harmony in music; there is a dark 
Inscrutable workmanship that reconciles 
Discordant elements, makes them cling together 
In one society. 
(Wordsworth, The Prelude. Lines 340-344. NA: 782) 
Examples (28a-c) do not appear to be explicable in terms of an account of apposition of 
elements which are close in meaning, producing a hybrid representation. If they do involve 
this type of reformulation, then the hybrid representations would appear to fall under the 
scope of the comparison: they are used as vehicles of the similes. It seems to me more likely 
that the ‘codas’, which can also involve devices deployed to generate of poetic effects (such 
as the use of an expressive ejaculation my god in (28b)), provide additional linguistically-
specified material which allows access to contextual assumptions which facilitate a 
reinterpretation of the initial comparison. Complex examples such as these recommend 
more focussed investigation of the use of poetic comparisons by individual authors and of 
those deployed in particular poems or oeuvres. But my account of simile understanding 
remains capable of explaining them. It seems that there are no genuinely ad hoc concept 
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vehicles, and, if there are, they do not significantly challenge the explanatory value of my 
hypothesis about how similes are understood. 
6.4 Simile failure 
Another type of data which are explained by my account are so-called ‘failed’ similes (see 
§4.8, especially example (36), repeated here as (29)): 
 (29) Black as the inside of a wolf’s throat. 
Pilkington claims that (29) is a failed simile (2000: 119f). But in §4.8 I argued that this 
example is comprehensible. What appears to have confused Pilkington is that the set of 
points of comparison for a simile such as (29) is very difficult to construct. But, on my 
account, poetic similes are characterised by indeterminacy of their comparison-relevant 
content. Once the optimally overall interpretation of (29) is reached, it is true that the set of 
points of comparison is indeterminate, and, hence, it is very unlikely for hearers/readers to 
be able to account for which properties are members of that set, even though the form of 
(29) (in particular the presence of the adjective black) indicates that properties associated 
with BLACKNESS are to be found within that set. My account entails that comparisons can 
always be used as poetic comparisons as long as that comparison can communicate relevant 
weak implicatures. When a non-poetic interpretation is not available, a poetic one will often 
be available. Therefore, I am justified in making the empirical claim that although there may 
be failed non-poetic comparisons in a given context (one where the relevant properties are 
not available to the hearer/reader), there are no failed poetic comparisons because the 
hearer/reader will continue to expend effort in interpreting a comparison even if a non-
poetic interpretation is not available. Moreover, this account explains why a type of linguistic 
expression which does not always communicate weak effects (certain forms of comparison) 
can be used poetically. 
6.5 Narrative intrusion 
One type of simile not explained by other accounts, but which can be accommodated here, 
involve what I call narrative intrusion79. In §5.4 I outlined how ‘additional’ linguistically-
                                                          
79 Lyne calls this phenomenon, where words appropriate to the vehicle appear in the 
narrative or the other way round, ‘trespass’ (e.g. 1998: 73ff, 92ff) , but he elsewhere 
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specified content can direct a hearer/reader’s search for relevance in simile understanding. 
Some (admittedly rare) examples of simile in poetry involve a poet elaborating upon the 
additional content in such a way that this content describes an independent narrative 
episode. In other words, what starts as an explanation or extension of a simile vehicle 
‘becomes’ a part of the narrative (see Gargani, 2009 ms: 50f for pre-theoretic discussion of a 
range of such examples). 
In examples (30a-d) alternative explanations are available. In (30a) one could argue that the 
use of dusty axis is metaphorical: 
(30a) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
(Hamburger, Instead of a Journey. Line 1. Alvarez (Ed.), 1966: 119) 
But this would miss the consistency between the simile and the (putative) metaphor. 
Similarly in (30b) the author is presented as both like a tree and being a tree: 
(30b) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
  
  
(R S Thomas, Here. Stanza 2. Lines 4-6. Alvarez (Ed.), 1966: 82) 
In (30c) a person’s face is compared to a lighthouse (a pharos) and the descriptions which 
follow appear to apply to either faces or rocky outcrops when literally interpreted, but could 
not do so at the same time: 
(30c) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
includes metaphors ‘foreshadowing’ the content of simile vehicles, the effects of which 
phenomenon I would attribute to the sharing of contextual assumptions (e.g. ib.: 41 n7). 
Example (31b) in particular is far more striking than any of the examples Lyne covers (Cf. also 
Hardie, 1986: 232). 
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(Walcott, Omeros 5.38.1. Lines 4-6. Walcott 1990: 193) 
Similarly in (30d) the description burrowed deeper into their holes applies literally only to the 
vehicle of the simile like moles, not to the tenor: 
(30d) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
  
  
(Walcott, Omeros 3.31.2. Lines 49-51. Walcott 1990: 164) 
Are these cases of metaphor-simile interaction (§6.3)? This is certainly possible. But it is not 
necessarily the most parsimonious explanation. Moreover, we get much clearer examples 
where the explanation of the simile involves the lexically-encoded sense of the words. In 
(31a) it is not true that hissing and heard are metaphorical: 
 (31a) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
(Walcott, Omeros 2.18.2. Line 1. Walcott 1990: 96) 
Should we simply say that (31a) is a lie? That cannot be the case, because (31a) achieves 
poetic effects just as a metaphor would. My claim is that it does not do so in the same way. 
The hearer/reader is not ‘forced’ to find a concept which would make the explicit 
assumption communicated by he heard it hissing consistent with the simile. Rather the 
description which the poet appends to the simile achieves relevance by encouraging the 
hearer/reader to entertain properties as part of the set of points of comparison (and 
contextual assumptions which can supply such properties) which he might not otherwise 
have entertained. He heard it hissing is not a metaphor. It is not a simile either. What the 
relevance theoretic account of style allows us to do is to identify certain expressions which 
can achieve poetic effects even though they cannot be easily classified as tropes. If these 
narrative intrusions could be classed as anything, they would probably count as non-
sequiturs. But they contribute to relevance in a particular way, which my account of simile 
understanding can encompass. 
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The most extreme such example I have found is (31b): 
(31b) EXAMPLE REDACTED FOR COPYRIGHT REASONS 
  
  
 
  
  
  
 
  
  
(Walcott, Omeros 2.14.2. Lines 25-31. Walcott 1990: 81) 
The description quickly stops being ‘about’ the moon at all, and the tenor becomes a part of 
the narrative in the next sentence. It is almost like a non-sequitur: a complete change of 
topic whose contribution to the relevance of the utterance as a whole is not explicitly 
signalled, nor is it immediately evident. But the narrative intrusion still ‘resonates’ with the 
simile in a particular way. But once the tenor ‘pops’ into the narrative, we are no longer 
dealing with an explicit comparison. Hence, example (31b) ceases to be a simile (if similes 
are comparisons) after the first line. But the detailed description of the behaviour of the 
hare in the narrative bequeaths a number of impressions to the moon, and vice versa. How 
can a poet expect something like (31b) to be comprehensible? Because the use of a 
comparison can achieve relevance by means of weak implicatures, and the poet can provide 
additional evidence as to how the comparison will be relevant. But the hearer’s/reader’s 
expectation of how a comparison will achieve relevance is so open that apparent non-
sequiturs like (31b) can affect the overall impression and hence contribute to relevance. 
Only certain poets (for example, Walcott) seem comfortable in deploying this kind of poetic 
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comparison. Such examples are certainly not common in English poetry. But they do exist, 
and so researchers into figurative language need to explain how they achieve their effects. 
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Conclusion 
The central question in this thesis has been how to explain the characteristic effects of 
poetic similes. These effects are, in relevance theoretic terms, poetic effects, and the 
question is one which can be approached from the perspective of a pragmatic approach to 
style: treating figurative utterances as utterances first, and reframing questions of figurative 
meaning in terms of why certain utterances achieve certain effects. However, this is not how 
the bulk of studies into figurative language have been conducted thus far. The competing 
approaches to the study of figurative language outlined in Chapter 3 cover a range of 
theoretical frameworks, which all share a certain assumption: similes are not worth 
investigating in their own right. Whether metaphors simply are similes, or metaphors and 
similes are understood via the same psychological processes of comparison or 
conceptualization, or metaphors and similes are equally irrelevant to the study of linguistic 
meaning, similes are of interest primarily for other reasons than accounting for the central 
question as it emerges in Chapters 3 and 4, and is spelled out in Chapter 5: why do certain 
comparisons achieve relevance by virtue of the poetic effects they communicate? 
Chapters 1-4 may have seemed like a rather circuitous route to a reformulation of the 
research question. However, as Chapter 3 in particular demonstrates, the current state of 
metaphor research is rather conflicted, both over the theoretical commitments of various 
approaches, and over which intuitions and experimental data are relevant. The most 
prominent subfield in figurative language studies is metaphor studies: in fact, one is more 
likely to find reference to the latter than the former in research departments, publications, 
funding applications and so on. But the status of simile, and how similes are understood, is 
part of that contested territory. My approach, which treats similes as a use of comparison, 
may seem to circumvent much of that debate. But, if I am right about how similes are 
understood, then this will have significant ramifications for how metaphor research ought to 
proceed, particularly in relation to the choice of relevant data and experimental stimuli. 
I gave are a number of more detailed consequences of my account for metaphor research, in 
particular my approach to metaphor-simile interaction which I put into practice in Chapter 6 
§6.3, as well as my proposals for how to tackle the emergent property metaphor problem in 
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§6.2, a problem which besets all the theoretical approaches to metaphor understanding 
explored in Chapter 3.  
The most important contributions to the literature made by this thesis are in Chapters 4-6. 
As well as bringing to the attention of the reader a range of data which pose a challenge to 
competing accounts of figurative language understanding, these chapters also propose an 
application of relevance theory which could easily be extended to a wide range of figurative 
language use. Most relevance theoretic research into figurative language has until now 
focussed primarily on issues pertinent to the semantics-pragmatics distinction. Although 
such research focusses on issues central to pragmatic theory, it does not get to the heart of 
what makes figurative language so interesting: that it communicates far more than the 
words used seem to warrant. My approach has been to apply the claims of relevance theory 
about how ostensive-inferential communication works to explain why any comparisons 
would communicate poetic effects. It makes no appeals to processes of conceptualization, 
perception or imagination which are not directly part of the process of mutual parallel 
adjustment which is motivated by the presumption of optimal relevance communicated. My 
account of simile understanding is a fully-inferential account. 
Although figurative language use clearly has something to do with mental creativity, in order 
to use the former to illuminate the latter we will have to explain how figurative language 
‘works’. If we do not have a theory of how figurative utterances are understood then using 
them as data in order to investigate mental creativity is a flawed approach. The temptation 
to do things the other way round is great, and even prominent relevance theorists have 
moved towards a rapprochement between relevance theory and processes of conceptual 
association (such as conceptual metaphors in Wilson, 2011) or have proposed that there is 
some kind of secondary process which is genuinely ‘creative’ which affects figurative 
language understanding (a ‘second mode’ of metaphor understanding. See e.g. Carston, 
2010a). My account of simile understanding demonstrates the strength of the early 
proposals in relevance theory for accounting for certain stylistic effects in terms of weak 
implicature (Sperber and Wilson, 1995). I have also proposed that generalising this approach 
to some of the data which Carston has used to advocate a second mode of metaphor 
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processing suggests that earlier relevance theoretic approaches to figurative language use 
were more robust than has been acknowledged. 
Moreover, the simplicity of my account provides a number of advantages, which are further 
supported by justifying my approach from first principles (Chapters 1 and 2), and by 
challenging widely-held, albeit largely tacit, assumptions in the field directly (Chapter 4). But 
the most important implication for the wider field is, as several of the theorists mentioned in 
Chapter 3 appear to have noticed, that if we have an account of how similes ‘get’ their 
figurative meaning, this might illuminate the rest of the phenomena that figurative language 
research is interested in. But, so I claim, this will only be true if the account of simile is itself 
sound: half a theory of simile will not suffice, nor will introducing notions of ‘metaphorical 
meaning’ into how similes are understood. Furthermore, there is a particular contextual 
implication of my thesis which I do intend to communicate, in part by virtue of the breadth 
of scope and content of this thesis: similes are not the ‘poor relation’ of metaphors and are 
worth studying in their own right (see also Bredin, 1998). Similes may provide further 
theoretical insights in figurative language studies and pragmatics, but also exhibit an 
astonishing range of ways in which they can evoke poetic effects. There is much more to be 
said about simile. 
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